ORDER S. D Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under the U P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as to Act. 2. The petitioners Radha Krishna advocate and Jai Krishna are landlords. Respondent No. 1 G. A. Brats is a tenant. The property in dispute in a portion of 40 Lowther Road, George Town, Allahabad. An application was moved by the petitioners initially under section 21(1) and Explanation (iv) of the Act in the dear 1972. After contest the prescribed authority rejected the application of the petitioners Thereafter an appeal was filed. The appeal was also rejected. Thereafter the petitioners filed a writ petition No. 2507 of 1974 in this Court. The petition was decided by A. Banerji, J. on 9th May, 1977. The order of the Additional District Judge in appeal dated 29th October, 1974 was quashed and the matter was remanded for reconsideration in the light of the observations made in the said judgment. This decision of A. Banerji, J. is reported in 1977 U.P. Rent Control Cases 439. 3. After remand the matter went back to the appellate authority. The appellate authority by its judgment dated 29th May 1978 again dismissed the appeal. The judgment dated 29th May, 1978 has now been challenged by means of the present petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged firstly that the appellate authority has not considered the need of the petitioners at all. The observation of the appellate authority that there is no material on record to show how many members are there in the family of the landlords is an observation which is erroneous on the face of the record. Learned counsel has further urged that in spite of a specific direction by this court in its judgment dated 9th May 1977, the appellate authority has not considered the specific needs of the petitioners landlords and has further wrongly observed that no counter affidavit has been filed to rebut the allegations made by respondent No. 1 in paragraph 5 of the affidavit which was the sole basis of the decision of the appellate authority at the earlier occasion. 5. I have heard Sri Rama Nand, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 at length. 6. 5. I have heard Sri Rama Nand, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 at length. 6. This Court in its judgment dated 9th May 1977 had observed as follows : "It will, therefore, be necessary in the interest of justice to direct the Appellate Authority to reconsider the application under section 21 of the Act afresh, in respect of the specific need of the landlord for additional accommodation. It will also be desirable that the appellate Authority "affords an opportunity to the petitioners to file a reply to the rejoinder affidavit and also issue directions for a spot inspection by a commissioner appointed by that court so that the lay-out and the size of the rooms are ascertained." 7. In paragraph 17 of the petition it has been averred that an affidavit of Radha Krishna was filed in reply to the rejoinder affidavit of Mr. G. A. Brass as directed by this Court. A copy of this affidavit has been attached as Annexure 3 to the petition. In the impugned order also at one place it has been categorically stated by the appellate authority that the landlords have filed a reply to the rejoinder affidavit of the tenant and lay-out of the bungalow has been prepared by the commissioner. In reply, which is Annexure 3 to the petition, the details of the members of the families of petitioner No. 1 as well as of petitioner No. 2 have been categorically stated in paragraph 12 of the affidavit. In spite of this specific averment the appellate authority has erroneously observed that there is no material on record to show how a many members are there in the families of these two landlords. This observation is clearly erroneous on the face of the record This fact further shows that the appellate authority has not at all applied its mind to the controversy in issue before it. At one place it has been observed that a reply to the rejoinder affidavit had been filed but it appears that most material reply which was the very basis of remand by this Court was not even read by the appellate authority. In the circumstances the first submission made by the learned counsel is well founded that the petitioners' need has not been considered by the appellate Authority, at all. 8. In the circumstances the first submission made by the learned counsel is well founded that the petitioners' need has not been considered by the appellate Authority, at all. 8. There may be many rooms in a particular accommodation but it is most relevant to determine whether the needs of the members of the family is bona fide the mere fact that there are number of rooms in the house is not sufficient to disregard the need of the landlord. The matter has to be considered on evidence and a mere observation or surmise cannot be sufficient to dispose of the matter. 9. In regard to the second submission also, as I have already held above that a reply to the rejoinder affidavit had been filed by the petitioners, the observation made by the appellate authority that no counter affidavit was filed to rebut the allegations made by the tenant in paragraph 5 of the affidavit is an observation absolutely erroneous on the face of the record. This also shows that the appellate authority has not cared to either look into the record or read the reply which was the main basis of remand by this Court. 10. Section 21 of the Act provides that the prescribed authority may on an application of a landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building if the building is bona fide required by the landlord. The question of bona fide requirement has to be gone into by the court after considering the number of the member of the family of the landlord, the needs of the individual members who are residing with the landlord and such other relevant circumstances in order to find out as to whether the need of the landlord is bona fide or not. The appellate authority has placed reliance on rule 16(a) of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 16(a) itself provides as follows : "Where the landlord has adequate and reasonable suitable accommodation having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status, his claim for additional requirements shall be construed strictly." 11. Rule 16(a) itself provides as follows : "Where the landlord has adequate and reasonable suitable accommodation having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status, his claim for additional requirements shall be construed strictly." 11. From a reading of section 21 along with rule 16(a) it is obvious that the legislature intended that when the need of a landlord is considered the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status have also to be given due consideration. A vague rejection of the landlord's need is not a proper consideration of an application under section 21 of the Act. 12. In view of the above I am of the opinion that the appellate authority has not properly considered the need of the landlords while disposing of the petitioners' applications. 13. It is not necessary to lay down specifically what has to be considered by the appellate authority but from the facts it appears that petitioner No. 1 had set up a case for the need of his two sons, one who is alleged to be a lawyer and the other a doctor. In paragraph 23 of the petition it has been categorically averred that the son Dr. V. K. Agarwal is in permanent employment in the University and he had temporarily gone abroad and was to come back in October 1978. There is nothing further on the record to establish as to whether Dr. V. K. Agarwal has come back from abroad or not but it has been stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that he has come back. In any case the matter has to be considered by the appellate authority. 14. In view of the above so far as the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are concerned they are well founded. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, vehemently contended that the application of the landlords is a dishonest application and has been made with an oblique motive. In support of this argument learned counsel has relied on Ajit Prasad v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others, 1979 All. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, vehemently contended that the application of the landlords is a dishonest application and has been made with an oblique motive. In support of this argument learned counsel has relied on Ajit Prasad v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others, 1979 All. R C. 73, K. C. Agarwal J. delivering the opinion in the case while interpreting the word 'bona fide' in section 21 of the Act held that the application should not be filed with an oblique motive and should not be a device to evict the tenant. This proposition is not disputed. The legislature in section 21 has used the word 'bona fide'. The word 'bona fide' itself indicates that the application should not be filed with any oblique motive or a device to evict the tenant but this question is dependent on facts. Respondent No. 1 had not taken this plea before the prescribed authority neither this plea was taken before the appellate authority. There is no finding as such by the appellate authority in regard to this plea. This plea is not a purely legal plea. The entire facts and circumstances have to be seen. In the circumstances respondent No. 1 cannot be permitted to raise this plea at this stage. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, however, given an explanation as to why the need of the landlords was not mentioned in derail initially. The application was initially moved keeping in view Explanation (iv) of sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Act where right was given to the landlord to evict a tenant if the landlord was in occupation of a portion of the accommodation. It was only subsequently, when doubt was raised in regard to the validity of Explanation (iv) that the petitioners further set up their personal need also. In the circumstances the mere fact that in the application it was not specifically pleaded cannot by itself amount to an oblique motive on the part of the petitioners. 17. The next argument of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 is that in the instant case substantial justice has been done and as such it is not a fit case for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. The next argument of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 is that in the instant case substantial justice has been done and as such it is not a fit case for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is well settled that the remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution is an extra-ordinary remedy and it is open to the High Court not to interfere if substantial justice has been done between the parties. In the instant case I am not satisfied that substantial justice has been done to the petitioners. This Court by its order dated 9th May, 1977 had remanded the matter for the consideration of the specific needs of the petitioners landlords. The appellate authority has not considered the specific need of the petitioners. It has observed that the petitioners have neither given the details of the members of the family nor have filed reply to the affidavit of the tenant, when both these facts were on record, as I have already indicated in detail above. In the circumstances grave injustice would be done to the petitioners if interference is not made under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has further urged that a portion of the accommodation has been vacated by Mrs. Butchia and the landlords had occupied the said accommodation. This question also is dependent on facts. If such a question is raised the appellate authority will consider the same in accordance with law. 19. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has further argued that there was already accommodation available with the petitioners in the shape of eight rooms newly constructed. This question was also not raised before the appellate authority. If such a question is raised the appellate authority will consider it in accordance with law. 20. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Additional District Judge dated 29th May, 1978 is set aside and the appeal is remanded to the appellate authority for decision afresh in the light of the observations made by me above in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs.