JUDGMENT - Waikar M.R. J.-This decision shall dispose of both Second Appeal No. 444 and 445 both of 1969. The appellants of both these Second Appeals are the decree holders. 2. The dispute relates to three premises located in the house known as Madgi at Amravati. A business in the name of Manakbansi was conduct-ed and owned by one deceased Girdharilal. The following genealogical tree would show how the present two appellant's decree holders were related to deceased Girdharilal. Girdharilal Girdharilal Vallabhdas Chakkilal (died on 10–10–1964) | Kesharbai Chite Girjabai (Widow of Vallabhdas) (W/o Chakkilal in Second Appeal No. 444/69). Vijaykumar Vishnuprasad, appellant S/o Vallabhdas in Second Appeal No. 445/69. 3. After the death of Girdharilal, the firm Manakbansi was managed and conducted jointly by two brothers Vallabh and Chakkilal. Chakkilal was the elder brother. 4. In the summer of 1964, these two brothers affected a partition of all the joint family property and in the month of June 1964 partition lists were also prepared, but before the partition could be effected and the list could be acted upon, Vallabh died on 10–10–1964. 5. As Keshar and Vijay heirs of Vallabh were not given their shares by Chakkilal, they both filed the Civil Suit No. 25/65 for partition and separate possession of their share in the joint family property. 6. Along with the plaint of that partition suit three schedules ABC were appended, showing property held by the joint family liable to be partitioned. Schedule A described the field property held by the joint family, Schedule B described the house property of the joint family and Schedule C described the movables. The Schedule C further referred to the decrees obtained, while the family was joint. 7. It may be pointed out that in Schedule B referring to the house property, the house “Madgi” which is the subject matter of the present dispute also found place. 8. That the partition suit ended in a compromise and a decree in terms of the said compromise came to be passed. In the compromise petition, that was filed, fresh three Schedules A, B, C were drawn by the parties showing the property allotted to the share of each. Schedule A described the property of all nature that was allotted to the share of Kesharbai and Vijay. In the compromise petition, that was filed, fresh three Schedules A, B, C were drawn by the parties showing the property allotted to the share of each. Schedule A described the property of all nature that was allotted to the share of Kesharbai and Vijay. Schedule B referred to the properties of all nature which had fallen to the share of Chakkilal and his son Vishnu. It may again be pointed out here that house “Madgi” of Amravati the subject matter of the present dispute was mentioned in Schedule B i.e. the property which was allotted to Keshurbai and Vijay as per this compromise petition. Schedule C described all the properties held jointly by both the parties. In these three schedules no doubt reference has to be found to the decrees obtained, while the family was joint, which found place in the Schedule C which was filed with the plaint. 9. In the said compromise, it was further stated that Kesharbai and Vijay waived their claim over the property other than Schedules A and C i.e. they waived their claim over property described in Schedule B which was allotted to Chakkilal and Vishnuprasad. It is again pertinent to note that name Manakbansi was permitted to be used by Chakkilal and his sor as per this compromise, signifying thereby that the shop was given to their share. 10. Thus by this compromise decree Chakkilal and Vishnu became exclusive owners of all the properties described in Schedule B which included house “Madgi” and became joint owners of the property mentioned in Schedule “C”. 11. Now before this partition the shop of firm Manakbansi had obtained three decrees against the three tenants in occupation of the premises in house “Madgi” for ejectment. One decree for ejection was passed against Agrawal and Sons; the other was passed against Ganpat (respondent of S. A. No. 444/69) and the third decree was obtained against Mahadeo (respondent of second appeal No. 445/69). 12. So far as the decree obtained against tenant Agrawal and Sons is concerned the decree showed the name of Manakbansi through its owner Chakkilal. So far as the decree against the other two tenants namely Ganpat and Mahadeo are concerned, they desired the decree holders as Manakbansi through owner Vallabhdas. 13. 12. So far as the decree obtained against tenant Agrawal and Sons is concerned the decree showed the name of Manakbansi through its owner Chakkilal. So far as the decree against the other two tenants namely Ganpat and Mahadeo are concerned, they desired the decree holders as Manakbansi through owner Vallabhdas. 13. Now, since the property Madgi had fallen to the share of Chakki-lal and Vishnu they started proceedings against all the three tenants, as per the three decrees. Here, we are not concerned with the decree that was against Agrawal and Sons. In respect of that execution also objections were raised, but ultimately Chakkilal was found entitled to execute that decree. That decree also showed Chakkilal as the owner of shop Manakbansi. 14. Cahokia initiated execution proceedings in 151 /67 against Ganpat and execution case 152/67 against Mahadeo. 15. Both Ganpat and Mahadeo the two judgment debtors preferred objections contending that Chakkilal could not execute the decree; as the decrees were obtained by Vallabhdas as the owner of Manakbansi. 16. The executing Court upheld the objection that was raised by judgment debtor Ganpat in execution case No. 151 /67, but curiously enough it rejected the objection that was raised by the other tenant Mahadeo; and found that Chakkilal was entitled to execute the decree. 17. Aggrieved by the decision in the two execution proceedings. Chakkilal and his son Vishnu preferred First Appeal No. 242/68 against the order that was passed in Execution Case No.151/67. While the tenant Mahadeo preferred First Appeal No. 60/69 against the order parsed in his-execjtion Case No. 152/57. 18. The First Appellate Court decided both these appeals by common judgment and it upheld the objections of the judgment debtors that Chakkilal and Vishnu were not competent to execute the said decrees. 19. Feeling aggrieved by this decision Chakkilal has preferred these two second appeals 444 and 445 of 1909. During the penueney of these appeals Chakkilal died and his legal representatives are brought on record. 20. 19. Feeling aggrieved by this decision Chakkilal has preferred these two second appeals 444 and 445 of 1909. During the penueney of these appeals Chakkilal died and his legal representatives are brought on record. 20. During the pendency of these two appeals the appellants need their application under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code for permission, to file additional documents namely the assignment deed and me affidavit executed by Keshar and Vijay the legal representatives of deceased Galahads to the effect that these decrees as per the compromise were assigned to chakkilal and as such Chakkilal and his heirs are emitieu to execute the decrees though they stood in the name of Vallabhdas as owner of Manakbansi. 21. It may further be pointed out that in Execution Case No. 151 /67 against Ganpat judgment-debtor Chakkilal had filed an application praying for amending the Cause Title by including the names of Keshar and Vijay the two legal representatives of deceased Vallabhdas, in order to meet the objections raised by the judgement debtor that Chakkilal was not the assign-ed entitled to execute the decree under Order 21, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code, as this application was rejected by the executing Court. 22. The preliminary objection raised by Shri P. Y. Deshpande in these second appeals is that the execution applications were barred by limitations, relying upon section 30(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and upon the two rulings namely (Messrs Nagardas Chhotanlal Shah v, Messrs Sardool-singh Kanmal Co).L which was followed in the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in (Trivikram Bhagwant Naik v. Vithalrao Gopalrao Sulaklie and others)2. In both these rulings the matters were governed by Article 183 of the old Limitation Act of 1908 and it was held that Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribed a shorter period of limitation than prescribed under Article 183 of the Act of 1908 and as such the provisions of section 30(b) of the new Limitation Act were attracted. 23. Now, before the amendment of the present Limitation Act, the limitation for the purpose of execution was dealt with in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (old) and Articles 182 and 183, of the old Limitation Act, 1908. 23. Now, before the amendment of the present Limitation Act, the limitation for the purpose of execution was dealt with in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (old) and Articles 182 and 183, of the old Limitation Act, 1908. Article 183 governed the applications for execution of decrees and orders of the Courts established by the Royal Charter and the Supreme Court, and the period of limitation was 12 years, but in case of part payment of money or interest or the acknowledgement of the right thereto the 12 years' period was to be computed from the date of such payment or date of acknowledgement. Article 182 was not applicable to such cases. Article 182 of the old Limitation Act and section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code (old) governed execution of decrees and orders of all other Civil Courts. The combined effect of section 48, Civil Procedure Code and Article 182, Limitation Act was that a decree holder was required to file execution applications within a period of three years from the various points of time specified in Article 182 while section 48, provided the maximum period of 12 years, before the expiry of which any fresh application for execution had to be made and a decree ceased to be enforceable after 12 years. 24. Thus the decree holder was required to keep the decree alive by successive applications for execution or for taking a step in aid of execution, every successive application being made within 3 years from the final order immediately prior to the execution. Thus apparently Article 183 of the Limitation Act (old) provided a longer period of limitation as compared to the period provided by Article 182. 25. The New Limitation Act repealed section 48, Civil Procedure Code and the old Article 182 is replaced by Article 136 of the present Limitation Act. The old Article 183, making specific provisions for decrees and orders of the Courts established by the Royal Charter was found unnecessary and hence deleted. 26. Thus present Article 136 covers execution of all decrees passed by any Civil Court. The old Article 183, making specific provisions for decrees and orders of the Courts established by the Royal Charter was found unnecessary and hence deleted. 26. Thus present Article 136 covers execution of all decrees passed by any Civil Court. It is thus clear that present Article 136, prescribes now a longer period of limitation as compared to old Article 182, inasmuch as execution of a decree under Article 182 was required to be kept alive every 3 years, while under present Article 136 even the first execution application can be filed any time within 12 years from the decree. 27. Now, in the light of these changes we have to refer to section 30(b) of the Limitation Act, relied upon by Shri Deshpande. The provision reads thus: “30. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, (b) any appeal or application for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, may be preferred or made within a period of ninety days next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such appeal or application by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier.” 28. It is obvious that this section would apply only to cases of curtailment by the later Act of the period of limitation that was prescribed by the earlier enactment. The principle underlying this section obviously is that whenever a later statute shortens a limitation period, parties must have a reasonable time to enforce existing causes of action, notwithstanding the statute. It is equally clear that this section does not apply only to cases where the right under the provisions of the repealed Act has been barred by the date of the new Act, coming into force. For instance of a decree was passed on 1–1-1960, an application for execution under Article 182 read with section 48, Civil Procedure Code was required to be filed within three years there from. If no such application is filed, then Article 136 of the Limitation Act which came into force on 1–1-1964 would be of no avail to the decree holder. 29. In the instant case, the ejectment decrees were passed on 31–10–1961 and the appeals preferred there from were dismissed on 16–7-1962. If no such application is filed, then Article 136 of the Limitation Act which came into force on 1–1-1964 would be of no avail to the decree holder. 29. In the instant case, the ejectment decrees were passed on 31–10–1961 and the appeals preferred there from were dismissed on 16–7-1962. Thus the first execution application could be filed any time within three years that is up to 16–7-1965; but since the new Limitation Act, 1963 came into force on 1–1-1964 and the old Article 182 stood repealed by the new Article 126, prescribing a longer period of limitation of 12 years, the decree holders were not obliged to file the first execution application on or before 16–7-1965, but they could file within the time prescribed by the new Article 126 and when they filed this present execution application on 6–4-1967 i. e. within 12 years from the date of decree, it cannot be said that they were barred by limitation, in view of the section 30(b) of the Limitation Act. Suffice it to say, that section 30(b) in the instant case has no application since the period of limitation prescribed under the old Act is not curtailed but is enlarged by the new Act. The submission of Mr. Deshpande, therefore, that the execution applications are barred by limitation is over-ruled. 30. The next question for consideration is whether the present appellants could file execution applications as assignees of the decrees under Order 21, Rule 11. 31. Mr. Aney submitted that the lower appellate Court in considering the compromise petition and the decree misread the schedules that were appended to the compromise petition. He further submitted that even apart from the Order 21, rule 16 the present appellants could file the execution application as representatives of deceased Vallabhdas. He placed reliance on (Jugalkishore Saraf v. M/s Raw Cotton Co. Ltd).3. This ruling was also referred to by the Courts below. The decision shows that one firm H instituted a suit for money in 1948 and during the pendency of the suit it executed a document whereby it transferred all the debts due to it in connection with its business. The transferee-respondent Company took no steps under Order 22. Ltd).3. This ruling was also referred to by the Courts below. The decision shows that one firm H instituted a suit for money in 1948 and during the pendency of the suit it executed a document whereby it transferred all the debts due to it in connection with its business. The transferee-respondent Company took no steps under Order 22. rule 10, Civil Procedure Code to get their names substituted in place of firm H, but allowed the firm to continue the said suit and eventually a decree came to be passed in the name of firm H. The partners of the said firm H migrated to Pakistan and the custodian of the evacuee property Bombay informed the respondent Company that the transaction of the transfer was proper and legal. Whereupon, the said Company presented an application under Order 21, rule 11 praying that the applicants be declared as assignees of the decree, as the decretal amount along with other debts had been transferred by the plaintiffs to them by the deed of assignment which was confirmed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property Bombay. A show cause notice under Order 21, rule 16 was issued by the Court and the judgment-debtor opposed the same. The question was whether the respondent Company was transferee within the meaning of Article 21, rule 16. Now, though deed of assignment had come into being not after the decree, but during the pendency of the suit itself, the High Court of Bombay, held that though the Order 21, Rule 16 on its strict construction did not apply, there was an equitable assignment of decree which would constitute as assignee for the purpose of Order 21, Rule 16. The Supreme Court in the said decision observed that as the said document did not cover the decree, there was no room for the application of the equitable principle and the respondent Company, therefore, could not claim under Order 21, Rule 16 as transferees by operation of law and could not maintain the execution application. All the same the application was found maintainable and the applicants were found entitled to execute under section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code as the persons claiming under the decree holder. All the same the application was found maintainable and the applicants were found entitled to execute under section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code as the persons claiming under the decree holder. It was observed: “There is nothing in Order 21, Rule 16 which expressly or by necessary implication, precludes a person, who claims to be entitled to the benefit of a decree under the decree holder but does not answer the description of being the transferee of that decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law, from making an application which the person from whom he claims could have made.” * * * “A person may conceivably become entitled to the benefits of a decree without being a transferee of the decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law. In that situation the person so becoming the owner of the decree may well be regarded as a person claiming under the decree holder.” 32. Now, it cannot be gainsaid that no particular form of writing is necessary to prove assignment. Order 21 Rule 16 merely requires a written assignment and it does not specify the form which it should take. (C. N. (Asundi v. Virappa Andamppa Manvi)4. In the instant case, therefore, a compromise petition presented by the parties in the suit certainly could be relied upon as a written document signifying assignment. The compromise petition no doubt did not specify in terms that the decrees obtained by the joint family were transferred or assigned to these appellants. The house in respect of which these decrees have been obtained against the tenants, however came to be allotted to these appellants. It further provided that the appellants would be entitled to use the firm's name Manakbansi for the purpose of their business. So the parties to the compromise intended that the decrees obtained in the name of shop or the firm were assigned to the appellants particularly when the said Madgi in respect of which the two decrees were obtained was also allotted to the share of the appellants. Thus on construction of the compromise deed it could be said that the two decrees were assigned or transferred to the appellants. 33. Thus on construction of the compromise deed it could be said that the two decrees were assigned or transferred to the appellants. 33. Assuming Order 21 Rule 16 Civil Procedure Code did not apply, the appellant certainly could apply under section 146 for execution as representative of deceased Vallabhdas who was described as owner of Manakbansi in the two decrees as the decree holder, since the appellants held joint interest in the said shops along with Vallabhdas who is now dead. In the reported decision of the .Supreme Court also it was observed that apart from Order 21, Rule 16, Civil Procedure Code the decree holders could execute as representatives under section 146. The explanation to Order 21, Rule 16 which is now newly added and which is in the following terms in fact gives effect to what has been observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1955 page 376: Explanation: “Nothing in-this rule shall affect the provisions of section 146, and a transferee of rights in the property, which is the subject matter of the suit, may apply for execution of. the decree without a separate assignment of the decree as required by this rule.” 34. Further during the pendency of these appeals the appellants filed application under Order 41 Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code praying for permission to file the assignment deed executed by Keshar and Vijay in their favour along with their affidavits. No doubt these documents came into being after the passing of the decree but the fact remains that the heirs of Vallabh, have no objection if the decrees are executed by the present appellants as the representatives of deceased Vallabh. As pointed out above an application was made by the present appellant (Ex. 17) in execution case No. 151/67 praying that the names of Keshar and Vijay be permitted to be included in the Cause Title which in fact would have brought on record all the representatives of deceased Vallabh, even assuming that the said compromise decree was held not to operate. The application of the applicants under Order 41 Rule 27 is allowed, firstly because the lower Court had failed to admit this evidence which they sought to tender and secondly they are necessary for pronouncing a proper judgment in these two appeals. The application of the applicants under Order 41 Rule 27 is allowed, firstly because the lower Court had failed to admit this evidence which they sought to tender and secondly they are necessary for pronouncing a proper judgment in these two appeals. In fact it was necessary for the executing Court to see whether the decrees sought to be executed were capable of execution or otherwise and the question in fact had to be decided also in the light of circumstance that whether a complete discharge of the liability under the decrees was possible and whether the decrees could be declared as wholly satisfied, so as to protect the interest of the judgment debtor. In the result, therefore, L find that the lower Appellate Court was wrong in holding that the present appellants could not execute the decrees in question. The appeals, are therefore allowed with costs and the objections raised by the judgment debtors are dismissed and the appellants would be allowed to execute the two decrees. I hope that the executing Court would dispose of these matters as expeditiously as possible. Appeals allowed. -----