ORDER M.M. Husain, J. -This petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. (new) has been filed for quashing the proceedings of case No. 68 of 1976 pending in the Court of a Judicial Magistrate at Sitapur. Those proceedings have arisen on the basis of charge-sheet. Annexure No. 2, submitted by Mahmudabad police for petitioners prosecution under Section 412, I. P. C. The Magistrate concerned has summoned the petitioner to stand his trial for offences under Sections 302, 394 and 412, I. P. C. in that case. The petitioner contends that his prosecution for the aforesaid offences is barred by Section 300 (1), Cr. P. C. (new) and, "therefore, the submission of the aforesaid charge-sheet by the police against the petitioner and his summoning by the Magistrate concerned to stand his trial for the aforesaid offences amounts to an abuse of the process of Court. 2. It is not disputed that earlier Mahmudabad police had prosecuted the petitioner and one Matin alias Munna alias "Sultana for offences under Section 302/ 34 and Section 394, I. P. C. with the allegation that they, along with others, entered into the house of one Imdad Khan and after strangulating his wife to death took away valuable property from Imdad Khans house. On the basis of that charge-sheet the petitioner, Matin and two others were tried by the IV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Sitapur, in connected Sessions Trials Nos. 633 and 633-A of 1976 for offences under Sections 302/34 and 394, I. P. C. On 1-6-1978 the learned Judge convicted the petitioner and Matin alias Munna for those offences and awarded different terms of imprisonment to them. They have filed appeals against their conviction and sentences which are pending in this Court as Criminal Appeal No. 426 of 1978 and Criminal Appeal No. 565 of 1978. A perusal of the judgment of the Sessions Judge pronounced in the aforesaid Sessions Trial shows that the allegation of the prosecution in the aforesaid case was that some articles removed by the robbers, after committing the murder of Imdad Khans wife, were recovered from petitioners possession. The learned Sessions Judge, however, did not frame any charge under Section 412, I. P. C. against the petitioner and tried him only for the main offences of murder and robbery and holding him guilty for those offences convicted him for the same. 3. The learned Sessions Judge, however, did not frame any charge under Section 412, I. P. C. against the petitioner and tried him only for the main offences of murder and robbery and holding him guilty for those offences convicted him for the same. 3. In the present impugned charge-sheet, Annexure No. 2 the same facts relating to offences of murder, robbery and recovery of robbed property have been alleged which were alleged in the previous trial wherein the petitioner was tried and convicted under Section 302/34 and Section 394, I. P. C. In the charge-sheet prosecution of the petitioner was claimed only under Section 412, I. P. C. but, somehow or the other, he has been summoned to stand his trial under Sections 302, 394 and 412, I. P. C. The contention of the petitioner is that after his conviction in the earlier trial for offences under Sections 302 and 394, I. P. C. on the basis of the same fact, on which the prosecution is now claimed under Section 412, I. P. C., his present prosecution is barred by Section 300 (1), Cr. P. C. (new). After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material on record I find force in this contention. 4. Section 300, Cr. P. C. (new) corresponds to Section 403, Cr. P. C. (old). Sub-section (1) of the aforesaid section of the new Code runs as follows:- "A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221 or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof." The above section embodies the ancient maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa i.e., no person should be twice vexed for the same cause. It lays down that where a person has once been tried and convicted or acquitted of an offence, he cannot again be tried for the same offence or for any other offence which is not distinct from the one previously tried. It lays down that where a person has once been tried and convicted or acquitted of an offence, he cannot again be tried for the same offence or for any other offence which is not distinct from the one previously tried. This section thus incorporates the common law principle of the well known pleas of autrefois acquit (formerly acquitted) and autrefois convict (formerly convicted). 5. In other words, it lays down that no one shall be punished or put in peril twice for the same matter. 6. Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India also provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. It operates as a bar to prosecution as well as conviction of a person for the same offence. The rule laid down in Section 300 (1), Cr. P. C. (new) is wider in terms inasmuch as it operates as a bar to the trial of a person who had once been convicted or acquitted not only for the same offence, but also for a cognate offence arising on the same facts. 7. In the present case the petitioner has obviously been wrongly summoned to stand his trial under Sections 302 and 394, I. P. C. because in the earlier trial he has already been tried and convicted for those offences and that conviction is still standing. So far as the trial of the petitioner for the offence under Section 412, I. P. C. is concerned Section 300 (1), Cr. P. C. (supra) not only lays down that a person once convicted of an offence shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, but it also lays down that on the same facts he can also not be tried for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221, Cr. P. C. or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (1) thereof. 8. Turning to Section 221, Cr. P. C. (new) it lays down that:- "221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed. P. C. or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (1) thereof. 8. Turning to Section 221, Cr. P. C. (new) it lays down that:- "221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed. (1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. (2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of sub-section (1), he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it." Illustration (a) attached to the said section lays down that if A is accused of an act which may amount to theft, or receiving stolen property, or criminal breach of trust or cheating, he may be charged with all those offences in one and the same trial. In Kartar Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (1952 Cri LJ 986): (AIR 1952 Vindh Pra 42) it was laid down that under Section 236, Cr. P. C. (old) charges under Sections 395 and 412, I. P. C. against an accused could be framed in the alternative and conviction under Section 395, I. P. C. could be altered to one under Section 412, I. P. C. in appeal when there was no surprise or prejudice. A learned Judge of our own High Court has laid down in Karhe Khan v. State (1968 All WR (HC) 871), which was a case under Section 403 (1), Cr.P.C. (old), that where an accused was already prosecuted and convicted or acquitted of the charge under Section 395, I. P. C. and later on another charge sheet was submitted against him under Section 412, I. P. C., when that alternative charge could be framed in the earlier trial, the second trial under Section 412, I. P. C. was barred by Section 403 (1), Cr. P. C. This is obviously so because under Illustration (a) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act the factum of recovery of property looted in a particular dacoity or robbery not only makes out a charge under Section 412, I. P. C. against the accused but it also raises an inference that he had participated in the alleged dacoity or robbery if recovery of property was made soon after the commission of the alleged dacoity or robbery. I am, therefore, of the opinion that after the conviction of the petitioner in the earlier trial for the offence under Section 394, I. P. C. and the Court which tried the petitioner in that case having failed to frame a charge under Section 412, I. P. C. against the petitioner on the basis of the facts which were disclosed in that trial, the prosecution is precluded from again prosecuting the petitioner under Section 412, I. P. C. on the basis of the same facts. The petitioners second trial on the basis of charge-sheet, Annexure No. 2, by the Magistrate concerned under Section 412, I. P. C. is thus barred by Section 300 (1), Cr. P. C. (new). If the proceedings pending against the petitioner on the basis of the said charge-sheet are allowed to continue it would obviously) amount to an abuse of the process of Court and in the interest of justice it is but necessary for this Court to interfere and quash the said proceedings. I, therefore, allow this petition and quash the impugned proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Sitapur on the basis of 'charge-sheet Anngxure No. 2.