JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - There are twenty one petitioners in this petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whereas petitioners Nos. 2 to 21 are the persons who carry on the trade of manufacturing Beeris in various districts of the State, petitioner No. 1 is the Secretary of an Association known as Beeri Traders Association' of which petitioners Nos, 2 to 21 are the members. 2. In order to provide for the welfare of the workers employed in the manufacture of cigar and heeris and for regulating the conditions oi their work and matters connected therewith, the Parliament enacted an Act entitled Beeri and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Empolyement) Act (1966) (Act 32 of 1966), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Thereafter the Governor of the State, exercising powers conferred by Section 44 of the Act, framed rules called the Beeri and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. 3. The petitioners filed the present petition impugning the validity of a large number of sections of the Act as also that of the Rules framed thereunder and prayed that an appropriate writ be issued to quash those provisions. 4. In the meantime, the validity of the Act and the Rules came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of India in the case of Mangalore Ganesh Beeri Works v. Union of India, ( AIR 1974 SC 1832 ),: (1974 Lab IC 1237). The Supreme Court held that various provisions of the Act and the Rules impugned before it were quite valid and did not contravene any constitutional provision. Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, confined his submissions with regard to only a few of the provisions of the Act and the Rules which, according to him, had not been considered or dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case mentioned above. 5. First of all learned counsel for the petitioners questioned the validity of Section 39 (2) of the Act which deals with settlement of certain disputes between the employer and the employee and contended that the method of settlement of dispute which, in the context of industrial adjudication, implies resolving of dispute by consent, the. legislature was not justified in making a provision in this regard which was different from the provisions dealing with settlement of disputes contained in the Industrial Disputes Act. legislature was not justified in making a provision in this regard which was different from the provisions dealing with settlement of disputes contained in the Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, once there was an element of consent in the resolving of dispute (settlement), any provision made for filing an appeal was meaningless. He further contended that, as the legislature did not lay down any guideline for settlement of such disputes, the provisions contained in Section oi the Act was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Section 39 of the Act runs thus:- "Application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (1) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), shall apply to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a dispute between an employer and employee relating to - (a) the issue by the employer of raw materials to the employees; (b) the rejection by the employer of been or cigar or both made by an employee, (c) the payment of wages for the been or cigar or both rejected by the employer shall be settled by such authority and in such summary manner as the State Government may by Rules specify in this behalf. (3) Any person aggrieved by a settlement made by the authority specified under sub-section (2) may prefer an appeal to such authority and within such time as the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, specify in this behalf. (4) The decision of the specified authority under sub-section (3) shall be final." 6. A perusal of the section clearly shows that the word 'settled' occurring in sub-section (2) has not been used in the sense in which such word, according to the petitioners, is used in industrial adjudications i.e. the disputes being resolved by consent. Here what the provision, "that the dispute shall be settled by the authority specified by the Government", means is that the dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the decision of the authority specified by the Government. The decision by the specified authority is to have the effect of settling the dispute between the paries in the same way in which the dispute between the parties is settled by a court of law by giving its decision. The decision by the specified authority is to have the effect of settling the dispute between the paries in the same way in which the dispute between the parties is settled by a court of law by giving its decision. In the context the word 'settled' used in the section does not imply that the parties must agree or consent to the resolving of the dispute in the way indicated by the authority specified by the Government. Viewed in this light, it cannot be said that the provision for appeal against an order of settlement of dispute is meaningless. 7. The, submission that Section 39 (2) of the Act is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it does not provide clearly the guidelines on the basis of which the disputes between the employer and the employee are to be resolved, also does not appeal to us. It cannot be denied that the specified authority has to decide only such disputes between the two parties which relate to:- (a) issue of raw materials to the employees; or (b) rejection by employer of beeri or cigar or both made by an employee, or (c) Payment of wages for the beeri or cigar or both rejected by the employer. Such disputes have to be decided by it in the light of the practice that generally prevails in the trade. The decision of such disputes, therefore, depends upon appreciating the circumstances of the case objectively. The provision for an appeal against the decision of the order made by the specified authority is also indicative of the same thing. As we have already said that in settling the disputes between the parties the specified authority has to keep in mind the facts connected with fair trade practice, it cannot be said that the specified authority is entitled by the section to decide the dispute arbitrarily and the section suffers from the vice of discrimination prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. We are also not impressed by the argument that the provisions contained in Section 39 of the Act for resolving the dispute of the nature specified therein, between the employer and employee, not being identical to those contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, render them either discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. We are also not impressed by the argument that the provisions contained in Section 39 of the Act for resolving the dispute of the nature specified therein, between the employer and employee, not being identical to those contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, render them either discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has, in the case of Mangalore Ganesh Beeri Works' case ( AIR 1974 SC 1832 ): (1974 Lab IC 1237) upheld the constitutional validity of the Act notwithstanding that it was conscious of the fact that the provisions contained in the Act were not identical to those contained in the Industrial Disputes Act and that it was only in certain aspects that the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act had been made applicable for governing the relationship of employer and employee under the Act. As the necessity of enacting a separate legislation providing for the welfare of the worker in the Beeri and Cigar industries has been recognised the employee and employer of such an industry fall in a different category and, as such, it cannot be said that such, provision contained in Section 39 of the Act which is not identical to those contained in Industrial Disputes Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 9. The petitioners' claim that they carry on the work of manufacturing beeris under the contractor or The-kedari system as also under the buyer and seller system. Under the Thekedari system the Thekedar or contractor is generally an experienced (sic) beeri rolled by other workers. He agrees to produce a certain result, namely, the preparation of stated number of beeris within a certain period and for this work he is given some margin or commission. The contractor engages workers who prepare beeris either at their own residences or at any working place appointed for that purpose by the contractor and deliver them at the end of the day. The contractor examines them and such of them as he thinks are substandard are rejected and this is known as 'Chhant'. All the beeris so collected by the contractor after the 'Chhant' are sent to the principal employer who, in most of the cases, has a second round of inspection. The contractor examines them and such of them as he thinks are substandard are rejected and this is known as 'Chhant'. All the beeris so collected by the contractor after the 'Chhant' are sent to the principal employer who, in most of the cases, has a second round of inspection. The principal employer pays the contractor at the stated rate and after he collects his money, after settling his account with principal employer, the contractor pays the rates to the labourers. 10. Under the buyer and seller system the principal employer, in the beginning of each year enters into an agreement with the contractor or Thekedar by which the sale of tobacco and Tendu leaves is agreed upon at a particular rate and the Thekedar or contractor, after rolling the beeries, supplies the rolled beeris to the principal employer and for the properly rolled beeris the principal employer pays the contractor or Thekedar a certain price. In this system the price of raw materials sold by the principal employer is always lower than the price of the rolled beeris supplied by the Thekedar or the contractor and accordingly the difference is the income of the contractor or Thekedar. It is out of this income that the contractor or Thekedar has to meet his own expenses of the rolled beeris. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners invited our attention to Rule 25 of the Rules which runs thus :- "Leave Book (1) The employer shall provide such employee including a house worker with back form No. VI or form VII as the case may be hereinafter referred to as the leave book. (2) The leave book shall be the property of the employee and the employer shall not demand it except for making entries therein and shall not keep it for more than a week at a time. If the employee loses his leave book the employer shall provide him with a duplicate copy on payment of six paisa.'' Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that both under the Thekedari or Contract system and buyer and seller system there are a large number of workers including home workers, in relation to which the position of the petitioners is that of a principal employer. The petitioners, as principal employers, are not in a position to control the working of such workers who are either engaged by the contractor or the sellers and cannot possibly make the entries in the leave book contemplated by Rule 35. The provisions of Rule 25 are, therefore, invalid and are liable to be struck down. 10-A. It may be that the petitioners being the principal employers (in relation to the contract labour employed through a contractor) are employees within the meaning of Rule 25 mentioned above and are, as such, under sub-rule (1) of Rule 25 bound to provide each employee of the contractor a leave book in form No. VII. However, the petitioners do not say that there is any difficulty in their complying with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 25 in relation to contract labour or that they have not been able to supply leave books in form VII to them. Sub-rule (2) merely provides that the leave book shall be the property of the employee and the employer shall not keep it except for making entries therein and shall not keep it for more than a week at a time. This sub-rule merely restricts the right of the employer to call upon the employee to hand over the leave book i.e. it lays down that the employer shall not call upon the employee to hand over the leave book except for making entries therein. The rule does not state as to who has to make the entries in the leave book. In this case there is no challenge whatsoever that any action has been initiated against the petitioners for not making entries in the leave book. The question whether the entries in regard to the leave etc. of contractor's labour, have to be made by the petitioners or some body else has not arisen so far. No proceedings for taking action against the petitioners for not making entries in the leave book, appear to have been initiated so far. In the circumstances it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the question as to whether or not the entries in the leave book of the contractor's labour are to be made by the petitioners, at this stage. In the circumstances it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the question as to whether or not the entries in the leave book of the contractor's labour are to be made by the petitioners, at this stage. Suffice it to say that sub-rule (2) when it provides that the leave book shall be the property of the employee and the employer shall not.' demand it except for making entries therein, does not create an impossibility in functioning and that no cause of action to question the vires of the sub-rule has arisen at this stage. 11. In the end the learned counsel for the petitioners claimed that the provisions contained in Rule 29 which lays down that no employer or contractor shall reject. as sub-standard or Chhant or otherwise more than five per cent of the beeris or cigars or both received from the workers including a home worker and that where any beeri or cigar is rejected as sub-standard or Chhant or otherwise on any ground other than the ground of wilful negligence of the worker, the worker shall be paid wages for the beeries or cigars or both rejected at one half of the rate at which the wages are payable to him for the beeris or cigars or both which have not been so rejected. He contended that the provisions requiring the employers to pay for rejected beeris and cigars is not constitutional. We, however, find that the Supreme Court has, in the case of Mangalore Ganesh Works, ( AIR 1974 SC 1832 ): (1974 Lab IC 1237) upheld the validity of similar rule framed by the Maharashtra Government. While dealing with the submissions similar to that raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners before us, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 8i of the judgment, observed thus:- "Maharashtra Rule 37 also permits rejection of more than five per cent and raising of disputes. The contention on behalf of the petitioners that the Maharashtra rules which requires payment at one half of the rate for rejected beeris on any ground other than the ground of wilful negligence of the worker is an unreasonable restriction is not correct. The Bombay High Court correctly held that the experience in the industries is that there is a market for substandard beeris. The Bombay High Court correctly held that the experience in the industries is that there is a market for substandard beeris. It is also reasonable to hold that home workers will be interested in seeing that the beeris are not substandard because in the process home workers would be earning less. The Maharashtra rule is intended to eliminate exploitation of illiterate workers who are mostly women. The Rules with regard to rejection are, therefore, reasonable. It is open to the employer to raise disputes for rejection above five per cent." In this view, we are unable to agree that the provisions of Rule 29 are un-constitutional. 12. In the result, we find no merit in any of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.