ORDER T.S. Misra, J. - Daya Shanker Saxena, opposite party No 3, filed an application under Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 seeking eviction of the present petitioners from the shops in question and for release of the same in his favour. That application was contested by the present petition on the ground, inter alia, that the need of the landlord was not genuine and bona fide. The prescribed Authority having held that the need of the landlord was bona fide allowed the application. An appeal was then filed by the present petitioners before the District Judge but that was dismissed. A writ petition No. 1350 of 1976 was then filed in this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. During the pendency of the writ petition Section 21 of the Act was amended adding a proviso to Section 21 (1) reading as under:- "Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed." It was found that the hardship of the landlord and the tenant was not compared and, therefore, the matter was sent back to the prescribed Authority for decision of the case afresh. It was, however, made clear that the finding that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide shall be final, and shall not be re-opened now. This order was passed by this Court on 3-5-1977. The matter was again considered by the prescribed Authority who made a comparative assessment of the hardships and came to the conclusion that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if the application under Section 21 was rejected than the hardship that would be caused to the tenants if the application was allowed. The prescribed Authority, therefore, allowed the application. He further directed that compensation equivalent to twenty month's rent shall be paid by the landlord. The prescribed Authority, therefore, allowed the application. He further directed that compensation equivalent to twenty month's rent shall be paid by the landlord. In case the compensation is paid the tenants were directed to vacate the premises within three months of the payment of the compensation and in case the compensation was not paid the tenants would be entitled to remain in occupation of the shops in question for a period of twenty months from 1-11-1978 without making payment of any rent. The tenants aggrieved by the order filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge which was dismissed on 26-11-1979. They have now challenged the orders of the prescribed Authority and the learned IInd Addl. District and Sessions Judge passed in appeal in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. For the petitioners it was urged that the Prescribed Authority as also the IInd Addl. District and Sessions Judge erred in not analysing the matter from the point that the need of the opposite party No. 3 could have been satisfied by the release of the part of the accommodation. It was also submitted that the said opposite-parties 1 and 2 had misconstrued the judgment of this Court (Annexure 5) on the point of the need of the opposite-party No. 3. Further it was argued that in assessing the comparative need of the parties the opposite-parties 1 and 2 have completely ignored the provisions of Rule 16 (2) of the Rules framed under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. I find no merits in the contentions raised. A perusal of the written statement filed by the present petitioners before the prescribed Authority would disclose that the petitioners had not pleaded that the need of the opposite-party No. 3 can be satisfied by the release of a portion of the accommodation is dispute. This plea is, therefore, not available to the petitioners. 3. Neither the Prescribed Authority nor the appellate Court below have in my view misconstrued the judgment of this Court in the writ petition No. 1350 of 1976. The case was remanded by this Court to the prescribed Authority for a fresh decision keeping in view the proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act extracted here in above. 3. Neither the Prescribed Authority nor the appellate Court below have in my view misconstrued the judgment of this Court in the writ petition No. 1350 of 1976. The case was remanded by this Court to the prescribed Authority for a fresh decision keeping in view the proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act extracted here in above. The prescribed authority was therefore, required to take into consideration the likely hardship to the tenants from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. The factors which are required to be kept in view are set out in Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act. Since the accommodation in question consists of two shops where business was being carried on clause (2) of R. 16 would be attracted. The factors as mentioned in clause (2) of Rule 16 were, therefore, to be taken into account while comparing the hardships of the landlord and the tenants. It was, however, made quite clear that the finding that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide was final and was not, therefore, liable to be re-opened. The prescribed Authority had, therefore, to consider only the question as to whether hardship would be greater to the landlord or to the tenants by the refusal of the application or by the grant of the application as the case may be. The prescribed Authority could not go into the question again as to whether the need of the applicant with regard to the shops in question was genuine. Hence on this ground as well it is not open to say at this stage that the need of the landlord for both the shops in question was not genuine and bona fide and that at any rate the said need can be met by releasing in his favour a portion of the shops in question. 4. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act were referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners to contend that the question of hardship was not gone into properly. 4. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act were referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners to contend that the question of hardship was not gone into properly. Clauses (a) and (b) read as follows:- "(2) (a) The greater the period since when the tenant opposite-party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite-party is, has been carrying on his business in that building the less the justification for allowing the application. (b) Where the tenant has available with him, suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. Suffice it to say that no material was placed with regard to clause (a) aforesaid. The period since when the petitioners had been carrying on business in that building was nowhere mentioned in the written statement filed before the prescribed Authority. Some allegation in that behalf has been made for the first time in the instant writ petition. Hence it cannot be said that the prescribed authority or the appellate Court below had failed to consider that allegation. The Court will consider only that matter which is alleged and proved before it. If a matter is neither alleged nor proved before the Court it cannot be taken into consideration at all and it is not open to a party to say at a later stage in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution that certain matter was not considered because nobody is expected to imagine something which was never stated before the Court, Clause (b) is also not attracted. It says that if the tenant has available with him, suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. In fact the factor mentioned in Clause (b) is normally invoked by the landlord and not by the tenant. If the tenant has available with him certain accommodation to which he can shift his business the landlord may come forward with the plea that the tenant shall not be put to hardship if he is evicted from the premises in dispute. It is not the question of offering alternative accommodation. If the tenant has available with him certain accommodation to which he can shift his business the landlord may come forward with the plea that the tenant shall not be put to hardship if he is evicted from the premises in dispute. It is not the question of offering alternative accommodation. Both the Courts below have found that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if the application is rejected that the hardship that would be caused to the tenant if the application is allowed. This finding has been reached after proper appreciation of evidence. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Muni Lal v. Prescribed Authority ( AIR 1978 SC 29 ) that it is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the prescribed Authority. A finding on question of comparative hardship of landlord and tenant is a finding of fact and cannot be disturbed in a writ petition. 5. For the reasons in the foregoing the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.