JUDGMENT T. R. Hand a, J.—The common prayer made in each of the above mentioned eight criminal writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, is for issue of a writ of habeas corpus or other suitable order/direction directing the release of the petitioners from Sub-Jail Kaithu Simla where these petitioners are presently detained under warrants issued by respondent No. (Executive Magistrate/Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Simla) to respondent No. 2 (Superintendent, Sub-Jail, Kaithu). 2. These petitions suggest that the petitioners were detained for their failure to furnish interim bonds demanded from them by respondent No. 1 under Section 116 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,- hereinafter referred to as the Code. No copy of any such order passed by respondent No. 1 demanding such bonds was, however, filed with the petitions nor full particulars of the proceedings conducted before respondent No. 1 were furnished. We, therefore, summoned the original records of respondent No. 1 in each case and have perused the same in order to apprise ourselves about the factual position. 3. A section of the non-Gazetted employees of the State Government is reported to have launched a State-wide agitation in support of their demands. All these agitating employees are on strike these days. The petitioners in all the above mentioned writ petitions also belong to this section of the non-Gazetted employees of the State Government. They are alleged to have taken active part in the agitation They were arrested by the Simla police under Section 151 of the Code from different parts of Simla town. Some of these arrests were made on 8-9-1980 and others on 10-9-1980. Those of the petitioners who were arrested on 8-9-1980 were produced before the Magistrate (respondent Not l)on 9-9-1980 and those arrested on 10-9-1980 were so produced on 11-9-1980. While producing these petitioners before the Magistrate, the police submitted an application in each case under Section 107 of the Code alleging that these petitioners had been instigating the shopkeepers to close their shops and the bus drivers to stop their buses in support of the demands and had further extended threats that in case the shopkeepers did not close their shops, the shops would be destroyed and in case the bus drivers cared to ply their buses, the buses would be burnt. In some cases the petitioners were alleged to have coerced and instigated the other employees who had not joined the agitation, to proceed on strike. These petitioners were further alleged to have threatened such employees with dire consequences in case they did not follow their line. The police thus expressed their apprehension that in case these petitioners were allowed to remain at large they were likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility and prayed that the petitioners be bound down for keeping the peace. 4. On receiving the police report, respondent No. 1 was of the opinion that there was sufficient ground to proceed in each case and hence he passed an order under Section 111 of the Code in each case setting forth the substance of the information received by him, the amount of the bond to be executed, the form for which it was to be in force as also the number of sureties required. As the petitioners were present in Court when such order under Section 111 was passed, the same was read over and explained to them and the plea of each of the petitioners was separately recorded. 5. It appears that after the order passed under Section 111 of the Code was read over and explained to the petitioners and their pleas were recorded, the prosecution made a prayer that each of these petitioners be directed under Section"? 116[ (3) to execute an interim bond for keeping the peace until the conclusion of the inquiry. While making this prayer, the prosecution filed in each case an affidavit of the Station House Officer of the concerned police station in support of its contention that the case was fit for taking immediate measures for prevention of breach of the peace and disturbance of the public tranquility during the pendency of the inquiry. While making this prayer, the prosecution filed in each case an affidavit of the Station House Officer of the concerned police station in support of its contention that the case was fit for taking immediate measures for prevention of breach of the peace and disturbance of the public tranquility during the pendency of the inquiry. The learned Magistrate after hearing the prosecution as also the counsel for the petitioners and considering the material placed before him in the form of the application made by the police under Section 107, the statements of the witness recorded by the police as also the affidavit of the Station House Officer furnished to him in the course of the proceedings, came to the conclusion that there was imminent apprehension of breach of the peace and public tranquility and that these were fit cases where the present petitioners should be directed to execute interim bonds under Section 116 (3) of the Code as prayed by the police. The learned Magistrate accordingly called upon the petitioners in each case to furnish interim bonds undertaking to keep peace during the pendency of the proceedings. 6. Since the petitioners failed to furnish the requisite bonds as directed by the learned Magistrate under Section 116 (3) of the Code, they were all remanded to judicial custody in Sub-Jail Kaithu till the next date of hearing fixed in the case for recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses or till the date the petitioners furnished the requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the Court. 7. It is thus in pursuance of the order passed by the Executive Magistrate of competent jurisdiction under Section 116 (3) of the Code that the petitioners in each case have been lodged in Sub-Jail Kaithu. 7. It is thus in pursuance of the order passed by the Executive Magistrate of competent jurisdiction under Section 116 (3) of the Code that the petitioners in each case have been lodged in Sub-Jail Kaithu. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that their detention in pursuance of the order passed by respondent No. 1 under Section 116 (3) of the Code is illegal and liable to be quashed on the following two grounds : (i) that holding of an enquiry within the contemplation of Section 116 (1) of the Code, being the sine qua non for passing an order under Section 116 (3) of the Code and in the instant cases such order having been passed without conducting any inquiry whatever, the same is without jurisdiction and the consequential detention of the petitioners on their failure to comply with such an order is illegal and without any sanction of law. (ii) that in some cases the amounts of the interim bonds which the petitioners were called upon to furnish under Section 116 (3) of the Code were more excessive than those mentioned in the order passed under Section 111 of the Code and for that reason also the orders passed under Section 116 (3) were bad in law." 8. In order to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners it is considered desirable to have a look at the relevant provisions of Chapter VI11 of the Code which contains the provisions about security for keeping the peace. 9. This chapter commences with Section 106 which deals with cases of security for keeping the peace on conviction. 10. Section 107 deals with cases of security for keeping the peace in other cases. The instant cases belong to this species. 9. This chapter commences with Section 106 which deals with cases of security for keeping the peace on conviction. 10. Section 107 deals with cases of security for keeping the peace in other cases. The instant cases belong to this species. Sub-section (1) of Section 107 which is relevant for our purposes reads as under :— "When an Executive Magistrate receives information that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility and is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he may, in the manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, for keeping the peace for such period, not exceeding one year, as the Magistrate thinks fit." 11. Section 108 deals with cases of security for good behaviour from persons disseminating seditious matters, Section 109 deals with cases of security for good behaviour from suspected persons and Section 110 deals with cases of security for good behaviour from habitual offenders. 12. There is then Section 111 which provides that where a Magistrate acting under Section 107, Sec. 108, Sec. 109 or Sec. 110, deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under such section, he shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number character and class of sureties (if any) required. This section thus deal with the form of the order to be passed by the Magistrate. 13. Section 112 provides that "if the person in respect of whom such order is made is present in Court, it shall be read over to him, or, if he so desires, the substance thereof shall be explained to him. 14. Sections 113 and 114 deal with cases of persons who are not pie-sent in Court. 15. Section 115 empowers the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of any person against whom an order is passed under Section 111. 16. 14. Sections 113 and 114 deal with cases of persons who are not pie-sent in Court. 15. Section 115 empowers the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of any person against whom an order is passed under Section 111. 16. The next important section is 116 which comprises of several sub sections We are concerned only with the first three sub-sections of this section Sub-section (1) provides that "where an order under Section 111 has been read or explained under Section 112 to a person present in Court, or when any parson appears or is brought before a Magistrate m compliance with or in execution of, a summons or warrant, issued under Section 113, the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary". 17. Sub-section (2) of Section 116 next provides that "such inquiry shall be made, as nearly as may be practicable, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trial and recording evidence in summons-cases". 18 Then follows sub-section (3) which provides that "after the commencement and before the completion, of the inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquility or the commission of any offence or for the public safety, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the person in respect of whom the order under Section 111 has been made to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour until the conclusion of the inquiry, and may detain him in custody until such bond is executed or, in default of execution, until the inquiry is concluded". 19. Proviso (b) to this sub-section says that "the conditions of such bond, whether as to the amount thereof or as to the provision of sureties or the number thereof or the pecuniary extent of their liability, shall not be more onerous than those specified in the order under Section 111". 20. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of Chapter VIII dealing with security for keeping the peace. 20. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of Chapter VIII dealing with security for keeping the peace. An analysis of these provisions would show that immediately on receipt of information under Section 107, the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction is required to apply his judicial mind to such information with a view to forming his opinion whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding further in the case. Where the Magistrate is of the opinion that the case is fit for proceeding further, he must draw an order in writing under Section 111 setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force as also the number, character and class of sure ties, if any, required. After he has passed such an order, the next stage would be to notify the contents of such order to the concerned person. In case such person happens to be present in the Court, the order should be read over to him or if he so desires substance thereof be explained to him. In case such person is not present in the Court when the order under Section 111 is made, the Magistrate is required to proceed under Sections 113 and 114 and a summons or a warrant accompanied by a copy of such order should be issued against such person. 21. After the order drawn up under Section 111 is read over or explain ed under Section 112 to a person present in the Court and in the case of a person who was not present in the Court when such order was drawn up, when such person appears or is brought before the Magistrate in execution of the process issued under Section 113, the stage is set for the Magistrate to inquire into the truth of the information upon which he has taken action in drawing up his order under Section 111. This inquiry is to be made under Section 116(1). 22. This inquiry is to be made under Section 116(1). 22. In cases where the inquiry cannot be concluded forthwith and the Magistrate is of the opinion that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquility or the commission of any offence or the prevention of public safety, sub-section (3) of Section 116 empowers the Magistrate to ask for an interim bond of the nature referred to in the order under Section 111 pending the completion of the inquiry. Such an order directing furnishing of an interim bond can, of course, be made only after the commencement and before the completion of the inquiry and has to be justified by reasons to be recorded in writing. 23. In the instant cases, there is no dispute that the requisite information within the contemplation of Section 107 of the Code was furnished to respondent No. 1 in each case and that this respondent after applying his mind to such information recorded a valid order under Section 111. This order under Section 111 was recorded in the presence of the petitioners and was read over/ explained to them. We have satisfied from the record that after this order was read over to the petitioners, the plea of each of them was separately recorded. It was thereafter that the prosecution made its prayer, that each of these petitioners be directed to execute an interim bond under Section 116 (3). While making such prayer, the prosecution produced before the Magistrate an affidavit of the Station House Officer of the concerned police station in each case. The Magistrate then heard the prosecution and the counsel for the petitioners, and also perused the material before him including the affidavits filed and then passed his order under Section 116 (3) calling upon the petitioners in each case to furnish and interim bond. The order so passed is duly sup ported by reasons in each case. 24. Now as already stated the main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the orders passed by respondent No. 1 under section 116 (3) in these cases are all without jurisdiction inasmuch as these orders were passed before the commencement of the enquiry within the contemplation of Section 116 (1). 24. Now as already stated the main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the orders passed by respondent No. 1 under section 116 (3) in these cases are all without jurisdiction inasmuch as these orders were passed before the commencement of the enquiry within the contemplation of Section 116 (1). In view of the unambiguous language of Section 116 (1) of the Code, there is now no scope for a second opinion that an order under Section 116 (3) can be passed only after the commencement and before the completion of the inquiry mentioned in sub-section (1). The question which therefore, needs our attention is as to when such an inquiry can be said to have commenced. There is no specific provision in the Code which may provide a direct answer to this question. 25. We shall, therefore, have to look into the nature and scope of the inquiry contemplated by sub-section (1) in order to determine as to when such an inquiry can be deemed to have commenced. At the cost of repetition we would like to reproduce the concluding part of sub-section (1) which reads the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary (emphasis supplied). A reading of the language of sub-section (1) of Section 116 would suggest that in the case of a person who is present in the Court when an order under Section 111 is made against him, the Magistrate shall forthwith proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken by him. The object of the inquiry, therefore, is to ascertain the truth of the information received by the Magistrate under Section 107 and on the basis of which he has made his order under Section 111. The section, however, does not enjoin any particular form of inquiry. The scope and nature of this inquiry on the other hand appears to be quite wide. It is not certainly restricted to recording of evidence of witnesses and subjecting them to cross-examination as has* been suggested on behalf of the petitioners. The section, however, does not enjoin any particular form of inquiry. The scope and nature of this inquiry on the other hand appears to be quite wide. It is not certainly restricted to recording of evidence of witnesses and subjecting them to cross-examination as has* been suggested on behalf of the petitioners. The use of the conjunctive, and in the concluding part of sub-section (1) quoted above would suggest that the inquiry within the contemplation of sub-section (1) includes something more than what can be strictly called evidence. This inquiry as already stated is intended to ascertain the truth of the information conveyed to the Magistrate under Section 107 and for ascertaining such truth the Magistrate may in the first instance like to hear the parties or either of them or to interrogate any of them or he may call and consider the affidavit of any person conversant with the facts of the case. All these steps would in our view be steps in the proceedings of the inquiry and as soon as the Magistrate takes any of these steps he can certainly be said to have commenced the inquiry within the contemplation of sub-section (1). If as a result of these steps in the inquiry the Magistrate considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace etc. he has jurisdiction to pass an order under sub-section (3) calling upon the person in respect of whom the order under Section 111 has been made, to execute a bond of the nature referred to in that order for keeping the peace until the conclusion of the inquiry and in default of such execution to detain such person in custody. 26. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Madhu Limaye and others v Ved Murti and others reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2481, in support of his contention that the inquiry within the contemplation of sub-section (1) of Section 116 can be said to have commenced only after some evidence is recorded by the Magistrate. We have carefully perused the judgment of their Lordships delivered in Madhu Limayes case (supra) but we are unable to find if this authority lends any support to the proposition advanced on behalf of the petitioners. In Madhu Limaye’s case the information conveyed to the Magistrate under Section 107, Cr. We have carefully perused the judgment of their Lordships delivered in Madhu Limayes case (supra) but we are unable to find if this authority lends any support to the proposition advanced on behalf of the petitioners. In Madhu Limaye’s case the information conveyed to the Magistrate under Section 107, Cr. P. C. was a cryptic one reading as under : "Sir, It is requested that there was immediate apprehensions of breach of peace from the aforesaid persons. Therefore, arrest was made under Section 151, Cr. P. C. There is a likelihood of breach of peace by them in future. Therefore, it is requested that in order to maintain peace they should be bound down under Section 107/117, Cr. P. C. on furnishing suitable bail and muchalkas, Sd/—Shiv Narain Saxena S. O. On that the Magistrate passed a short order reading as under : "I have seen the police report dated 9-8-70 and I am satisfied that there is an apprehension of breach of peace and public tranquility from the side of O. Ps. Nos. 1 and 2 who are active members pf S, S. P, engaged in land grab movement and wrongful acts to public property and in my opinion there are sufficient grounds for proceeding u/s 107, Cr. P. C. for the prevention of breach of peace and public tranquility. A notice u/s 112 Cr. P. C. has been read over to O. Ps. Nos. 1 and 2 today, calling upon them to show cause why they should not be ordered to execute a personal bond of Rupees 5,000 with two reliable sureties each like amount for keeping peace for a period of one year. As regards O. P. No. 3, the S. O. Cantt. could not satisfy the Court when questioned orally as to who he was and what was his address. In my opinion there is no necessity of taking any evidence on this point later on. In view of this I am not satisfied that there is an apprehension of breach of peace and public tranquility from O. P. No. 3.. Accordingly, I discharge him. Fix on 20-8-70 for statement of O. Ps. Nos. 1 and 2". In my opinion there is no necessity of taking any evidence on this point later on. In view of this I am not satisfied that there is an apprehension of breach of peace and public tranquility from O. P. No. 3.. Accordingly, I discharge him. Fix on 20-8-70 for statement of O. Ps. Nos. 1 and 2". Their Lordships observed in the course of the judgment in para 13 as under : "It will be noticed that before the Magistrate took action to call for an interim bond, he did not make any efforts to enquire into the truth of the information as is required by Section 117 (3) of the Code. He only saw the police report and was satisfied from it, without even questioning the Sub-Inspector. He did question him with regard to Narender Shastri who is described in the Order as O. P. No. 3 but not others". Their Lordships further observed "it appears therefore, that the Magistrate used the powers under Section 117(3) without commencing to enquire into the truth of the information. No sworn statement of any kind was obtained by him and he adjourned the cases for the examination of the petitioners without summoning the witnesses in support of the information. He, however, asked the petitioners to furnish an interim bond or go to jail." 27. Later in the course of the judgment their Lordships observed that the Magistrate ought to have entered upon the inquiry and satisfied himself, atleast, prima facie about the truth of the information in relation to the alleged facts Their Lordships nowhere specifically referred to the nature of the inquiry within the contemplation of Section 116 (1). From their observations made in the case which are to the effect that the Magistrate did not question the Sub-Inspector with regard to Madhu Limaye and Ram Adar Giri who were O. Ps. Nos. 1 and 2 in the case and that he obtained no sworn statements of any kind before passing the order under Section 117 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 an inference can, however, be drawn that putting of questions to the Sub-Inspector and obtaining affidavits with respect to the facts constituting the information under Section 107 of the Code would amount to steps taken in the course of inquiry within the contemplation of Section 116 (1). From this a further inference can be drawn that as soon as the Magistrate takes any of such steps the inquiry shall be deemed to have commenced. Their Lordships, however, did observe that the inquiry within the contemplation of sub-section (1) of Section 116 would be deemed to have commenced when a trial is deemed to have commenced according to the summons procedure. 28. The provisions which deal with the trial of summons cases by Magistrates are found in Chapter XX of the Code. The opening section of this chapter is Sec. 251 which provides that when in a summons-case the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make. The following Section 252 provides for conviction on the plea of guilty in the discretion of the Magistrate. Section 253 provides for conviction on plea of guilty in the absence of the accused in petty cases. The procedure in a case where the accused is not convicted under Section 252 or 225 is provided in Section 254. 29. The trial in the summons-case would thus commence as soon as the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and the particulars of the offence of which he is accused are stated to him and he is asked to plead there to. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 111, 112 and sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 116 of the Code and bearing in mind the fact that the procedure for trial of summons-cases is prescribed for an inquiry envisaged by sub-section (1) of Section 116, it would be clear that in the case of a person who is present in the Court when the order under Section 111 is passed, the inquiry shall be deemed to have commenced as soon as such order is read over and explained to him and he is called upon to plead to the allegations made against him. This interpretation , according to us, is in accordance with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case (supra). This interpretation , according to us, is in accordance with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case (supra). We thus find that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the orders passed under Section 116 (3) by respondent No. 1 in the instant cases were without jurisdiction having been passed before the commencement of the inquiry within the contemplation of sub-section (1) of Section J16 is devoid of force and cannot be accepted. 30. With respect to the second objection raised on behalf of the petitioners against the validity of the orders passed under Section 116 (3) of the Code we find that it is only in the case of the petitioners in Criminal Writ Petitions Nos. 5, 6 and 8 of 1980 that the amounts of the bonds which these petitioners were required to furnish under Section 116 (3) of the Code are more excessive than the amounts of the bonds mentioned in the order passed under Section 111 of the Code. In view of the express language of proviso (b) attached to sub-section (3) of Section 116 reproduced above, it was frankly conceded by the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents that these orders cannot be sustained and need be modified so as to bring the amounts of the bonds asked for under Section 116 (3) at par with the amounts of the bonds mentioned in the orders passed under Section 111 of the Code. We accordingly direct that the orders passed by respondent No. 1 under Section 116 (3) in the case of the petitioners of the above mentioned three Criminal Writ Petitions be modified so as to bring the amounts of the bonds asked for in these orders at par with the amounts mentioned in the orders passed under Section 111 of the Code in each case. 31. After the orders passed under Section 116 (3) of the Code with respect to the petitioners in Criminal Writ Petitions No.3, 6 and 8 are modified in accordance with our directions given above, no infirmity would be found with the orders of respondent No. 1 calling upon the petitioners to furnish interim bonds under Section 116 (3) and in default of furnishing such bonds directing their detention in judicial custody. We thus find that the detention of the present petitioners in Sub-Jail Kaithu has behind it the sanction of law in the form of valid orders passed under Section 116 (3) of the Code by a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction and as such no case for issue of a Writ in the nature of habeas corpus is made out in any of these cases. 32. With these remarks and subject to the modifications of the orders made under Section 116 (3) of the Code in the case of the petitioners in Criminal Writ Petitions Nos. 5, 6 and 8 as directed above, we dismiss all these petitions. Petitions dismissed.