JUDGMENT : M.N. Shukla, J. This is an appeal u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act against an order passed by the Claims Tribunal rejecting an application by the alleged widow of the deceased by which she had prayed for being impleaded in the motor accident claim case, which was already pending. It is necessary to state the relevant facts leading to this appeal. One Sri Pritam Dev Sharma had died by an accident and an application for compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (here-in-after referred to as the Act) was made by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, who were the brother and sister respectively of the deceased. During the pendency of that case an application was made by the present Appellant claiming to be the widow of the deceased. The reliefs claimed in the application are significant and are re-produced: It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the claimants be directed to implead the Applicant either as claimant or as a Respondent and if in the opinion of the learned court this application should have been filed within 6 months of the accident, then the delay be condoned. 2. The Tribunal held that the limitation for preferring a claim of compensation on account of the death of the deceased had run out and the application for impleadment was, therefore, not maintainable. The Tribunal also observed that since the claimants who had already made the application u/s 110-A did not admit the Appellant's status as a widow of the deceased, hence the claimants were not bound to implead her in the claim and on that ground also the application must be rejected. Aggrieved by that order the Appellant has preferred this appeal. A preliminary question which needs consideration is as to whether this appeal is competent. Aggrieved by that order the Appellant has preferred this appeal. A preliminary question which needs consideration is as to whether this appeal is competent. Section 110-B reads: 110-B. Award of the Claims Tribunal--On receipt of an application for compensation made u/s 110-A, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may, make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid ; and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be. 3. A plain look at the above section reveals that an appeal lies only against an award given by the Claims Tribunal and, therefore, it is to be examined as to whether the impugned order passed in the instant case -could be deemed to be an award so as to give rise to a right of appeal. The application for compensation has to be u/s 110-A and as Section 110-B provides, on receipt of such application the Claims Tribunal shall “after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid.” Thus, it is incumbent on the Tribunal to make an enquiry on receipt of an application u/s 110-A and a claim petition ends in an award given u/s 110-B. Even where there is no adjudication on merits it has been held that in certain circumstances such application can be deemed to have culminated in an award. Thus, for instance, where the application has been made after the expiry of period of limitation and an application for condonation of delay is made and the latter application is rejected and consequently the claim petition is also dismissed, it has been held that this amounts to passing an order which would be appealable u/s 110-D. The reasoning seems to be that an order dismissing a claim petition as barred by limitation has the effect of an order refusing to grant compensation and is as such an award within the meaning of Section 110-B--See Komal Charan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1971 All 503 . We are in respectful agreement with that decision and are inclined to hold that where the ultimate effect of the impugned order is to refuse the grant of compensation, it is virtually making an award as contemplated by Section 110-B. This, of course, presupposes that there was a claim petition. 4. Therefore, if it can be spelt out on the facts of the instant case that there was a claim petition the order rejecting the same would be tantamount to an award. In our opinion the dismissal of the Appellant's application for impleadment had the ultimate effect of rejection of the claim for compensation and that is the very essence of an award. Prima facie, the Appellant merely made an application for impleadment but one of the prayers made in that application was that she should be impleaded as 'claimant'. Even otherwise we are unable to comprehend as to why this application made on 17-10-1974 should not be treated substantially as an application for compensation. We are alive to the fact that Section 110-A(2) enjoins that such application shall be “In such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.” Certain rules have been framed by the Uttar Pradesh Government in exercise of its powers u/s 110-A of the Act. They are known as the U.P. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1967. Rule 3 provides that every application for payment of compensation made u/s 110-A of the Act shall be made in the form appended to these rules and a form is prescribed under the rules. Admittedly the Appellant did not submit her claim for compensation in the prescribed form. They are known as the U.P. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1967. Rule 3 provides that every application for payment of compensation made u/s 110-A of the Act shall be made in the form appended to these rules and a form is prescribed under the rules. Admittedly the Appellant did not submit her claim for compensation in the prescribed form. The objection raised is that the mandatory provisions of Section 110-A having not been complied with, the application made by the Appellant could not be construed as an application for compensation. We are unable to accede to this contention. In interpreting beneficial legislation courts should not be sticklers for forms. They have only to see whether there has been substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed by such statute and they would lean in favour of an interpretation which would further the objects of legislation rather than defeat them. No technicalities, therefore, should be permited to deny the remedy intended to be given to a person or class of persons aggrieved by a certain evil. Where the Legislature intervenes to remedy such evil an interpretation which will promote the grant of such relief must be preferred. By the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956(act 100 of 1956) Section 100 of the Principal Act was amended and inter aha, a group of new sections, Section 110-A to Section 110-F was added. The passing of the Amendment Act was necessitated by the vast increasing incidence of the accidents and offences relating to motor vehicles inspite of which the Legislatures felt that adequate punishment should be provided by the Act and further that the remedy provided for persons aggrieved was not speedy and effective. In the statement of objects and reasons, it was recited: Several State Governments had pointed out that the offence relating to motor vehicles were on the increase mainly because the penalties provided in Chapter IX were inadequate. Provision has, therefore, been made to enhance the penalties or fine and also to introduce the punishment of imprisonment for more serious offences. 5. Provision has, therefore, been made to enhance the penalties or fine and also to introduce the punishment of imprisonment for more serious offences. 5. Commenting on the shortcomings of Section 110 of the Act, as it already existed, the statement of objects and reasons further said: Under the existing Section 110, powers to appoint persons to investigate and report on motor accidents have been given to State Governments but the officers so appointed are not empowered to adjudicate on the liability of the insurer or on the amount of damages to be awarded, except at the express desire of the insurance company concerned. This provision has not helped persons of limited means in preferring claims on account of injury or death, because a court decree has to be obtained before the obligation of an insurance company to meet claims can be enforced. It is, therefore proposed to empower State Governments to appoint Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals to determine and award damages. The amendments in these clauses make the necessary provision. 6. Obviously, therefore, the dominant object of the Amending Act was to mitigate the dilatory procedure which had been, the product of the old Act and to provide more efficacious and speedy remedy to the claimants. Surely a better and more effective machinery was devised by the Amending Act. It would, therefore, by destructive of the very purpose of the said Act if a technical interpretation were adopted which would again stand in the way of a speedy and effective remedy for obtaining the relief intended to be conferred by the Act. Consequently we are persuaded to treat a claim application, which substantially gives all the relevant facts, as sufficient for the purpose of Section 110-A even though it may not conform to the prescribed form and may contain some omissions. In Bessarlal Laxmichand Ghirawala v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Greater Bombay AIR 1979 Bom 337 it was held in para 15 of the Reports: “formal defect or failure to mention appropriate names of the parties, who would be liable to pay ultimately compensation to the claimants was never intended to defeat the claims filed under the Act”. In Bessarlal Laxmichand Ghirawala v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Greater Bombay AIR 1979 Bom 337 it was held in para 15 of the Reports: “formal defect or failure to mention appropriate names of the parties, who would be liable to pay ultimately compensation to the claimants was never intended to defeat the claims filed under the Act”. It was also observed in the same case that it was basically the duty of the Claims Tribunal to find out all the parties who may be liable to pay compensation and that all the relevant facts were left by the Act to be ascertained by the Claims Tribunal itself. Therefore, in view of the specific terms in which a prayer was made in the impleadment application we are satisfied that it was in substance an application for compensation and it should have been dealt with as such. It is a necessary corollary that rejecting the aforesaid application of the Appellant ultimately resulted in refusing the ground of the claim and consequently the impugned order was at par with an award, even though there was no adjudication on the merits. Hence, the order fell within the ambt of Section 110-B and the present appeal was competent. 7. The question, however, which has been seriously canvassed on behalf of the Respondents is that the application of the Appellant dated 17-10-1974 was treated by the Tribunal as a claim petition, that it had been filed beyond the period of six months and was consequently barred by limitation. The tribunal had, therefore, no jurisdiction to allow such an application and it was rightly rejected. Such a rigid application of the rule of limitation to the facts of the present case, we think, would operate very harshly and should, therefore, be eschewed. After all the proceedings initiated by the application u/s 110-A given by the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were already pending and had not terminated. If during the pendency of the case, other claimants also joined in the proceedings by making an application, there was ample ground for condoning the delay, particularly when the application made under the aforesaid Act by the Appellant contained a prayer for condonation of delay and conclusively showed that she was not guilty of any laches and had been prevented by sufficient cause from making an application within the prescribed period. It was stated in the application that the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had assured the Appellant that they would file a claim for compensation on behalf of the Appellant also but later it was found that the aforesaid Respondents had mala-fide concealed the name of the Appellant and had applied for the payment of the compensation to themselves. It is surprising that without recording any finding on the merits of this allegation, the Tribunal summarily dismissed the application. It appears that the tribunal lost sight of a very salutary provision contained in the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A which says that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months If it is satisfied that the Applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. In Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transport Co. Ltd. AIR 1971 SC 1924 the daughters of the deceased were not made parties to the petition filed by his widow but later on they were impleaded. But by that time the limitation for filing an application for compensation had expired. The tribunal did not condone the delay, though a prayer for the same was made but the High Court in its discretion condoned the delay and the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the High Court, laying stress on the fact that the “tribunal had jurisdiction to condone the delay in making the application.” Therefore, even if it is assumed that the Appellant's claim petition was belated, it was a fit case for the condonation of delay and we hereby condone the delay. 8. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant, however, made another submission which, if accepted, would completely rule out the view that the Appellant's claim for compensation was barred by limitation. It appears that on a correct construction of Section 110-A of the Act it must be held that all such claims are made in a representative capacity for the benefit of those who could claim compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act. The relevant section of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be stripped of its significant background. In fact, it is merely a continuation of the provisions of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The relevant section of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be stripped of its significant background. In fact, it is merely a continuation of the provisions of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. Sections 110 and 110-A to 110-F merely provide a speedier remedy, obviously conceived as a better one from the point of view of the injured person or his unfortunate dependants. No new rule or even a new remedy has been created by Section 110-A; the form alone is changed. It would, therefore, be in conformity with the spirit and object of the Act that a claim application made by any of the heirs or the legal representatives should be deemed to ensure for the benefit of the other legal claimants as well. The legislative history of the provision fully corroborates this Interpretation. When Sec 110-A was introduced by Act 100 of 1956, the words used in Clause (b) of Section 110-A(1) were that an application for the compensation can be made, where the death has resulted from the accident, “by the legal representative” of the deceased. This implied that the legal representative must make a joint application. Significantly, by Act 100 of 1956, those words were replaced by “by all or any of the legal representatives” of the deceased. Section 110-A, insofar as it is relevant for purposes of this case, at present reads: (Their Lordships than quoted Section 110-A, Sub-section (1)(a)(b)(c), Proviso, (2) and (3), Proviso and proceeded on to observe:-Editor). 9. Obviously, therefore, it will be deemed, following the language of the provisions, to insist on all the heirs or legal representatives joining together to make an application. When once anyone of the heirs or the legal representatives has commenced an action by making an application within the prescribed period it must be construed as having been made in a representative capacity and the claims of other heirs should not fail on account of their omission to make an application within tire. Particularly when such a claimant prays for being impleaded during the pendency of the proceedings Initiated by another application for compensation, it will be wholly incorrect to treat such an application as barred by limitation. Particularly when such a claimant prays for being impleaded during the pendency of the proceedings Initiated by another application for compensation, it will be wholly incorrect to treat such an application as barred by limitation. The courts have laid emphasis on the fact that the term “legal representative” in Section 110-A includes persons referred to as “representative in Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, namely, the widow, husband, parent or child of the deceased. Under Rule 2(c) of the U.P. Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal Rules, 1967 it is provided that “legal representative” shall have the meaning assigned to it in Clause (11) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This alone perhaps might have the effect of restricting the meaning of the term to some extent but keeping in mind the implication of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, which was a precursor of the present Act which substantially continues the same provision with only a more efficacious and speedier form for redress a broad meaning must be assigned to the term “legal representatives” in Section 110-A. From this it follows that an application made by one of the legal representatives or the heirs must be treated as being for the benefit of the other claimants as well who later apply for compensation. The entire action for compensation is verily in the nature of representative proceedings. The interpretation which we have adopted with regard to this provision is supported by ample authorities. See M. Ayyappan v. Mokhatar Singh AIR 1970 Mys 67 and Kasturilal Gopaldas and Another Vs. Prabhakar Martand Patki and Another, AIR 1971 MP 145 . The Courts have consistently preferred a liberal construction on the language of Section 110-A. Accordingly they have held that the claim on behalf of the minor children should be made by their guardian, that if the deceased is also survived by his widow and she files a claim on her behalf, she will be deemed to have claimed and will be entitled to get compensation even on behalf of her minor children and of whom she is the guardian. Even if no such claim is specifically made by her, her right to claim compensation on behalf of the minor children in the same proceedings will remain unaffected. See Shanti Devi v. General Manager Punjab Roadways AIR P&H 13 and Ballygunge Bank Ltd. Vs. Even if no such claim is specifically made by her, her right to claim compensation on behalf of the minor children in the same proceedings will remain unaffected. See Shanti Devi v. General Manager Punjab Roadways AIR P&H 13 and Ballygunge Bank Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1947 Cal 159. Thus we are convinced that the application for compensation made by the Appellant was not barred by limitation and the order of the Tribunal rejecting the same on that preliminary ground was erroneous and must be set aside. 10. We, accordingly, set aside the order, allow the above appeal and remand the case to the Claims Tribunal for adjudication of the Claim petition on merits after giving opportunity to the parties to lead evidence on all the points at issue in the case, including the question as to whether the Appellant is the widow of the deceassed. The Appellant shall be entitled to her costs from Respondent No. 1 and 2.