JUDGMENT 1. - In this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance against the judgment of the learned single Judge, the short question that calls for determination is whether the four persons whose names are mentioned below and whose services had been engaged by the Railway Employees Co-operative Banking Society Limited (which will be hereinafter referred to as the Society) come within the definition of the term 'employee' as contained in Section 2 (f) of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act):- 1. Shri Kanhaiya Lai, Sweeper, 2. Shri Nand Kishore, Night-Watchman, 3. Smt. Shakuntala, Water-woman, 4. Shri Ram Bharose, Gardner. 2. It appears that a dispute arose be-tween the Society and the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner for Rajasthan as to whether the Act can be applied to the Society on the ground that it employs 50 persons. We may straightway observe that if any one of the four persons about whom the dispute has arisen cannot be considered as an 'employee' a defined in the Act, the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable to the* Society. Even the Society admits that there are 46 employees employed by it but its contention is that these four persons have been engaged by it casually, and that too not in connection with the work of the establishment and, therefore, they cannot be considered as employees. It may be pointed out, here, that the Legal Advisor to the Central Government by his order dated January 11, 1977, held the above mentioned four persons as employees, and, thereby dismissed the representation made by the Society. Consequently, the Society filed the writ petition which was dismissed by the learned single Judge, who concurred in the view taken by the Legal Advisor,, 3. Consequently, the Society filed the writ petition which was dismissed by the learned single Judge, who concurred in the view taken by the Legal Advisor,, 3. Now, before we proceed to examine the cases of each of the above mentioned four persons, it would be proper to reproduce the definition of the word 'employee' contained in Section 2 (f) of the Act:- "2 (f) 'employee' means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person employed by or through a contractor or in connection with the work of the establishment." (1) Kanhaiya Lal is a whole-time Sweeper employed by the Railway. He works on part-time basis at the premises of the Society for cleaning the urinals/ lavatories for which he is paid Rs. 15/-, per mensem by the Society. He comes twice or three times in a week for doing the job. Thus, it is clear that he is not a whole-time employee but only a part-time worker, and his work is to clean the lavatories. (2) Nand Kishore is a night-watchman. Of course, he is not in the exclusive employment of the Society as he keeps a watch at night on a number of other shops also, situated in the same locality. He is paid Rs. 4/- per day. Thus, it is clear that he is also not in the exclusive employment of the Society. (3) Smt. Shakuntala Devi has been employed by the Society for serving water fco the employees of the Society during office hours. There is nothing on the record to show whether she serves anywhere else and thus is a part-time employee and, therefore, she may be taken to be in the exclusive employment of the Society. (4) Shri Ram Bharose is a Gardner. He works elsewhere also and thus he is a part-time worker. He does not come for doing his job daily, but is said to be attending the Society's premises ten days in a month to look after the garden. Thus, it is clear that he is also a part-time worker and not in the exclusive employment of the Society. 4. He works elsewhere also and thus he is a part-time worker. He does not come for doing his job daily, but is said to be attending the Society's premises ten days in a month to look after the garden. Thus, it is clear that he is also a part-time worker and not in the exclusive employment of the Society. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that these four persons are only part-time employees and they cannot be said to have been employed in connection with the work of the establishment which is banking business. He has also argued that at best they can be treated as casual workers. Et has been submitted that Kanhaiya Lal is a whole-time employee of the Railway and, therefore, cannot be considered to be an employee at any other place. As regards Nand Kishore, it has been urged that he is a night-watchman for a number of shops situated in the vicinity of the Society's premises and it would be incongruous to consider him as an employee of all those shop-keepers who have engaged his services for keeping night-watch. For Shakuntala Devi the contention is that her work is not connected with the work of the establishment. For Ram Bharose the argument is that he is a part-time gardner and the maintenance of garden has no connection with the business carried on by the Society. 5. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon The Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. The Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd., AIR 1976 SC 66 : (1976 Lab IC 1) ; The Mysore State Co-operative Printing Works Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1976 Lab IC 1307 (Kant) ; Bikaner Cold Storage Co.. Bikaner v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1979 Raj LW 287: (1979 Lab IC 1017) ; The Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. United Electrical Industries Ltd., 1976 Lab IC 251 (Ker) and Argent v. Minister of Social Security, 1969 Lab IC 392 (QBD) . 6. On the other hand, Mr. Ram Raj Vyas, learned counsel for the respondents, has urged that the fact that the aforesaid four persons are part-time workmen is no ground for not holding them to be employees as defined in the Act as the employee contemplated in the said definition. may be a whole-time employee or part-time employee. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Ram Raj Vyas, learned counsel for the respondents, has urged that the fact that the aforesaid four persons are part-time workmen is no ground for not holding them to be employees as defined in the Act as the employee contemplated in the said definition. may be a whole-time employee or part-time employee. It has also been argued by him that the work done by an employee need mot be necessarily in connection with the business of the employer. All that is required is that the person must be employed in any kind of work in the establishment. It may be any kind of work manual or otherwise. In support of the stand taken by him. he has placed reliance on Silver Jubilee Tailoring House and others v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments and another, AIR 1974 SC 37 : (1974 Lab IC 133) and New Steel Textiles v. Union of India, 1975 Lab IC 1400 (Ker) . 7. Before we deal with the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for both the parties, we deem it necessary to observe that by and large it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether a person falls within the definition of an 'employee' as contained in the Act. 8. In The Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. The Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. (1976 Lab IC 1) (SC) (supra) it was held that when under the terms and conditions of an agreement apprentices are engaged by a Company as mere trainees for a particular period for a distinct purpose and the employer is not bound to employ them in their works after the period of training is over, they cannot be said to be employed in the work of the Company or in connection with the work of the Company during the apprenticeship. That would have been so, if they were employed in a regular way by the Company. In our opinion, this case has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case as none of the four persons is an apprentice. 9. In the Mysore State Co-operative Printing Works Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (1976 Lab IC 1307) (Kant) (supra) the question was whether (1) House Orderly, (2) Night Watchman and (3) the Secretary were the employees of the petitioner-Co-operative Printing Works Limited? 9. In the Mysore State Co-operative Printing Works Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (1976 Lab IC 1307) (Kant) (supra) the question was whether (1) House Orderly, (2) Night Watchman and (3) the Secretary were the employees of the petitioner-Co-operative Printing Works Limited? The learned Judge held that the question whether House Orderly and Night Watchman are employees, could be decided only after notice to the concerned Watchman and taking evidence in the matter and giving a proper hearing to both the parties. However, in the case of the Secretary it was held that he was a deputed Government servant and, consequently, not an employee of the Society. It was observed that the payment of salary to the Secretary was necessitated by the terms of deputation and also as per bye-law and as such he was not an employee as defined under Section 2 (f) of the Act. In our view, the principle enunciated in that case has no application to the present case inasmuch as it is not the appellant's case that the Services of any of the above mentioned four persons had been lent to the Society. 10. In Bikaner Cold Storage Company v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (1979 Lab IC 1017) (Raj) (supra) a Full Bench of this Court observed that mere casual or temporary persons employed in an establishment, not connected with the normal or regular work of such establishment, cannot be counted for the purpose of determining as to whether the establishment was (governed by the provisions of clause (a) of sub-s. (3) of S. 1 of the Act. It was a case of temporary labourers employed for the purpose Of carrying out the repairs of the factory building. It was held the even if casual or temporary workers are engaged occasionally or intermittently to meet some temporary expediency or unusual or emergent situation, such temporary or casual workmen cannot be considered to be employees of the concern for the purpose of Section 1 (3) (a) of the Act. It is enough to point out that in the present case none of the four persons can be said to be casual or temporary workers engaged occasionally to meet some temporary situation, and, therefore, the rationale of the Full Bench decision cannot be applied to the case on hand. 11. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is. 11. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is. The Employees' State Insurance Corpn. v. M/s, United Electrical Industries Ltd. (1976 Lab IC 251) (Ker) (supra). In that case it was held that the mere fact that certain workmen are referred to as casual workmen does not of course determine their character but if from the facts it is found that they are not 'employed' by the employer but are mainly engaged' for casual labour, there is no scope for demanding contribution in respect of such workmen. It was found that the workmen in the Canteen were employed in connection with the work incidental to the purpose of the factory, then even if they are employed by the independent contractor, they would be employees, if they are working on the premises of the factory. In this view of the matter, the Canteen employees wert-held to be covered by the definition of the term 'employee', as contained in Section 2 (f) of the Employees' State Insurance Act. In our opinion, this case is of no help to the appellant. On the other hand, it supports the respondents to a certain extent. 12. In Argent v. Minister of Social Security (1969 Lab IC 392) (supra) which is an English case, decided by a single Judge of Queen's Bench, it was held that the petitioner was not employed under a contract of service and was, therefore, not an employed person but was at all times a self-employed person. It was also observed that no single test is decisive for determining whether a proposal-is self-employed or employed under a contract of service. In our opinion, this- case is also of no assistance to the appellant. 13. Thus, all that can be said on the basis of the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is that it is only in case of casual labour employed for meeting a particular emergent situation that it cannot be considered as falling within the definition of the word 'employee'. 14. 13. Thus, all that can be said on the basis of the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is that it is only in case of casual labour employed for meeting a particular emergent situation that it cannot be considered as falling within the definition of the word 'employee'. 14. In the present case, Kanhaiya Lai, Nand Kishore and Ram Bharose are no doubt part-time employees and that all the four persons are not employed directly in connection with the work of the establishment but these facts alone would not, in our opinion, take these persons out of the ambit of the term 'employee' as defined in Section 2 (f) of the Act. There is nothing in the definition to show that the employee must be a whole-time one. Thus the employee may be a part-time employee. Then again the definition envisages that the person may be employed in any kind of work manual or otherwise in the establishment or in connection with the work of the establishment. 15. In Silver Jubiliee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments (1974 Lab IC 133) (SC) (supra) while dealing -with the definition of the term 'person employed' contained in Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Shops and Establishments Act (10 of 1951) Mathew J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed that there is no reason why a person who is only employed part-time should not be a servant and it is doubtful whether regular part-time service can be considered even prima-facie to suggest anything other than a contract of service. The learned Judge went on to observe that according to the definition contained in Section 2 (14) of the Act even if a person is not wholly employed, if he is principally employed in connection with the business of the shop, he will be a 'person employed' within the meaning of the sub-section. It is pertinent to point out that 'person employed' was defined in the Shops and Establishments Act as 'a person wholly or principally employed in connection with the business of the shop.' The definition of the words 'person employed' was thus a restricted one inasmuch as he must be a person principally employed in connection with the business of the shop. However, the definition of the word 'employee' contained in our Act is not restricted inasmuch as there are no-words 'wholly or principally employed" contained therein, and it is further clear that the person need not be employed in connection with the work of the establishment but he may be employed in any kind of work manual or otherwise in the establishment. Thus, this wider definition of 'employee', in our opinion,! embraces a part-time employee as also an employee who is engaged for any work in the establishment which may not necessarily be connected with the work of the establishment. It is true that none of these four persons has been employed in connection with the work of the establishment which is banking business. But the definition of the term does not envisage that only those employees who are doing the banking work in the establishment are employees and nobody else. In this connection, reference may be made to the Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ramtahel Ramanand, AIR 1972 SC 1598 : (1972 Lab IC 864) wherein while dealing with the definition of the term 'employee' contained in Bombay Industrial Relations Act (11 of 1947) it was held by their Lordships that the workers in order to-come within the definition of the term 'employee' need not necessarily be directly connected with the main industry, that is, manufacture of textile fabrics. Thus it appears to us that an employee , engaged in any work or operation which is incidentally connected with the work of an establishment is an employee as defined in the Act. We are also of the opinion that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that an employee cannot have more than one --employer has also no force. 16. No other point was pressed in support of the appeal. 17. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge that the above mentioned four persons must be considered as 'employees' as defined in the " Act appears to be correct and does not call for any interference. 18. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal, but make no order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******