RAM CHANDRA PRASAD v. STATE OF SIKKIM — 1980 DIGILAW 7 (SIK)

JUDGEMENT Bhattacharjee, J. :- The petitioner, whose surety-bond executed for the appearance of an accused before Court has been forfeited and who has accordingly been called upon to pay the penalty thereof, has come on in revision against the orders of forfeiture and imposition of penalty. The bond was taken by a Judicial Magistrate and was for appearance in that Court, but has been forfeited by the Additional Sessions Judge, to whose Court the case of the accused was subsequently transferred for trial by an order of the Sessions Judge. The main ground urged by Mr. N.K.P. Saraf, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the petition and against the impugned orders is that the bond having been furnished in the Court of Judicial Magistrate and being for appearance in that Court, could not be forfeited by the Additional Sessions Judge, even though the case might have been assigned to him for disposal by aa order of transfer. 2. The question as to whether a bond for the appearance of an accused before a Court can be forfeited by such Court only where the accused was required to appear, or whether it can also be forfeited by the Court which has taken the bond, though for appearance in another Court, or whether it can also be forfeited by the Court to which the case may subsequently be transferred by commitment or otherwise, is far from settled and certain, as will appear from the vast mass of case-law clustering around Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This led the Law Commission to recommend restructuring of the provisions in its 41st Report on the Code wherein it has been observed as hereunder (at page 330, paragraph 42.2) :- "A doubt has sometimes arisen whether, in the case of a bond for appearance in a particular Court, that Court alone can forfeit it, or whether any Magistrate of the First Class has the power. As a matter of policy we think that this power should in the case for bond for appearance before a Court be confined to that Court as that Court is in the best position to judge the gravity of the breach of conditions causing forfeiture. Occasionally, some doubt has also arisen whether a bond for appearance before a Court can be forfeited by the order of a Court to which the case was later transferred. Occasionally, some doubt has also arisen whether a bond for appearance before a Court can be forfeited by the order of a Court to which the case was later transferred. It is only proper that the transferee Court should have the same first Court had when the case was in that Court. We propose to clarify both these points by a suitable amendment." (Underlining for emphasis). 3. These recommendations have resulted in recasting of the relevant provision in Sec. 446 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, providing expressly that a bond for appearance before a particular Court can be forefeited only by that Court or by the Court to which the case has been subsequently transferred. The new Code of 1973, however, has not yet been extended to Sikkim where we are still governed by the earlier Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Let me, therefore, consider whether under Section 514 of the Code of 1898, the Court of the Additional Session Judge, being a transferee Court, could forefeit the bond of the petitioner. 4. The relevant provisions of Section 514 being Sub-Section (1) thereof, are as hereunder :- "Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond is taken under this Code or of the Court of Presidency Magistrate, or Magistrate of the First Class. "or when the bond in for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court, "that such bond has been forfeited. "the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof or to show cause why it should not be paid." (underlining for emphasis). 5. There is no doubt a very long cetena of decisions, which can be found to be quoted in any standard treatise on Code of Criminal Procedure, laying down that in view of the juxtaposition of the expression when the bond is for appearance before a Court" and the expression "to the satisfaction of such Court", in the second sub-paragraph and the expression "the Court shall" in the 'fourth sub-paragraph, when the bond is for appearance before n Court, only that a Court, where appearance was to be made according to the bond, can forfeit such bond. Reference may be made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ballabhadas Motiram v. Emperor (AIR 1943 Bom 178) : (44 Cri LJ 549), which has also been referred to by the Law commission in its Report, as representing this view. There is also a catena of case, though not that long, laying down a contrary view and reference may be made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Harwari Lal v. State (AIR 1959 All 751) : (1959 Cri LJ 1380), also noted in the Report of the Law Commission, as representing this view according to which, a bond for at appearance before a Court, being also a word under this Code" within the meaning of the provisions of the first Sub-paragraph, can be forfeited there under by the three Courts mentioned therein and, in view of the express provisions of the second sub-paragraph can also be forfeited by the Court before which appearance is required by the terms of the bond. On a consideration of the provisions of Section 514(1), as quoted hereinabove, I have, and this I have with respect, not been able to persuade myself to agree with the former view and have, with equal respect, agreed with the contrary view and I would now proceed to state my reasons. 6. There can be no doubt that a bond for appearance of the accused before a Court, whether executed by the accused or by the surety, as envisaged in the second sub-paragraph of Section 514(1), is also a "bond taken under this Code" within the meaning of the first subparagraph. And if such a bond for appearance is also a "bond taken under this Code", within the meaning of the first sub-paragraph, then I cannot find any reason why the same cannot be dealt with under that first sub-paragraph and not thus be forfeited by the Courts mentioned therein, namely, the Court by which the bond is taken, the Court of the Presidency Magistrate and the Court of the Magistrate of the First Class. But a bond for the appearance of an accused before a particular Court may not very often be a bond which has been taken by that particular Court, as is contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 499, whereunder, "if the case so require, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear. But a bond for the appearance of an accused before a particular Court may not very often be a bond which has been taken by that particular Court, as is contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 499, whereunder, "if the case so require, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear. when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session, or Court to answer the charge." It is in such case that the second subparagraph operates and authorises such latter Court also, though it has not taken the bond, or is not the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class, to forfeit the bond and to proceed accordingly. 7. As already noted, Section 446(1) of the new Code of 1973 expressly confines the authority to forfeit a bond of appearance to the Court before which such appearance is to be made under the terms of the bond or the Court to which the case has been subsequently transferred. But from this alone, it would, in my view, be too broad a proposition to contend that a chance in the law has been deliberately made and that the authority to forfeit a bond for appearance before a particular Court, which is now expressly confined to that Court only, was not so confined to that Court only in Section 514 of the earlier Code, or that under that Section, a transferee Court could not forfeit a bond for appearance, as it can do now under the new Code. As is well-known, it would not be correct to say that every change in the phraseology introduced by way of amendment or reenactment necessarily implies a change in the law, for it entirely depends upon whether the change was merely meant to clarify or to alter the existing law. Such changes are very often made to clear up some ambiguities or to, present possible misinterpretation and do not, by themselves, justify any inference that the law must have been something different before. No authority should be needed for such a well-established principle of interpretation of Statutes but, if needed, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. Pratap Singh Kairon (AIR 1964 SC 295 at p. 310). No authority should be needed for such a well-established principle of interpretation of Statutes but, if needed, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. Pratap Singh Kairon (AIR 1964 SC 295 at p. 310). And as I have already pointed out, the report of the Law Commission shows that these changes were proposed only to "clarify" the position in law. 8. Be that as it may, on a construction of the relevant provisions of Section 514(1), I am, as at present advised of the opinion that any bond taken under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, including a bond for appearance before a Court, can be forfeited by the Court by which the bond is taken as well as by the Court before which appearance was conditioned and also the Court of the Presidency Magistrate and of the Magistrate of the First Class. And in my view, the second sub-paragraph of Section 514(1), far from confining the authority to forfeit a bond for appearance only to the Court where appearance was conditioned by such bond, provides such Court as an additional authority to do so in addition to the authorities mentioned in the first sub-paragraph. As I have already noted, a bond "for appearance before a Court", can obviously, under the express terms of the second sub-paragraph, be forfeited by such Court. But such a bond being also obviously a "bond under this Code" within the meaning of the first sub-paragraph and not having been otherwise excluded from its operation, I entirely fail to under stand why such a bond cannot be dealt with under the said sub-paragraph and cannot be forfeited by the Courts mentioned therein including even the Court which has taken the bond. 9. But even then, the question raised in this revision is not answered. For here, the bond for appearance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate for appearance in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, but has been forfeited by the Additional Sessions Judge, to whose Court the case has been transferred for trial though, under the terms of the bond in question, the accused was not conditioned to appear before him. For here, the bond for appearance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate for appearance in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, but has been forfeited by the Additional Sessions Judge, to whose Court the case has been transferred for trial though, under the terms of the bond in question, the accused was not conditioned to appear before him. The Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, not obviously being a Court of the Presidency Magistrate or the Magistrate of the First Class and not also being the Court which took the bond or the Court before whom the bond required the accused to appear, could not forfeit the bond, unless the Court before which the accused is so required to appear under the bond would in law, include any Court to which the case has been subsequently transferred. As I have already noted, in Section 446 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred. has been expressly authorised to forfeit the bond for appearance, even though the terms of the bond do not command such appearance. But, as I have already pointed out, from this change of law alone, it may not be safe to infer that this could not be done under the earlier Code, by which this case is governed. 10. I will very much like to hold, if I can, that a Court to which a case subsequently transferred for trial can also forfeit a bond for appearance, though there is no express terms therein requiring appearance, before such Court, because, in my view, it would be conducive to the speedier administration of criminal justice if the Court trying the offence is also empowered to forfeit the bond for appearance in order to ensure the attendance of the offender. This also appears to be the view of the Allahabad High Court in Mustaquimuddin v. Emperor (AIR 1926 All 297) : (27 Cri LJ 377), also noted in the Report of the Law Commission where it has been observed that "any other view of the law would produce most inconvenient results since if an accused were on bail, when a case was transferred, it would in every case be necessary before transferring the case to order hrs arrest or to require him to give fresh sureties". And if I am to hold otherwise, I would be really wondering as to why the transferee Court, which gets clothed with all the powers of a transferor Court in respect of the offence and the offender, would not get this power to enforce the attendance of the offender before it, though the transferor Court admittedly possessed this power. As the Law Commission has observed, "it is only proper that the transferee Court should have the same power to deal with such a bond as the first Court had when the case was in that Court". The argument on the basis of the principles of the law of contract does not really impress me, the argument being that the contract for appearance or to secure appearance being with a particular Court, can be enforced only by such Court. Because in that case a bond for appearance taken by one Court for appearance before another Court, cannot also be forfeited by the latter, with which admittedly there was no contract, though this power cannot obviously be disputed in view of the provisions of the second sub-paragraph of Section 514. Nor can the Courts of the Presidency Magistrate or of the Magistrate of the First Class can have any general power to forfeit any bond taken under this Code under the first sub-paragraph, for they may not very often be parties to the contract in the bond, but this power, again, cannot be disputed under the provisions of the first sub-paragraph. Nor can a Magistrate discharge the sureties from the bonds of his bond (sic) under Section 502, if the argument based in the principles of contract is accepted and persued. These powers have been derived from the provisions of the Statutes dehors any contract, and, therefore, if such a power can be leaned in favour of a transferee Court from the provisions of the Statute, the absence of any contract and the argument based thereon need not detain us. 11. But on a construction of the provisions of Section 514(1) along with some other provisions of the Code and also the relevant provisions of Section 446(1) of the new Code along with the Explanation, it may be difficult to deduce such power under the provisions of Section 514(1) in favour of the transferee Court, appearance wherein is not mandated by the terms of the bond. 12. 12. Sections 449 (441 ?) of the Code, which deals with the bond of accused and sureties, provides in Sub-Section (2)(3 ?) that "if the case so requires, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear, when called upon, at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge." Now, if the position in law is that a Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred can forfeit the bond for appearance, even though the bond does not require appearance before such transferee Court, it is difficult to understand as to why in case of the case being committed or otherwise transferred to the High Court or the Court of Session or to any other Court, the bond, in order to the effective to enforce the appearance of the accused in such subsequent Court, "shall" have to "also" bind the person released on bail to appear in such Court "to answer the charge." I am afraid that these provisions, as contained in Section 499(2), rather indicate that without such express binding by and in the terms of the bond, the Legislature considered that the High Court, the Court of Session or any Court to which the case may subsequently be transferred, would not be in a position to enforce the appearance of the accused. And if such Courts cannot enforce the attendance of the accused without an express binding to that effect in the bond for appearance, these Courts cannot obviously forfeit the bonds without any such express undertaking. 13. The Explanation to Section 446(1), read along with the provisions of the Sub-Section, of the new Code, may also favour such a construction. The Explanation runs thus :- "A condition in a bond for appearance, or production of property, before a Court shall be construed as including the condition for appearance, or as the case may be, for production of property, before any Court to which the case may subsequently be transferred." 14. Section 446(1) clearly provides that "where a bond under this Code is for appearance ......... before a Court' and it is proved to the satisfaction of that Court, or of any Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred, that the bond has been forfeited, .... Section 446(1) clearly provides that "where a bond under this Code is for appearance ......... before a Court' and it is proved to the satisfaction of that Court, or of any Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred, that the bond has been forfeited, .... the Court shall, record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof..........". It is difficult to understand as to why, after expressly empowering the transferee Court to forfeit a bond for appearance, whether or not such bond was for appearance be, fore such transferee Court, it has been thought necessary to provide for a statutory fiction to the effect that "a condition for appearance before a Court shall be construed as including a condition for appearance before" such transferee Court. At any rate, this has given rise to a contention, not without any force, that, the transferee Court could not forfeit a bond for appearance, even under the express provisions of Section 446(1), unless the Explanation thereto expressly provided that the bond "shall be construed as including a condition for appearance before any Court to which the case may subsequently be transferred." Have we not been told that the Legislature shall be presumed not to have wasted a single ward or to indulge in redundant superfluity ? 15. In a decision of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. M. Homi (AIR 1955 SC 478) : (1955 Cri LJ 1017) relied on by Mr. Saraf, it was held that a condition in the bond to surrender to Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum, within three days of the receipt of the appellate judgement of the Privy Council, could not be considered to cover the case when the appeal stood transferred to the Federal Court under the provisions of the Abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1947, and was ultimately disposed of by the Supreme Court, because there was no term in the bond to the effect that the surety would be bound by any judgement or order given by such other Courts as may succeed to the jurisdiction then vested in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This decision is, however, not an authority for the decision of the question as to whether the transferee Court can forfeit a bond for appearance, when the terms thereof did dot expressly require appearance before such transferee Court. It may, however, be treated as an authority for the proposition that the terms of such bonds are to be strictly construed and reference therein to any Court, after whose final judgement the bond would become operative, would not, by itself, include the successor or the transferee Court and that, therefore, it may be contended that it should logically follow that the Court which took the bond or the Court before whom appearance was conditioned by the bond, would not include the transferee Court to empower the latter to forfeit a bond for appearance. 16. When the attention of the learned counsel and also the learned Advocate-General was drawn to the two-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1972 SC 16) : (1972 Cri LJ 5) and we asked whether this decision is an authority for the proposition that a transferee Court can forfeit a bond for appearance, though the bond did not expressly require appearance before such Court the learned Advocate-General frankly submitted that though some of the observations made therein, at the first blush, might appear to support such a contention, the decision, as would appear from a proper scrutiny thereof, does not lay down any such broad proposition. I agree with the learned Advocate-General. The bond in question before the Supreme Court was not a "bond for appearance before a Court" within the meaning of the second sub-paragraph of Section 514, and accordingly, under the express terms of the first sub-paragraph, it could be forfeited by the Court which took it or by the Court of the Presidency Magistrate or the Magistrate of the First Class. And as such, the bond in that case, though taken by one Sub-Divisional Magistrate, could be legally forfeited by another Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the same district, if the latter was also a Magistrate of the First Class. And as such, the bond in that case, though taken by one Sub-Divisional Magistrate, could be legally forfeited by another Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the same district, if the latter was also a Magistrate of the First Class. Though it does not expressly appear from the judgement that the forfeiting Sub-Divisional Magistrate was a Magistrate of the First Class, in all probability he was so, as the case was under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for carrying essential commodities to a prohibited area, and was, therefore, punishable under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Act with imprisonment up to 3 years at the relevant time (now up to 5 years) and could be tried by a Magistrate of the First Class only, it is true that the Supreme Court in that case did not sustain the order of the forfeiture expressly on this line of reasoning, but upheld it on the ground that the undertaking in the bond was to produce it, not before any particular Court, but before the Court and "the word 'Court' in the bond in the present case will mean the Magistrate's Court which dealt with the case". This decision, therefore, is not and, in the facts and the circumstances of the case, cannot be an authority for any general proposition that a transferee Court can forfeit the "bond for appearance," though the terms thereof do not require appearance before that Court. 17. But even assuming that the transferee Court can forfeit a bond of appearance, though the terms thereof do not condition appearance before the transferee Court, the transfer itself must have been legally made. I am, afraid that the order of the Additional Sessions Judge cannot be sustained, even if it was held that a transferee Court has all the powers to forfeit a bond which a Court which took the bond or before whom appearance was conditioned by the bond had because the order of transfer, by which the case was transferred to his Court, was itself illegal. As will appear from the Order Sheet, the criminal case, in which the bond in question was given, was pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, but, as will appear from the order dated 9-4-80, "as per the order of transfer dated 8-4-80, passed by the Hon'ble Sessions Judge", it was transferred to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge. A Sessions Judge can surely transfer a case under Section 528 "from one Criminal Court to another Criminal Court in the same Sessions Division", "if he is of opinion that it is expedient for the ends of justice", but, as the relevant provision of Sub-Section (1C) would be to show, he can do so only "on an application made to him in this behalf". The corresponding provisions contained in Section 408(2) of the new Code of 1973, however, expressly authorise a Sessions Judge to order such transfer not only on the application of a party but also "on the report of the lower Court" or even "on his own initiative", because, as the Law Commission has observed in its 41st Report, it was "found desirable that a Sessions Judge should be authorised" to do so. But as already noted, that Code does not govern us here where we are still governed by the old Code. From the records of the trial Court, it does not appear that there was any such application by any of the parties and the learned Public Prosecutor, appearing with the learned Advocate-General, has conceded that there was no such application by any party to the case and that the transfer was effected as a result of a general order passed by the Sessions Judge in respect of a bunch of cases. This, I am afraid, the Sessions Judge could not do, even if he did it with the best of intention. The order of transfer, therefore, cannot stand and must fall and with it falls the jurisdiction of the transferee Court in respect of the case, including the power, if it had any, to forfeit the bond for appearance furnished in that case. The order of forfeiture, therefore, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge must be quashed along with the order of imposition of penalty. 18. One thing before I conclude. The order of forfeiture, therefore, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge must be quashed along with the order of imposition of penalty. 18. One thing before I conclude. In Ramesh Chandra's case (1972 Cri LJ 5) (SC) (supra), the High Court did not allow the surety to urge in revision that the forfeiture of the bond was bad as it "was executed in one Court and it was forfeited in another Court", on the ground that "the point had not been raised either before the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge" and on appeal, the Supreme Court held that "the High Court rightly refused the appellant to urge this ground as to want of jurisdiction" as "such a plea of jurisdiction is interlaced with question of facts". I must, however, note that the learned Advocate-General, with his usual fairness, has not contended that the petitioner in this case is not entitled to urge this ground as to want of jurisdiction in view of the decision in Ramesh Chandra's case (supra) or otherwise. I am also satisfied that the plea raised by the petitioner in this case is not "interlaced" with any "question of facts", disputed or otherwise, but is based purely on a construction of the terms of the bond of appearance, the order of transfer and the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, as such, should be allowed to be raised even according to the decision in Ramesh Chandra's case (supra), the ratio whereof appears to be that such a plea could be raised before the High Court and the Supreme Court, even though not raised earlier, "without any question of facts and purely on the construction of the bond" and in fact, was allowed to be raised before the Supreme Court, though without success. 19. In the result, the revision, therefore, succeeds and the impugned orders of forfeiture and imposition of penalty are quashed. Though the present revision has not been directed directly against the order of transfer, the same having been found to be illegal and without jurisdiction and such finding being the basis of the present order, must also be quashed in respect of the criminal case in question in which the bond for appearance has been taken, along with all the proceedings taken by the transferee Court of the Additional Sessions Judge pursuant to such order of transfer. The records of the case, therefore, shall go back to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, where it was pending before it was transferred to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge and the Judicial Magistrate shall proceed with the case and also with the question of forfeiture of the bond of appearance in accordance with law. 20. GUJRAL, C. J. :- I have had the advantage of reading the judgement of my learned brother Bhattacharjee, J., and though I concur with the final order that the Revision petition has to be allowed yet I find it necessary to record a separate judgement, as the matter involved is of considerable importance and has been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions by the various High Courts. Moreover, with great respect for my learned brother, I find it difficult to accept the interpretation placed on the first part of Section 514(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (hereinafter called the "Code") especially the expression "or, when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court". 21. The facts necessary for the decision of this petition are not in dispute. The petitioner had executed a Surety Bond in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate for appearance of the accused in that Court but the case was subsequently transferred for trial to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, where the accused did not appear and the bond was forfeited by the impugned order of the Additional Sessions Judge. The transfer of the case was brought about by an order of the Sessions Judge, Gongtok, which was made suo motu without there being any application for transfer by any party. 22. While accepting this petition, Bhattacharjee, J., has taken the view that the order of transfer was illegal and the Additional Sessions Judge was, therefore, not competent to forfeit the Bond. I fully agree with this view and finding that no useful addition to the discussion regarding this aspect, being possible, with respect, I adopt the reasoning recorded by my learned brother. 23. For facility of reference, the relevant portions of Sections 499 and 514(1) of the Code may first be set down : "499. I fully agree with this view and finding that no useful addition to the discussion regarding this aspect, being possible, with respect, I adopt the reasoning recorded by my learned brother. 23. For facility of reference, the relevant portions of Sections 499 and 514(1) of the Code may first be set down : "499. (1) Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the police-officer or Court, as the case may be. (2) If, the case so require, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge". "514. (1) Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class. or, when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court, that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid". At the outset, it may be stated that the controversy centres around two aspects of the first part of Section 514 of the Code and may be summarised thus : (i) Whether in case of a bond for appearance, only a Court where appearance is to be put in, can forfeit the bond or the other three Courts mentioned in the first paragraph of Section 514 of the Code, namely, the Court to whose satisfaction the bond was executed or the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, can also forfeit the bond. (ii) Whether the Court to which a case has been transferred for enquiry or trial can also forfeit the bond even though the bond did not contain a commitment that the person released on bail would be required to appear in that Court. 24. Taking up the second controversy first, though there is some authority in favour of the proposition that a transferee Court can forfeit a bond even though the bond did not specifically require appearance in the Court but the clear wordings of Section 514(1) of the Code interpreted in the light of Section 499 of the Code show preference for the interpretation that a transferee Court cannot forfeit a bond if there is no stipulation in the bond that the appearance will have to be put in the transferee Court also, it may be added that there is overwhelming authority in favour of this view and the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. M. Homi (AIR 1955 SC 478) : (1955 Cri LJ 1017) further lend support to this interpretation. 25. Before referring to the case law on the point, it would be profitable first to examine the relevant provisions. Section 514(1), which mentions the Courts which can forfeit the bonds under the Code, makes no reference at all to any Court to which the case may be transferred. From the words "or, when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court" occurring in Section 514(1) it can on no account be inferred that the Court before which the accused is to appear according to the stipulation in the bond, would also include the Court to which the case may be transferred. The language of this Section does not contain even a remote indication that the transferee Court is included within the expression "such Court". In fact, Section 499, which relates to the bond of the accused and the sureties, places the matter beyond controversy as its clause (2) clearly provides that if the case so require, the "bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge". If the expression "such Court" occurring in Section 514(1) would include the transferee Court, Sub-Section (2) of Section 499 would be rendered redundant as in that case there would have been no necessity of including a condition in the bond that the person released on bail shall also appear in the High Court, Court of Session and other Courts, if so required. The very fact that in case the presence of the accused is required in any of the Courts mentioned in Sub-Section (2) of Section 499, it was considered imperative that the bond should indicate such a requirement, would negative any interpretation that the stipulation in a bond for appearance in a Court specified in the bond would include a stipulation to appear in any other Court to which the case may be transferred. Sub-Section (1) of Section 499 requires that the bond shall mention the time and place where the accused is required to attend. All these conditions of the bond would have to be strictly construed and any bond which does not contain any of the stipulations mentioned in Section 499(1) and Section 499(2) of the Code cannot be forfeited if there is a breach of that stipulation. 26. At this stage it would be appropriate to examine whether assistance can be sought from the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called the Code of 1973) which has replaced the Code of 1898, and this brings to the forefront the question whether an earlier Act can be interpreted in the light of a later legislative measure. The question has been considered by Maxwell in his book on the Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition at pages 69 and 70) in the following words : "'How far one may look at a later statute is questionable.' The question was discussed by the House of Lords in Kirkness v. John Hudson and Co. Ltd., (1955 AC 696), where Lord Reid said (at p. 735) that the earlier decision of the House in Ormond Investment Co. Ltd., (1955 AC 696), where Lord Reid said (at p. 735) that the earlier decision of the House in Ormond Investment Co. v. Betts (1927-2 KB 326) afforded 'conclusive and binding authority for the proposition that, in construing a provision of an earlier Act, the provisions of a later Act cannot be taken into account except in a limited class of case and that rule applied although the later Act contains a provision that it is to be read as one with the earlier Act. Of course, that does not apply where the later Act amends the earlier Act or purports to declare its meaning : in such cases the later Act operates directly by its own force. But where the provisions of the later Act could only operate indirectly as an aid to the construction of words in the earlier Act those provisions can only be used for that purpose if certain conditions apply to the earlier Act when it is considered by itself'. For the later statute to become relevant, there must be something 'obscure or ambiguous, or readily capable of more than one interpretation' in the earlier one, some 'phrase fairly and equally open to divers meanings'. If such an ambiguity can be found, it becomes permissible to look at the later Acts 'not perhaps to construe the earlier statute, but to see the meaning which Parliament puts on the self-same phrase in a similar context, in case it throws any light on the matter'." (emphasis supplied). 27. The Supreme Court in I.-T. Officer, Kanpur v. Mani Ram (AIR 1969 SC 543) has approved the view taken in Kirkness v. John Hudson and Co. Ltd. (1955 AC 696) and has made the following observations :- "The argument was that these Sections apply to a case of a regular assessment and the enactment of these Sections should be treated as a Parliamentary exposition of Sec. 18A(3) of the earlier Act as referring only to a case of regular assessment. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. There is nothing in 1961 Act to suggest that Parliament intended to explain meaning or clear on doubts about the meaning of the word 'assessed' in Section 18A(3) of the earlier Act. Generally speaking, a subsequent Act of Parliament affords no useful guide to the meaning of another Act which came into existence before the later one was ever framed. There is nothing in 1961 Act to suggest that Parliament intended to explain meaning or clear on doubts about the meaning of the word 'assessed' in Section 18A(3) of the earlier Act. Generally speaking, a subsequent Act of Parliament affords no useful guide to the meaning of another Act which came into existence before the later one was ever framed. Under special circumstances, the law does however admit of a subsequent Act to be resorted to for this purpose but the conditions under which the later Act may be resorted for the interpretation of the earlier Act are strict : both must be laws on the same subject and the part of the earlier Act which it is sought to construe must be ambiguous and capable of different meaning." (Emphasis supplied). JUDGEMENT Bhattacharjee, J. :- The petitioner, whose surety-bond executed for the appearance of an accused before Court has been forfeited and who has accordingly been called upon to pay the penalty thereof, has come on in revision against the orders of forfeiture and imposition of penalty. The bond was taken by a Judicial Magistrate and was for appearance in that Court, but has been forfeited by the Additional Sessions Judge, to whose Court the case of the accused was subsequently transferred for trial by an order of the Sessions Judge. The main ground urged by Mr. N.K.P. Saraf, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the petition and against the impugned orders is that the bond having been furnished in the Court of Judicial Magistrate and being for appearance in that Court, could not be forfeited by the Additional Sessions Judge, even though the case might have been assigned to him for disposal by aa order of transfer. 2. The question as to whether a bond for the appearance of an accused before a Court can be forfeited by such Court only where the accused was required to appear, or whether it can also be forfeited by the Court which has taken the bond, though for appearance in another Court, or whether it can also be forfeited by the Court to which the case may subsequently be transferred by commitment or otherwise, is far from settled and certain, as will appear from the vast mass of case-law clustering around Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This led the Law Commission to recommend restructuring of the provisions in its 41st Report on the Code wherein it has been observed as hereunder (at page 330, paragraph 42.2) :- "A doubt has sometimes arisen whether, in the case of a bond for appearance in a particular Court, that Court alone can forfeit it, or whether any Magistrate of the First Class has the power. As a matter of policy we think that this power should in the case for bond for appearance before a Court be confined to that Court as that Court is in the best position to judge the gravity of the breach of conditions causing forfeiture. Occasionally, some doubt has also arisen whether a bond for appearance before a Court can be forfeited by the order of a Court to which the case was later transferred. It is only proper that the transferee Court should have the same first Court had when the case was in that Court. We propose to clarify both these points by a suitable amendment." (Underlining for emphasis). 3. These recommendations have resulted in recasting of the relevant provision in Sec. 446 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, providing expressly that a bond for appearance before a particular Court can be forefeited only by that Court or by the Court to which the case has been subsequently transferred. The new Code of 1973, however, has not yet been extended to Sikkim where we are still governed by the earlier Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Let me, therefore, consider whether under Section 514 of the Code of 1898, the Court of the Additional Session Judge, being a transferee Court, could forefeit the bond of the petitioner. 4. The relevant provisions of Section 514 being Sub-Section (1) thereof, are as hereunder :- "Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond is taken under this Code or of the Court of Presidency Magistrate, or Magistrate of the First Class. "or when the bond in for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court, "that such bond has been forfeited. "the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof or to show cause why it should not be paid." (underlining for emphasis). 5. "or when the bond in for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court, "that such bond has been forfeited. "the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof or to show cause why it should not be paid." (underlining for emphasis). 5. There is no doubt a very long cetena of decisions, which can be found to be quoted in any standard treatise on Code of Criminal Procedure, laying down that in view of the juxtaposition of the expression when the bond is for appearance before a Court" and the expression "to the satisfaction of such Court", in the second sub-paragraph and the expression "the Court shall" in the 'fourth sub-paragraph, when the bond is for appearance before n Court, only that a Court, where appearance was to be made according to the bond, can forfeit such bond. Reference may be made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ballabhadas Motiram v. Emperor (AIR 1943 Bom 178) : (44 Cri LJ 549), which has also been referred to by the Law commission in its Report, as representing this view. There is also a catena of case, though not that long, laying down a contrary view and reference may be made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Harwari Lal v. State (AIR 1959 All 751) : (1959 Cri LJ 1380), also noted in the Report of the Law Commission, as representing this view according to which, a bond for at appearance before a Court, being also a word under this Code" within the meaning of the provisions of the first Sub-paragraph, can be forfeited there under by the three Courts mentioned therein and, in view of the express provisions of the second sub-paragraph can also be forfeited by the Court before which appearance is required by the terms of the bond. On a consideration of the provisions of Section 514(1), as quoted hereinabove, I have, and this I have with respect, not been able to persuade myself to agree with the former view and have, with equal respect, agreed with the contrary view and I would now proceed to state my reasons. 6. On a consideration of the provisions of Section 514(1), as quoted hereinabove, I have, and this I have with respect, not been able to persuade myself to agree with the former view and have, with equal respect, agreed with the contrary view and I would now proceed to state my reasons. 6. There can be no doubt that a bond for appearance of the accused before a Court, whether executed by the accused or by the surety, as envisaged in the second sub-paragraph of Section 514(1), is also a "bond taken under this Code" within the meaning of the first subparagraph. And if such a bond for appearance is also a "bond taken under this Code", within the meaning of the first sub-paragraph, then I cannot find any reason why the same cannot be dealt with under that first sub-paragraph and not thus be forfeited by the Courts mentioned therein, namely, the Court by which the bond is taken, the Court of the Presidency Magistrate and the Court of the Magistrate of the First Class. But a bond for the appearance of an accused before a particular Court may not very often be a bond which has been taken by that particular Court, as is contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 499, whereunder, "if the case so require, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear. when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session, or Court to answer the charge." It is in such case that the second subparagraph operates and authorises such latter Court also, though it has not taken the bond, or is not the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class, to forfeit the bond and to proceed accordingly. 7. As already noted, Section 446(1) of the new Code of 1973 expressly confines the authority to forfeit a bond of appearance to the Court before which such appearance is to be made under the terms of the bond or the Court to which the case has been subsequently transferred. 7. As already noted, Section 446(1) of the new Code of 1973 expressly confines the authority to forfeit a bond of appearance to the Court before which such appearance is to be made under the terms of the bond or the Court to which the case has been subsequently transferred. But from this alone, it would, in my view, be too broad a proposition to contend that a chance in the law has been deliberately made and that the authority to forfeit a bond for appearance before a particular Court, which is now expressly confined to that Court only, was not so confined to that Court only in Section 514 of the earlier Code, or that under that Section, a transferee Court could not forfeit a bond for appearance, as it can do now under the new Code. As is well-known, it would not be correct to say that every change in the phraseology introduced by way of amendment or reenactment necessarily implies a change in the law, for it entirely depends upon whether the change was merely meant to clarify or to alter the existing law. Such changes are very often made to clear up some ambiguities or to, present possible misinterpretation and do not, by themselves, justify any inference that the law must have been something different before. No authority should be needed for such a well-established principle of interpretation of Statutes but, if needed, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. Pratap Singh Kairon (AIR 1964 SC 295 at p. 310). And as I have already pointed out, the report of the Law Commission shows that these changes were proposed only to "clarify" the position in law. 8. Be that as it may, on a construction of the relevant provisions of Section 514(1), I am, as at present advised of the opinion that any bond taken under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, including a bond for appearance before a Court, can be forfeited by the Court by which the bond is taken as well as by the Court before which appearance was conditioned and also the Court of the Presidency Magistrate and of the Magistrate of the First Class. And in my view, the second sub-paragraph of Section 514(1), far from confining the authority to forfeit a bond for appearance only to the Court where appearance was conditioned by such bond, provides such Court as an additional authority to do so in addition to the authorities mentioned in the first sub-paragraph. As I have already noted, a bond "for appearance before a Court", can obviously, under the express terms of the second sub-paragraph, be forfeited by such Court. But such a bond being also obviously a "bond under this Code" within the meaning of the first sub-paragraph and not having been otherwise excluded from its operation, I entirely fail to under stand why such a bond cannot be dealt with under the said sub-paragraph and cannot be forfeited by the Courts mentioned therein including even the Court which has taken the bond. 9. But even then, the question raised in this revision is not answered. For here, the bond for appearance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate for appearance in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, but has been forfeited by the Additional Sessions Judge, to whose Court the case has been transferred for trial though, under the terms of the bond in question, the accused was not conditioned to appear before him. The Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, not obviously being a Court of the Presidency Magistrate or the Magistrate of the First Class and not also being the Court which took the bond or the Court before whom the bond required the accused to appear, could not forfeit the bond, unless the Court before which the accused is so required to appear under the bond would in law, include any Court to which the case has been subsequently transferred. As I have already noted, in Section 446 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred. has been expressly authorised to forfeit the bond for appearance, even though the terms of the bond do not command such appearance. But, as I have already pointed out, from this change of law alone, it may not be safe to infer that this could not be done under the earlier Code, by which this case is governed. 10. has been expressly authorised to forfeit the bond for appearance, even though the terms of the bond do not command such appearance. But, as I have already pointed out, from this change of law alone, it may not be safe to infer that this could not be done under the earlier Code, by which this case is governed. 10. I will very much like to hold, if I can, that a Court to which a case subsequently transferred for trial can also forfeit a bond for appearance, though there is no express terms therein requiring appearance, before such Court, because, in my view, it would be conducive to the speedier administration of criminal justice if the Court trying the offence is also empowered to forfeit the bond for appearance in order to ensure the attendance of the offender. This also appears to be the view of the Allahabad High Court in Mustaquimuddin v. Emperor (AIR 1926 All 297) : (27 Cri LJ 377), also noted in the Report of the Law Commission where it has been observed that "any other view of the law would produce most inconvenient results since if an accused were on bail, when a case was transferred, it would in every case be necessary before transferring the case to order hrs arrest or to require him to give fresh sureties". And if I am to hold otherwise, I would be really wondering as to why the transferee Court, which gets clothed with all the powers of a transferor Court in respect of the offence and the offender, would not get this power to enforce the attendance of the offender before it, though the transferor Court admittedly possessed this power. As the Law Commission has observed, "it is only proper that the transferee Court should have the same power to deal with such a bond as the first Court had when the case was in that Court". The argument on the basis of the principles of the law of contract does not really impress me, the argument being that the contract for appearance or to secure appearance being with a particular Court, can be enforced only by such Court. The argument on the basis of the principles of the law of contract does not really impress me, the argument being that the contract for appearance or to secure appearance being with a particular Court, can be enforced only by such Court. Because in that case a bond for appearance taken by one Court for appearance before another Court, cannot also be forfeited by the latter, with which admittedly there was no contract, though this power cannot obviously be disputed in view of the provisions of the second sub-paragraph of Section 514. Nor can the Courts of the Presidency Magistrate or of the Magistrate of the First Class can have any general power to forfeit any bond taken under this Code under the first sub-paragraph, for they may not very often be parties to the contract in the bond, but this power, again, cannot be disputed under the provisions of the first sub-paragraph. Nor can a Magistrate discharge the sureties from the bonds of his bond (sic) under Section 502, if the argument based in the principles of contract is accepted and persued. These powers have been derived from the provisions of the Statutes dehors any contract, and, therefore, if such a power can be leaned in favour of a transferee Court from the provisions of the Statute, the absence of any contract and the argument based thereon need not detain us. 11. But on a construction of the provisions of Section 514(1) along with some other provisions of the Code and also the relevant provisions of Section 446(1) of the new Code along with the Explanation, it may be difficult to deduce such power under the provisions of Section 514(1) in favour of the transferee Court, appearance wherein is not mandated by the terms of the bond. 12. 12. Sections 449 (441 ?) of the Code, which deals with the bond of accused and sureties, provides in Sub-Section (2)(3 ?) that "if the case so requires, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear, when called upon, at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge." Now, if the position in law is that a Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred can forfeit the bond for appearance, even though the bond does not require appearance before such transferee Court, it is difficult to understand as to why in case of the case being committed or otherwise transferred to the High Court or the Court of Session or to any other Court, the bond, in order to the effective to enforce the appearance of the accused in such subsequent Court, "shall" have to "also" bind the person released on bail to appear in such Court "to answer the charge." I am afraid that these provisions, as contained in Section 499(2), rather indicate that without such express binding by and in the terms of the bond, the Legislature considered that the High Court, the Court of Session or any Court to which the case may subsequently be transferred, would not be in a position to enforce the appearance of the accused. And if such Courts cannot enforce the attendance of the accused without an express binding to that effect in the bond for appearance, these Courts cannot obviously forfeit the bonds without any such express undertaking. 13. The Explanation to Section 446(1), read along with the provisions of the Sub-Section, of the new Code, may also favour such a construction. The Explanation runs thus :- "A condition in a bond for appearance, or production of property, before a Court shall be construed as including the condition for appearance, or as the case may be, for production of property, before any Court to which the case may subsequently be transferred." 14. Section 446(1) clearly provides that "where a bond under this Code is for appearance ......... before a Court' and it is proved to the satisfaction of that Court, or of any Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred, that the bond has been forfeited, .... Section 446(1) clearly provides that "where a bond under this Code is for appearance ......... before a Court' and it is proved to the satisfaction of that Court, or of any Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred, that the bond has been forfeited, .... the Court shall, record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof..........". It is difficult to understand as to why, after expressly empowering the transferee Court to forfeit a bond for appearance, whether or not such bond was for appearance be, fore such transferee Court, it has been thought necessary to provide for a statutory fiction to the effect that "a condition for appearance before a Court shall be construed as including a condition for appearance before" such transferee Court. At any rate, this has given rise to a contention, not without any force, that, the transferee Court could not forfeit a bond for appearance, even under the express provisions of Section 446(1), unless the Explanation thereto expressly provided that the bond "shall be construed as including a condition for appearance before any Court to which the case may subsequently be transferred." Have we not been told that the Legislature shall be presumed not to have wasted a single ward or to indulge in redundant superfluity ? 15. In a decision of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. M. Homi (AIR 1955 SC 478) : (1955 Cri LJ 1017) relied on by Mr. Saraf, it was held that a condition in the bond to surrender to Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum, within three days of the receipt of the appellate judgement of the Privy Council, could not be considered to cover the case when the appeal stood transferred to the Federal Court under the provisions of the Abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1947, and was ultimately disposed of by the Supreme Court, because there was no term in the bond to the effect that the surety would be bound by any judgement or order given by such other Courts as may succeed to the jurisdiction then vested in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This decision is, however, not an authority for the decision of the question as to whether the transferee Court can forfeit a bond for appearance, when the terms thereof did dot expressly require appearance before such transferee Court. It may, however, be treated as an authority for the proposition that the terms of such bonds are to be strictly construed and reference therein to any Court, after whose final judgement the bond would become operative, would not, by itself, include the successor or the transferee Court and that, therefore, it may be contended that it should logically follow that the Court which took the bond or the Court before whom appearance was conditioned by the bond, would not include the transferee Court to empower the latter to forfeit a bond for appearance. 16. When the attention of the learned counsel and also the learned Advocate-General was drawn to the two-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1972 SC 16) : (1972 Cri LJ 5) and we asked whether this decision is an authority for the proposition that a transferee Court can forfeit a bond for appearance, though the bond did not expressly require appearance before such Court the learned Advocate-General frankly submitted that though some of the observations made therein, at the first blush, might appear to support such a contention, the decision, as would appear from a proper scrutiny thereof, does not lay down any such broad proposition. I agree with the learned Advocate-General. The bond in question before the Supreme Court was not a "bond for appearance before a Court" within the meaning of the second sub-paragraph of Section 514, and accordingly, under the express terms of the first sub-paragraph, it could be forfeited by the Court which took it or by the Court of the Presidency Magistrate or the Magistrate of the First Class. And as such, the bond in that case, though taken by one Sub-Divisional Magistrate, could be legally forfeited by another Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the same district, if the latter was also a Magistrate of the First Class. And as such, the bond in that case, though taken by one Sub-Divisional Magistrate, could be legally forfeited by another Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the same district, if the latter was also a Magistrate of the First Class. Though it does not expressly appear from the judgement that the forfeiting Sub-Divisional Magistrate was a Magistrate of the First Class, in all probability he was so, as the case was under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for carrying essential commodities to a prohibited area, and was, therefore, punishable under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Act with imprisonment up to 3 years at the relevant time (now up to 5 years) and could be tried by a Magistrate of the First Class only, it is true that the Supreme Court in that case did not sustain the order of the forfeiture expressly on this line of reasoning, but upheld it on the ground that the undertaking in the bond was to produce it, not before any particular Court, but before the Court and "the word 'Court' in the bond in the present case will mean the Magistrate's Court which dealt with the case". This decision, therefore, is not and, in the facts and the circumstances of the case, cannot be an authority for any general proposition that a transferee Court can forfeit the "bond for appearance," though the terms thereof do not require appearance before that Court. 17. But even assuming that the transferee Court can forfeit a bond of appearance, though the terms thereof do not condition appearance before the transferee Court, the transfer itself must have been legally made. I am, afraid that the order of the Additional Sessions Judge cannot be sustained, even if it was held that a transferee Court has all the powers to forfeit a bond which a Court which took the bond or before whom appearance was conditioned by the bond had because the order of transfer, by which the case was transferred to his Court, was itself illegal. As will appear from the Order Sheet, the criminal case, in which the bond in question was given, was pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, but, as will appear from the order dated 9-4-80, "as per the order of transfer dated 8-4-80, passed by the Hon'ble Sessions Judge", it was transferred to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge. A Sessions Judge can surely transfer a case under Section 528 "from one Criminal Court to another Criminal Court in the same Sessions Division", "if he is of opinion that it is expedient for the ends of justice", but, as the relevant provision of Sub-Section (1C) would be to show, he can do so only "on an application made to him in this behalf". The corresponding provisions contained in Section 408(2) of the new Code of 1973, however, expressly authorise a Sessions Judge to order such transfer not only on the application of a party but also "on the report of the lower Court" or even "on his own initiative", because, as the Law Commission has observed in its 41st Report, it was "found desirable that a Sessions Judge should be authorised" to do so. But as already noted, that Code does not govern us here where we are still governed by the old Code. From the records of the trial Court, it does not appear that there was any such application by any of the parties and the learned Public Prosecutor, appearing with the learned Advocate-General, has conceded that there was no such application by any party to the case and that the transfer was effected as a result of a general order passed by the Sessions Judge in respect of a bunch of cases. This, I am afraid, the Sessions Judge could not do, even if he did it with the best of intention. The order of transfer, therefore, cannot stand and must fall and with it falls the jurisdiction of the transferee Court in respect of the case, including the power, if it had any, to forfeit the bond for appearance furnished in that case. The order of forfeiture, therefore, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge must be quashed along with the order of imposition of penalty. 18. One thing before I conclude. The order of forfeiture, therefore, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge must be quashed along with the order of imposition of penalty. 18. One thing before I conclude. In Ramesh Chandra's case (1972 Cri LJ 5) (SC) (supra), the High Court did not allow the surety to urge in revision that the forfeiture of the bond was bad as it "was executed in one Court and it was forfeited in another Court", on the ground that "the point had not been raised either before the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge" and on appeal, the Supreme Court held that "the High Court rightly refused the appellant to urge this ground as to want of jurisdiction" as "such a plea of jurisdiction is interlaced with question of facts". I must, however, note that the learned Advocate-General, with his usual fairness, has not contended that the petitioner in this case is not entitled to urge this ground as to want of jurisdiction in view of the decision in Ramesh Chandra's case (supra) or otherwise. I am also satisfied that the plea raised by the petitioner in this case is not "interlaced" with any "question of facts", disputed or otherwise, but is based purely on a construction of the terms of the bond of appearance, the order of transfer and the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, as such, should be allowed to be raised even according to the decision in Ramesh Chandra's case (supra), the ratio whereof appears to be that such a plea could be raised before the High Court and the Supreme Court, even though not raised earlier, "without any question of facts and purely on the construction of the bond" and in fact, was allowed to be raised before the Supreme Court, though without success. 19. In the result, the revision, therefore, succeeds and the impugned orders of forfeiture and imposition of penalty are quashed. Though the present revision has not been directed directly against the order of transfer, the same having been found to be illegal and without jurisdiction and such finding being the basis of the present order, must also be quashed in respect of the criminal case in question in which the bond for appearance has been taken, along with all the proceedings taken by the transferee Court of the Additional Sessions Judge pursuant to such order of transfer. The records of the case, therefore, shall go back to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, where it was pending before it was transferred to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge and the Judicial Magistrate shall proceed with the case and also with the question of forfeiture of the bond of appearance in accordance with law. 20. GUJRAL, C. J. :- I have had the advantage of reading the judgement of my learned brother Bhattacharjee, J., and though I concur with the final order that the Revision petition has to be allowed yet I find it necessary to record a separate judgement, as the matter involved is of considerable importance and has been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions by the various High Courts. Moreover, with great respect for my learned brother, I find it difficult to accept the interpretation placed on the first part of Section 514(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (hereinafter called the "Code") especially the expression "or, when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court". 21. The facts necessary for the decision of this petition are not in dispute. The petitioner had executed a Surety Bond in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate for appearance of the accused in that Court but the case was subsequently transferred for trial to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, where the accused did not appear and the bond was forfeited by the impugned order of the Additional Sessions Judge. The transfer of the case was brought about by an order of the Sessions Judge, Gongtok, which was made suo motu without there being any application for transfer by any party. 22. While accepting this petition, Bhattacharjee, J., has taken the view that the order of transfer was illegal and the Additional Sessions Judge was, therefore, not competent to forfeit the Bond. I fully agree with this view and finding that no useful addition to the discussion regarding this aspect, being possible, with respect, I adopt the reasoning recorded by my learned brother. 23. For facility of reference, the relevant portions of Sections 499 and 514(1) of the Code may first be set down : "499. I fully agree with this view and finding that no useful addition to the discussion regarding this aspect, being possible, with respect, I adopt the reasoning recorded by my learned brother. 23. For facility of reference, the relevant portions of Sections 499 and 514(1) of the Code may first be set down : "499. (1) Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the police-officer or Court, as the case may be. (2) If, the case so require, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge". "514. (1) Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class. or, when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court, that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid". At the outset, it may be stated that the controversy centres around two aspects of the first part of Section 514 of the Code and may be summarised thus : (i) Whether in case of a bond for appearance, only a Court where appearance is to be put in, can forfeit the bond or the other three Courts mentioned in the first paragraph of Section 514 of the Code, namely, the Court to whose satisfaction the bond was executed or the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, can also forfeit the bond. (ii) Whether the Court to which a case has been transferred for enquiry or trial can also forfeit the bond even though the bond did not contain a commitment that the person released on bail would be required to appear in that Court. 24. Taking up the second controversy first, though there is some authority in favour of the proposition that a transferee Court can forfeit a bond even though the bond did not specifically require appearance in the Court but the clear wordings of Section 514(1) of the Code interpreted in the light of Section 499 of the Code show preference for the interpretation that a transferee Court cannot forfeit a bond if there is no stipulation in the bond that the appearance will have to be put in the transferee Court also, it may be added that there is overwhelming authority in favour of this view and the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. M. Homi (AIR 1955 SC 478) : (1955 Cri LJ 1017) further lend support to this interpretation. 25. Before referring to the case law on the point, it would be profitable first to examine the relevant provisions. Section 514(1), which mentions the Courts which can forfeit the bonds under the Code, makes no reference at all to any Court to which the case may be transferred. From the words "or, when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court" occurring in Section 514(1) it can on no account be inferred that the Court before which the accused is to appear according to the stipulation in the bond, would also include the Court to which the case may be transferred. The language of this Section does not contain even a remote indication that the transferee Court is included within the expression "such Court". In fact, Section 499, which relates to the bond of the accused and the sureties, places the matter beyond controversy as its clause (2) clearly provides that if the case so require, the "bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge". If the expression "such Court" occurring in Section 514(1) would include the transferee Court, Sub-Section (2) of Section 499 would be rendered redundant as in that case there would have been no necessity of including a condition in the bond that the person released on bail shall also appear in the High Court, Court of Session and other Courts, if so required. The very fact that in case the presence of the accused is required in any of the Courts mentioned in Sub-Section (2) of Section 499, it was considered imperative that the bond should indicate such a requirement, would negative any interpretation that the stipulation in a bond for appearance in a Court specified in the bond would include a stipulation to appear in any other Court to which the case may be transferred. Sub-Section (1) of Section 499 requires that the bond shall mention the time and place where the accused is required to attend. All these conditions of the bond would have to be strictly construed and any bond which does not contain any of the stipulations mentioned in Section 499(1) and Section 499(2) of the Code cannot be forfeited if there is a breach of that stipulation. 26. At this stage it would be appropriate to examine whether assistance can be sought from the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called the Code of 1973) which has replaced the Code of 1898, and this brings to the forefront the question whether an earlier Act can be interpreted in the light of a later legislative measure. The question has been considered by Maxwell in his book on the Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition at pages 69 and 70) in the following words : "'How far one may look at a later statute is questionable.' The question was discussed by the House of Lords in Kirkness v. John Hudson and Co. Ltd., (1955 AC 696), where Lord Reid said (at p. 735) that the earlier decision of the House in Ormond Investment Co. Ltd., (1955 AC 696), where Lord Reid said (at p. 735) that the earlier decision of the House in Ormond Investment Co. v. Betts (1927-2 KB 326) afforded 'conclusive and binding authority for the proposition that, in construing a provision of an earlier Act, the provisions of a later Act cannot be taken into account except in a limited class of case and that rule applied although the later Act contains a provision that it is to be read as one with the earlier Act. Of course, that does not apply where the later Act amends the earlier Act or purports to declare its meaning : in such cases the later Act operates directly by its own force. But where the provisions of the later Act could only operate indirectly as an aid to the construction of words in the earlier Act those provisions can only be used for that purpose if certain conditions apply to the earlier Act when it is considered by itself'. For the later statute to become relevant, there must be something 'obscure or ambiguous, or readily capable of more than one interpretation' in the earlier one, some 'phrase fairly and equally open to divers meanings'. If such an ambiguity can be found, it becomes permissible to look at the later Acts 'not perhaps to construe the earlier statute, but to see the meaning which Parliament puts on the self-same phrase in a similar context, in case it throws any light on the matter'." (emphasis supplied). 27. The Supreme Court in I.-T. Officer, Kanpur v. Mani Ram (AIR 1969 SC 543) has approved the view taken in Kirkness v. John Hudson and Co. Ltd. (1955 AC 696) and has made the following observations :- "The argument was that these Sections apply to a case of a regular assessment and the enactment of these Sections should be treated as a Parliamentary exposition of Sec. 18A(3) of the earlier Act as referring only to a case of regular assessment. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. There is nothing in 1961 Act to suggest that Parliament intended to explain meaning or clear on doubts about the meaning of the word 'assessed' in Section 18A(3) of the earlier Act. Generally speaking, a subsequent Act of Parliament affords no useful guide to the meaning of another Act which came into existence before the later one was ever framed. There is nothing in 1961 Act to suggest that Parliament intended to explain meaning or clear on doubts about the meaning of the word 'assessed' in Section 18A(3) of the earlier Act. Generally speaking, a subsequent Act of Parliament affords no useful guide to the meaning of another Act which came into existence before the later one was ever framed. Under special circumstances, the law does however admit of a subsequent Act to be resorted to for this purpose but the conditions under which the later Act may be resorted for the interpretation of the earlier Act are strict : both must be laws on the same subject and the part of the earlier Act which it is sought to construe must be ambiguous and capable of different meaning." (Emphasis supplied).