M. K. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS criminal miscellaneous application arises out of a order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Jhalod on an application by the accused. (Ex 6) in criminal case No. 1061 of 1978 praying that the prosecution be held as time barred and the offence therefore not cognizable. ( 2 ) A few facts necessary to appreciate the point which arises in this petition may be first stated. The petitioner accused at the relevant time that is for the period from 1971 to 1975 was a member of the Managing Committee as also the Chairman of the Jhalod Urban Co-operative Bank Limited. It was alleged that he committed an offence under sec. 147 (1) (r) read with sec. 148 (1) (r) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 (the Act) on or about 5. 5. 1971 by getting sanctioned from the bank a block capital loan of Rs. 50 0 in favour of Messrs. Sanjeli Rice Pulse and Small Industries in which firm he was a person interested) he being a partner thereof. It was alleged that inspite of bye-law No. 31 of the bank providing otherwise and in contravention thereof he remained present at the meeting of the Managing Committee of the said bank on 5. 5. 1971 and using his influence as the Chairman got the said loan sanctioned in favour of the said firm by getting a resolution passed by the managing committee and thereby he committed the said offence. It was also alleged that the general board of the bank on learning this appointed an inquiry committee on 10-8-1975 and the inquiry committee submitted its report to the District Registrar on 18-10-1975 The District Registrar Co-operative Societies Panchmahals thus for the first time it was the prosecution case came to know about the offence on 18-10-1975 and after getting the necessary sanction as provided under sec. 149 (3) of the Act to prosecute the accused. filed the said complaint through complainant Navinchandra M. Shah Assistant District Registrar of Co-operative Societies Panchmahals at Godhra. ( 3 ) IT was urged before the lower courts on behalf of the accused and it is also urged here by Mr. 149 (3) of the Act to prosecute the accused. filed the said complaint through complainant Navinchandra M. Shah Assistant District Registrar of Co-operative Societies Panchmahals at Godhra. ( 3 ) IT was urged before the lower courts on behalf of the accused and it is also urged here by Mr. Patel the learned Advocate representing the petitioner accused that the period of limitation in the instant case would begin to run from the date of the offence that is 5-5-1971 and the prosecution launched therefore on 15-12-1978 was obviously time barred. ( 4 ) IT is also urged by Mr. Patel that in any event it cannot be said that the commission of the offence became known to the person aggrieved by the offence on 18-10-1975 as held by both the courts below when the committee appointed by the board of the bank submitted its report to the Registrar. The person aggrieved by the offence further submits Mr. Patel would not be the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar who is the complainant in the instant case but the bank which was being run by the managing committee with the Chairman at its helm and it also cannot be said that it was only on 10-8-1975 when the board appointed a committee when the offence became known to the bank. In the submission of Mr. Patel the offence must have been known to the bank from the very beginning because the loan was sanctioned by the managing committee of the bank as far back as 5-5-1971 and the bank in the usual course must have known that it was sanctioned in favour of a firm of which its Chairman who is the present accused was a partner. Thus in any view of the matter submits Mr. Patel the prosecution is time barred and the learned Magistrate committed a grave error in taking cognizance of the same after the period of limitation ( 5 ) SEC. 469 of the Code provides thus :- (1) The period of limitation in relation to an offender shall commence. Thus in any view of the matter submits Mr. Patel the prosecution is time barred and the learned Magistrate committed a grave error in taking cognizance of the same after the period of limitation ( 5 ) SEC. 469 of the Code provides thus :- (1) The period of limitation in relation to an offender shall commence. (A) on the date of the offence; or (B) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer whichever is earlier; or (C) x x x x. (2 ). In computing the said period the day from which period is to be computed shall be excluded. ( 6 ) THE next relevant provision is contained in sec. 470 (3) which read with the Explanation appended thereto provides thus :- (3) Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given or where under any law for the time being in force the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence then in computing the period of limitation the period of such notice or as the case may be the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. EXPLANATION : In computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be excluded. ( 7 ) THERE is no dispute that in the instant case the period of limitation would be three years and therefore if the starting point is taken from the date when the offence was committed viz. 5-5-1971 then the prosecution launched on 15-12-1978 would be barred by limitation. ( 8 ) BUT it is submitted by Mr. Vaidya the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State the instant case is covered by the provisions contained in clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 469. 5-5-1971 then the prosecution launched on 15-12-1978 would be barred by limitation. ( 8 ) BUT it is submitted by Mr. Vaidya the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State the instant case is covered by the provisions contained in clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 469. The offence became known to the person aggrieved by the same only when the Registrars office received the report of the committee appointed by the bank which report was received on 18-10-1975 and taking into consideration the period of five months and four days spent in obtaining the required sanction it would be seen that the prosecution launched was within time as it has been held by both the courts below. The question therefore which arises is as to who is the person aggrieved by the decision in the instant case. Is it the Bank as submitted by Mr. Patel or the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar who is the complainant as submitted by Mr. Vaidya and as is assumed by both the lower Courts ? The offence is one which is covered by sec. 147 (1) (r) read with sec. 148 (1) (r ). Sec. 147 (1) (r) provides that It shall be an offence under this Act if an officer of a society wilfully recommends or sanctions for his own personal use or benefit or for use or benefit of a person in whom he is interested a loan in the name of any other person. Sec. 148 is a punishing section and clause (r) of sub-sec. (1) of the said section provides that Every employer or officer member agent or servant of a society or any other person who commits an offence under sec. 147 shall on conviction be punished if it is an offence under clause (r) of that section with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. Sec. 149 (3) inter alia provides that No prosecution under this Act shall be lodged except with the previous sanction of the State Government in the case of an offence under clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 147 and of the Registrar in the case of any other offence under this Act. Sec. 149 (3) inter alia provides that No prosecution under this Act shall be lodged except with the previous sanction of the State Government in the case of an offence under clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 147 and of the Registrar in the case of any other offence under this Act. Such sanction shall not be given except after hearing the party concerned by an officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government by a general or special order. Sec. 3 provides for appointment of Registrar Additional Registrars Joint Registrars Deputy Registrars Assistant Registrars etc. to assist the Registrar in his functions under the Act and sub-sec. (1) thereof provides that For carrying out the purposes of this Act the State Government shall appoint a person to be the Registrar of Co-operative Societies for the State. ( 9 ) IT is therefore contended by Mr. Vaidya that it would be the Registrar and the persons assisting him who will be responsible for carrying out the purposes of the Act and a duty is therefore cast on the Registrar and the persons assisting him to carry out these purposes and in that sense as submitted by Mr. Vaidya the Registrar or the persons assisting him including the Assistant District Registrar who is the complainant in the instant case would come within the meaning of the phrase a person aggrieved by the offence. On going through the scheme of the Act as contained therein there is hardly any scope for such an argument. A person who is entrusted with duties of a public character and who has to perform these duties in his capacity as a public servant cannot be equated with a person aggrieved by the offence within the meaning of section 469 of the Code. Mr. Patel in this connection drew my attention to Sulochna v. State Registrar of Chits (Investigation and Prosecution ). Madras (1978) Cr. Law Journal 116 wherein while interpreting the phrase the person aggrieved by the offence occurring in sec. 569 (1) (b) the Madras High Court observed that the said phrase should be given a limited or restricted coverage viz. one who is personally and directly affected by an offence and not to any member of the public or even an officer who is charged with the duty of enforcing the prohibitory regulations under a statute. 569 (1) (b) the Madras High Court observed that the said phrase should be given a limited or restricted coverage viz. one who is personally and directly affected by an offence and not to any member of the public or even an officer who is charged with the duty of enforcing the prohibitory regulations under a statute. The Madras High Court has also made the following observations after referring to a number of decisions which are very important :these authorities certainly land support to my view that the Registrar cannot be taken to be a person aggrieved by the offences so as to claim the benefit of extended limitation provided under sec. 469 (1) (b) and (c) of the Code. The Registrar has come forward with the complaint in performance of his official duty and not on account of any grievance felt or sustained by him personally in the contraventions committed by the petitioner. Complaints preferred in discharge of ones official duty are vastly different in character and nature from complaints preferred by persons aggrieved by commission of the offences. They distinctly fall in two different categories and the former is not to be confused with the latter. ( 10 ) NOW applying this test to the present case it would be the bank if at all which can be considered as the person aggrieved and certainly not the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar. But even if that view is taken it will not help the accused in the present case because the starting point will be the first day on which such offence came to the knowledge of the Bank. There is no substance in Mr. Patel submission that the offence came to the knowledge of the Bank on the very day it was committed that is on 5-5-1971 because the bank must have known at that time that in a meeting of the Managing Committee held under the chairmanship of the accused a resolution was passed sanctioning the loan of Rs. 50 0 in favour of M/s Sanjeli Rice Pulse and Small Industries in which the accused was a partner. There cannot be any such presumption. 50 0 in favour of M/s Sanjeli Rice Pulse and Small Industries in which the accused was a partner. There cannot be any such presumption. On the contrary the presumption would be that these facts which constitute an offence had not come to the knowledge of the Bank at that time since had they come to the knowledge of the Bank they would never have sanctioned the loan which would be in contravention of law. In order to constitute an offence under sec. 147 (1) (r ). mere act of sanctioning the loan is not sufficient. It has to be accompanied by the fact that the officer of the society concerned wilfully recommended or sanctioned the said loan; that he did so for his own personal use or benefit or for the benefit of the person in whom he was interested. Merely because the bank at a meeting held of the Managing Committee in the presence of the accused who was its Chairman sanctioned the loan in favour of the said firm it cannot be said that the loan was wilfully recommended by the accused or that the members of the Bank Committee knew that he was a partner in the said concern in whose favour the loan was sanctioned. There is also nothing on record as observed by the lower courts that period to 10-8-1975 when the General Board of the Bank appointed an inquiry committee in the matter the said facts which would constitute an offence under sec. 147 (1) (r) punishable under sec. 148 (1) (r) of the Act had already come to the knowledge of the Bank and if 10-8-1975 is taken as the starting point of limitation than also after allowing for the period of 5 months and 11 days in obtaining the sanction the prosecution launched on 15-12-1978 would be in time. .