J. K. Cotton Spinning, Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. , Kanpur v. State of Uttar Pradesh
1980-07-21
K.N.SINGH, S.J.HYDER
body1980
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - The petitioner is a Public Limited Company engaged in the manufacture and sale of cotton and blended fibre. Its factory is situated at Kanpur and its Headquarter is situated at Kamla Tower, Dwarikadhish Road, Kanpur. The company has engaged a number of workmen in connection with its manufacture and sale of cotton and blended fibre. In pursuance of Section 45 of the Factories Act, the company maintains a canteen for The benefit of its workmen. The persons employed in the canteen raised a demand for being given the same wages and dearness allowance and other benefits which was being paid to the workmen employed in the factory. The petitioner company did not accept the demand made by the canteen employees. Thereupon conciliation proceedings were taken which also failed as no settlement could be arrived at between the parties. On the report of the Conciliation Officer, the State Government by its order dated December 28, 1977, referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The petitioner company filed writ petition No. 2577 of 1978 in this Court challenging the validity of the order of reference and obtained stay of the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. 2. Meanwhile the respondent-work-men who are employed in the canteen made an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (Central Act) before the Labour Court at Kanpur for computation of certain benefits including wages and dearness allowance. The petitioner company filed objection and asserted that the application under Section 33-C (2) was not maintainable as the benefits claimed by the respondent-workmen was disputed by the company and the dispute was pending adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal which had been referred to adjudication by the State Government by its order dated 28-12-1977. On the pleadings raised by the parties, the Labour Court framed four different issues and directed the parties to produce evidence by its order dated 19-4-1979. By that order the Labour Court further observed that the preliminary objection as well as the merits of the case would be decided simultaneously after the evidence was produced by the parties. The petitioner company thereupon filed this petition under Article 226 of the Con situation, challenging the order of the Labour Court dated April 19, 1979. 3.
By that order the Labour Court further observed that the preliminary objection as well as the merits of the case would be decided simultaneously after the evidence was produced by the parties. The petitioner company thereupon filed this petition under Article 226 of the Con situation, challenging the order of the Labour Court dated April 19, 1979. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since there was interim order passed by this Court in writ petition No. 2577 of 1978, the Labour Court could not proceed further in the matter. This contention is no longer open to the petitioner as the writ petition No. 2577 of 1978 has been dismissed by us by a separate order and the stay order has been discharged. Learned counsel then urged that since the petitioner company had raised a dispute that the respondent-workmen were not its employees and no relationship of employer and employee existed between the parties, the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act was not maintainable. Learned counsel further urged that the preliminary objection raised by the petitioner should have been decided by the Labour Court before proceeding to hear and decide the dispute on merits. Section 33-C (2) provides a summary procedure for granting relief to the workmen as it permits the workmen to approach the Labour Court for computing benefits which is capable of being computed in terms of money. A workman may approach the Labour Court for computing the benefits in terms of money. Prior to the amendment of Section 33-C (2) (Central Act) in 1964 a workman could not claim monetary benefits like wages, dearness allowance and bonus etc. as held by the Supreme Court in Kaya Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ( AIR 1965 SC 1488 ). Even though the Supreme Court was dealing with the scope of Section 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947, but the principles laid down by the Supreme Court are, applicable to the interpretation of Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 as the provisions of Section 6-H are analogous to Section 33-C of the Central Act. After the amendment of the Central Act the position has changed and now it is permissible for a workman to approach the Labour Court claiming benefits like wages, dearness allowance etc. 4.
After the amendment of the Central Act the position has changed and now it is permissible for a workman to approach the Labour Court claiming benefits like wages, dearness allowance etc. 4. The question, however, arises as to whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to determine the wages and dearness allowance which are disputed by the management of the petitioner company. Proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act are summary in nature and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is like that of execution court. While exercising summary jurisdiction under Section 33-C (2), the Labour Court is not empowered to adjudicate on the rights of the parties which can conveniently be done under a reference made to an industrial court. No doubt, the Labour Courts jurisdiction is not ousted merely on a dispute being raised by the employer relating to the right of the workmen to receive benefits of wages and dearness allowance, but in a case where the employer has set up a plea that the workmen concerned are the workmen of the contractor and that there is no relationship of master and servant between the company and the workmen employed in the canteen, the Labour Court, could not assume jurisdiction by deciding the question against the employer. In such a situation the proper course would be to direct the party concerned to get the dispute adjudicated by an industrial Court. 5. We are supported in our view by a decision of the Supreme Court, in Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan, ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ). Dealing with this question the Supreme Court observed that it must be borne in mind that cases which fall within Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central), cannot be brought within the scope of Section 33-C (2). In the instant case the dispute as to whether the persons employed in the canteen are employees of the petitioner company or that they are employees of the contractor, has been referred for adjudication, and that the respondent workmen are entitled to the same wages and dearness allowance which are being paid by the petitioner company to its workmen employed in the factory. These two matters have already been referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal which will decide the same on evidence produced by the parties before it. 6.
These two matters have already been referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal which will decide the same on evidence produced by the parties before it. 6. The Labour Court while considering the claim of the respondent workmen will have to determine and hold an enquiry into the existence of their right and such an enquiry would necessarily require a finding on the question as to whether the respondent workmen are employees of the petitioner company or they are the employees of the contractor. In such a situation the Labour Court will be overstepping the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal which has already taken cognizance of the dispute in pursuance of the order dated December 28, 1977 issued under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. It is true that a mere denial by the employer about the existence of the right which is sought to be computed in terms of money by the workmen, cannot take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but in the case like the present one where the dispute has already been referred for adjudication relating to relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner company and the respondent-workmen, the Labour Court cannot decide that question in summary jurisdiction under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. In our opinion the, questions raised by the respondent-i workmen in their application under Section 33-C (2) have already been referred for adjudication by the State Government, therefore, their application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act was not maintainable. 7. In the result we allow the petition and quash the order of the Labour Court dated April 19, 1979 as well as the proceedings pending before it. Parties shall bear their own costs.