ORDER A. N. Varma, J. - This is a landlord's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is directed against an order passed by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge dated 23-12-1976. The learned District Judge by the aforesaid order allowed the appeal of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. the tenants of the accommodation in dispute, and dismissed the application of the petitioner under section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 2. The petitioner is the owner and landlord of the accommodation which is a shop situate at Nakkhas Kohna, Allahabad, of which respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are the tenants. The petitioner filed an application under section 21(1)(a) of the aforesaid Act for the eviction of the said tenants in November 1974 on the ground that the petitioner was unemployed and that he had no other shop in which he could start some business for earning a livelihood. 3. The application was resisted by the tenants on the ground that the application of the petitioner was mala fide and he did not bona fide require the shop in dispute for doing business. The allegations upon which the application of the landlord were made, were denied in the written statement as well as in the affidavit which was filed on behalf of the tenants. 4. By the order dated 25-2-1976, the Prescribed Authority allowed the petitioner's application. The tenants thereupon filed an appeal which was dismissed by the order dated 12-4-76. Thereafter, the tenants. filed a writ petition in this Court which too was dismissed in limine by an order dated 13-5-76. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the tenants went up in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the tenants on the short ground that the provisions of section 21 of the aforesaid U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 had been amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976, as a result of which the authorities were enjoined to compare the hardship likely to be caused to the tenant from the grant of the application with the hardship that might be suffered by the landlord by its rejection. These provisions having been added to section 21 of the Act retrospectively, the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, the learned District Judge as well as this Court were held by the Supreme Court to have become erroneous in law inasmuch as none of these Courts had compared the hardship likely to be caused to the tenants from the grant of the application. The Supreme Court, however, instead of quashing all the three orders decided to send back the case to the learned District Judge for disposing of the appeal filed by the tenant after taking into account the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant as required by the amended section 21 of the Act in the light of the various factors set out in Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act. 6. When the matter went back to the learned District Judge upon remand, the learned District Judge allowed the appeal by an order which is subject of challenge in this writ petition. In allowing the appeal, the learned District Judge recorded two findings :- 1. That the landlord did not bona fide require the shop in dispute ; 2. Upon a comparison of hardship likely to be caused to the two parties, it is the tenant who would suffer more than the landlord. 7. When this petition came up for hearing on the last occasion, learned counsel for the petitioner sought leave of this Court to move the Supreme Court for clarification of its order dated 20-9-1976. It was urged before me on the last date that the Supreme Court had not left the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord open. Counsel had submitted that the only question which had been left open by the Supreme Court to be determined by the learned District Judge was the one relating to comparative hardship. The petitioner thereafter appears to have moved an application before the Supreme Court for clarification of its order dated 20-9-1976. The Supreme Court after hearing counsel for the parties, passed the following order :- "After bearing parties, we are of the view that it is for the High Court to decide whether the Additional District Judge has gone beyond the specific direction given by this Court while disposing of the appeal and remanding the case on 20-9-1976. The High Court will, therefore, dispose of the matter accordingly." 8. The High Court will, therefore, dispose of the matter accordingly." 8. Today, when the petition was taken up for hearing, the first submission which the learned counsel for the petitioner made was that it was not open to the learned District Judge to decide afresh the question whether the landlord bona fide required the shop in dispute. It was urged that it must be taken that the finding which the learned District Judge on the previous occasion gave, holding that the need of the landlord was genuine, was affirmed by the Supreme Court by necessary implication inasmuch as the Supreme Court had only directed comparison of respective hardship and nothing else. I do not agree. The Supreme Court had by its order dated 20-9-1976 quashed the entire order passed by the first appellate court on the previous occasion. The entire order having been quashed the findings upon which the order was passed must be deemed to have been set aside, the said finding not having been specifically affirmed by the Supreme Court. There is nothing in the order passed by the Supreme Court which might suggest that the Supreme Court had by necessary implication affirmed the finding given by the appellate court on the question of bona fide requirements of the landlord. I, therefore, find no substance in the first point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner next assailed the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord on merits. It was urged that the trial court had found that the petitioner had no place to carry on the business. Learned counsel also contended that the learned District Judge fell into a manifest error of law in drawing an adverse inference from the fact that the petitioner had prior to the moving of the present application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 been pursuing a suit for ejectment of the tenants on the ground of default, which suit was disposed of in 1974. Counsel submitted that the fact that the petitioner was pursuing his remedy by way of a suit was a point in favour of the petitioner and not against him. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no substance in the above argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Counsel submitted that the fact that the petitioner was pursuing his remedy by way of a suit was a point in favour of the petitioner and not against him. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no substance in the above argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The question whether the petitioner bona fide required the shop in dispute is essentially a question of fact. The finding given therein cannot be disturbed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India except on the ground that it is vitiated by some error of law, or that it is arbitrary or is otherwise unsustainable in law. In my opinion none of these grounds exists in the present case. 11. The learned District Judge in the present case has found against the petitioner on various facts and circumstances which to my mind are relevant. The factor which has weighed most with the learned District Judge is that the petitioner has let out a shop belonging to him to his own step brother according to the petitioner in the year 1972, and according to the tenants in the year 1976. The learned District Judge has observed that the petitioner came to the court on the plea that he had separated from his step brother in the year 1968, and that the said step brother had served a notice asking the petitioner to vacate the shop which was in petitioner's occupation at that time. This notice is said to have been served in 19o9. The learned District Judge has observed that if the petitioner's need had really been genuine and pressing, one would not have expected him to let out the shops to his step brother. The circumstance that the petitioner had available with him a shop which he not only did not occupy himself but let it out to his step brother, was rightly emphasised by the learned District Judge as militating against the plea of the petitioner that he was suffering great hardship on account of non-availability of a shop as well as on account of the fact that his step brother had served a notice upon him in the year 1969. The learned District Judge has also taken note of the fact that even though the petitioner's brother had served a notice, according to the petitioner's allegation, on the petitioner as far back as in 1969, he did not move an application under section 21 of the U.P. Act No. X1II of 1972 until November 1974. In my judgment, the learned District Judge was justified in drawing adverse inference against the petitioner from his omission to take immediate steps after his brother had served a notice on him as far back as 1969. The learned District Judge was, therefore, justified and had material before him for holding that the petitioner does not appear to be needing the shop in dispute bona fide. 12. In any case even if this Court were inclined to take a different view of the evidence, that would not be a sufficient ground for interfering with the orders passed by the courts below. 13. Another circumstance which the learned District Judge has taken into account is the complete absence of any particulars as to the business which the petitioner intended to start in the shop in dispute. Counsel placed reliance on two decisions of this Court to the effect that mere absence of particulars of the business proposed to be started by the landlord is not sufficient for a finding that he does not bona fide require the shop in dispute. That may be so. However, in the present case, even in evidence, the petitioner did not care to bring out what business he proposed to start in the shop in dispute. The court below was, therefore, justified in holding against the petitioner on the ground of absence of such particulars. 14. As regards the contention that the petitioner is unemployed and that that fact is sufficient to entitle the petitioner to an order in his favour, I find that on a totality of circumstances, the court below has rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner does not bona fide require the shop in dispute. Whether the petitioner really required the shop in dispute for starting a business depended on a variety of circumstances. On the basis of these circumstances, the learned District Judge does not believe the petitioner's case that he has any genuine difficulty about accommodation or that be does bona fide intend to start some business. 15. Whether the petitioner really required the shop in dispute for starting a business depended on a variety of circumstances. On the basis of these circumstances, the learned District Judge does not believe the petitioner's case that he has any genuine difficulty about accommodation or that be does bona fide intend to start some business. 15. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision reported in the case of Ram Lal Obroy v. District Judge, Jhansi and others, 1977 All. R.C. 203, in which a learned Judge of this Court has observed that the fact that the landlord was pursuing a remedy by way of a suit for eviction against the tenant on the ground that be was in arrears of rent instead of filing an application straightaway under section 21, did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the landlord did not bona fide require the accommodation in dispute. 16. The case is distinguishable. In that case, the application under section 21 of the Act had been moved immediately after the withdrawal of the suit without the loss of any time. In the present case, the delay of which the petitioner is accused, was not only in prosecuting the suit for eviction but even prior thereto. The petitioner had not taken steps towards getting possession of the shop immediately, after the notice was served on him by his brother in 1969. For nearly two years, the petitioner did not take any steps. The suit for eviction on the ground of default was filed only in the year 1971. Under these circumstances, the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not of much assistance to him. 17. For the reasons stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.