ORDER M. P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings in mutation. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The last admitted tenure-holders, Sukh Ram, died and thereafter two applications were moved under S. 34 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act claiming mutation. The petitioners Lekhraj and Devi Ram moved one application and, inter alia, they based their claim on a gift deed which was allegedly executed by the deceased Sukh Ram. The execution of the said gift deed was denied by opposite party No. 4 Kalandi. He claimed to be entitled to mutation on the basis of succession and possession. The application of the petitioners was rejected by the Tehsildar on 14th Mar. 1975, and a true copy of his order is annexure I to the petition. The Tehsildar has recorded a clear finding that Kalandi was in possession and not the petitioners before me. Thereafter a revision was filed before the Additional Collector, but the same was dismissed by an order dated 23rd Aug. 1976, a true copy whereof is annexure II. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 4 states that the date 23-3-76 typed at the end of the said order is a typographical error and the correct date is 23rd Aug. 1976. Thereafter a second revision was tiled under S. 219 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act against the said order dated 23rd Aug. 1976, but second revision also fail- ed. Now the petitioners have come up in the instant petition, and in support thereof, I have heard Dr. J. N. Dubey. In opposition, Sri B. B. Paul has made his submissions on behalf of opposite party No. 4 Sri Paul raised a preliminary objection that this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable because an equally efficacious alternative remedy was available to the petitioners by way of filing a regular suit to establish their title. J. N. Dubey. In opposition, Sri B. B. Paul has made his submissions on behalf of opposite party No. 4 Sri Paul raised a preliminary objection that this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable because an equally efficacious alternative remedy was available to the petitioners by way of filing a regular suit to establish their title. The learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench pronouncement of this Court in the case of Jaipal v. Board of Revenue ( AIR 1957 All 205 ): (1956 All LJ 807 (1)) where it was laid down as follows: "It has, however, been the consistent practice of this court not to interfere with orders made by the Board of Revenue in cases in which the only question at issue is whether the name of the petitioner should be entered in the record of rights. That record is primarily maintained for revenue purposes and an entry therein has reference only to possession. Such an entry does not ordinarily confer upon the person in whose favour it is made, any title to the property in question and his right to establish his title to is expressly reserved by S. 40 (3) of the Act. The only exception to this general rule is in those cases in which the entry itself confers a title on the petitioner by virtue of the provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act." 3. It should be seen that after the pronouncement of the Division Bench, sub-sec. (3) of S. 40 was deleted by the U. P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act (No. X of 1961). However, by the U. P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act (No. XXXV of 1970) S. 40-A was placed on the Statute Book, and it lays down the law almost analogous to that which was contained in the deleted sub-sec. (3) of S. 40. Accordingly, in my view, the aforesaid Division Bench pronouncement continues to be saved and it has not lost its efficacy and relevance despite the deletion of subsection (3) of S. 40. 4. Dr. Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioners, sought to place reliance on Rudra Pratap v. Board of Revenue ( AIR 1975 All 125 ): (1974 All LJ 669) which is a single Judge pronouncement and where the learned single Judge sought to distinguish the aforesaid Division Bench pronouncement. 4. Dr. Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioners, sought to place reliance on Rudra Pratap v. Board of Revenue ( AIR 1975 All 125 ): (1974 All LJ 669) which is a single Judge pronouncement and where the learned single Judge sought to distinguish the aforesaid Division Bench pronouncement. It is not necessary to say anything as to whether the distinction which the learned single Judge sought to place on the Division Bench, is justified or not. In any case, in the proceedings in the instant ease, it cannot be said that the decision of the authorities below is not on the basis of possession. The clear finding of fact recorded by the trial court and by the first revisional court is that opposite party No. 4 was in possession, and on the said basis mutation was granted. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. it has been found that the petitioners are in possession. It is not necessary for me to say anything in respect of the said contention. I am only concerned with the question of alternative remedy at the present stage. It has seemed to me tli at the Division Bench pronouncement in the said case is applicable for deciding the preliminary objection which Sri Paul has raised against the maintainability of this writ petition. In my view, the case of Rudra Pratap v. Board of Revenue (supra), besides being a single Judge pronouncement, is really not applicable to the facts of the present petition. 5. Dr. Dubey next placed reliance on a Division Bench pronouncement of this court in the case of Ganesh Prasad v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1974 All 379 ): (1974 All LJ 628). Again, in my view, the facts in the said case are distinguishable. The said case was decided with reference to I the maintainability of a petition which arose out of the proceedings under S. 145, Cr, P. C. A School which had been dispossessed in the execution of a decree, sought to get back possession within two months of its dispossession claiming that the decree was null and void and that it ; ms wrongly dispossessed in the execution of the said decree. As it had been dispossessed within two months, therefore, the aid of the criminal court was sought for getting back possession. As it had been dispossessed within two months, therefore, the aid of the criminal court was sought for getting back possession. This controversy came to this court by way of a writ petition, and the same was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court on the ground that an alternative remedy by way of filing a suit had not been exercised and, therefore, it was not a fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The Special Appeal Bench allowed the appeal holding that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petition should have been entertained, and reliance was placed on L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly ( AIR 1971 SC 33 ). It should be seen that the facts in the case of Ganesh Prasad v. State of U. P. (supra) were peculiar. The question of getting back possession was important for the school and, therefore, it was felt that the petition should not have been thrown out on the ground of the existence of an alternative remedy. No such situation can be said to be involved in pure mutation proceedings. The decision of the Supreme Court in tire case of Lala Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly (supra) is again easily distinguishable. In the said decision it was emphasised that as the alternative remedy of filing a revision under S. 35 of the old Income-tax Act of 1922 before the Commissioner of Income-tax had become time barred due to the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court, which had been admitted land was not dismissed in limine, it was bot just that the petition should be subsequently, at the hearing stage, dismissed on the ground of tire existence of the alternative remedy. It may be said that as the alternative remedy bad become time barred due to the pendency of the writ petition, the Supreme Court felt that injustice was bound to be caused to the petitioners of tire writ petition. No such situation is involved in the present case. It has not been contended before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the alternative remedy of a suit has become time barred, or has become unavailable on account of the pendency of this petition in this court. No such situation is involved in the present case. It has not been contended before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the alternative remedy of a suit has become time barred, or has become unavailable on account of the pendency of this petition in this court. In my view, therefore, the law laid down in the aforesaid Supreme Court pronouncement is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 6. Accordingly, I uphold the preliminary objection raised on behalf of opposite party No. 4 and dismiss this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground of the existence of an equally efficacious alternative remedy by way of filing a regular suit to establish title. 7. The petition fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no, order as to costs.