ORDER K. P. Singh, J. - These two writ petitions have been directed against the judgment of Vth Additional District Judge, Kanpur dated 10th March, 1979 whereby the rent appeals filed by the landlords and the tenant were decided. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the above noted writ petitions are that Smt. Dukhia Hazzin was the landlady of the disputed accommodation No. 95/32-B, Pech Bagh, Kanpur. She filed an application under section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent, and Eviction) Act, 1972 for the release of the aforesaid accommodation as she needed the first floor for residential purposes and the ground floor for business purposes. During the pendency of the application she died and her heirs and legal representatives have also put forward their claim for the release of the aforesaid accommodation. 3. The tenant had contested the application of the landlords on the allegations that there was no bonafide and genuine need, and that the tenant is a firm carrying on business for the last more than 80 years in the aforesaid accommodation and the partners also using a portion of the accommodation for residential purposes and that the landlady had also filed an application earlier, but she had failed, hence the application in question was a mala fide application and that all the landlords were not impleaded, hence the application was defective. The Prescribed Authority through its order dated 4-5-1978 partly allowed the application of the landlords for the release of the first floor of the accommodation, but rejected their claim for the ground floor. Aggrieved by the Judgment of the Prescribed Authority the tenant and the landlords both went in appeals and the appellate court through its judgment dated 20th March, 1979 confirmed the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. Aggrieved by the Judgment of the appellate court both the tenant and the landlords have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution through the above mentioned writ petitions. 4. Writ petition No. 2810 of 1979 is on behalf of the tenant whereas writ petition No. 5860 of 1979 is on behalf of the landlords. It has been contended on behalf of the landlords in their writ petition that the subordinate authorities have patently erred in comparing the needs of the parties in the present case. 4. Writ petition No. 2810 of 1979 is on behalf of the tenant whereas writ petition No. 5860 of 1979 is on behalf of the landlords. It has been contended on behalf of the landlords in their writ petition that the subordinate authorities have patently erred in comparing the needs of the parties in the present case. According to the learned counsel for the landlords the need of the members of the families of landlords, on the findings recorded by the subordinate authorities, are such that the whole accommodation should have been released in favour of the landlords. It has been emphasised before ire that petitioner No. 3 Ghulam Nadir is an Advocate and has only one big and one small room in his occupation and he has seven members in his family, hence his need for the office in the ground floor was a genuine need which has not at all been taken into account by the subordinate authorities. It has also been emphasised that the appellate Court has arbitrarily and perversely observed that the difficulties of petitioner No. 3 would be greatly mitigated from the released accommodation on the first floor without addressing himself to the number of the members of his family and their needs, and the accommodation in possession of petitioner No. 3. 5. The learned counsel for the tenant in reply has submitted that the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate authorities should not be interfered with by this Court in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties the subordinate authorities have weighed the needs of the landlords and have arrived at the correct conclusions. 6. In the writ petition filed on behalf of the tenant it has been contended that the subordinate authorities have patently erred in comparing the needs of the parties and they have been swayed by the circumstance that the tenant was a co-sharer, in premises Nos. 95/33 and 98/149, but they did not consider a material fact that those accommodation were not vacant and the tenant could not easily shift to those accommodations. 7. 95/33 and 98/149, but they did not consider a material fact that those accommodation were not vacant and the tenant could not easily shift to those accommodations. 7. In reply the learned counsel for the landlords submitted that the subordinate authorities have compared the needs of the parties and they have rightly come to the conclusion that the need of the landlords was greater and less hardship would occur to the tenant if the residential portion was released in favour of the landlords. According to him the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate authorities need not be interfered with by this Court in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the impugned judgment. In my opinion the needs of the landlords are genuine and bona fide. For the grant of the application under section 21 of the U.P. U. ban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 the subordinate authorities should be satisfied with the bona fide need of the landlords and they should also take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. In the present case both the parties contend that the subordinate authorities have not compared the needs of the parties from correct angle. 9. To me it also appears that the appellate court has failed to consider the needs of the landlords in the light of the number of the members of their families and their needs as to whether they deserve the release of the whole accommodation or nit. The appellate court has not indicated that petitioner No. 3 Ghulam Nadir in writ petition No. 5760 of 1979 really needed the ground floor for his office and how his need would stand mitigated in the circumstances of the present case merely by release of the residential portion of the house. The appellate court has failed to give a reasoned order on this aspect of the matter, hence its judgment deserves to be quashed and the writ petition of the landlords should be allowed. 10. The appellate court has failed to give a reasoned order on this aspect of the matter, hence its judgment deserves to be quashed and the writ petition of the landlords should be allowed. 10. As regards the contention raised on behalf of the tenant in his writ petition, it is proper to quote the following findings recorded by the appellate court :- "......The opposite party admittedly own two houses Nos. 95/53 and 98/149, simply because a partition suit is going on as between the co-owners of these two houses, it could not be concluded that Mohammad Yusuf and Mohammad Siddiqui who are partners of the opposite party firm could not arrange to live in it." Similarly the Prescribed Authority has also observed as below :- "........It is admitted that the O.Ps. own other accommodation including premises No. 95/33 and 98/149 in which there is residential accommodation. The contention of the O.P.c, was that litigation is pending, but in my opinion no advantage of this alleged litigation should be given to the O Ps. the suit is admittedly for partition and is between the co-sharers. The possession of the co-sharers is admitted. The O.P. has in his family much less number in comparison to landlord's family and in case the O P. is evicted from the residential portion in my opinion O.P. would suffer very little inconvenience and trouble. O P. has alternate accommodation in which it can manage the accommodation if comparison between the needs and requirements of both the parties is made. I am of the opinion that needs of the applicants for additional residential accommodation is genuine and pressing. The landlord will suffer greater hardship and inconvenience in my opinion in the present case is in favour of the applicant landlords. I find that their need for additional residential accommodation is genuine and bona fide." 11. In comparing the needs of the parties it appears that the subordinate authorities have considered this circumstance that the tenant was a co-sharer in the premises Nos. 95/33 and 981149, but they have failed to consider an important aspect as to whether the aforesaid accommodations could be taken possession of by the tenant in the near future, hence the need of the tenant' should have been properly weighed by the subordinate authorities. 95/33 and 981149, but they have failed to consider an important aspect as to whether the aforesaid accommodations could be taken possession of by the tenant in the near future, hence the need of the tenant' should have been properly weighed by the subordinate authorities. Since the judgment of the appellate court is going to be quashed at the instance of the landlords, I think it proper to permit the tenant also to place his grievances before the appellate court. 12. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party had emphasised that the findings recorded by the subordinate authorities in respect of the released portion should be made final by this Court, but in the circumstances of the present case, I think it proper to grant an opportunity to the tenant also to convince the last court of fact about hardship on the ground that premises No. 95/33 and 48/149 are not available for use, hence the tenant may suffer hardship, which may be greater than that of the landlords. However, I do not express any opinion on the question of hardship likely to occur to the parties in vise the application is granted or refused, but I have a feeling that the needs of the landlords in the circumstances of the present case are genuine and bona fide. Since the comparison of the needs of the parties is the function of the subordinate authorities and it is an essential question to be determined before an application under section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, is granted or refused. I think it proper to ask the appellate court to re-examine the hardship of the parties in the light of their pleadings and evidence on record. 13. In the result both the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned judgment of the appellate court is hereby quashed and the appellate court is directed to re-examine the hardships to the parties in the light of their pleadings and evidence on record. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.