UDAY SINHA, J. 1. This application in revision by the plaintiffs is directed against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur where by the plaint was rejected under Order 7, rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The facts essential for disposing of the present application are hereinafter stated. 3. The suit lands were bakast jote lands of the ex-landlords of Barari. At a family partition or the ex-landlords they fell to the share of Shashi Mohan Thakur. The lands being bakast were deemed to be settled with the ex-proprietor. The lands being diara lands, were subject to erosion and fluvial action of river Ganges and went down the waters sometime in 1961/62. The State Government initiated proceedings for consolidation of holdings in terms of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1961/62 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The consolidation proceedings were completed and notification to the effect was finally published on 19.1.1965. It is not disputed that in the course of the consolidation proceedings the suit lands were submerged in water. In the consolidation proceedings in the matter of preparation of upto-date record of rights in terms of section 8 of the Act, the suit lands were recorded as "Bihar Sarkar" the lands came out of water sometime in 1975. The proprietors unaware of the entry in the record of rights, assumed possession over them and wherever it was possible they grew vegetables. They also appropriated the kas and other growths on the suit lands. The petitioners purchased the suit lands by a registered sale deed or 8.9.1976 from the ex-proprietor Shashi Mohan Thakur. Having purchased the suit lands, the plaintiffs claimed to have entered into possession of the said lands. In October, 1976 the local Kramchari went at the spot and with the intent of interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs threatened them to give up possession on the plea that the lands were of the Bihar Government which had been recorded as such in the record of rights. Threatened by the attitude of the Kramchari, representing the State Govt. the petitioners filed the title suit out of which the present application arises on 12.1.1977. Notice of tae suit having been issued the State of Bihar entered appearance and filed written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiffs. Threatened by the attitude of the Kramchari, representing the State Govt. the petitioners filed the title suit out of which the present application arises on 12.1.1977. Notice of tae suit having been issued the State of Bihar entered appearance and filed written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiffs. Besides other pleas it was contended on behalf of the State that section 37 of the Act, was a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The court below accepted the stand of the defendant and rejected the plaint as being barred by the provisions of section 37 of the Act. Hence the present application. 4. Section 37 originally read as follows : “Bar for jurisdiction of Court No Civil Court shall enterain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act. unless such decision or order has decided a question relating to title of land or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto." The section was amended by Bihar Act, 27 of 1975. After amendment section 37 reads as follows :- "Bar of Jurisdiction of Civil Courts No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act, with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act" The submission on behalf of the petitioners is that section 37 of the Act, as it stood before the amendment was the relevant provision and in terms or that section the present suit was not barred According to the plaintiffs, the provisions of section 37 after the amendment Act, of 1975 were not relevant. In order to appreciate this submission it is essential to take notice of the subject matter of the suit. The prayer in the plaint was as follows:- "(a) The court be pleased to bold and declare that the plaintiffs have go indefeasible right, title in the land in suit and the defendant has got absolutely no manner of right, title in the same as the suit land was Nagdi occupancy jote land of the plaintiff's vendor Shree Shashi Mohan Thakur. (b) On the above adjudication it be declared that the suit land has been wrongly recorded as Bihar Sarkar 10 the Survey made under the Consolidation Act, and the Survey entry in respect of the land in suit is wrong, null and void and without jurisdiction and not binding on the plaintiffs the substance of prayer at paragraph (a) was that the plaintiff's sought adjudication of their right and title in the suit lands as Nagdi occupancy jote of the plaintiff's vendor Shashl Mohan Thakur. The second prayer in substance was that the entry in tile record of rights had been wrongly made as Bihar Sarkar and that it was wrong, null and void and without jurisdiction and not binding on the plaintiffs. Section 37 of the Act, even before amendment or after placed no bar upon a civil court to adjudicate pure question of the. The bar was only to entertainment of a suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order under the Act, it is obvious therefore that any order passed. In terms of the Consolidation Act, cannot be varied or set aside by Civil Court but it does not deprive a Civil Court of the jurisdiction to decide question of title for all times. The scheme of the Act, is that while the consolidation proceedings are in operation no court should decide any question in relation to title. The scheme is contained in section 4 of the Act. Section (1) (b) of the Act, prohibits courts from entertaining any suit or legal proceeding while the consolidation proceedings are in progress. Suits Instituted prior to the Initiation of consolidation proceeding shall abate in terms of section 4 (c) of the Act. It is now well established that the abatement of the suit or appeal subsists only till the consolidation proceedings are in progress. The notification by State Government in official gazette stating that the consolidation operation have been closed, thereafter suits or appeals which had abated during the consolidation proceedings may be revived. In Ram Krit Singh and others vs. The State of Bihar and others a Full Bench of this court, to which I was a party laid down that on the close of consolidation operations in a village or area the abated suits would revive. In Ram Krit Singh and others vs. The State of Bihar and others a Full Bench of this court, to which I was a party laid down that on the close of consolidation operations in a village or area the abated suits would revive. It is thus obvious that the jurisdiction or civil courts to adjudicate questions of title remains in I abeyance during the consolidation operation it does not annihilare that powers of Civil Courts for all times. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that after the consolidation proceedings have come to a close, the jurisdiction of civil courts to adjudicate upon pure questions of title is not barred by section 37 of the Act. That is the position in law before the amendment of section 37 or after. The amendment, therefore, makes little difference in power of civil courts to adjudicate upon questions of title. The idea that courts are not debarred from adjudicating questions of title after the close of consolidation proceed logs is implicit in the words of section 37 (before amendment) itself. The second part of the section quoted above lays down that if the decision of the consolidation authorities has decided questions relating to title to lands or to some interest in land as between the parties having conflicting claims the jurisdiction of Civil Courts will no be barred. It would be curious situation that while civil suits would not be barred if the consolidation authorities have decided a question relating to title but it would be barred if no question of title has been decided by them. I see no warrant for this interpretation in regard to the content of section 37 of the Act, before the amendment or 1975. If a question of title has not been decided by the consolidation authorities a citizen must have some forum for getting a judicial verdict in regard to his title. In my view, a pure suit for title is not barred by section 37 of the Act. The clause unless such decision or order has decided a question relating to land or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims therefore is not to be found in section 37 after the amendment, but that makes no difference so far as the power or courts to adjudicate pure questions of title is concerned. The clause unless such decision or order has decided a question relating to land or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims therefore is not to be found in section 37 after the amendment, but that makes no difference so far as the power or courts to adjudicate pure questions of title is concerned. What will be the result of the suit is a different question and has no relevance to the maintainability of the suit. In my view, therefore the court below was clearly in error in rejecting the plaintiff's plaint as being barred by section 37 of the Act. The plaintiff’s wanted adjudication of their title. They did not seek to vary or set aside the order of the consolidation authorities. The plaintiff could not be denied their right to have their title adjudicated. 5. Learned Government Pleader no. 4 conceded that a title suit involving by pure questions of title would not be barred by section 37 of the Act. He, however, contended that such a title suit in which the jurisdiction might result in nullifying the effect of an order passed under the consolidation proceeding would be barred. I regret, there is no substance in this submission. Once having conceded that the Civil Court has Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate questions of title de hors any orders passed during the consolidation proceedings, It is not open to the opposite party to bring in the bar of section 37 by the back door as that would result in taking away the right of a citizen to have his question of title adjudicated by a court of law. In my considered view, therefore, neither before the amendment nor after the amendment was Civil Court debarred from entertaining a suit relating to pure question of title. I must make it clear that this observation of mine is not in relation to a situation where consolidation proceeding is in progress. If the consolidation proceedings have come to a close, Civil Courts are free to adjudicate the question of title. 6. Provisions similar to those of section 37 are to be found in several statutes and views similar to what I have taken above have been accepted in regard to their scope. If the consolidation proceedings have come to a close, Civil Courts are free to adjudicate the question of title. 6. Provisions similar to those of section 37 are to be found in several statutes and views similar to what I have taken above have been accepted in regard to their scope. An instance at hand is the one in section 35 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters which have been the subject of any application made or proceeding taken under chapters II to VI of Act. It is now well settled that section 35 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, place no bar on question of title and a suit for title to compensation is maintainable, Reference in this connection may be made to a division Bench decision of this court in Nawabzadi Kaniz Fatima Vs. Mohammad Yasin and others. On parity of reasoning, I am or the view that section 37 of the Bihar Consolidation or Holding and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 does not bar entertainment of suits for title by civil courts. 7. The second prayer of the plaintiffs was merely incidental to the primary prayer for adjudication of title. It is not necessary for the purpose or this application to decide whether the prayer in relation to the entry in the survey can be granted or not to the plaintiffs for the simple reason that the first prayer being cognizable by a civil court the plaint could not have been rejected. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge was, therefore clearly erroneous and without jurisdiction. 8. There is, however, an insurmountable difficulty in the way of the petitioners. By the impugned order the court below had rejected the plaint. The rejection of a plaint is decrees. The order was therefore, appealable in terms of section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order being appealable, the present civil revision application must be held to be not maintainable. There is thus no option but to dismiss the present civil revision application. Learned counsel for the petitioners endeavoured to steer clear of this difficulty by contending that although the court below used the expression "the plaint is rejected", it really held that the suit was not maintainable and, therefore, the order was revisable. The endeavour of learned counsel for the petitioners is entirely without substance. Learned counsel for the petitioners endeavoured to steer clear of this difficulty by contending that although the court below used the expression "the plaint is rejected", it really held that the suit was not maintainable and, therefore, the order was revisable. The endeavour of learned counsel for the petitioners is entirely without substance. The order on the face of it was order of rejection of the plaint and therefore, appealable and not revisable. 9. For the reasons, stated above, tile application is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case without cost it will be open to the plaintiffs to institute a fresh suit for declaration of their title. I agree Application dismissed.