ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - Both these petitions are connected and they arise out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter called the Act.). 2. The facts, in brief, are these. Rajendra Pratap Singh, who is the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2994 of 1978 was issued the notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act and he filed objections. These objections were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 31-1-1877 and a true copy of the same is Annex-are 2 to the petition. Thereafter, two appeals were filed, one by the said Rajendra Pratap Singh and the other by Smt, Sushila Devi, who is claimed to be the judicially separated wife of the said Rajendra Pratap Singh, Both the appeals were decided by one common judgment dated 23-12-1977, a true copy whereof is Annexure 3 to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment is also on the record, 3. Now in both these petitions, the two petitioners have sought to question the aforesaid order of the Prescribed Authority dated 31-1-1977 and the said judgment of the appellate court dated 23-12-1977, In support of the petitions, I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and in opposition, learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. 4. The following contentions were raised on behalf of the petitioners:- 1. Lands situated within the Town Areas of Kora and Malaka were illegally included in the holding of the tenure-holder Rajendra Pratap Singh, The Ceiling Law did not apply to such lands. 2. In the earlier ceiling proceedings Smt. Sushila Devi had been treated as a separate tenure-holder and in the subsequent ceiling proceedings her land was, therefore, not liable to be clubbed with he holding of her husband Rajendra Pratap Singh, 3. Smt. Sushila Devi was a judicially separated wife and, therefore, her lands were not liable to be clubbed with the holding of her husband Rajendra Pratap Singh, 4. Certain land was wrongly treated as irrigated under Section 4-A of the Act. 5. Certain transfers were wrongly ignored; they should have been accepted. 5. I shall deal with the said points in seriatim. Certain land was wrongly treated as irrigated under Section 4-A of the Act. 5. Certain transfers were wrongly ignored; they should have been accepted. 5. I shall deal with the said points in seriatim. POINT No. 1:- So far as this point is concerned, the relevant notification was not produced before the authorities below which would have shown that some land in dispute lay within the urban areas to which the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 extended. As lower Appellate Court has pointed out, the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 applies only to the areas which were on 7-7-1949 included in a Municipality or a Notified Area or a Cantonment or Town Area. As there is a presumption about the correctness of the official acts, therefore, it was for the petitioner to have produced the necessary notification which would have disclosed whether some of the plots included in the holding of the petitioner stood situated within the limits of a Town Area on 7-7-1949. No such notification was produced even during the hearing of the petition. Accordingly, the first point is rejected. POINT No. 2:- So far as this point is concerned, it should be seen that it is wholly immaterial that Smt. Sushila Devi, the wife of the petitioner, was treated as a separate tenure-holder in the earlier ceiling proceedings. It should be seen that the provisions contained in the Ceiling Act before its amendment by the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act 1972 (U. P. Act No. 18 of 1973) were radically different. There was no provision for the clubbing of the land held by the wife with the holding of her husband-tenure-holder. In view of the definition of the 'family' in Section 3 (7) and of the 'tenure-holder in Section 3 (17), it is clear that when the husband has been treated as the tenure-holder, the wife herself cannot be treated to be a tenure-holder. Further, Section 5 (3) provides for the clubbing of the land held by the members of the family of a tenure-holder with the holding of the tenure-holder. Further, Section 5 (3) provides for the clubbing of the land held by the members of the family of a tenure-holder with the holding of the tenure-holder. Reading all these provisions together, it is obvious that the land held by Smt. Sushila Devi as the member of the family of her husband tenure-holder was bound to be clubbed with the holding of her husband tenure-holder and she could not herself be treated as a tenure-holder in her own rights. Therefore, it is not at all material that in the earlier ceiling proceedings, which were held under the provisions of the Act as they stood before 8-6-1973, the wife had been treated as a separated tenure-holder. The said finding lost its relevance and effect in view of the change in the law brought about by the U. P. Act No. 18 of 1973. The constitutionality of the provisions of the Ceiling Act providing for the clubbing of the lands held by the members of the family with the holding of the tenure-holder concerned, was sought to be attacked on the ground of the infringement of fundamental rights, but such a challenge cannot be entertained in view of the fact that the Ceiling Act and its amending Acts were included in the 9th schedule of the Constitution. (See State v. Rajesh Pachauri. 1977 All WC 180: 1977 Rev Dec 160: ( AIR 1977 SC 915 )). Accordingly, this point is also rejected. POINT No. 3:- The appellate court rightly observed that Smt. Sushila Devi admittedly was not a judicially separated wife on 8-6-1973. The judgment dated 16-8-1975, on which reliance was placed to establish that Smt Sushila Devi was a judicially separated wife, could not be taken into consideration as the relevant date for determining the ceiling area and the surplus land of the tenure-holder is 8-6-1973 under the provisions of Section 5 (1) of the Act. Therefore, the subsequent events had to be disregarded. See the following cases:- 1. Uma Shanker v. State, (1978 All WC 381): (1978 All LJ 138). 2. Bhuneshwari Singh v. State, (1979 All LJ 274) 3. Shivnath Singh v. State, (1978 All WC 211): (1978 All LJ 212). 4. State v. District Judge (1964 All LJ 558): ( AIR 1964 All 451 ) (DB) 5. Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. State (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4403 of 1977 decided on 5-3-1979) (All) 6. 2. Bhuneshwari Singh v. State, (1979 All LJ 274) 3. Shivnath Singh v. State, (1978 All WC 211): (1978 All LJ 212). 4. State v. District Judge (1964 All LJ 558): ( AIR 1964 All 451 ) (DB) 5. Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. State (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4403 of 1977 decided on 5-3-1979) (All) 6. Bishambhar Singh v. State (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3080 of 1977 decided on 2-1-1979) (All) This point is accordingly rejected. POINT No. 4.:- So far as this point is concerned the appellate court refused to entertain it on the ground that this contention was not made the subject-matter of an issue before the Prescribed Authority and the said authority had no occasion to go into the said controversy. It was further laid down that only a vague objection in this regard had been taken in the objections filed by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority under Section 10 . (2) of the Act and no plot numbers were specified which the petitioner claimed to be un-irrigated. In the said state of affairs, the appellate court felt that if the tenure-holders were allowed to canvass the said controversy at the belated stage, then the State was bound to be prejudiced. In the said discretion exercised by the appellate court, I cannot interfere within the limited scone of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It should be seen that I am not exercising any appellate jurisdiction but my jurisdiction is strictly supervisory. (See Sayed Yokoob v. K. S. Radha-krishnan, ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ) and Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte, ( AIR 1975 SC 1297 ). POINT No. 5.:- Admittedly, the transfers were effected after 24-1-1971. Section 5 (6) of the Act clearly lays down that such transfers shall be ignored unless the tenure-holder succeeds in satisfying the Prescribed Authority that the transfers were made in good faith and for adequate consideration. In the instant case, neither the Prescribed Authority nor the appellate court was satisfied with the good faith of the transfer. It should be seen that clause (b) of the proviso speaks of the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority on the said points. In the instant case, neither the Prescribed Authority nor the appellate court was satisfied with the good faith of the transfer. It should be seen that clause (b) of the proviso speaks of the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority on the said points. In Ram Agyan Singh v. Murlidhar Agarwal, (1969 All LJ 1060), the Division Bench laid down as follows:- "There is also the important consideration that the benefit under the proviso is dependent on the satisfaction of the State Government, and I think it is well settled that where it is the satisfaction of a statutory Authority which affects the determination of a question, it is not open to the Court on a petition for certiorari to interfere with that determination unless the satisfaction of the statutory authority can be shown to be perverse or vitiated by mala fide". 6. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the satisfaction of the authorities below suffers from any perverseness or lack of bona fide. In Anurag Kumar v. IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, (1979 All LR (Summary) 123 at p. 108): (1979 All LJ 571), K. N. Goel, J. laid down as follows:- "Having regard to this history of legislation the obvious intent of the Legislature was that transfers made on or after the date of release of the election manifesto (24-1-1971) were normally to be presumed to be mala fide in the special sense of their being motivated by the desire of avoiding the impact of the expected legislation for lowering of ceilings. Conversely, it follows, such motivation should normally be presumed absent where steps for transfer had, beyond the realm of doubt, been taken or initiated before that date." Accordingly, this point is rejected. 7. Both the petitions fail and are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.