Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, M. P. Varma, JJ. 1. This appeal is by defendant no.1. The plaintiff respondent instituted a suit for declaration that the order of his discharge from service passed by the Collector of Gaya on 28-4-1967 was illegal and without jurisdiction. He also claimed a decree of Rs.13,873:70 on account of the arrears of salary and other allowances payable to him according to his service conditions from the month of July, 1962, to February, 1966, i, e. for the period just before the institution of the suit. The suit was filed on the 12th of March, 1966. As we are concerned with a very short question of limitation involved in tnis appeal, we are deliberately omitting all the bundles of facts, which have been stated in the judgment of the court below. The trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. It held that the order of di charge of the plaiatiffas illegal and void for failure of holding a proper enquiry and non" compliance of other provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The trial Court allowed a sum of Rs.12,19136 also on account of the arrears of salary and other allowances to the plaintiff. The State of Bihar accordingly appealed to this Court. 2. Mr. Angad Ojha, learned Government pleader no.1, has raised only one question for consideration of this Court and the question is as to whether the court below was right in decreeing the plaintiffs claim for arrears of salary etc. for a period beyond three years. 3. Although no specific issue on the question of limitation was framed by the trial court, the question of limitation was pleaded in the written statement and it was contended in the Court below on behalf of the appellant that the suit of the plaintiff was governed by Article 102 of the old Limitation Act, which corresponds to Article 7 of the new Limitation Act and, tnerefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to get arrears of salary for the period beyond three years prior to the date of the institution of the suit. The Court below overruled this plea of limitation relying upon a Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of State of mad V/s. A. V. Anan tharaman, (AIR 1963 Madras 425), wherein it was held that the right of the dismissed Government servant for recovery of arrears of pay accrues after his reinstatemant and, therefore, he could institute a suit within three years from that date. The learned Government pleader disputed the correctnes of this decision of the Madras High Court on the basis of the authorities of Madaya Pradesh and Punjab High Courts. We shall come to these authorities herein after Article 7 of the new Limitation Act prescribed a period of three years limitation for institution of suit from the date when the wages accrue due. The trial Court on the basis of the aforesaid decision of the Madras High Court took, the view, as already seen above, that a person who is confronted with an order of discharge or dismissal cannot institute a suit unless the said order is set aside and, therefore, the right to claim the arrears of salary arises only after the order of discharge or dismissal is set aside. 4. Having given our most anxious thought and consideration to the question raised on behalf of the appellant by the learned Government pleader, we are of the opinion that with due respect to the learned Judges of the Madras high Court, we do not find it possible to accept their view. 5. The starting point for institution of the suit as contemplated under article 7 of the Limitation Act is clearly from the date when the wages accrue due. It was not disputed by Mr. Kailash Roy, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent that the salary did accure to the plaintiff every month but he contended that the right of the plaintiff of claim the salary was obstructed on account of the impugned order of his discharge and, therefore, until the right to make the claim became available, the period of limitation should not start to run. We find that this question has fallen for consideration in various High courts besides the Federal Court and the Supreme Court, and, save and except, the Madras High Court, no other Court has taken such a view. We find that this question has fallen for consideration in various High courts besides the Federal Court and the Supreme Court, and, save and except, the Madras High Court, no other Court has taken such a view. All the Courts are unanimous that in case of monthly wages, they accrue and become due in law on the last date of each month and the period of limitation for each months wages would begin to run from that date; and that the date of termination of the service will not be the starting point under this Article. The madras High Court also has not disputed the time of accrual of the salary that in the case monthly wages, it becomes due on the last date of each month but has simply purported to make a distinction to the starting point of limitation under Article 7 with reference to the "right to recover arrears of salary". 6. Now we may notice some of the authorities of the other High Court before going to the cases of Federal Court and of the Supreme court. We shall first notice the two authorities referred to by the barned Government pleader. In the case of Union of India, New Delhi, V/s. P. V. Jagannath Ray ( AIR 1968 MP 204 ) the order of dismissal of a civil servant passed in violation of sec.240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was under challenge. In this case the plaintiff had entered into a railway service in the year 1941 in the bengal Nagpur Railway. His services were terminated with effect from 18-3-1945. He then instituted a suit in the civil court claiming a declaration that the order of termination of his services was illegal. He succeeded in the suit and the decree of the trial Court was maintained upto the High Court and the plaintiff was reinstated by an order da;ei 2-1-1959. He then instituted a suit 01 the 1st of March 1952, claiming the arrears of his salary until his renistatement for a total sum of Rs.45281.34 paise. It was on these facts that the question of limitation arose and it was held by the learned judges, in disagreement with the view of the Madras High. He then instituted a suit 01 the 1st of March 1952, claiming the arrears of his salary until his renistatement for a total sum of Rs.45281.34 paise. It was on these facts that the question of limitation arose and it was held by the learned judges, in disagreement with the view of the Madras High. Court that the claim of the arrears of salary accrued to the plaintiff every month and so his claim for the arrears of salary for a period prior to the three years of the institution of the suit would be barred by limitation. 7. The Punjab High Court had also, in the case of Union of lndia through the Secretary, Ministry of Communication Government of India, New delhi V/s. Ram Nath Chitory (AIR 1966 Punjab 500) recorded its disagreement with the view of the Madras High Court and later, a Full Bench of this High court in the case of Jagdish Miner V/s. union of India and another (AIR 1969 punjab and Haryana 441) on the facts and the circumstances very much similar to that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, observed that on the declaration of the order of dismissal of a civil servant being void and inoperative, the dismissal becomes ineffective from its inception and the civil servant continues in service in spite of the order and the cause of action for the salary accrues every month by a legal fiction, therefore, the order of dismissal becomes nan est and non-existing in the eye of law and all the consequences flowing from its automatically follow. The employee, therefore, would be deemed to be in service all along and entitled to claim the arrears in respect of the said period. We are tempted to quote an observation from this decision, which runs as follows : "the sweep arid amplitude of the legal fiction that the employee should be deemed to be in service all along will have the effect of preventing payment of arrears in respect of a period beyond three years when actually the employee was doing nothing for the Government. " We find that the Bombay High Court also in the case of Dr. V. D. Angal V/s. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968 Bombay 304) has taken the same view. " We find that the Bombay High Court also in the case of Dr. V. D. Angal V/s. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968 Bombay 304) has taken the same view. 8 The principle underlying in all these cases is that in a suit for declaration by a dismissed employee on the ground that the same was void and illegal, the employee is entitled to claim the arrears of salary on the date of the institution of the suit and if he omits to sue for the same then under order II Rule 2 of the code of Civil Procedure that would affect the subsequent suit for arrears prior to the said date. Once this principle, which is the basis of all the above cases is accepted, then in our view there is no escape from the conclusion that the plain tiff is bound to claim his salary for the period of three years when he goes to the court for a declaration that the order of his discharge or his termination of service was bad, we get support for this view from the case of the Punjab province V/s. Tara Chand (AIR 1947 Federal Court 23 ). We find that the question had fallen for consideration before the Supreme Court also in the case of jai Chand Sawhaney V/s. Union of India (1970. (II) Supreme Court Journal 288) wherein in very clear terms Mr. Justice Shah (as he then was) observed that "if the order of dismissal is set aside the public servant is deemed to be in service throughout the period during which the order of dismissal remained operative and his right to sue for salary arises at the end of every month in which he was unlawfully prevented from earning the salary, which he could, but for the illegal order of dismissal, have earned. The period of limitation under Article 102 of the indian Limitation Act, 1908, commence to run when the wages "accrue due" "and the wages accrue due when in law the servant becomes entitled to wages". 9. The period of limitation under Article 102 of the indian Limitation Act, 1908, commence to run when the wages "accrue due" "and the wages accrue due when in law the servant becomes entitled to wages". 9. In view of the series of authorities, noticed above we are left with no doubt in our mind that the judgment of the trial Court cannot be upheld to the extent it has purported to allow the arrears of salary to the plaintiff-respondent for a period beyond three years from the date of the institution of the suit and to that extent this appeal must succeed. 10. Before parting with the case, however, we would like to notice a submission made by Mr. Kailash Roy that on account of this view there may be grave injustice in some such cases where the plaintiff is detained by his employer in disposal of the departmental proceeding inasmuch as his right to go to the civil court may arise in some cases after exhausting the departmental or other remedies. Circumstances of this type, no doubt, can arise and the court is aware where departmental proceedings have taken abnormally Long time. In such a case a plaintiff, who is delayed without any fault of his own to seek redressal in the court of law may suffer on the ground of limitation. We, however, do not feel any necessity to deliberate upon this aspect of the matter as it has not been shown to us that this question needs any consideration on the facts of the present case. 11. For the reasons discussed above, we allow the appeal in part to the extent indicated above, but in the circumstances make no order as to costs, appeal allowed