ORDER G. P. Singh, C.J. l. This order shall also dispose of Mise. Petition No.122 of 1977. 2. The Management of Bhilai Steel Plant owns captive Rajhara and Nandini, Certain employees of the Plant were the common cadre. The petitioners in Misc. Petition No.1076 of 1976 who are employees in Design and Drawing Establishment of ore, Mines and Quarries Department and are working at the Mines Headquarters at Bhilai, belonged to this cadre. By order dated 3rd March 1962 passed by the General Manager there was a bifurcation and the personnel working in Drawing and Design office was allocated to the Mines organisation. In the year 1963 the Management introduced the incentive bonus scheme for the persons employed in Rajhara and Nandini mines. The benefit of the scheme was denied to the persons working in Design and Drawing office at the plant. By an agreement dated 19th August 1975 entered into between the Management and the Samyukta Khadan Mazdoor Sangh, a registered Union, a reference was made under section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for arbitration to Shri S.K. Sanyal Resident Engineer, Bhilai, for deciding, the following specific matters in dispute:- (A) Whether the Design and Drawing staff of Mines Head Quarters, who have been excluded from the purview of the Production Incentive Scheme can be legitimately brought within the coverage of the Production Incentive Schemes of Rajhara and Nandini Mechanised Mines. If so, how and from what date? (B) Whether the separation of Design and Drawing staff of O-M, Dept from the Design and Drawing staff of the plant was justified if not, what relief the concerned workmen are entitled to ?" The arbitrator gave his award on 26th May 1976. If so, how and from what date? (B) Whether the separation of Design and Drawing staff of O-M, Dept from the Design and Drawing staff of the plant was justified if not, what relief the concerned workmen are entitled to ?" The arbitrator gave his award on 26th May 1976. After narrating at considerable length the contentions advanced by the Union and the Management, the arbitrator gave the following award: Reference A:- "Some legitimate ground exists for bringing the Design and Drawing staff of the Mines Headquarters within the purview of the production incentive scheme, Considering the contribution made by the Design and Drawing staff of the Mines Headquarters to the production and incentive earnings of the Design and Drawing staff in the Rajhara and Nandini Mines, I am of the view that ends of justice will be met if a lump sum amount as detailed below is paid to each of the employees of the different categories for the period between the introduction of the first incentive scheme covering the Design and Drawing staff in the Mines i.e. 1st April 1963 and the introduction of the last incentive scheme covering an categories of staff i.e. 1st August 1975. Part payment to employees who have worked in Design and Drawing Department of Mines Headquarters for part of this time should be made on prorata basis:- 1. Design Assistant Rs.2,800/- 2. Sr. Draftsman Rs.2,600/- 3. Estimator Rs.2,000/- 4. Draftsman Rs.1,500/- 5. Jr. Draftsman Rs.1,100/- 6. Tracer Rs.700/- Reference (B):- "I consider that the separation of Design and Drawing staff of OMQ Department from the Design and Drawing staff of the plant is justified and hence, the concerned workmen are not entitled to any relief." 3. A perusal of the award quoted above wil1 show that the arbitrator held that there was some legitimate ground for bringing the Design and Drawing staff of the Mines Headquarters within the purview of the Production Incentive Scheme. The arbitrator, however, instead of leaving the quantum of payment to be determined in accordance with the scheme decided that a lump sum payment as specified in the award be made to the different categories of employees for the period from 1st April 1963 to 1st August 1975. The arbitrator, however, instead of leaving the quantum of payment to be determined in accordance with the scheme decided that a lump sum payment as specified in the award be made to the different categories of employees for the period from 1st April 1963 to 1st August 1975. As regards the second point in dispute, the arbitrator held that the separation of Drawing and Design staff of the Ore, Mines and quarries Department from the Drawing and Design staff of the plant was justified. The five employees in Misc. Petition No.1076 of 1976 challenge the award in so far as the award has gone against the workmen. The Management also challenges the same award in so far as it has gone against the Management. The Management's petition is Misc. Petition No.122 of 1977. It may here be mentioned that the Samyukta Khadan Mazdoor Sangh which was a party to the arbitration agreement and the award has not taken any part in the proceedings before us although it was joined as respondent No.2 in Misc. Petition No.122 of 1977 and seems to be not interested in the matter. 4. Learned counsel for the Management raised before us a preliminary objection that Misc. Petition No.1076 of 1976 is not maintainable as it was filed by the employees and not by the Union which was a party to the reference. The question whether the employees affected are entitled to challenge the award by a petition under Article 226, when the union does not come forward to challenge it, is settled by two decisions of this Court in favour of the employees:(Sital v. C.G.I. Tribunal 1969 JLJ 68 = AIR 1969 MP 200 and Bhilai S. Emp. Assi. v. A.W. Kanmadikar 1974 JLJ 91 = 1973 MPLJ 1025 . The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled. 5. The argument of the learned counsel for the employees before us is that the arbitrator did not give any reasons for making the award. It is pointed out that although the arbitrator extensively noted the contentions raised by the Union and the Management, the award was made without disclosing any reason as to why the contentions raised by the Union or the Management were acceptable or not acceptable. Learned counsel submits that failure to give reasons lends a serious infirmity in the award. In our opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel must be accepted. Learned counsel submits that failure to give reasons lends a serious infirmity in the award. In our opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel must be accepted. The award of an arbitrator functioning under section 10-A derives its authority not merely from the agreement by which the dispute is referred but also from the statutory provisions contained in sections 10-A 17, 17-A, 18 and other allied provisions. In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind. Cycles Ltd AIR 1963 SC 874 , it was held that the arbitrator functioning under section 10-A is not a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution although he is a quasi-judicial authority amenable to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226. This restricted view of the, status of the arbitrator taken in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha's case does not now hold the field. In Rohtas Industries v. Its Union AIR 1976 SC 425 , the Supreme Court held that in view of the amendments to section 10-A and other cognate provisions by Act, No.36 of 1964, the position is changed and that it is legitimate to regard such all arbitrator now as part of the methodology of the soyereign's dispensation of justice, thus falling within the rainbow of statutory tribunals amenable to judicial review'. The position, therefore, now is that the arbitrator acting under section 10-A has the status of a statutory Tribunal. The award given by the arbitrator may effect not only the parties to the agreement but also those who are given opportunity of being heard under sub-section (3)(a) of section 10-A. The award may affect thousands of workers. In this background it is legitimate to infer from section 10-A an implied statutory obligation on the arbitrator to give his reasons in support of the conclusions of fact and law reached by him in the award. In Rohtak Delhi Transport (Prt) Ltd v. Risal Singh (1964) 1 LLJ 89 , a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court, (Grover and Dua, JJ.) held that the award should disclose on its face the reasons which may show the broad working of the arbitrator's mind in coming to his conclusions in adjudicating upon the dispute so that if the matter is brought before the Court, judicial scrutiny by it within the permissible limits under Article 226 of the Constitution is not made impossible or rendered wholly nugatory. We entirely agree with the view taken by the Punjab High Court. This view is now strongly supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Rohtas Industries case (supra). In that case although the point was not finally decided, the Supreme Court observed; "The need for a speaking order, where considerable numbers are affected in their substantial rights, may well be a facet of natural justice or fair procedure." It was further observed; "We may, by way of a side, express hopefully the view that a minimal judicialisation by statement, laconic or lengthy of the essential law that guides the decision, is not only reasonable and desirable but has, over the ages, been observed by arbitrators and quasi-judicial tribunals as a norm of processual justice." We are conscious of the recent Full Bench decision of this Court in Natwar Singh v. State of M.P. 1980 JLJ 69 , where by majority it has been held that unless expressly or impliedly required by the statute or the rules, there is no obligation on a tribunal to give reasons. The majority judgment does not say that the obligation to give reasons can arise only when it is expressly laid down by the statute or the rules. It leaves the Court free to infer such an obligation impliedly from the provisions of the Act or the rules constituting the tribunal. Having regard to the provisions of section 10A and other provisions relating to nature of functions of the arbitrator and the binding effect of his award, we are of opinion that the Act impliedly imposes on him the obligation to give reasons in support of his conclusions or findings reached in the award. Failure to give reasons when it is obligatory to do so constitutes an error of law apparent on the face of the record. A number of contentions raising questions of law and fact relevant to the disputes were raised before the arbitrator by the Union and the Management. The award does not show as to what was the view taken by the arbitrator on these questions. The arbitrator is not expected to write a lengthy judgment like a Court, but he must briefly indicate the working of his mind i.e. the process of reasoning which leads him to decide the dispute referred in the way he does by the award. 6. The arbitrator is not expected to write a lengthy judgment like a Court, but he must briefly indicate the working of his mind i.e. the process of reasoning which leads him to decide the dispute referred in the way he does by the award. 6. Before parting with the case we will like to say that although we have decided this case without in any way departing from the majority ruling in Natwarsingh's case, the said ruling may have to be reconsidered in some appropriate case, for the view taken in it is not consistent with the modern trends in the administrative Jaw. Under the strict common law rule a tribunal was not bound to give reasons unless required to do so by statute and the record was limited to the pleadings if any and the adjudication but not the evidence. nor the reasons unless the tribunal chose to incorporate them in the adjudication: (R. V. Northumbar land Commensation Appeal tribunal (1952) 1 KB 338, P.352, Judicial review by issuance of a writ of certiorari thus could be easily frustrated except in cases of want of or excess of jurisdiction by withholding the reasons, for in the absence of reasons there could hardly be any error of law apparent on the face of the record. This unsatisfactory state of the common law was recognised both by the Committee on the Ministers' powers of 1932 and by the Committee on the Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries of 1957 and the latter's recommendation was given affect to in the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, section 12 of which provides that (subject to certain exceptions) each of the numerous tribunals specified in Schedule I to the Act must furnish a statement, either written or oral, of the reasons for its decision if requested to do so no or before the giving of its decision. The statement of reasons so furnished forms part of the decision and accordingly becomes part of the record. Critics of English law are of the view that "no single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reason for their decisions." Prof. The statement of reasons so furnished forms part of the decision and accordingly becomes part of the record. Critics of English law are of the view that "no single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reason for their decisions." Prof. Wade thinks that instead of waiting for parliament to make it obligatory on the tribunals to give reasons in support of their decisions, "the Courts might well have done as much on their own initiative, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice and is also a healthy discipline for all who exercise power over others." (Wade, Administrative law, 4th edition. p. 464). Although section 12 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Art is limited in application to the enumerated tribunals, the recent decisions of the English Courts have come "close to recognising a general right to reasoned decisions" on the principle that a denial of reasons hampers the exercise of the right of appeal as also right to approach the High Court for error on the face of the record. It is also said that a decision which is not supported by reasons can be condemned as arbitrary and unreasonable; (Wade, ibid). Our Supreme Court in this respect has been more progressive. In a long line of decisions beginning at least from Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder AIR 1961 SC 1669 and Bhagat Raja v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1606 and for the present (to our knowledge) ending with Seimens Engg and Mfg. Co. v. Union of India AIR 1976 SC 1785 , Mahendra and Mahendra Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 798 p. 823, Organ Chemical Industries v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 1803 p. 1808 and Rama Varma v. State of Kerala AIR 1979 SC 1918 p. 1922, it has been held that a quasi-judicial authority or tribunal must give reasons in support of its order. This general obligation has been spelt out as a fundamental principle without the aid of a statute on the reasoning that requirement of stating the reasons is a principle of natural justice and that constitutional provisions (Articles 226 and 136) relating to judicial review would be defeated if the quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals are free not to give reasons. This general obligation has been spelt out as a fundamental principle without the aid of a statute on the reasoning that requirement of stating the reasons is a principle of natural justice and that constitutional provisions (Articles 226 and 136) relating to judicial review would be defeated if the quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals are free not to give reasons. Some general observations to the contrary in Som Datt. v. Union of India AIR 1969 SC 4146 and Tarachand v. Delhi Municipality AIR 1977 SC 567 , have to be confined to the cases of disciplinary proceedings against an employer and to the cases of appellate or revisional authorities. There is a good body of judicial opinion that the disciplinary authori1y need not record its own reasons when it is agreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer and there may also be room for controversy as to the extent of the reasons to be given by an appellate or revisional authority when the original authority's order containing adequate reasons is merely affirmed: (See Jain and Jain, Administrative Law. third edition pp. 244;245 and footnote 1 at P. 245). But these cases cannot be taken to have set at sought all progressive thinking that a quasi-judicial order passed by the original authority must disclose its reasons. When a statute dealing with a quasi-judicial order did not in express terms provide that the person affected should be heard before passing of the order, Byles. J, said more than a century back that "the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature", (Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works. (1863) 14 CBRS 180 P. 194), we have marched ahead of that landmark and we can now safely say that if a statute dealing with a quasi-judicial order does not expressly provide that the party affected must be heard and that reasons must be given in support of the order the justice of our legal system will supply both these omissions of the legislature; (See Mohanlal v. Union of India 1980 JLJ 165 P. 167) It may here be mentioned that under the American Administrative Law, section 8 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 1940, provides that the decision of an administrative agency shall include a statement of findings and conclusions and the reasons or basis therefore, on all the material issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record. It has been held by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that "the necessity for administrative agencies to provide a statement of reasons is a fundamental principle of administrative law: (Schwartz, Administrative Law, 1976, p. 423). Our Supreme Court has gone to the length of saying that even in cases of administrative orders where rights of parties are affected rules of natural justice have to be followed and it is desirable that the order should contain reasons (Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa AIR 1975 SC 2226 . p. 2234 and Manabir Jute Mills v. Shibhan Lal AIR 1975 SC 2057 p. 2060. Thus the majority ruling of the Full Bench in Natwarsingh's case with great respect to the learned Judges, appears to us to be somewhat out of tune with the times and there are good grounds for rethinking on the points decided therein. 7. The petitions are allowed. The award made by the arbitrator is quashed. The arbitrator is directed to make a fresh award deciding the dispute referred to him in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs of these petitions. The security amount be refunded to the petitioners in both the petitions.