JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—The petitioner Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., is a Company registered under the Companies Act and is manufacturing various products including Vanaspati Ghee (Rath Brand). Respondent No. 4 is the Managing Director of this Company. Respondent No. 3 is the distributor of this Company for its product Rath brand Vanaspati for Himachal Pradesh. Respondent No. 2 runs a provision shop at Simla and deals inter alia in Vanaspiti Ghee. Respondent No. 1 is the State of Himachal Pradesh and has been impleaded through the Government Food Inspector, Simla. 2. Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint against the petitioner and the other three respondents under section 7 read with section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Simla. Shortly stated the allegations in the complaint are that the Food Inspector on 23-3-1979 purchased a sample of Vanaspati Ghee from respondent No. 2 for the purposes of analysis. The sample comprised of a sealed tin of 2 kg. capacity of Rath brand Vanaspati Ghee and it had been purchased and dealt with in the manner prescribed under the Act and the rules made there under. On being analysed by the Public Analyst, the sample was found adulterated on account of deficiency in vitamin contents. 3. It appears that on an enquiry made by the Food Inspector at the time of taking the sample under section 14-A of the Act, respondent No. 2 disclosed that he had purchased the Vanaspati Ghee out of which the sample had been taken from respondent No. 3 under a warranty. The Food Inspector accordingly while issuing a notice under section 12 in form VI to respondent No. 2, issued a similar notice to respondent No. 3 also. 4. After making the allegations as above against respondents Nos. The Food Inspector accordingly while issuing a notice under section 12 in form VI to respondent No. 2, issued a similar notice to respondent No. 3 also. 4. After making the allegations as above against respondents Nos. 2 and 3, the complainant summed up the case against the accused persons in the penultimate para of the complaint in the following terms : "As Ram Prakash accused kept the said Vanaspati in store and was selling the same for human consumption, M/s. Imperial Coal Company Simla being the sole distributor sold the said Vanaspati to the accused No, 1 and M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills under the management of its Managing Director manufactured and sold adulterated and misbranded Vanaspati which they sold to M/s. Imperial Coal Co. Simla, have committed an offence under section VII of the P. F. A. Act, 1954." 5. The complaint was presented by the Food Inspector before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Simla on 31-7-1979 when the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the following order : Presented to-day by Shri D. N. Kaushik Govt. F. L Office to check and report on 2-8-79. Sd/- C.J.M.” There is then the report of some Court official reading like this : "I have gone through the case file and found correct as per the list attached with this file by the Food Inspector. Submitted for order please. Sd/- 1-8-79” The Chief Judicial Magistrate then passed the following order on 2-8-79 ; “2-8-79.—Present F. I. Sh. D. N. Kaushik Report seen. Register Issue summonses to the accused for 20-9-79. Sd/- C. J. M.” 6. No further progress was made in the complaint as the service of respondent No. 3 had yet to be effected when the petitioner Company presented the present petition seeking to invoke the re visional/inherent jurisdiction of this Court under sections 397/482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated against it and its Managing Director respondent No. 3 on the basis of the aforesaid complaint. 7. It would be obvious from a bare reading of the proceedings reproduced above that in passing his order dated 2-8-1979 summoning all the accused impleaded in the complaint, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, to say the least, acted in a most leisurely and irresponsible manner, not expected of a Judicial Officer of his status and experience. 7. It would be obvious from a bare reading of the proceedings reproduced above that in passing his order dated 2-8-1979 summoning all the accused impleaded in the complaint, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, to say the least, acted in a most leisurely and irresponsible manner, not expected of a Judicial Officer of his status and experience. At no stage of time prior to the date of this order did he care even to have a look into the contents of the complaint much less to apply his mind thereto with a view to satisfy himself if there was adequate justification for him to summon the accused or any of them He simply called for a report from the Court official, perused the same and ordered that the accused be summoned as if ft was a routine and innocuous order and he enjoyed plenary powers to drag any person to answer a criminal charge merely on the ground that a complaint hid been made against such a person. It must be remembered that an order summoning a person to appear in a Court of law to answer a criminal charge entails serious consequences. It has the effect of abridging the liberty of a citizen which is held so precious and sacred in our Republic. Such an order must not be passed unless it has behind it the sanction of law. 8. It was precisely with this end in view that the Legislature in its wisdom enacted Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the Code, This is a small chapter comprising of only four sections from section 200 to section 203. Its scope is to distinguish unfound ed from genuine cases so as to root them out at the very outset without calling upon the party complained against. Section 200 makes it obligatory on the part of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint to examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and to reduce the substance of such examination into writing. An exception, however, is made in the case of a complaint made by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a complaint made by a Court. An exception, however, is made in the case of a complaint made by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a complaint made by a Court. Even in such complaints though it is not obligatory for the Magistrate to examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, there is no bar for the Magistrate to make such examination of the complain ant and the witnesses if he considers it necessary so to do. In fact in appropriate cases he must do so. The object of such examination is to ascertain if any prima facie case is made out for proceeding further with the complaint after summoning the accused. Sometimes such examination may not be sufficient to enable the Magistrate to take a decision aforesaid especially when the allegations made in the complaint are made not on the personal knowledge of the complainant but on information conveyed to him. Section 202 of the Code is intended to meet a situation of this type. This section empowers the Magistrate to hold a further enquiry into the case himself or to direct investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he may deem fit. The purpose of such further enquiry or investigation is again the same, namely, to enable the Magistrate to form an opinion whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint. 9. Next comes section 203 which enjoins that the Magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if after considering the examination, if any, made under section 200 and the result of the enquiry or investigation, if any, under section 202 he is of the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. 10. It is only when the Magistrate does not dismiss the complaint under section 203 and is of the opinion that there is -sufficient ground for proceeding, that he can commence the proceedings against the accused by compelling his attendance before the Court. The procedure for issue of process for such attendance is found in section 204 of the Code. 11. It is only when the Magistrate does not dismiss the complaint under section 203 and is of the opinion that there is -sufficient ground for proceeding, that he can commence the proceedings against the accused by compelling his attendance before the Court. The procedure for issue of process for such attendance is found in section 204 of the Code. 11. Reading sections 203 and 204 together and keeping in view the sequence in which these sections appear in the Code, would go to suggest that in arriving at his conclusion whether or not to issue process against the accused, the Magistrate shall have to consider the same material on a consideration of which he shall have to decide whether the complaint should be dismissed under section 203. In fact for the purposes of section 204 the Magistrate shall have to consider the aforesaid material more minutely and in greater details. The reason is that where for the purposes of section 203 the Magistrate has to consider this material only for the purposes of forming an opinion whether there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, for the purposes of section 204 he has to not only form an opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding but he has also to take a decision regarding the nature of process to be issued for enforcing the attendance of the accused, whether summons or warrants. Issue of summons or warrants would depend upon the nature of the case and hence the Magistrate before the issue of process shall have further to form his opinion with respect to the nature of the offence for which the accused is to be summoned. It would thus necessarily follow that before directing issue of process against an accused person, the Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the material before him and ascertain not only that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further in the complaint but also the nature of the offence for which the accused need be summoned. It necessarily follows that under this provision the Magistrate does not enjoy an unrestricted power to summon a person at his whim, fancy or caprice simply because a complaint has been filed against him. It necessarily follows that under this provision the Magistrate does not enjoy an unrestricted power to summon a person at his whim, fancy or caprice simply because a complaint has been filed against him. Although strictly speaking it is no requirement of section 204 that an order directing issue of process against the accused be supported by detailed reasons, nonetheless this order has to be made by the Magistrate after applying his judicial mind to the material on record and this application of mind must be exhibited in the order itself in one way or the other. An order passed by the Magistrate without application of such mind would be without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. 12. From a perusal of the impugned order it is just not possible to arrive at the conclusion that the Chief Judicial Magistrate applied his mind much less a judicial mind to the allegations made in the complaint, before directing the issue of process against the accused persons. For this reason alone the order dated 2-3-1979 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate is liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. All proceedings initiated in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate in persuance to this impugned order are also quashed. 13. The case is now sent back to the Chief Judicial Magistrate with the direction to proceed further in accordance with law as discussed above and from the stage when the complaint was presented to him. Order accordingly.