JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. -This is a defendants second appeal in a suit for possession over a plot of land situated within the Municipal limits of the town of Saha-jahanpur. 2. According to the plaintiffs case that he and, before him, his predecessors-in-interest were the zamindars of the land. It was originally let out to Ram Charan as a tenant. Ram Charan surrendered the land some 40 or 45 years before the institution of the suit. It was then let out to Ubed Ullah alias Wahidullah who had tall thereon and had also erected a Chhappar on a portion of it. After remaining in possession of about 20 to 25 years, Ubedullah also surrendered it and the land remained vacant for about a year and half. It was then let out to Chhotey Carpenter, who was in possession till 1961. A suit was filed against Chhotey. He was ejected under the decree passed in that suit. Thereafter the plaintiff raised boundaries on all the four sides of the land, the boundary to the east being lower in height. The plaintiff then wanted to raise certain constructions over the land. He applied to the Municipal Board for permission to do so. The permission was granted but the State Public Works Department objected on the ground that the land was within the prohibited distance from the centre of the road and constructions could not be raised thereon. A case was instituted against the plaintiff but the State Public Works Department did not pursue it. The plaintiff then gave the land to Mohammad Umar, the second defendant, in the year 1966-67. He established a workshop thereon. In the meantime, Ganesh, the first defendant, instituted a proceeding under S. 145 of the Criminal P. C. in respect of the land in suit which was decided in his favour and possession was delivered to him. He demolished the constructions and also felled Pakar trees standing thereon. The plaintiff then instituted the suit giving rise to the present second appeal for possession and for a decree for damages. 3. The first defendant Ganesh contested the suit. The second defendant Mohammad Umar did not contest it. The pleas raised by the second defendant were that Ram Charan, his predecessor was the tenure holder of the land and after him the land came into possession of his heirs and descendants; that Pakar trees were planted by Ram Charan. 3. The first defendant Ganesh contested the suit. The second defendant Mohammad Umar did not contest it. The pleas raised by the second defendant were that Ram Charan, his predecessor was the tenure holder of the land and after him the land came into possession of his heirs and descendants; that Pakar trees were planted by Ram Charan. He also relied on the result of the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The quantum of damages claimed was also challenged and it was further pleaded that the suit was barred by time and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try it. The following were the issues framed; (1) Whether the plaintiffs are owners of the land in suit? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are owners of the material in dispute? (3) Whether the plaintiffs were owners of the trees in dispute? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any damages? If so, its amount? (5) Is the suit barred by time? (6) Whether the court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? (7) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? The trial court found on issue No. 1 that the plaintiff was the owner of the land in suit; on issue No. 2 that he was the owner of the material; on issue No. 3 that the trees belonged to the plaintiff as they stood on the land of which the plaintiff was the owner; on issue No. 5 that the suit was not barred by time; on issue No. 6 that the land was not agricultural and the entries to the contrary were incorrect and that, therefore, the court had jurisdiction to try it. It was lastly held on issue No. 4 that the plaintiff was entitled to the wood and the bricks available on the spot and to Rs. 100/-as damages. In the result the plaintiff was held entitled, on issue No. 7, to recover possession over the land in suit and the bricks and the wood lying thereon and damages for the sum of Rs. 100/- and the suit was decreed accordingly against the first defendant. 4. 100/-as damages. In the result the plaintiff was held entitled, on issue No. 7, to recover possession over the land in suit and the bricks and the wood lying thereon and damages for the sum of Rs. 100/- and the suit was decreed accordingly against the first defendant. 4. Two main points were raised in the District Court on appeal by the first defendant Ganesh, namely, (1) that the plaintiff had not been able to prove that the land was surrendered to him by Ram Charan about 40 to 45 years ago or that he, the plaintiff or his predecessors-in-interest remained in continuous possession of the land ever since; (2) that the plaintiff had been unable to show that the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 5. On a detailed appraisal of the evidence on the record, the lower appellate court found against the defendant-appellant on both the points. It held that the land in suit was surrendered to the plaintiffs predecessor by Ram Charan and the plaintiff and before him his predecessor-in-interest had continued to be in possession thereon. It further held that the land in suit was Abadi and was not cultivated; that the entries in the revenue record and Bhumidhari Sanad dated 1st January, 1965 obtained by the first defendant Ganesh were wrong and the land in suit being not land within the meaning of the U. P.B Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the civil court alone B had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 6. Mr. G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant Ganesh B has raised only one point before me. According to him zamindari was abolished in the Municipal area of Shah-jahanpur with effect from 1st day of July, 1963 vide Government notification B No. 2653/I-A-168-60, dated 20th June, 1963, published in Part of the U. P. Gazette dated 29th June, 1963, a copy of which is also printed at pages 492 to 494 of the 1964 Edition of the U. P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Munual printed by the Superintendent, Printing and Stationery,. U. P. Lucknow under the authority of the Revenue (A) Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. U. P. Lucknow under the authority of the Revenue (A) Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The consequence was that all the rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in the agricultural area demarcated under Section 5 of the U. P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956, vested in the State with effect from 1st July, 1963 under Section 8 of the Act, and that being so the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the land as the erstwhile zamindar thereof, to maintain the suit at any time after that date. The suit itself was filed in the year 1967 and was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. In order to show that the land in suit had been demarcated as agricultural area, learned counsel relied on the fact that Bhumidhari rights had been conferred on the first defendant-appellant vide Ext. A-I and the further fact that the plaintiff had himself applied for correction of the record but his application was dismissed on the ground that it was highly belated and a revision filed by him therefrom was also unsuccessful, vide papers filed in this court. He further urged that in any case, the suit had to be stayed under clause (v) of Rule 38 of the U. P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1957 and since that was not done by the two courts below, this second appeal must be stayed by this Court under that rule and the suit must thereafter be abated under Rule 39 (1) of the said Rules of course after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard. 7. Mr. S.S. Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. A.K. Sharma, on the other hand contended that the demarcation of the land in suit and the conferment of bhumidhari rights on the defendant-appellant by the revenue authorities was wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity inasmuch as the land was at the relevant time not cultivated at all and could not, therefore, be treated to be an agricultural area. He relied on the declaration of law on this point by the Supreme Court in S.P. Watel v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1973 SC 1293 ). He relied on the declaration of law on this point by the Supreme Court in S.P. Watel v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1973 SC 1293 ). He further pointed out that Rules 38 and 39 of the rules had no application to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the suit was instituted in the year 1967, a few years after the Government notification under Section 8 of the Act, and could not, therefore, be said to be a suit pending on the date of vesting. Not being a suit or proceeding pending on the date of vesting neither the suit nor the appeals therefrom could be stayed under Rule 38 or abated under Rule 39. The only question which could if at all arise was whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that was, according to the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, answered rightly by the courts below by holding that the land in suit was not agricultural land and the entries of conferment of bhumidhari rights on the defendant-appellant by the revenue authorities were a nullity being wholly without jurisdiction. 8. It may be here observed that the findings of the two courts below that the land was Abadi and was thus not land within the meaning of U. P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, has not been challenged before me by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant. He has mainly relied only upon the facts that the land in suit was demarcated as an agricultural area and the consequences of the notification under Section 8 of the Act divesting the plaintiff of all his rights, title and interest of a Zamindar on the land. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties in this case find that the effect of the notification under Section 8 of the U. P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1956 and the consequences of vesting enunciated under Section 10 of that Act could not be avoided without having the notification adjudicated void, and assuming that this could be done even in the present case, there is formidable difficulty in adopting that course. The difficulty is that although the notification may be termed void on the finding that the land was not agricultural, that adjudication cannot lawfully be arrived at in the absence of the State Government which is not a party to the present suit and even if an amendment of the plaint were to be allowed at this stage by impleading the State Government as a party, the bar of limitation would stand in the way. It was further pointed out to me that even in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 the limitation prescribed for a suit for cancellation of an instrument was 3 years. The notification in the present case was dated 30-6-1963 and it came into force on 1-7-1963. Even from 1-7-1963 the period of three years within which the suit for cancellation of the notification could be filed expired on 1-7-1966. That was before the institution of the present suit. The course adopted by the Supreme Court in S. P. Watel v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1973 SC 1293 ) (supra) could not also be adopted in view of the fact that even a writ petition cannot lawfully be entertained after such a long lapse of time. I may here point out that there were no extenuating circumstances in the present case which might have enabled plaintiffs to seek extension of limitation. Even the first application for correction of the demarcation was made in the year 1969, some 6 years after the issue of the notification. 10. If the notification stands, the plaintiffs have no case because their proprietary rights in the land disappeared with the notification under Section 8 of the Act and the fact that the notification may have been without jurisdiction or a nullity on the findings arrived at by the court below that the land was Abadi and was not land within the meaning of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 can be of no avail to the plaintiffs, for the limitation of time within which the notification could be challenged by a suit or writ petition against the State Government has long since expired. 11. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree under appeal is set aside, but, in the circumstances of the case, I would direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.