ORDER T.S. Misra, J. - The opposite party No, 3 filed an application under Section 21 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 on 12th August, 1976, seeking eviction of the present petitioner from the premises in question and for the release of the same in his favour. The grounds on which the application was founded were these: The applicant's family consisted of five persons including three school going children and the accommodation with the applicant was inadequate, that income of the applicant was not sufficient to meet the education expenses of his children, that the applicant's wife, who is M.A., B.Ed., proposes to start a children Nursery School in the premises occupied by the opposite party (the present petitioner) including another portion of the house occupied by one Smt. Rama Devi against whom a release application under Section 16 of the said Act was already pending, that the applicant's wife was making her best efforts to get the required sanction of the State Education Department for starting such an educational institution in the premises in question and was in correspondence with the authorities of the Basic Education Board of Uttar Pradesh, that after getting the sanction and approval of the Board, the applicant's wife has to satisfy the concerned authorities of the Basic Education Board that she has at her disposal sufficient and suitable place and accommodation to start such an educational institution, that even if no such sanction or approval is accorded by the U.P. Education Board, the applicant's wife will start her own private Nursery and Primary School for the children of the locality for which there is a pressing need in the locality for which a type of children's Nursery School and that besides rendering such social service in the sphere of spreading literacy of opening such a school in the locality, the applicant's wife hoped to earn some small money by this profession for which she is fully qualified. 2. The application was contested by the present petitioner before the Prescribed Authority who filed his affidavit in support of his objection. 2. The application was contested by the present petitioner before the Prescribed Authority who filed his affidavit in support of his objection. In his objection he stated that the family of the landlord consisted of himself, his wife and three minor children, that the alleged need of the applicant's wife to start a school was denied, and that the tenant-petitioner had been residing in the premises in question for the last about 18 years and his family consisted of himself his wife, his two minor sons and two major sons. The tenant-petitioner also pointed out that the accommodation at the disposal of the landlord is a double stored building comprising of one big hall, five rooms, one big veranda, kitchen with store room, 1 bath room, open courtyard with kitchen garden and open land measuring about 50' x 25' and it was urged that this accommodation was more than sufficient for the need of the applicant and his family. He also pointed out that the accommodation in his occupation comprises of two small rooms, one small tin shed, one small courtyard and a latrine without electric and a common water tap and that the accommodation was hardly sufficient for his need. With regard to the income it was stated that the landlord is a Central Government employee getting about Rs. 900/- per month with other amenities whereas the tenant was an employee in a private firm getting Rs. 300/- per month and he could not afford to have another house within his means. It was also alleged that the landlord on his own showing wanted to convert the residential accommodation into a commercial one and, therefore, the application under Sec. 21 of the Act was not maintainable. 3. The Prescribed Authority found that the landlord was undergoing great financial crisis and was in need of heavy extra income. Further, his wife, who is M.A., B.Ed., had entered into correspondence with the authorities concerned for the purposes of opening a primary and nursery school and further she had to satisfy the authorities concerned that she had sufficient accommodation for the said purpose; hence the Prescribed Authority held that the need of the applicant's family was there. At the same time he held that the tenant had failed to show that his need was more genuine and pressing as compared to that of the applicant. The application was, therefore, allowed. 4. At the same time he held that the tenant had failed to show that his need was more genuine and pressing as compared to that of the applicant. The application was, therefore, allowed. 4. The tenant filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge from the order of the Prescribed Authority. The learned Third Additional District Judge, Lucknow, who heard the appeal, noticed the fact that the wife of the landlord is M.A., B.Ed., that she proposes to start a children Nursery School that the landlord, however, cannot be asked to keep his wife idle and not do any work, that she is highly educated and wants to teach children and she cannot be precluded from it, that she has been in correspondence with the authorities of the Government to run the school and that the premises is well suited for the school and held that the need of the landlord was bona fide. It was also held that the landlord did not want to convert the residential building into a commercial building. So far as the comparative assessment of hardships is concerned, the learned Additional District Judge observed as under:- "On comparison of the needs of the parties it is apparent that the applicant has got no other accommodation for opening the school. To the contrary the opposite party may have alternative accommodation. He can also claim another accommodation of allotment on priority basis on the ground of his eviction from the disputed premises." The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. The tenant has now come to this Court with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. That petition has been opposed. 5. For the petitioner it was urged that from the averments made in the application under Section 21 of the Act it was quite plain that the landlord wants to occupy the residential building for business purposes; hence the application is not maintainable in view of the third proviso to Section 21 of the Act. The argument was that both the Courts below have recorded a finding that the landlord needs the residential building for the purpose of running a primary School therein by his wife. Such a purpose, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, is a business purpose and therefore, the application under Section 21 is barred by the third proviso of Sec. 21. Such a purpose, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, is a business purpose and therefore, the application under Section 21 is barred by the third proviso of Sec. 21. The learned counsel for the landlord-opposite-party, on the other hand, submitted that it would not be a business purpose and the application cannot be said to be barred by the third proviso as alleged. According to his submission, the accommodation from which eviction is sought for is a part of the residential building which is occupied by the landlord and, therefore, the landlord has a right to evict the tenant from that building. The wife of the applicant wants to run a Primary and Nursery School in the accommodation in question to educate children of the locality. It is a social purpose or social service and not a business purpose and while rendering such a social service if some income is also earned, that would not make the service as business or profession or trade or calling. 6. A landlord under sub-section (1) of Section 21 is entitled to file an application against his tenant on the ground that he bona fide requires an accommodation in question for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling however, the third proviso to Section 21 says that no such application shall be entertained in the case of any residential building for occupation for business purposes. Reading together clause (a) of sub-section (1) with clause (ii) of third proviso, it is manifest that a landlord can file an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he bona fide requires the accommodation in question for purposes of business but if the accommodation in question has been used as residential accommodation, an application for eviction of the tenant therefrom would not lie if the landlord wants to use that residential building for occupation for business purposes. In other words, a landlord can file an application for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation which was used for business purposes by the tenant for occupation for business purposes but if the accommodation was used for residential purposes, he cannot seek eviction of the tenant for occupation for business purposes. In other words, a landlord can file an application for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation which was used for business purposes by the tenant for occupation for business purposes but if the accommodation was used for residential purposes, he cannot seek eviction of the tenant for occupation for business purposes. The term "business" has been defined in Rule 2 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, as meaning any profession, trade or calling. Therefore, a residential building cannot be permitted to be converted for occupation for any profession, trade or calling. Admittedly, the accommodation in question occupied by the present petitioner is a residential building. It has to be seen whether the landlord requires it for occupation for business purposes, that is to say, for the purpose of any profession, trade or calling. If he requires it for the purpose of any profession trade or calling, his application would certainly be barred by the third proviso to Section 21 of the Act. ' 7. The terms "profession, trade or calling" came up for construction in a number of cases before this Court as also other High Courts. Recently a Division Bench of this Court also considered that meaning of these three words in the case of Dr. Bashiruddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr ( (1978) 1 Ren CJ 199 : (1978 All LJ 82)). The Division Bench referred to a Madhya Pradesh High Court case in Badri Lal v. Digamber Jain Sonkutch (1973 Ren CJ 345; (AIR 1973 Madh Pra 272)) wherein it was held that 'running' of a Pathsala or school for religious instructions is a business within the meaning of Section 12 (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the Model Town Welfare Council v. Bhupinder Pal Singh (1971 Ren CJ 548 : (AIR 1973 Punj 76)) also construed the word 'business' occurring in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the Model Town Welfare Council v. Bhupinder Pal Singh (1971 Ren CJ 548 : (AIR 1973 Punj 76)) also construed the word 'business' occurring in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. One of the questions considered by the Full Bench was as to whether the word "business" has been used in the definition of "rented land" in Section 2 (f) and in clause (b) of Section 13 (3) (a)(ii) of the Act in the restricted sense of commercial business carried on with the motive of earning profit or in the larger sense in which the expression includes everything which engages the time, Talent and interest of a man, i.e., something in which a person proposes to engage himself either as a duty or in discharge of the responsibilities of his office. The Full Bench held:- The word 'business' in Section 2 (f) and Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act need not necessarily be commercial business carried on with a profit motive. The word includes within its scope a charitable business or a dealing in the interest of the public or a section of the public". Both the aforesaid decisions were concerned with interpreting the word 'business' occurring in enactments which are pari materia with the Act with which the Division Bench was concerned and with which I am concerned in the instant case. The Division Bench approved of the view taken in the aforesaid cases. The word 'profession' has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary Vol. VIII, Pages 1427-28 as: "The occupation which one professes to be skilled in and to follow (a) Avocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of learning or science is used in its application to the affairs of others or in the practice of an art founded upon it." The facts of the instant case show that the wife of the applicant wants to run a Primary or Nursery School in order to augment the income of her family. She holds degrees of M.A. and B.Ed. She is in correspondence with the educational authorities of the Government to run the school. It was urged on behalf of the landlord that she wants to do some social service in the sense of spreading literacy in the locality in the city. She holds degrees of M.A. and B.Ed. She is in correspondence with the educational authorities of the Government to run the school. It was urged on behalf of the landlord that she wants to do some social service in the sense of spreading literacy in the locality in the city. She thus wants to suitably utilise her expert knowledge for rendering the alleged social service or for starting an educational institution in the accommodation in question for educating small children of the locality. The word 'profession' here would, therefore, include within its scope a dealing in the interest of the public or a section of the public. It was not the finding of the Courts below that the applicant landlord was short of residential accommodation, i.e., the accommodation in his possession was not sufficient enough to meet the requirements of his family consisting of himself, his wife and three minor children. The emphasis on his need was to open a school so as to supplement the income or as was urged in the arguments to render some social service because the applicant's wife happens to be possessing M.A. and B.Ed. degrees. The need of the landlord as set out in his application under Section 21 of the Act was, in my view, one for a "business" purpose. The Division Bench in Dr. Bashiruddin's case (1978 All LJ 82) (supra) had held :- "The third proviso of the section lays down that "no application under Cl. (a) shall be entertained in the case of any residential building for occupation for business purposes." In our opinion, the proviso debars landlord from applying for the eviction of a tenant from buildings under use as residence for the other purposes mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21 (1) that is to say for the purposes of profession, trade or calling. The right of a landlord to apply for the eviction of a tenant from a residential building remains intact provided he needs it for the purposes of his own residence or residence of any member of his family or any other person for whose benefit it is held by him but the clause under consideration acts as an impediment to the landlord converting a residential building into a non-residential building. That, in our judgment, is the intention of legislature. That, in our judgment, is the intention of legislature. Instead of repeating the words "for purpose of any profession, trade, or calling" occurring in clause (a) of Section 21 (1), the legislature has used the compendious expression "business purposes". We are firmly of the view that the words "business purposes" within the meaning of cl. (ii) of the Third Proviso to Section 21 covers within its range "purposes of any profession, trade or calling", occurring in Section 21 (1) clause (a)." 8. The learned counsel for the landlord-opposite party submitted that sub clause (a) provides that an application may be moved by a landlord who is the trustee of a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust. If the object of the trust is to impart education the landlord can make an application for eviction of a tenant from a residential accommodation if the accommodation is required for running a school therein; hence it was urged that clause (ii) of the third proviso, if interpreted in the manner set out hereinabove, would render the aforesaid right of a trustee landlord infructuous or nugatory and, therefore, clause (ii) of the third proviso should not be given such wide interpretation. I am unable to accept the argument. In fact this argument finds its answer in the observations of the Division Bench extracted hereinabove. It is further answered (sic) by purposes of a charitable trust, the objects of which provided for discrimination in respect of its beneficiaries on the ground of religion caste or place or birth no application under Cl. (a) shall be entertained. Clause (ii) of the third proviso covers those cases where the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation for his occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family or for the purpose of any profession, trade or calling. But if the residential building is sought to be converted for business purposes, no application under clause (a) shall be entertained by reason of the third proviso to Sec. 21 of the Act. 9. The learned counsel for the landlord further submitted that the said third proviso applies to a case where eviction is sought from the whole building and not from a part of the building. This argument is not borne out from the proviso itself. 9. The learned counsel for the landlord further submitted that the said third proviso applies to a case where eviction is sought from the whole building and not from a part of the building. This argument is not borne out from the proviso itself. There is no such provision in the Act that if a tenant is occupying a part of the building for residential purposes, the landlord can evict him from that building for carrying on business therein as defined in the Act. The contention of the tenant that the application under Section 21 of the Act was not maintainable has, therefore, merit. 10. That apart, neither the prescribed Authority nor the appellate Court below has made a comparative assessment of the hardships of the landlord and the tenant in the manner contemplated by Section 21 read with Rule 16 of the rules framed under the Act. The impugned orders are liable to be quashed on this ground as well 11. For the reasons in the foregoing, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the order dated 9th September, 1978, passed by the Third Additional District Judge, Lucknow in Rent Appeal No. 9 of 1978 and the order passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 19th December, 1977 in P.A. Case No. 213 of 1977, are quashed and the application under Section 21 of the Act is rejected.