JUDGMENT : C.S.P. SINGH, J. 1. This is a revision by the 'Plaintiff, which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1968. The suit was filed for ejectment of the Defendant-tenant and for arrears of rent. It was decreed for arrears of rent, but was dismissed as to ejectment. The decree passed by the trial court has been upheld in revision. 2. The suit for ejectment of the Defendant failed on the view that the conditions requisite for ejecting the tenant required by the Rent Act, 1972 were not fulfilled. The Plaintiff had sought to avail this advantage by asserting that the premises in dispute belonged to an educational institution whose income was applied for the purpose of that institution, and so such were exempt from the purview of the Act in view of Section 2 sub Clause (b) thereof. This contention, as has been seen failed, as the Plaintiff's suit for ejectment was dismissed. 3. Counsel for the Applicant urged that the entire income from the shop in dispute was utilised for the educational college, and as such the premises were covered by the exemption granted by Section 2(b) of the Rent Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section 2(1)(b) is to the following effect: 2. Exemptions from operation of Act: (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (b) any building belonging to or vested in a recognised educational institution, the whole of the income from which is utilised for the purposes of such institution. 4. It is settled that a person seeking advantage of an exemption clause under a statute must fulfil all the requirements thereof, in order to get the benefit granted by that provision. The Plaintiff in the present case had to establish that the shop belonged to or vested in a recognised educational institution, and that income from the shop was utilised for the purpose of that institution. In order to establish this, the Plaintiff's counsel urged that the Arya Kanya Pathshala Association was accorded permission by the Agra University to open to degree college subject to the condition that the college possessed a guaranteed permanent inalienable income of Rs. In order to establish this, the Plaintiff's counsel urged that the Arya Kanya Pathshala Association was accorded permission by the Agra University to open to degree college subject to the condition that the college possessed a guaranteed permanent inalienable income of Rs. 4,500/- per annum, and in order to meet this requirement a registered charge had been created on the income of some of the properties of the Association, including the present property, so as to secure an yearly income of Rs. 2, 640/-. It was urged that as a result of the charge the rental income from the shop came to be utilised for the sole purpose of the educational college. This document is paper No. 28-C and recites in the first place that the Association will pay to the college an amount of Rs. 2, 640/- only from the rental income of the property of the Association till the college continues to exist. It then goes on to create a charge on the property, and its rental income for payment of this amount. In the event of default, payment can be enforced against the rental income of the property or by its sale. Although, counsel for the Defendant-Respondent contended that the rental income of the shop was not utilised by the college, but it is not necessary to enter into this controversy on the view that is proposed to be taken. We may assume that the rental income of the shop was being utilised for the college, but, before the Plaintiff can succeed in obtaining the exemption granted by Section 2(1)(b) it has to be established that the shop belonged to or vested in a recognised educational institution. Now, it can not be reasonably disputed that the shops belonged to the Arya Kanya Pathshala Association and not to the educational college, for the shops have been built by the Association, and there is no document on the record transferring them to the college. Mr. Mandhyan appearing for the Applicant fairly expressed his inability to substantiate that the shops belonged to the college. He, however, urged that they vested in the recognised educational institution viz. the college. The fact that both the words "belonged" and "vested" have been used by the Legislature in Section 2(1)(b) clearly suggests that the word "vested'' has to be given a wide import and not confined to property vested in title alone. He, however, urged that they vested in the recognised educational institution viz. the college. The fact that both the words "belonged" and "vested" have been used by the Legislature in Section 2(1)(b) clearly suggests that the word "vested'' has to be given a wide import and not confined to property vested in title alone. The concept of the word "vested", which is a word of wide import, have been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union Vs. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 . After referring to a number of decisions of English Courts their Lordships have this to say to the meaning to be scribed to that word: That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statute also....The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 - 49 and 54 and 54-A when they spell of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that onwership has passed to any of them. 5. In the present case the statute clearly indicates that the word "vest" has not been used as vesting in title for that is excluded by the use of the word "belonging to" which occurs in the earlier part of this sub-section. We may now examine, as to whether the college which is undoubtedly an educational institution has possession over the shops or the shop vests in it in any other limited sense. That the college does not have possession over the shops can not be disputed, for there is nothing on the record to indicate the possessionary rights of the college over these shops. Mr. Mandhyan, however, urged that it vests in a limited sense, inasmuch as the college enjoys the income of the shop. There is a fallacy in this argument. A distinction must be drawn between the income which occurs from the property, and the property itself. Section 2(1)(b) clearly brings this out, for it insists not only that the property should vest in the educational institution, but further that its income must be utilised for the college. Thus, from the mere fact that income from a particular property goes to college we cannot conclude that the property also vests in the college in a limited sense. Section 2(1)(b) clearly brings this out, for it insists not only that the property should vest in the educational institution, but further that its income must be utilised for the college. Thus, from the mere fact that income from a particular property goes to college we cannot conclude that the property also vests in the college in a limited sense. Some act other than the mere fact of receipt income of the property would be required so as to make the property vest, even in a limited sense in the educational institution. In cases where this were so, the fact that the income is also being enjoyed, may be an additional consideration for treating the property as having vested in a limited sense in the college. There is another question which has vexed me while considering this aspect of the matter, and that is whether the educational institution claiming such a benefit should be a juristic entity. For how can any property vest, even in a limited sense in a body which is not a juristic entity. The college run by the Association can hardly be described as a juristic entity, as it is neither a corporation sole, or aggregate or a constitutional or statutory entity. However, it is not necessary to explore this matter in this case as the claim that the shop in dispute vests in the college falls on the considerations already adverted to. It was next urged that Society is an educational institution, and as such the shops vest in it, and as the income is utilised for the college run by the society all conditions requisite for granting the exemption exists. Section 2(1)(b) has already been extracted above. In order to get advantage of this provision the entity claiming it must be a recognised educational institution, that is it must be an institution (2) one that is educational in nature and (3) it must be recognised. The word 'institution' has not been defined in the Act. One, therefore, has to go by the common notion of that word. Dealing with the meaning of this expression under the Income Tax Act of 1842 (English) Lord Mac Naghten in the case of Mayor Etc. of Manchester v. M. Adam 1896 AC 500 observed, "it is a little difficult to define the meaning of the term "institution" in the modern acceptation of the word. Dealing with the meaning of this expression under the Income Tax Act of 1842 (English) Lord Mac Naghten in the case of Mayor Etc. of Manchester v. M. Adam 1896 AC 500 observed, "it is a little difficult to define the meaning of the term "institution" in the modern acceptation of the word. It means, I suppose, an undertaking formed to promote some defined purpose having in view generally the instruction or educational of the public. It is the body (so to speak) called into existence to translate the purpose as conceived in the mind of the founders into a living and active principle." 6. We may now advert to the memorandum of association of the society for determining whether it is an educational institution. The memorandum of association of the society are set out in paragraph 2 of the memorandum, and they are: The aims and objects of the society shall be as follows: (a) To teach domestic articles to Hindu girls, and diffuse literary, general, commercial, industrial, scientific and religious education among them, (b) To afford help to poor and deserving or orphan Hindu Girls, (c) To acquire and receive property and manage it and to raise funds and collect money by subscription and donation for the benefit of Hindu girls, (d) To start, establish, manage & control any charitable, literary, commerical, industrial, religious and educational institution or boarding house for the benefit of Hindu girls (e) To prepare Girl Guides, Scouts and volunteers for the public service, (f) To devise means for improving the moral, social and physical condition for Hindu girls (g) To co-operate with affiliate or amalgamate other similar institutions (h) To do or perform any other act which may be incidental; or conductive to the attainment of the aforesaid objects. 7. On the test formulated by Lord Mac Naghten, the society is an institution inasmuch as it has been brought about to fulfil the purposes set out in its memorandum of association, which are of public charitable nature including education. The test formulated by Lord Mac Naghten has been accepted by this Court in the case of Commr. of Income Tax, U.P., Lucknow Vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, AIR 1954 All 291 . 8. Now to the other questions whether it is a wholly educational institution or its purposes are manifold? and whether the society falls within the description "recognised educational institution." 9. of Income Tax, U.P., Lucknow Vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, AIR 1954 All 291 . 8. Now to the other questions whether it is a wholly educational institution or its purposes are manifold? and whether the society falls within the description "recognised educational institution." 9. It will be seen that although Clause (a) is confined to teaching of domestic articles etc. which is a part of educational charity Clauses (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) are much wider than (a) and they create a charity whose purpose is not confined to education. Thus, the objects of the society are comprehensive, and include not only education, but host of others. In my view the advantage conferred u/s 2(1)(b) is confined to an educational charity, and not to a charity of a composite nature, which includes education also. Counsel urged that the dominant purpose of the object for which the society was formed is education. His contention is that Clauses (b). (c), (d), (e) and (f) of paragraph 2 of the memorandum are controlled by Clause 2(a), and the other clauses have to be read as being confined to educational purpose only. This argument perplexes me for it does not derive any support from the language of paragraph 2, nor does it rest on any discernible legal principle. Clause (b) talks of giving help to poor and deserving or orphan Hindu girls. The use of the word 'or' in Clause 2(b), which is normally used as a disjunctive unless the context indicates otherwise, (there is no contextual indication to the contrary) permits the society to give help to the poor and deserving belonging to any caste or creed, and not confined to orphan Hindu girls alone. So far as Clause (a) is concerned, that is confined to educational facility being given to Hindu girls alone. How can it be said in these circumstances that Clause (a) covers the field covered by Clause (b). When one comes to Clause (d) it states that the society is empowered to establish, manage and control any charitable, literary, commercial, industrial and religious institution or boarding house as also educational institution for the benefit of Hindu girls. How can it be said in these circumstances that Clause (a) covers the field covered by Clause (b). When one comes to Clause (d) it states that the society is empowered to establish, manage and control any charitable, literary, commercial, industrial and religious institution or boarding house as also educational institution for the benefit of Hindu girls. The fact that under Clause (d) educational institution have been mentioned specifically along with other charitable, literary, commercial, industrial and religious institutions, which the society may start or manage or control for benefit of Hindu girls, is a pointer to the fact that the setting of an educational institution, or embarking on education for benefit of Hindu Girls does not control the setting up of other institutions whose primary object is not to impart education, nor is it possible to read Clause (c) as being confined only to educational charity, for it talks of preparing girls guides, scouts and volunteers for public service. Nor does the improvement of moral, social and physical condition of Hindu girls contemplated by Clause (f) confine the object of the activity of the society to an educational purpose. The composite charitable objects of the society, therefore, takes out the society from the purview of an educational society alone. Therefore, in these circumstances, it deprives the society from claiming benefit u/s 2(1)(b). The society also does not qualify for exemption, as it does not meet the requirement of being a recognised educational society. The word "recognised" has not been defined, but it obviously refers to an educational institution, which is recognised under any one of the State Acts providing for recognition of educational institution. Some of these Acts are, the Agra University Act, The State Universities Act, Intermediate-Education Act. The word 'recognised' has ' obviously been used in the sense of recognition of an educational institution as contemplated by any one of these Acts. The society is not recognised educational institution, although, the college run by it" may be so. The mere registration of the society under the Societies Registration Act will not confer on it a 'recognised' status. Order of recognition has to be passed under these Education Acts, so as to confer recognised status on the educational institution. We, thus, find that even if we were to examine the position by reference to the association the requirement of Section 2(1)(b) are not fulfilled. 10. Mr. Order of recognition has to be passed under these Education Acts, so as to confer recognised status on the educational institution. We, thus, find that even if we were to examine the position by reference to the association the requirement of Section 2(1)(b) are not fulfilled. 10. Mr. Mandhyan also made an attempt to induce me to hold that the objects of the society are purely educational by pointing out that the society from its inception has been engaged only in educational activity, and also made an attempt to establish this by reference to the rules of the society. The fact that a society which has multi purposes objects confines its activity to a particular period of time only to one of its objects, which in the present case is education, will not make it an educational society, if its objects are manifold. It may in one particular period of its existence confine itself to one particular object, but as there is no impediment to its changing its activity, to cover other charitable fields in keeping with it its object, it will not be of an educational society alone so long as its charter, as disclosed by the memorandum approves other charitable activities also. The resort to the rules, so as to curtail the impact of the objects as disclosed in paragraph 2 of the memorandum is futile for it is settled that rules being subordinate to the memorandum of the association cannot curtail its amplitude. The reason being that a subordinate rule making power cannot control the primary one. See the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala Education Act case, wherein it has been held that the rules framed under a statute cannot curtail or be used as to interpret the main provision of its statute. This principle which has been applied in interpreting statutes, can safely be applied for interpreting the objects and the rules of a society which is registered under the Societies Registration Act. 11. The Revision is accordingly dismissed with costs.