JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - This is a defendants second appeal against whom the lower appellate court passed a decree for ejectment from the house in question of which they were the tenants. The trial court had refused the decree for ejectment of the appellants. 2. The respondent, who was plaintiff in the suit, purchased the property on March 25, 1968. The appellants were tenants of the property from before that date. The case of the plaintiff, which was accepted by both the courts below, was that the appellants had knowledge of the transfer of the property in favour of the plaintiff from at or about the time of the transfer. The appellants, according to the plaintiff, defaulted in payment of rent and failed to pay the full amount within a month of the service upon them of a composite notice of demand and the one under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The period for which rent was demanded from the appellants was between March 25, 1968 and April 30, 1970. They tendered a sum of Rs. 249/-through two money orders in which they mentioned that they were tendering the amount of rent due till May-34, 1970. The amount so tendered was, however, refused by the plaintiff. The case that the plaintiff took in this regard in court was that it did not represent the amount due to her for the entire period between March 25, 1968 and May 31, 1970. 3. The trial court, as noticed above, did not pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the ejectment of the appellants from the premises in dispute. It took the view that in the circumstances of the case the appellants could not be said to have committed any default in the matter of payment of arrears. The plaintiff, however, succeeded in persuading the lower appellate court that the appellants did commit default in payment of the arrears as they did not tender the full amount due to the plaintiff for the period between March 25, 1968 and May 31, 1970, but tendered an amount which fell short of it. It is the decree for ejectment from the premises in suit that is being assailed by the defendants in the present second appeal. 4. It is the decree for ejectment from the premises in suit that is being assailed by the defendants in the present second appeal. 4. The premises in suit were admittedly governed by the provisions of Section 14 of the U. P. Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952 (Act No. X of 1952) at the relevant time. That provision, in so far as it is material, provided that: "14. Restrictions on eviction - No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord. (b )......................." 5. A perusal of the provision would reveal that eviction could be sought of a tenant who had "wilfully" failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within the stipulated period. The eviction of a tenant could not be sought on the ground merely of default by him in making payment of the arrears of rent to the landlord within a period of one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand by the landlord. 6. The word "wilfully" has received judicial interpretation and it is settled that it connotes the idea of a deliberate or intentional default on the part of the tenant in the matter of the tender and payment of an amount of rent in arrears when demanded of him by a landlord. If authority be needed, suffice would it be to refer to the decisions of this court in the cases of Hori Lal Varshney v. Amar Nath Sharma ((1951) All WR (HC) 294) and Radhey Mohan v. Har Narain Das ( AIR 1952 All 504 ): (1952 All LJ 152) in which the word "wilfully" as occurring in Section 3 of U.P. Act No. Ill of 1947 came up for interpretation. 7. The question whether the default committed by the appellant was wilful or not is not essentially one of fact as contended by the learned counsel for the; plaintiff-respondent but is a mixed question of fact and law. See Khivraj Chordia v. G. Maniklal Bhattad ( AIR 1966 Mad 67 ). 7. The question whether the default committed by the appellant was wilful or not is not essentially one of fact as contended by the learned counsel for the; plaintiff-respondent but is a mixed question of fact and law. See Khivraj Chordia v. G. Maniklal Bhattad ( AIR 1966 Mad 67 ). The facts found in the present case by the lower appellate court cannot be said to lead to an inference that the appellants committed default in tendering the entire amount of arrears due to the plaintiff for the period between March 25, 1968 and May 31, 1970 wilfully as understood in the sense aforesaid. 8. In fact a perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, where it deals with point No. 3 formulated by it, would show that no such intentional or deliberate action can be attributed to the appellants from which it can be held that they wilfully failed to tender the amount of arrears of rent. The lower appellate court has observed, that "it appears that the defendants wanted to send rent for 26 months which came to Rs. 494/- but the first money order was by mistake sent for Rs. 493/- only, therefore the sum of rupee one was immediately sent by another money order, Both were, however, tendered and refused on the same day. The plaintiff cannot claim any benefit from this fact because both money orders were tendered simultaneously. However, in the money order, Ex. A 6, the defendants mentioned that they were sending rent for 26 months up to 31-5-1970. This means that he sent the rent from 1-4-1968 to 31-5-1970. He did not send any rent from 25-3-1968 to 31-3-70. If the plaintiff would have accepted the money order, she would have been deemed to have accepted it as entire arrears of rent up to 31-5-1970 and then she would not have been able to claim the rent for 25-3-1 1968 to 31-3-1968. Since the tender by money order was not of the entire dues f she was entitled to refuse the same. The : defendant did not make a valid tender and is not protected by Section 14 of the Act. It will be noticed that in the notice of demand a sum of Rs. 475/- only s' was demanded as rent up to 24-4-1970. The amount sent by the defendant was . much more than this. The : defendant did not make a valid tender and is not protected by Section 14 of the Act. It will be noticed that in the notice of demand a sum of Rs. 475/- only s' was demanded as rent up to 24-4-1970. The amount sent by the defendant was . much more than this. But in view of the condition imposed by the defendant that the remittance was for rent up to 31-5-1970 the plaintiff could not have accepted the same. 9. It is clear that even on the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate court the element of wilful default on the part of the appellants cannot be said to be made out. 10. The absence of a finding that the appellants tenant wilfully failed to make payment to the plaintiff of the arrears of rent by the lower appellate court affects the jurisdiction of that court to pass a decree for the eviction of the appellants from the premises in suit. The provisions of Section 14 of the Act, extracted above, make it abundantly clear that unless the court comes to the conclusion that there has been a wilful default on the part of the tenant to make payment of the amount of arrears to the landlord, it would not be able to entertain a prayer for a decree for the eviction of the tenant from the premises in, suit. In the present case, as noticed earlier, there is no finding that the appellants wilfully committed default in tendering the amount of arrears of rent to the plaintiff. On this view of the matter, the decree for ejectment cannot be sustained. 11. The result of the discussion aforesaid is that the decree for the ejectment of the appellant from the premises in suit is liable to be set aside. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The decree for the ejectment of the appellants from the premises in suit is set aside. The plaintiffs suit to that extent shall stand dismissed. In the circumstances, however, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.