JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - The quashing of the order of termination of service passed against the opposite party No. 1 by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, Opposite Party No. 2, has given rise to the present writ petition. Before we take up the grounds of challenge raised by the petitioners against the order of the Tribunal, a few facts may be stated. 2. By order dated 5-3-64, Opposite No. 1 was appointed Marketing Inspector in a temporary capacity. On 23-2-1973 the State Government ordered the promotion of opposite party No. 1 to the post of Senior Marketing Inspector. This order was communicated to opposite party No. 1 by the Regional Food Controller, petitioner No. 2. By order dated 21-6-1974 the services of opposite party No. 1 from the post of Senior Marketing Inspector were terminated. Against this order of termination of service opposite party No. 1 preferred representation to the State Government which was rejected. Opposite party No. 1 thereafter preferred a review application which too was rejected. Thereafter he filed writ petition in this court which was admitted on 28-4-1975. Thereafter opposite party No. 1 withdrew the writ petition and preferred claim petition before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal on 25-4-1977. Before the Public Services Tribunal opposite party No. 1 challenged the order of termination of Services on these grounds; (1) Neither one months notice had been given to him nor one months salary had been paid which he was entitled to under the relevant rules. (2) The order was highly discriminatory as persons junior to him were still working. (3) He was holding the post of Marketing Inspector in a substantive capacity and, therefore, even if his services were not required on the post of Senior Marketing Inspector, he could only be reverted to the post of Marketing Inspector and his services could not be terminated. The claim petition of opposite party No. 1 was resisted lay the petitioners on these grounds; (1) Failure to give one months notice or one months salary in lieu of notice did not invalidate the termination of service. At the most opposite party No. 1 was entitled to one months salary which was remitted to him on 1-5-1975 but he refused to accept the same. (2) Opposite party No. 1s work and conduct was not found satisfactory and, therefore, the order of termination was not discriminatory or arbitrary. At the most opposite party No. 1 was entitled to one months salary which was remitted to him on 1-5-1975 but he refused to accept the same. (2) Opposite party No. 1s work and conduct was not found satisfactory and, therefore, the order of termination was not discriminatory or arbitrary. (3) The claimant was temporary on the post of Senior Marketing Inspector as I also on the Lower Post of Marketing Inspector and, therefore, he did not have any lien on either post; as I such, it was not necessary to revert opposite party No. 1 to the post of Marketing Inspector. 3. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Special Appeal No. 119 of 1971' Ram Prasad Chaudhari v. State of U. P. decided on 24-8-1973 the Tribunal held that the termination of service of opposite party No. 1 was invalid because neither one months notice was given to him nor one months salary was paid. The Tribunal found that the remittance of salary on 1-5-75 after opposite party No. 1 had already filed writ petition in this court did not have the effect of validating the termination notice. On this basis also the Tribunal allowed the claim petition of opposite party no. 1 and quashed the order of termination of services. In respect of opposite party No. 1s plea that the order of termination was discriminatory; the Tribunal observed that there were adverse entries against opposite party no. 1 and there were also complaints against him and his employer had found that his work and conduct was not satisfactory. The Tribunal was, therefore, of the opinion that the order of termination was neither discriminatory nor arbitrary. The Tribunal did not go into the question as to whether opposite party no. 1 had lien on the post of Marketing Inspector or not. 4. The above order of Tribunal has been challenged by the State of U.P. and the Regional Food Controller through this petition. Sri Umesh Chandra, learned Chief Standing Counsel, urged that the order of Tribunal was based on non-existent rules and was, therefore, bad in law. Learned counsel urged that the validity of the termination order was to be judged with reference to the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 1975 Rules or Rules of 1975) and not with reference to the Appointment (B) Department notification no. Learned counsel urged that the validity of the termination order was to be judged with reference to the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 1975 Rules or Rules of 1975) and not with reference to the Appointment (B) Department notification no. 230/11-1953, dated January 30, 1953 which was interpreted by this Court in Ram Prasad Chaudharis case (supra). According to the learned counsel the notification had been rescinded under R. 5 (1) of the 1975 Rules with effect from the date it was issued, viz. 30-1-1953, and therefore the dictum laid down by this Court in Chaudharis case (supra) could not be utilised for judging the validity of the impugned order of termination of service. R. 5 of 1975 Rules provide as follows;- "5. (1) The rule promulgated with Appointment (B) Department notification no. 230/II-B-1953, dated January 30, 1953 shall stand resined and with effect from the same date. (2) Notwithstanding such rescission, anything done or any action taken or purporting to be done or taken under the said rule shall be deemed to have been done or taken under these rules." 5. From the above it is obvious that the notification which came up for interpretation before this Court in Chaudharis case (supra) was rescinded retrospectively with effect from the date on which it was issued viz. January 30, 1953. In view of the provision made in sub-rule (2) above the action taken under the rescinded notification is to be deemed to have been taken under the Rules of 1975. In view of this position the validity of the order of termination of service passed against opposite party no. 1 has to be impugned with reference to the provisions of the Rules of 1975. 6. Rule 3 of Rules of 1975 provides for termination of the services of Government servant employed in temporary capacity. Sub-rule (2) of R. 1 specifically provides that Rule 3 read with Rr. 2 and 4, shall be deemed to have come into force on Jan. 30, 1953. 6. Rule 3 of Rules of 1975 provides for termination of the services of Government servant employed in temporary capacity. Sub-rule (2) of R. 1 specifically provides that Rule 3 read with Rr. 2 and 4, shall be deemed to have come into force on Jan. 30, 1953. The said rule reads as follows :- "3 (1) - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any existing rules or orders on the subject, the services of a Government servant in temporary service shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority, or by the Appointing authority to the Government servant. (2) The period of notice shall be one month: provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith, and on such termination the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowance, if any, for the period of the notice or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services................. 7. Under sub-rules (1) and (2) of R. 3 the appointing authority can terminate the services of a Government servant by giving him one months notice. The proviso reproduced above provides two| things. Firstly, it authorises the appointing authority not to give one months notice and terminate the services forthwith. Secondly, it provides the consequence of not giving one months notice. The consequence provided is that the Government servant concerned can claim salary and allowances, if any payable, for one month or for such period as falls short of one month. This is all that the concerned Government servant in entitled to. In view of this provision the order of termination itself is not invalidated if neither one months notice is given to the Government servant concerned nor one months salary is paid in lieu of notice. The 1975 Rules were not brought to the notice of the Tribunal and the Tribunal decided the case on the basis of 1953 notification which was not in existence on the date the Tribunal made its order. The order of the Tribunal is, therefore, obviously erroneous. It is, therefore, held that the order of termination of service passed against opposite party no. The order of the Tribunal is, therefore, obviously erroneous. It is, therefore, held that the order of termination of service passed against opposite party no. 1 is not vitiated on account of failure on the part of the petitioner to give to opposite party no. 1 one months notice or one months salary in lieu thereof. The salary for one month, as observed above, was tendered to opposite party no. 1, but he refused to accept the same. 8. Sri, Z. Jelani, learned counsel for opposite party no. 1, however, urged that in view of the fact that Rule 5 came into force simultaneously with the promulgation of the rules. Rule 3 could not be deemed to be in existence at the time the order of termination was passed against opposite party no. 1. According to the learned counsel Rule 3 could be deemed to be in existence on the date the order of termination of service was passed only if Rule 5 was enforced with effect from the date the said order was passed or with effect from a dale earlier thereto. In support of his contention the learned counsel placed reliance upon sub-r. (2) of Rule 1 which provides as follows:- "1 (2) - This rule and Rules 2, 3 and 4 shall be deemed to have come into force on 30th January, 1953 and Rule 5 shall come into force at once." We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel. The effect of enforcing Rule 5 simultaneously with the enforcement of the Rules of 1975 is to reinforce the retrospective operation of Rules 2, 3 and 4 which has been provided under sub-rule (2) of Rule 1. It is on account of the immediate enforcement of Rule 5 that the validity of the order which was in existence at the time the rules were published is to be judged with reference to the provision made in the First proviso to anything in the language of the latter portion of sub retroactivity provided under the first part of the said sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 (sic). 9. The learned counsel further argued that Rule 3 was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as it created an invidious classification. 9. The learned counsel further argued that Rule 3 was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as it created an invidious classification. The learned counsel argued that Rule 3 would not be applicable to the case of a Government servant whose order of termination of service had been quashed by a court of law or Tribunal before the promulgation of the 1975 Rules while the said rule would be applicable to a Government servant whose case against the order of termination was pending before a court or tribunal. The argument is devoid of merit. Rule 3 does not make any such classification; it applies uniformly to all orders passed prior to the enforcement of 1975 Rules as also to orders passed thereafter. 10. Sri Jelani next argued that opposite party no. 1 was holding lien on the post of Marketing Inspector and, therefore, he could only be reverted to the said post and his services could not be terminated. The order of appointment of opposite party no. 1 to the post of Marketing Inspector is Annexure-1 to the claim petition preferred before the Tribunal. In this order it was specifically provided that the services of the persons who were appointed by the order were purely temporary and were liable to termination at any time without notice. The opposite party no. 1 has not placed on record any order by which he may have been confirmed on the post of Marketing Inspector so as to acquire lien on the said post. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that opposite party no. 1 held lien on the post of Marketing Inspector. 11. Sri Jelani also argued that the order of termination of service was against the terms on which opposite party no. 1 was promoted to the post of senior Marketing Inspector. Learned counsel pressed that in the promotion order it was mentioned that the promotion was purely temporary and opposite party no. 1 could be reverted at any time but it did not mention that the service I could be terminated. On this basis it I was urged that the only right that was I reserved by the appointing authority was to revert opposite party no. 1 to the post of Marketing Inspector and not to terminate his services and, therefore, the order of termination was bad in law. On this basis it I was urged that the only right that was I reserved by the appointing authority was to revert opposite party no. 1 to the post of Marketing Inspector and not to terminate his services and, therefore, the order of termination was bad in law. Sri Umesh Chandra on the other hand argued that the Rules of 1975 applied to all Government Servants who were in temporary service of the Government and since the petitioner was temporary on the post of Marketing Inspector as well as on the post of Senior Marketing Inspector, his services could be terminated under the 1975 Rules and it was not necessary to revert the petitioner to his original post. We find force in the argument of the learned counsel. Sub-R. (3) of Rule 1 provides as follows:- "(3) - They shall apply to all persons holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh and who are under the rule making control of Governor, but who do not hold a lien on permanent post under the Government of Uttar Pradesh." Under the above sub-rule the Rules do not apply to Government servants who hold lien on a permanent post. We have held above that opposite party no. 1s appointment on the post of Marketing Inspector as well as on the post of Senior Marketing Inspector was in temporary capacity and he had not acquired lien on either post. Opposite party no. 1, therefore, did not fall within the purview of the excepting clause of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1. The Rules of 1975 were, therefore, clearly applicable to opposite party no. 1. The mere fact that in the order of promotion it was provided that opposite party no. 1 could be reverted to his original post did not take away the jurisdiction of the appointing authority which was conferred upon him under the Rules of 1975. It may be pointed out that the promotion order in respect of opposite party no. 1 was issued in the year 1973 and the rules applicable to the case were promulgated in the year 1975. The language of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 shows that the said Rule will prevail over an order which is in conflict therewith. This position is clearly brought out from this language in sub-rule (1) of Rule 3. 1 was issued in the year 1973 and the rules applicable to the case were promulgated in the year 1975. The language of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 shows that the said Rule will prevail over an order which is in conflict therewith. This position is clearly brought out from this language in sub-rule (1) of Rule 3. "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any existing rules or orders on the subject....................." Thus this ground which was urged by Sri Jelani in support of the order passed by the Tribunal is also not tenable. 12. It was lastly urged by Jelani that opposite party no. 1 had been promoted to the post of Senior Marketing Inspector under the orders of the State Government and State Government was, therefore, his appointing authority and the State Government alone was competent to terminate the services of the petitioner under the 1975 Rules but in the case on hand the services were not terminated by the State Government but by the Regional Food Controller. It is true that the order of termination of services which was served upon opposite party no. 1 was issued by the Regional Food Controller. Before the Services Tribunal opposite party no. 1 did not raise the plea that the Regional Food Controller was not his appointing authority and, therefore, his services could not be terminated by him. The plea of want of jurisdiction in the Regional Food Controller to issue the termination notice not having been raised before the Public Services Tribunal, opposite party no. 1, is not entitled to support the order of the Tribunal on the said ground. In case the plea had been raised before the Public Services Tribunal, it would have been possible for the petitioners to state the circumstances in which the order of termination came to be issued by opposite party no. 2. In this view of the matter we are unable to entertain the last argument advanced by Sri Jelani for supporting the order of the Tribunal. 13. In view of the above, the petition succeeds. The petition is accordingly allowed and the order dated 29-3-1979 passed by the U. P. Public Services Tribunal No. III Lucknow (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. The costs of this petition will however be easy.