Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a retail merchant and the occupant of building No. XIX/307 I within the Municipal limits of Shertallai. The petitioner received on 22-11-1977 Ext. P1 notice dated 21-11-1977. H reads: No. J. 4327 (A)/1977. Municipal Office, Shertallai, Date: 21-11-1977. NOTICE A copy of the provisional order under S.247 (1) of the Kerala Municipalities Act is enclosed herewith. You are required to show cause, if any, within three (3) days of the receipt of this notice why the provisional order should not be confirmed (Sd.) Municipal Commissioner. To V. M. Kuriyakkose, Punnakkal Veedu, SMC XIX/307. PROVISIONAL ORDER UNDER S.247(1) OF THE KERALA MUNICIPALITIES ACT Whereas I am satisfied that Sri V. M. Kuriyakose, Punnakkal Veedu, has constructed a building of Shertallai Municipality without obtaining the requisite permission as contemplated under S.230 of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960 I hereby require Shri V. M. Kuriakose to demolish the said construction within 24 hours of the receipt of this order and report compliance. (Sd.) Municipal Commissioner Copy to the Health Inspector." This notice was issued under S.247 (1) of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960 ('the Act'). The effect of this notice is that the petitioner was given three days' time from the date of receipt to show cause why the provisional notice issued under S.247 should dot be confirmed. Accordingly the petitioner had in terms of Ext. P1 time till the evening of 25-11-1977 to show cause; and, the 2nd respondent was incompetent to confirm the provisional notice until the expiry of the said three days. Within the three days, viz., on 24-11-1977, the petitioner showed cause and Ext. R3 is his explanation, the relevant portion of which I shall extract: Admittedly Ext. R3 explanation of the petitioner was personally handed over by him to the 2nd respondent on 24-11-1977. It was then that he was given Ext. P3 which is dated 23-11-1977 reading as follows: No. J. 4327/ (A)/ 77. (SEALED) Municipal Office, Shertallai 23111977 NOTICE UNDER SEC. 247 (3) OF KERALA MUNICIPALITIES ACT A provisional order No. J. 4327 (A) dated 21-11-1977 under S.247(1) was served to Sri. V. M. Kuriakose, Punnakkal Veedu (building No. XIX/307) on 22-11-1977. In the above order it was directed to demolish the unauthorised construction. But Sri. Kuriyakose has neither complied with the lawful direction nor offered any explanation. Hence the provisional orders already issued is hereby confirmed. Sri. V. M. Kuriakose, Punnakkal Veedu (building No. XIX/307) on 22-11-1977. In the above order it was directed to demolish the unauthorised construction. But Sri. Kuriyakose has neither complied with the lawful direction nor offered any explanation. Hence the provisional orders already issued is hereby confirmed. Sri. Kuriyakose is therefore required to demolish the unauthosised construction specified in the order dated 21-11-1977 within three (3) days of the receipt of this Notice failing which steps will be taken from this office to demolish the above structure at the risk and cost of Shri Kuriyakose. (Sd) Manager in Charge of Commissioner. To Shri. V. M, Kuriyakose, Punnakkal Veedu, XIX/307' 2. Ext. P3 is challenged by the petitioner on various grounds. It is contended that it was a malafide order; it was prematurely made and issued; it was violative of natural justice; and, it contravened S.246 (2) and 247 of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960 (Act 14 of 1961). 3. The petitioner states that on 28-11-1977 his building was broken open by the Municipal authorities in his absence and they demolished the additional structure made by him. The petitioner's counsel, Shri. Ibrahimkutty submits that it was clearly stated in Ext. R3 that all that the petitioner had done was to enclose a verandah, and that neither the position nor the dimension of the building or any room therein had been thereby altered. The proviso to S.246(1) clearly states: "works of necessary repair which do not affect the position or dimension of a building or any room therein shall not be deemed an alteration or addition for the purpose of this section." Sub-section (2) of that section provides: "If any question arises as to whether any addition or alteration is a necessary repair not affecting the position or dimension of a building or room, such question shall be referred to the council whose decision shall be final." Relying upon these provisions, counsel says that the 2nd respondent was not entitled to have the structure pulled down without complying with the requirements of sub-section (2) which says that any dispute as regards the question mentioned in the proviso to sub-section 246(1) has to be referred to the Council. By not doing this, counsel submits, the 2nd respondent has overstepped his limits and usurped the power of the Council, 4. On the face of it there is considerable force in this submission. By not doing this, counsel submits, the 2nd respondent has overstepped his limits and usurped the power of the Council, 4. On the face of it there is considerable force in this submission. Apart from this, the manner in which Ext. P1 was issued, and confirmed by Ext. P3, followed by demolition by breaking open the house in the absence of the petitioner, unfortunately smacks of arbitrariness. 5. Ext. P1 notice gave the petitioner three days' time to submit his explanation as to why the provisional order made under S 247(1) should not be confirmed. The provisional order, if confirmed, was meant to require the petitioner to demolish the structure within 24 hours. The time element in the notice as well as in the provisional order is extremely significant, and indicative of a flagrant desire to flout the cardinal principles of natural justice. S.247 speaks of reasonable time. By no stretch of imagination can three days be regarded as reasonable in matters of this kind. Whenever public officers invested with authority propose to act in abridgment of civil rights, they must, unless stated to the contrary in the statute under which they act, give persons likely to be affected by such acts, reasonable notice of the same. The concept of "reasonable" is relative. It is a question of degree, dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. What may be reasonable in one may not be so in another Rules of natural justice vary from case to case There may arise exceptional circumstances calling for immediate action to save life and property, such as in the case of a building which is in imminent danger of falling, or catching fire, and the like. Calamities and catastrophes, such as war, earthquake, epidemics and the like, may also call for instantaneous action. In such cases, subject to statutory requirements, it may be permissible for the authorities to act on very short notice two days or even one day may not be unreasonable, dependent on the circumstances or even to dispense with notice altogether. There are innumerable cases of less urgency where there is no immediate danger to life and property, but where quick action is required in public interest, such as. for example, steps to abate public nuisance In such cases a week's notice may not be unreasonable. There are innumerable cases of less urgency where there is no immediate danger to life and property, but where quick action is required in public interest, such as. for example, steps to abate public nuisance In such cases a week's notice may not be unreasonable. In other cases of public need no less important, but comparatively less urgent, as where the demolition of buildings is ordered to widen public roads or canals, or to construct water tanks, hospitals and the like, anything less than 10 days, subject to statute, may be unreasonable. Even in such cases, two weeks would indeed be fairer and more reasonable. In ordinary circumstances, however, notice shorter than two weeks is, in my view, unreasonable. 6. The object of the notice is to alert the party as to his obligations in law and the consequences of his failure to carry them out, or as to the proposed action by the authorities and the source of power to initiate such action; so that the person concerned will have reasonably sufficient time to comply with the demand or to protest against it and vindicate his rights. He is entitled to reasonable time either to do what he is asked to do, or to consult his lawyer to take steps to defend himself. Anything less than two weeks, 1 should think, is, in ordinary circumstances, unreasonably short. Except in cases like those I mentioned earlier, where public interest demands immediate action, or where the statute provides for a different period, principles of natural justice require notice of minimum two weeks. In the present case, I do not see what urgency there was to prompt the 2nd respondent to allow the petitioner as short a time as 3 days. The provisional order calling upon the petitioner, in the event of it being confirmed, to demolish the construction within 24 hours of the receipt of the same was, in the circumstances of this case, extremely arbitrary. 7. The matter does not however end there. Even three days' time was not given to the petitioner to comply with Ext. P1. Ext. P3 dated 23-11-1977 was made one day after Ext. P1 notice was served on the petitioner. Ext. P3 is a notice under S.247 (3) of the Act. 7. The matter does not however end there. Even three days' time was not given to the petitioner to comply with Ext. P1. Ext. P3 dated 23-11-1977 was made one day after Ext. P1 notice was served on the petitioner. Ext. P3 is a notice under S.247 (3) of the Act. The sub-section reads: "If the owner fails to show cause to the satisfaction of the commissioner, the commissioner may confirm the order with any modification he may think fit to make, and such order shall then be binding on the owner and on the failure of the owner to comply with the order, the commissioner may himself cause the building or part thereof, as the case may be, to be demolished and the expenses of such demolition shall be recoverable from the owner." This sub-section postulates confirmation of the provisional order upon the failure of the owner of the building to show cause to the satisfaction of the Commissioner. In other words, the Commissioner is entitled to confirm a provisional order, which in this case is Ext. P1, only upon the failure of the owner to show cause. The failure of the petitioner to show cause could not have arisen until the time granted to him under Ext. P1 for that purpose viz., three days from the date of receipt of the same, had expired. That time had not expired when Ext. P3 was made or served on the petitioner. As I stated earlier Ext P3 was made on 23111977 and was admitted by served on the petitioner on 24111977 which was a day prior to the expiry of the time mentioned under Ext. P1. For this reason alone Ext. P3 was incompetently made and served and is therefore invalid. 8. The second paragraph of Ext. P3 reveals the callousness with which it was issued and the indifference to facts. It says that the petitioner "neither complied with the lawful direction nor offered any explanation". This is totally untrue, and I am surprised that such a statement should have been made by a statutory authority. The petitioner, as I have already observed, had time to comply with the direction contained in Ext. P1 till the evening of 25 11 1977. But on the 24th nay, the 23rd when Ext. This is totally untrue, and I am surprised that such a statement should have been made by a statutory authority. The petitioner, as I have already observed, had time to comply with the direction contained in Ext. P1 till the evening of 25 11 1977. But on the 24th nay, the 23rd when Ext. P3 was made the petitioner was accused by the 2nd respondent of haying failed to comply with the direction It was on the basis of that incorrect premises that Ext. P3 was made. The petitioner in the last paragraph of the order was given three days' time to demolish the structure The time given was most unreasonable. The manner in which Ext. P3, which on the face of it was invalid, was enforced in the absence of the petitioner by breaking open the building and removing the goods which it contained, does not, to say the least, speak well of the authorities. 9. The harm has been done. The building has been demolished. The evidence has disappeared. The complaint of the petitioner has become therefore irremediable in the present proceedings except that Ext. P3 is liable to be quashed. I quash Ext. P3 The O.P. is allowed to that extent. The petitioner is entitled to his costs in the present proceedings from the 2nd respondent. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.