ORDER M. P. Mehrotra, J. -This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The petitioner was issued a notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act and he filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 8-7-1976, a true copy whereof is annexure 2 to the petition. Thereafter an appeal was filed by the petitioner and a true copy of the grounds of appeal is annexure 3 to the petition. It may be stated that the State had also filed an appeal against the said order of the Prescribed Authority Both the appeals were decided by a common judgment dated 21-4-1977, a true copy whereof is annexure 4 to the petition. 3-4. Now the petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof have heard Sri B. B. Paul, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. 5. It may be stated that in this petition a controversy was involved regarding the interpretation and validity of Section 4 (ii) of the Act. I referred the said controversy to a larger Bench and in view of the answer of the larger Bench the learned counsel for the petitioner did not press the said ground when the petition was heard by me after the receipt of the answer of the larger Bench. 6. At the hearing of the petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner pressed before me the following contentions: - (i) That certain land was wrongly treated as irrigated and the same should have been treated as un-irrigated. (ii) The number of members in the family was wrongly treated as 6 while it should have been treated as 7 and in this connection the learned counsel contended that the finding in the earlier ceiling proceedings holding the members of the family as 7 should have been treated as res judicata in view of the Division Bench pronouncement in Krishna Kumar v. State of U. P. (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 3073 of 1978, decided on 21-9-1979. (iii) The sale deed dated 1-6-1974 should have been accepted and should not have been ignored. (iv) Plots nos. 930 and 282 should have been treated as abadi plots and should have been excluded from the holding of the petitioner. Writ Petn. No. 3073 of 1978, decided on 21-9-1979. (iii) The sale deed dated 1-6-1974 should have been accepted and should not have been ignored. (iv) Plots nos. 930 and 282 should have been treated as abadi plots and should have been excluded from the holding of the petitioner. The Prescribed Authority should have carried out a local inspection to ascertain whether the said plots were abadi land or not. (v) The petitioner should have been entitled to the benefit of two additional hectares of irrigated land in respect of the unmarried daughter even if she was found to be major on 8-6-1973. (vi) The land in the holding of the petitioner was ancestral and his sons had vested share therein and such shares of the sons should not have been included in the holding of the petitioner. 7. So far as the first contention is concerned, it should be seen that before the appellate court this contention was raised and the appellate court accepted the contention of the petitioner in respect of certain plots but in respect of four plots the contention was not accepted. Those plots are nos. 245, 430, 916 and 929. From the Khasra extracts for 1378. 1379 and 1380 Faslis which are annexures 5, 6 and 7 to the petition, it is clear that the said plots were rightly treated as irrigated. The source of irrigation is mentioned in respect of each plot and two crops were grown in each of the said four plots in 1378 Fasli. In my view, therefore, on the authority of the Division Bench in Kallu v. State (1979 All WC 579), the said plots were rightly treated as irrigated. Learned counsel contended that the khasra entries were unreliable because wrong area of plot no. 245 was mentioned therein, would not like to say anything in this connection because before the lower appellate court or before the Prescribed Authority it was never contended that the khasra entries were unreliable or wrong. No point was raised before the appellate court that in view of the earlier decision in the ceiling proceedings, the said four plots should have been treated as un-irrigated. There is no ground in the memorandum of appeal annexure 3 to the said effect. No point was raised before the appellate court that in view of the earlier decision in the ceiling proceedings, the said four plots should have been treated as un-irrigated. There is no ground in the memorandum of appeal annexure 3 to the said effect. It is well known that unless the plea of res judicata is raised and the necessary documents are tiled, it cannot be allowed to be raised at the subsequent stages of the litigation unless the plea can be raised as a pure question of law on the basis of the evidence and material on record. I am not exercising any appellate power while dealing with a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. From the grounds of appeal and the judgment of the lower appellate court it is obvious that no contention was made that the said four plots should have been treated as un-irrigated on the basis of the earlier finding recorded by the ceiling authorities. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to ground no. 2 in his objection filed before the Prescribed Authority (annexure no. 1). It is a vague ground and nothing specific has- been said in respect of the four plots in question. In any case, before the appellate court no such ground was raised in the memorandum of appeal. Accordingly, I hold that the said four plots were rightly treated as irrigated by the appellate Court. 8. So far as the second contention is concerned, it should be seen that this contention was never pressed before the lower appellate court as is clear from the judgment of the said court (annexure 4 to the petition). In the petition, of course, it has been stated that the said point was pressed but in the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to accept the said contention. It is well known that the judgment of a court is normally treated as best proof of the contentions actually pressed before that court. Of course, there is no rigidity about this rule but the normal approach is as aforesaid. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the memorandum of appeal a ground had been set out in respect of the said plea and, therefore, it should be held that the said ground was pressed before the lower appellate court. Of course, there is no rigidity about this rule but the normal approach is as aforesaid. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the memorandum of appeal a ground had been set out in respect of the said plea and, therefore, it should be held that the said ground was pressed before the lower appellate court. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukhpal Singh v. Kalyan Singh ( AIR 1963 SC 146 ), it is actually the ground which is pressed which is to be dealt with by the appellate court. Therefore, the mere fact that there was a ground in the memorandum of appeal will not enable the learned counsel to contend that the said ground must have been pressed before the lower appellate court. 9. However, even apart from the said aspect of the matter, I would like to say that I would not interfere in my extraordinary jurisdiction with the finding recorded by the lower appellate court even if the said finding was held to be not sustainable on the ground of the decision in the earlier ceiling proceedings. It should be seen that I am exercising an extraordinary jurisdiction and I am not bound to interfere like an appellate court. I have a discretion to interfere taking into account all the circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the Prescribed Authority emphasised that on the own admission of the petitioner, the unmarried daughter was a major on the relevant date, i. e., 8-6-1973. The Lekhpal clearly admitted that he had included the said daughter as a member of the family in the wrong belief that unmarried daughters, irrespective of whether they were major or minor, were to be treated as members of the family. Subsequently, when he came to know of the correct position that an unmarried daughter, if major, was not to be treated as a member of the family, then in the subsequent notice he excluded her and treated the family to consist of 6 members. In view of this statement of the Lekhpal, coupled with the own admission of the petitioner that on the relevant date the unmarried daughter was a major, I think the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the family consisted of 6 members could not be taken exception to leaving apart the question of res judicata. In view of this statement of the Lekhpal, coupled with the own admission of the petitioner that on the relevant date the unmarried daughter was a major, I think the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the family consisted of 6 members could not be taken exception to leaving apart the question of res judicata. In such circumstances, I would decline to interfere with such a finding even if the same could be held to be bad on the ground of the technical plea of res judicata. 10. So far as the third contention is concerned, it should be seen that before the appellate court this point was not pressed as is clear from the judgment of the said court. From the order of the Prescribed Authority it is clear that the said sale deed dated 4-6-1974 was hit by S. 5 (8) of the Act. The notice under S. 9 (2) of the Act was published on 22-7-73 and as the sale deed was executed after the said date, therefore, it was covered by S. 5 (8) of the Act. It is clearly provided in the said provision that every transfer made in contravention of the prohibition contained therein shall be void. Therefore, this document was bound to be treated as void and there was no question of extending the benefit of clause (b) of the proviso to S. 5 (6) of the Act because the same shall not be applicable to the said document. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore rejected. 11. The fourth contention of the petitioner relates to plots nos. 930 and 282. It is contended that the said plots should have been treated as abadi land and should not have been included in the holding of the petitioner. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of R. C. Srivastava, J. in Hafiz Shafat Ali v. State of U. P. (1979 All LR 472). It should be seen that before the appellate court the contention was pressed in respect of plot no. 161/3, area 10 biswas, and the appellate court held the said plot to be abadi land and directed that the said area of 10 biswas of the said plot be excluded from the holding of the petitioner. No contention was pressed before the appellate court regarding plots nos. 930 and 282. 161/3, area 10 biswas, and the appellate court held the said plot to be abadi land and directed that the said area of 10 biswas of the said plot be excluded from the holding of the petitioner. No contention was pressed before the appellate court regarding plots nos. 930 and 282. Even in the grounds of appeal no ground was taken in respect of plot no. 282. The Prescribed Authority had rejected the contention regarding plot no. 282, stating that in respect of the said plot situated in village Dharampur, the petitioner had not substantiated that the same was abadi land. In respect of plot no. 930 the Prescribed Authority found that the same was recorded as Mazrua in khasra 1380 fasli and therefore, the petitioners contention that the said plot was abadi was rejected. 12. I.earned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Prescribed Authority was bound to have carried out the local inspection to determine the said controversy. In this connection he has placed reliance on the following cases. (i) Gajendra Singh v. State of U. P. (1978 All LR 602). (ii) Shital Singh v. State of U. P. (1978 All LR 605). 13. I have looked into the said cases but in my view, none of them had laid down that the Prescribed Authority is bound to carry out a local inspection to determine whether a piece of land is abadi land or not. In my view it was in the discretion of the Prescribed Authority to make a local inspection and no interference can be made within the restricted scope of a writ with the exercise of the discretion by the Prescribed Authority. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner moved any application before the Prescribed Authority praying for such a local inspection and if any such prayer was made, why the same was rejected. No ground has been stated in the petition contending that the Prescribed Authority was .bound to have carried out a local inspection for determining the said controversy. 14. Accordingly, I reject the fourth contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. So far as the fifth contention is concerned, I reject the same. I have already held that I would not go into the question of the number of members of the family in the instant petition. 14. Accordingly, I reject the fourth contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. So far as the fifth contention is concerned, I reject the same. I have already held that I would not go into the question of the number of members of the family in the instant petition. Learned counsels contention that even if the unmarried daughter was held to be major on 8-6-1973, still, the benefit of two additional hectares of irrigated land should have been given to the petitioner cannot be accepted in view of the provisions contained in S. 5 (3) of the Act. Learned counsel contended that there was no justification in law for making discrimination between an adult son and an adult daughter and that the same would be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. This contention cannot be entertained in the instant writ petition in view of the fact that the Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 and the subsequent Amending Acts stand included in Schedule IX of the Constitution. The fifth con tention is accordingly rejected. 16. Coming now to the sixtli and the last contention, it should be seen that the same also was never canvassed before the appellate court as is clear from the judgment of the said Court. The Prescribed Authority had dealt with the controversy under issue no. 7 and it was found that on the own admission of the petitioner, his son was aged about 21 years which meant that he was born some time in 1955 and thus he was not in existence on 30-6-1952. Therefore, the said son could have no share in the holding which was shown in C. L. H. Form 3 issued to the petitioner. This finding was never questioned in the grounds of appeal. This was a vague, general assertion in ground no. 7 of the grounds of appeal and it was to the effect that in the family of the petitioner there were 7 members and that the land was ancestral and not the self acquired property of the petitioner appellant. Hence each member had l/7th share. This ground was much too general and vague and no specific point was taken that the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority about the date of birth of the son of the petitioner was incorrect. In my view, there is no merit in the said contention. 17. Hence each member had l/7th share. This ground was much too general and vague and no specific point was taken that the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority about the date of birth of the son of the petitioner was incorrect. In my view, there is no merit in the said contention. 17. This petition accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed, .but there will be no order as to costs