JUDGMENT : K.N. SETH, J. 1. Hindu National School Management Trust Society a society registered under the Indian Societies Registration Act runs Hindu National Inter College Dehradun, which is recognised by the U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Petitioner No. 2 is the Committee of Management constituted for managing and conducting the affairs of the College. Trilok Chand Sharma, Respondent No. 3, was a teacher in College. By a resolution dated 26-4-1976 the Committee of Management suspended Respondent No. 3 and constituted a sub-committee consisting of the president, vice-president and a member of the Committee to enquire into the charges. The sub-committee framed charges against Respondent No. 3 and served it on him on 12-5-1976 who submitted his reply to the charges on 30-5-1976 and a supplementary reply on 14-6-1976. The sub-committee submitted its report on 24-6-1976 holding that the charges had been established against Respondent No. 3. The Committee of Management thereafter passed a resolution on 29-6-1976 approving the report of the sub-committee and decided to dismiss Respondent No. 3 from service with effect from 26-4-1976. Papers were sent to the District Inspector of Schools for approval as contemplated by Section 16-G (3) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The District Inspector of Schools granted the necessary approval on 20-10-1976. Thereafter the Committee of Management on 31-10-1976 passed an order dismissing Respondent No. 3 from service with effect from 26-4-1976. Respondent No. 3 challenged that order in appeal before the Regional Deputy Director of Education who allowed the appeal by his order dated 24-12-1977 on the grounds (1) that in the meeting of the Committee of Management held on 31-10-1976, which resolved to dismiss Respondent No. 3 from service, two teachers, who were ex-officio members, were not present and in their place two other teachers attended the meeting; and (2) that only the Principal or Manager of the College could be appointed to conduct the enquiry into the charges against Respondent No. 3 and it could not be entrusted to a sub-committee in view of Regulation 35 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Act which was mandatory. The Petitioners have challenged the legality of that order. 2. The petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench. The Petitioners have challenged the legality of that order. 2. The petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench. The Bench felt doubt about the correctness of the rule laid down in R.P. Dixit v. Managing Committee 1971 ALJ 896 which formed the basis of the decision of the Regional Deputy Director of Education that Regulation 35 is mandatory and must be strictly complied with. On a reference made by the Division Bench the petition has been placed before this Bench for decision. 3. Before dealing with the question whether Regulation 35 is mandatory or directory in nature we may deal with the other ground which weighed with the Regional Deputy Director of Education to set aside the order of dismissal of Respondent No. 3. The validity of the meeting held on 31-10-1976 was assailed on the ground that two teachers, who were ex-officio members were not present and in their place two other teachers attended the meeting. This meeting was held in pursuance of Regulation 45 of Chapter III of the Regulation which provides that the Committee shall implement the decisions of the Inspector or Regional Inspectress within two weeks of its intimation. According to Respondent No. 3 Sri R.C. Goel and Sri Suresh Singh Suryawansi, two teachers of the institution, were elected ex-officio members of the Committee on 3-2-1976 for a period of one year. They were not invited and in their place Sri Kailash Chandra and Sri Ravindra Kukreti were invited to attend the meeting which rendered the deliberations of the meeting illegal. The stand taken by the Petitioners was that the term of the two teachers, who were earlier ex-officio members of the Committee of Management, had expired and the two teachers, who did attend the meeting on that date were those who had been co-opted as ex-officio members of the Committee of Management. It was asserted that this point was raised before the Regional Deputy Director of Education but he ignored to give any finding on it The controversy on the question whether the term of Sri R.C. Goel and Sri Suresh Singh had come to an end or not and whether Sri Kailash Chandra and Sri Ravindra Kukreti had been validly co-opted in their place is not of much significance. As noted earlier, the meeting of 31-10-1976 was held in pursuance of Regulation 45. In that meeting no decision was to be taken. As noted earlier, the meeting of 31-10-1976 was held in pursuance of Regulation 45. In that meeting no decision was to be taken. It was solely for the purpose of implementing the earlier decision which had been approved by the District Inspector of Schools. It has been disputed that the quorum at the meeting was complete and it was unanimously resolved to implement the earlier decision dismissing Respondent No. 3 from service. Two representatives of the teachers did attend the meeting. Since no fresh decision was to be taken at this meeting, even assuming that irregularity was committed in not inviting Sri R.C. Goel and Sri Suresh Singh to the meeting it would not invalidate the proceedings of the meeting. In any case no prejudice was caused to Respondent No. 3 by the alleged irregularity. 4. The main question for consideration before us related to the scope and nature of Regulation 35. The Regulation reads as follows: 35. On receipt of a complaint or an adverse report of facts of a serious nature, the Committee may in the cases of teachers appoint the Headmaster or Principal or Manager as the inquiry officer (or the Manager may himself set up the inquiry if such power has been delegated to him by the Committee under rules) and in the case of the Headmaster or Principal, a small sub-committee with instructions to submit the report as expeditiously as possible. 5. Regulations 36 and 37 set out in detail the procedure to be followed in conducting the enquiry and taking a decision on the report of the proceedings and recommendations of the Enquiring Authority. Clause (1) of Regulation 36 requires that a definite charge or charges shall be communicated to the employee charged. He shall be required within a specified time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desired to be heard in person. An oral enquiry has to be held in respect of such allegations as are not admitted. Such oral evidence as the Enquiring Authority considers necessary will be heard. The persons charged is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and such witnesses may be called as he may wish subject to the power of the Enquiring Authority for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing to refuse to call a witness. Such oral evidence as the Enquiring Authority considers necessary will be heard. The persons charged is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and such witnesses may be called as he may wish subject to the power of the Enquiring Authority for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing to refuse to call a witness. It is further enjoined that the proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. It is open to the Enquiring Authority to make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the employee. Clause (3) of Regulation 36 provides that where there is difficulty in observing exactly the requirements of the provisions of Clause (1) and those requirements can in the opinion of the Enquiring Authority be waived without injustice to the person charged, he may for reason to be recorded in writing waive them. The Enquiring Authority is required to submit its report along with its recommendations to the Committee. By Regulation 37 it is provided that on receipt of the report of the proceedings and recommendations of the Enquiry Authority the Committee of Management shall, after notice to the employee, meet to consider the report of the proceedings and recommendations made and take decision on the case. The employee, if he so desires, has a right to appear before the Committee in person and state his case and answer any question that may be put to him by any member present at the meeting. The Committee is then required to send a complete report together with all connected papers to the Inspector or Regional Inspectress, as the case may be for approval of action proposed by it. It is thus obvious that these Regulations have been framed to safeguard the interest of the employees against unjust and arbitrary actions of the Committee of Management. 6. Under Regulation 35 in the cases of teachers and other employees the Enquiry Officer is to be the Head Master or Principal or Manager and in the cases of Head Master or Principal, the enquiry has to be conducted by a small sub-committee appointed by the Committee of Management. The question is whether every part of this Regulation is to be treated as mandatory and must be strictly complied with. The question is whether every part of this Regulation is to be treated as mandatory and must be strictly complied with. In R.P. Dixit's case (supra) the Division Bench took the view that since the enquiry against the principal was conducted not by a subcommittee but by the Committee of Management itself, there was non-compliance with the provisions of Regulation 35. The Bench relied on the dictum that if law requires something to be done in a particular manner it has to be done in that very manner or not at all and that inspite of the use of word 'may' in Regulation 35 it is obligatory to appoint a small sub-committee to hold the enquiry against the Principal. It cannot possibly be disputed that the provisions relating to the holding of an inquiry is mandatory but can it be said that the constitution of the Enquiring Authority is also mandatory in the sense that no departure at all can be made in that respect? Dealing with the question whether a particular provision is mandatory or is merely directory the Supreme Court in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895 observed that this question cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. In that case the question was whether Sub-section (3) of Section 131 of the U.P. Municipalities Act was mandatory. The Supreme Court held that the first part of Sub-section (3) of Section 131 dealing with publication of proposal and draft rule along with notice was mandatory but the second part of that provision, which related to the manner of publication was only directory. 7. In Haridwar Singh Vs. The Supreme Court held that the first part of Sub-section (3) of Section 131 dealing with publication of proposal and draft rule along with notice was mandatory but the second part of that provision, which related to the manner of publication was only directory. 7. In Haridwar Singh Vs. Bagun Sumbrui and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1242 Mathew, J. stated the same principle in these words: No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. In each case one must look to the subject matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and are indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory... Where a prescription related to performance of a public duty and to invalidate acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty. Such prescription is generally understood as mere instruction for the guidance of those upon whom the duty is imposed--see Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar Vs. The State of Bombay and Others, AIR 1952 SC 181 . Where however, a power or authority is conferred with a direction that certain regulation or formality shall be complied with, it seems neither unjust nor incorrect to exact, a rigorous observation of it as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority--See Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 6th Edition pp. 649-650. 8. Dealing with the same problem S.A. de Smith in his book Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Third Edition summarised the position thus; The law relating to the effect of failure to comply with procedural requirements resembles an inextricable tangle of loose ends. Although it would be futile to attempt to unravel or cut all the knots, it is possible to state the main principles of interpretation that the courts have followed and to illustrate their application in a few settings. When Parliament prescribes the manner or form in which a duty is to be performed or a power exercised, it seldom lays down what will be the legal consequences of failure to observe its prescriptions. When Parliament prescribes the manner or form in which a duty is to be performed or a power exercised, it seldom lays down what will be the legal consequences of failure to observe its prescriptions. The courts must therefore formulate their own criteria for determining whether the procedural rules are to be regarded as mandatory, in which case disobedience will render void or voidable what has been done, or as directory, in which case disobedience will be treated as an irregularity not affecting the validity of what has been done (though in some cases it has been said that there must be "substantial compliance" with the statutory provisions if the deviation is to be excused as a mere irregularity)... The whole scope and purpose of the enactment must be considered, and one must assess "the disregarded, and the relation of the it provisions to the general object intended to be secured by the Act". Howard v. Bodington (1877) 2 P.D. 203. Furthermore much may depend upon the particular circumstances of the case in hand. Although "nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience '' breach of procedural or formal rules is likely to be treated as a mere irregularity if the departure from the terms of the Act is of a trivial nature, or if no substantial prejudice has been suffered by those for whose benefit the requirements were introduced, or if serious, public inconvenience would be caused by holding them to be mandatory, or if the court is for any reason disinclined to interfere with the act or decision that is impugned." 9. We do not consider it necessary to refer to other cases and the opinion ex- pressed by other eminent jurists on the question under consideration. It appears to be well settled that in order to judge the nature and scope of a particular statute or rule i.e. whether it is mandatory or directory the purpose for which the provisions has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provisions, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. As observed earlier, the object in framing Regulation 35 is to provide a safeguard to the employee of the educational institution against arbitrary and capricious actions of the Committee of Management. The enquiry, on the basis of the charges framed, has to be conducted in case of a teacher or other employees by the Head Master, Principal or the Manager and by a sub-committee appointed by the Committee of Management in case of a Principal or Head Master. The Head Master or the Principal being the head of the institution it was considered desirable that a small sub-committee should hold the enquiry and it should not be done by a single individual. With regard to an enquiry against a teacher, although it is provided that it shall be conducted by a single individual, is the object of the provision defeated if the enquiry is conducted by a sub-committee? The safeguards provided to the teacher before taking action against him are: (1) the grounds on which it is proposed to take action against him are reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which are communicated to him and they have to be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged employee of the facts and circumstances against him; (2) he has right to put in a written statement of his defence, to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to produce witnesses in support of his case; (3) the Enquiring Authority has to maintain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof; (4) on receipt of the report of the proceedings and the recommendation from the Enquiring Authority, the committer of Management is enjoined to serve another notice on the employee; (5) the Committee has to consider the report of the proceedings and the recommendations made and then take a decision on the case; (6) the employee, if he so desires, has a right to appear before the Committee in person to state his case and answer any question that may be put to him before the decision is taken and (7) the Committee has then to send a complete report together with all connected papers to the Inspector or Regional Inspectress, as the case may be, for approval of action proposed by it. All these safeguards are available to a teacher whether his enquiry is conducted by the Head Master or Principal or Manager or it is conducted by a small sub-committee. It cannot be successfully contended that by making a departure with regard to the constitution of the Enquiring Authority the purpose for which the provision has been made or the intention of the legislature in making the provision is violated or any serious general inconvenience or injustice is caused to the teacher concerned. On the other hand, the entrustment of the enquiry to a small sub-committee in place of the Head Master or Principal or Manager ensures to the teacher concerned greater and better safeguards than he would have had if enquiry is conducted by an individual. 10. In certain circumstances, it may not at all be possible to entrust the enquiry to the Head Master or Principal or Manager. That individual may be highly biased against the teacher or for one reason or the other may not be available to conduct the enquiry within a reasonable time. If the provision relating to the personnel of the Enquiring Authority is held to be mandatory, it may cause serious prejudice to the teacher concerned and his interest would suffer and also defeat the purpose of getting a fair and impartial enquiry conducted. It does not appear that any special purpose was sought to be achieved by confining the choice of an Enquiry Officer between the Principal or Head Master or the Manager in case the enquiry was to be conducted against a teacher. In normal course the Principal and the Manager being persons conversant with the affairs of the College should be required to enquire into the charges against a teacher but if the circumstances so require, the enquiry may be entrusted to a sub-committee, which is definitely a more august body than a Principal or Head Master or Manager. It would give no cause for embarrassment to the teacher concerned inasmuch as the enquiry would be conducted by a more responsible and higher body. That would substantially satisfy the requirements of Regulation 35. 11. It would give no cause for embarrassment to the teacher concerned inasmuch as the enquiry would be conducted by a more responsible and higher body. That would substantially satisfy the requirements of Regulation 35. 11. The decision in R.P. Dixit's case (supra) which was subsequently followed in Gulub Chand Pandey v. Deputy Director of Education 1977 AWC 11 was based on a wrong premise that the legislature having assigned the enquiry to a named person, it could not have been conducted by any other person. The learned Judges took the view that the mention of the Enquiry Officer in the regulation amounted to assignment. In our opinion Regulation 35 only empowers the Committee of Management to delegate its authority to enquiry into the charges against teachers and other employees to the Head Master or Principal or Manager and in the case of Head Master or Principal to a small sub-committee. The view taken in R.P. Dixit's case (supra) is contrary to the law pronounced by the Supreme Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose Vs. The Hon'ble The Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285 . In that case the Supreme Court held: ...the exercise of the power to appoint or dismiss an officer is the exercise not of a judicial power but of an administrative power. It is none the-less so, by reason of the fact that an opportunity to show cause and an enquiry simulating judicial standards have to precede the exercise thereof. It is well-recognised that a statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have delegated his functions merely by deputing a responsible and competent official to enquire and report. That is the ordinary mode of exercise of any administrative power. What cannot be delegated except where the law specifically so provides is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of such power. As pointed out by the House of Lords in Board of Education v. Rice 1911 AC 179 a functionary who has to decide an administrative matter, of the nature involved in this case, can obtain the material on which he is to act in such manner as may be feasible and convenient, provided only the affected party has a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any relevant and prejudicial material. 12. In regulation 35 there is no assignment but only a delegation of power of the Committee of Management. 12. In regulation 35 there is no assignment but only a delegation of power of the Committee of Management. In legal parlance 'to assign' means to make or set over to another, to transfer or to assign property or some interest therein. In case of assignment the assignor is deprived of the right transferred and it vests in the assignee. On the other hand, the term 'delegation' does not imply deprivation of one's authority. In Huth v. Clarke (25 QBD 391) interpreting the word 'delegation' Wills, J. observed: In my opinion the word, in its general sense and as generally used, does not imply or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring of authority upon some one else. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, it has been explained as "to 'delegate' to another is not to denude yourself." 13. In Roop Chand Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503 while interpreting the provisions of Sections 21(4) and 41 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act held that when the Government delegates its power to entertain and decide an appeal u/s 21(4) to an officer and the officer pursuant to such delegation hears the appeal and makes an order, it is the order of the Government. The aforesaid Act enables the Government to delegate its power but such a power when delegated remains the power of the Government. When the delegate exercises the power, he does so for the Government. u/s 16-G of the Act the Committee of Management is the appointing authority. The power to punish vests in the Committee. Regulation 33 enables it to delegate its power of enquiry to a named officer or to a subcommittee. Even in the case of a teacher where the enquiry is to be conducted by a named officer it would substantially comply with the requirement of law if the power to conduct the enquiry is delegated to a sub-committee. 14. Regulation 35 uses the word 'may'. The use of that word may not be determinative of the nature of the provision but keeping in view the nature and object of the statutory provisions and the intention behind it the provision must be held to be directory. 15. No other point was pressed before us for consideration during the course of hearing. 16. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. 15. No other point was pressed before us for consideration during the course of hearing. 16. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Regional Deputy Director of Education dated 24-12-1977 is quashed. Parties shall bear their own costs.