JUDGMENT : A.N. Varma, J. This is a tenant's petition. It is directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below decreeing a suit filed by the Plaintiff-Respondent against the Petitioners for the latter's ejectment from the certain premises situate in the city of Bareilly. 2. Shortly stated the plaint case was that the Petitioner No. 1 Mohd. Ayub Khan (who was arrayed in the suit as Defendant No. 1) was the tenant of the Plaintiff in the house in dispute. He, however, without the permission of the Plaintiff sublet the accommodation in dispute to Babu Khan (Defendant No. 2 in the suit). It was also asserted that the Petitioners had committed a default. The Plaintiff served a notice of demand and termination of tenancy on Defendant No. 1. However, the tenant neither paid the arrears of rent nor vacated the accommodation in dispute and hence the suit. 3. The suit was contested by the Petitioners who denied that Defendant No. 1 had sublet the accommodation to Defendant No. 2. It was asserted that Defendant No. 2 was the brother-in-law (wife's brother) of Defendant No. I. He was residing in the house in dispute with Defendant No. 1 from the very childhood. The plea of default was also repudiated by the Defendant No. 1. 4. In support of their respective cases, parties led oral and documentary evidence. 5. Plaintiff examined himself and two other witnesses all of whom stated that Defendant No. 1 had passed on the possession of the accommodation in dispute to Defendant No. 2 four or five years prior to the institution of the suit and that he had since then permanently shifted to Delhi. The Defendants also examined their witnesses to say that Defendant No. 1 had not shifted to Delhi and that he had not sublet the accommodation to Defendant No. 2. It was asserted that the Defendant No. 2 was living in the house in dispute with Defendant No. 1 being his relation as licensee. 6. The trial court believed the Plaintiff's evidence and held that Defendant No. 1 had shifted to Delhi and had passed on the possession of the accommodation in dispute to Defendant No. 2 as asserted by the Plaintiff. On these facts, the trial court held that Defendant No. 1 had sublet the shop to Defendant No. 2. The issue of default was also answered in favour of the Plaintiff. On these facts, the trial court held that Defendant No. 1 had sublet the shop to Defendant No. 2. The issue of default was also answered in favour of the Plaintiff. On these findings the suit of the Plaintiff was decreed. The Defendants filed a revision u/s 25 which has been dismissed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Bareilly. The learned District Judge has concurred with the trial court in the finding that Defendant No. 1 had shifted to Delhi as asserted by the Plaintiff and has allowed the accommodation to be occupied by Defendant No. 2. The learned District Judge, on these facts, relying on the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 held that the Defendant No. 1 would be deemed to have sublet the accommodation to Defendant No. 2. On the question of default however, the learned District Judge disagreed with the trial court and held that default was not proved. On the finding on the issue of subletting, the learned District Judge affirmed the decree of the trial court for the ejectment of the Petitioners. 7. Counsel for the Petitioners first submitted that the learned District Judge fell into a patent error of law in applying the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It was urged that that “provisions would have no application to a suit filed on the grounds mentioned u/s 20(2) of the said Act. Learned Counsel contended that Section 25 of the aforesaid Act would also not apply as according to the Defendant's case subleting, if any, had taken place prior to the coming into force of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 8. Having heard Learned Counsel for the parties, I find no merits in this petition. 9. In my view, the learned District Judge rightly applied the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) of the aforesaid Act in determining the question of tenancy. 10. The clear case of the Plaintiff as proved by his evidence was that Defendant No. 1 had allowed the Defendant No. 2 to occupy the accommodation in dispute four or five years prior to the institution of the suit and that Defendant No. 1 had himself shifted to Delhi. The trial court has believed the Plaintiff witnesses. 10. The clear case of the Plaintiff as proved by his evidence was that Defendant No. 1 had allowed the Defendant No. 2 to occupy the accommodation in dispute four or five years prior to the institution of the suit and that Defendant No. 1 had himself shifted to Delhi. The trial court has believed the Plaintiff witnesses. It has specifically mentioned in its judgment that these witnesses have all stated that Defendant No. 2 has been residing in the house in dispute for the last four or five years. After referring to the statement of these witnesses, wherein the duration of possession of Defendant No. 2 in the house in dispute has been specifically noticed, the trial court has observed as follows: Considering the material on the record, I am satisfied that the evidence led by the Plaintiff that the Defendant had vacated the house and delivered its possession to Defendant No. 2 is worthy of reliance. I, therefore, hold that the Plaintiff has sublet the house in dispute to Defendant No. 2. 11. The above finding was given by the trial court believing the version of the Plaintiff and disbelieving the version of the Defendant No. 1 that he had not shifted to Delhi. The above quoted finding is undoubtedly a finding to the effect that the Defendant No. 1 has allowed the accommodation in dispute to be occupied by Defendant No. 2, who is admittedly not a member of the family of the Defendant No. 1. It is clear from a reading of the judgment of the trial court that with regard to the version of the facts given by the two parties, it is the version of facts as given by the Plaintiff which has been accepted by the trial court. Reading the finding of the trial court as a whole, there is no manner of doubt that the finding of the trial court is that the Defendant No. 1 passed on the possession of the house in question to Defendant No. 2 four or five years piror to the institution of the suit as asserted by the Plaintiff and his witnesses. 12. 12. Counsel for the Petitioner referring to the finding of the trial court quoted above submitted that the said finding does not imply that the trial court also accepted the fact that Defendant No. 2 was allowed to occupy the accommodation in dispute only four or five years ago as asserted by the Plaintiff. I do not agree. The conclusion of the trial court on point No. 1 has to be read in the light of the discussion which preceded it. So construed there is no manner of doubt that the trial court had accepted the version of facts given by the Plaintiffs in its entirety. 13. The above being a finding on the issue of fact namely as to when the Defendant No. 1 allowed the Defendant No. 2 to occupy the accommodation in dispute, the learned District Judge rightly applied the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) of the aforesaid Act. The learned District Judge also observed thus: It follows that Defendant No. 1 had shifted to Delhi, while Defendant No. 2 was residing in the house in dispute. 14. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners relying on a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1976 Allahabad 570 urged that Section 25 of the aforesaid Act being prospective in its operation, the provisions of Section 12(1)(B) which are referred to in the explanation to Section 25 could not be applied to the present case as the sub-tenancy set up by the Plaintiff, according to the Petitioners had taken place or commenced prior to the coming into force of the Act. I find no substance in this argument. The finding of fact recorded by the trial court is that the Defendant No. 1 had allowed the accommodation to be occupied by Defendant No. 2 four or five years piror to the institution of the suit. The suit was filed in the year 1978. This means that the Defendant No. 1 had allowed the accommodation to be occupied by Defendant No. 2 subsequent to the coming into force of the aforesaid Act. That being so, the provisions of Section 25 plainly became attracted to the facts of the present case. 15. Section 25 of the aforesaid Act reads as follows: 25. Prohibition on sub-letting (1) No tenant shall sub-let the whole of the building under his tenancy. That being so, the provisions of Section 25 plainly became attracted to the facts of the present case. 15. Section 25 of the aforesaid Act reads as follows: 25. Prohibition on sub-letting (1) No tenant shall sub-let the whole of the building under his tenancy. (2) The tenant may with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate sub-let a part of the building. Explanation--For the purpose of this Section: (1) Where the tenant ceases, within the meaning of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 12, to occupy the building or any part thereof, he shall be deemed to have sub-let that building or part; (ii) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not amount to sub-letting. Explanation to Section 25 clearly provides that if a tenant allows the accommodation in dispute to be occupied by another, who is not a member of his family, would be deemed to have sub-let the accommodation. On the facts found by the trial court that the Defendant No. 1 has allowed the accommodation in dispute to be occupied by Defendant No. 2 about four or five years prior to the institution of the suit the courts below rightly applied the provisions of Section 25 and consequently, of Clauses (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the aforesaid Act. There is thus no force in the first point urged by the counsel for the Petitioner. 16. Counsel for the Petitioners next contended that in order to prove the allegation of sub-tenancy the Plaintiff has not only to prove exclusive possession of the sub-tenant over the accommodation in dispute but also that the relationship of lessor and lessee existed between the tenant-in-chief and the alleged sub-tenant. In support, the Learned Counsel relied on a decision reported in 1979 U.P. Rent Control Cases 58. The proposition of law canvassed by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners is unexceptionable. However, the said proposition has no application to the facts of the present case. It is the statutory provision namely Section 25 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which makes a difference. Section 25 read with its explanation creates a legal fiction. It provides that under the circumstances mentioned therein sub-tenancy would be deemed to have come into existence. However, the said proposition has no application to the facts of the present case. It is the statutory provision namely Section 25 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which makes a difference. Section 25 read with its explanation creates a legal fiction. It provides that under the circumstances mentioned therein sub-tenancy would be deemed to have come into existence. The case cited by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner was not concerned with the application of Section 25 of the aforesaid Act. As already stated on the facts found by the trial court, the learned District Judge was perfectly entitled to apply the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) of the aforesaid Act. 17. In view of what has been stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs.