JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - Plaintiff is in appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge of Balasore dismissing his suit for specific performance of contract for sale of 2.44 acres of land as per the agreement dated 12-9-1966 (Ext. 1). 2. Plaintiff alleged that Janaki, a member of the Scheduled Tribes, was in need of money for legal necessity and as sale could not be effected without the requisite permission stipulated under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, the consideration money was fixed up at Rs. 6,000/-, the agreement to sell (Ext. 1) was executed; a sum of Rs. 4,000/. as part of the consideration money was advanced and Plaintiff was put in possession. It had been stipulated that Janaki would execute the sale deed after obtaining the requisite permission. She, however, did not take appropriate steps and ultimately died. A notice of demand was raised against her daughter, the Defendant, by Ext. 2 and when in the reply, the agreement to sell was disputed, the suit was brought on 10-7-1968. 3. In the written statement, it was pleaded that Janaki had borrowed ten maunds of paddy from the elder brother of the Plaintiff and the creditor had asked for a blank stamp paper as security. The said blank paper had been converted into the agreement (Ext. 1). The alleged legal necessity was disputed. 4. The learned Trial Judge came to hold that Janaki was an illiterate rural lady and the onus lay on the Plaintiff to prove by cogent and satisfactory evidence that Ext. 1 had been duly executed. The learned Trial Judge drew adverse inference against the Plaintiff for non-examination of one Umakanta Si and on the basis of the evidence came !o hold that the document (Ext. 1) was not a valid one. Referring to certain intrinsic material in the document (Ext. 1) the learned Trial Judge found that the left-hand thumb impression of Janaki had been affixed on the left-hand margin of the document which was an unusual feature. He also did not accept the plea of part payment of the consideration money and, therefore, dismissed the suit. 5. Though not raised in the Court below, at the hearing of the appeal, the bar of suit as provided u/s 40(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act came up for consideration. He also did not accept the plea of part payment of the consideration money and, therefore, dismissed the suit. 5. Though not raised in the Court below, at the hearing of the appeal, the bar of suit as provided u/s 40(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act came up for consideration. Sub-section (2) provides: Every Suit for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of land, instituted after the 26th day of September, 1970 an before the commencement of the Orissa Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973 shall abate and no suit for the specific performance of any such contract entered into before such commencement shall be maintainable. Mr. Mohanty for the Appellant agrees that even if such a question was not raised in the written statement it was obligatory for the court to give effect to the mandatory provision of the statute. The legislative intention in providing Sub-section (2) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhikari Sahu and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors. ILR 1975 Cutt. 843, At page 889 of the Reporter, this Court observed: The restriction imposed under Sub-section (1) is with a view to facilitating the determination of the ceiling area. Transfer by mortgage in favour of certain institutions has been exempted from the operation of Sub-section (1). Similarly, decrees are honoured by Clause (b) of the proviso and execution proceedings are saved. No serious attack has been advanced against this part of Section 40. The State has recognised an interregnum between the 26th day of September, 1970 and the 2nd October, 1973. Suits instituted for specific performance of contracts between this period are to abate and after the 2nd October, 1973, a suit for specific performance of contract entered into before the 2nd October 1973 is not maintainable. A lot of dispute has been raised in regard to the justification for fixing up the date as the 26th. September 1970. As we intend to deal with that aspect independently, much discussion on the said provision at this stage is not warranted. One of us had occasion to deal with the question again in the case of Banambar Behera and Anr. v. Ganesh alias Ganeswar Parida and Ors. 47 (1979) C.L.T. 608. There the contract for sale was dated 16-2-1964 and the suit had been filed on 25-3-1966. One of us had occasion to deal with the question again in the case of Banambar Behera and Anr. v. Ganesh alias Ganeswar Parida and Ors. 47 (1979) C.L.T. 608. There the contract for sale was dated 16-2-1964 and the suit had been filed on 25-3-1966. This Court did not accept the plea of bar u/s 40(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act as it was held that the second part of Sub-section (2) did not intend to touch suits filed before the 26th day of September. 1970. The reasoning given In paragraph 8 of the decision would not make Sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act applicable to the suit. We are inclined to endorse the view. 6. It was held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Ardesir H. Hama v. Flora Bassoons AIR 1928 P.C. 208 : In a suit for specific performance on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed he was required to prove a continuous readings and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit.... Although so far as the Act (Specific Relief Act) is concerned, there is no express statement that the averment of readiness and willingness is in an Indian suit for specific performance as necessary as it always was in England (Section 24 (b) is the nearest), it seems invariably to have been recognized, and, on principle their Lordships think rightly, that the Indian and the English requirements in this matter are the same. See e.g., Karsandas v. Chhotalal AIR 1924 Bom. 199. And, with this fact in view, Section 19 of the Act becomes in the present investigation all important. The aforesaid dicta of the Judicial Committee were in clear terms approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Gomathinayagam Pillai and Others Vs. See e.g., Karsandas v. Chhotalal AIR 1924 Bom. 199. And, with this fact in view, Section 19 of the Act becomes in the present investigation all important. The aforesaid dicta of the Judicial Committee were in clear terms approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Gomathinayagam Pillai and Others Vs. Pallaniswami Nadar Justice Shah, as the learned Judge then was, after quoting the observations of the Judicial Committee stated: The Respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of bearing of the suit. On this part of the case the Trial Court record a clear finding against the Respondent that he was at no time ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The High Court did not consider the effect of this finding upon the claim of the Respondent and without expressing dissent with that finding granted a decree for specific performance to the Respondent. In the instant case, Plaintiff did not at all plead his readiness and willingness. It is true that as P.W. 1, in paragraph 8 of his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but this does not satisfy the requirement of law. The Judicial Committee as also the Supreme Court dearly indicated that the Plaintiff had to plead that fact and the pleading if traversed had to prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. 7. Admittedly Janaki was an illiterate, old lady belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. Burden law on the Plaintiff to prove due execution of the agreement. The defence plea was that Janaki never knew that she was being asked to execute an agreement for sale of 2.44 acres of land a kaida taken from her as security had been converted into agreement. The agreement itself has unusual features. The scribe (P.W. 2) has admitted tbat be bad scribed some documents and be bad seen several documents. When be was asked to explain the unusual feature of the left-band thumb impression appearing on the left-side margin of the document, he could not give a satisfactory explanation for it. The learned Judge has, therefore, not accepted the document to be a genuine one. When be was asked to explain the unusual feature of the left-band thumb impression appearing on the left-side margin of the document, he could not give a satisfactory explanation for it. The learned Judge has, therefore, not accepted the document to be a genuine one. We do not think, the assessment is wrong. Whether Janaki bad any need for selling of the property has also a material bearing on the question of genuineness of the agreement. The legal necessities bad been specified in the document and the learned Trial Judge on the basis of the evidence has come to hold that the averment relating to either of the legal necessities was not true. If Janaki had no need of selling the property and raising money, there would indeed be no occasion for her to enter into a contract for sale. The evidence regarding passing of the part of the consideration money is equally unsatisfactory. In view of this state of the record, we do not think the Plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for specific performance. 8. Mr. Mohanty for the Appellant conceded that the Court cannot decree specific performance in view of the clear bar under the Land Reforms Act that without permission from the requisite authority a sale of property belonging to a member of the Scheduled Tribes would not be valid. Admittedly, no permission has been obtained. Mr. Mohanty, however, contended that we can pass a decree binding the Defendant to execute the sale deed as and when the requisite permission was obtained. As we have not been impressed with the genuineness of the agreement, the question of our giving such a direction does not arise. The appeal has to fail. We accordingly dismiss it. We, however, leave parties to bear their own costs in this Court. J.K. Mohanty, J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed