ORDER Mahavir Singh, J. -This is a revision against the order of the judicial Magistrate Lucknow in not framing a charge against the opposite party. 2. The relevant facts are that the applicant had lodged a report at the police station Husainganj alleging that the opposite party along with his wife, two daughters, son and some others had forcibly entered into her house on 6-4-1974 at 9.55 P, M. and assaulted her daughters and looted some property. 3. On investigation the police had first submitted a charge-sheet on 11-6-1974 against only three persons, namely, wife and two daughters of the opposite party under Sections 147, 323 and 452, Indian Penal Code and later on further investigation an additional charge-sheet was filed on 20-7-1974 against the opposite party, her son and two more persons. 4. After taking cognisance when the proceedings for charge began, the learned Magistrate on considering police report and taking the statements recorded under Section 161 into consideration held that the accusation against the opposite party No. 1 was groundless. He, therefore, discharged him and framed charge only against the remaining six persons. The informant, Smt. Sukhmati Devi has now come to this court and contends that the learned Magistrate acted beyond jurisdiction in discharging the opposite party and that there was same evidence against him as against the other persons charged by him. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant and the learned counsel for the opposite party at length. The material question in this case is as to what is the nature of power of a Magistrate under Section 239, Cr. P. C. 6. The learned counsel for the opposite party contends that the Magistrate has not to act merely as a machine but has to go into the documents on which the prosecution relies and if the 4'ocuments themselves did not make out a case prima facie, the Magistrate was within his rights to discharge him and not to frame charge against him. He relies upon C.S. and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1972 SC 545 ): (1972 Cri LJ 329). on the other hand learned counsel for the applicant contends that there is a prima facie evidence on record and it is not open to Magistrate to weigh the evidence and hold as to which evidence was believable. He relies upon C.S. and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1972 SC 545 ): (1972 Cri LJ 329). on the other hand learned counsel for the applicant contends that there is a prima facie evidence on record and it is not open to Magistrate to weigh the evidence and hold as to which evidence was believable. He relies for this upon Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 2 SCC 39 : (1978 Cri LJ 642). 7. So far as the case of Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India (supra) is concerned, this case is about the scope of Section 209, Criminal P, C. which deals with the powers of a committing court. The provisions of Section 209 Cr. P. C. are, however, much different from Section 239, Cr. P. C, which is the provision in issue in this case, Under Section 209, Cr. P. C. a Magistrate has not to examine the evidence, He has merely to ascertain whether the case is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. He has to see from the report of the police whether such case is made out. Under Section 239 the provisions are different. Here it has been specifically laid down that if on considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he shall discharge accused. So he has been given power to examine the documents. In C. S. and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v, State of Maharashtra (supra) which was a case of Section 251-A, Criminal P. C. (old) but the provisions in the present Code are similar. It was clearly held that a Magistrate is entitled to consider the entire material to find out whether the charge was groundless. In other words if there is no ground for framing charge, he has not blindly to adopt the decision of the prosecuting agency. So the Magistrate was right in examining the material placed before him. 8. In the present case the only documents relied by the prosecution are the statements recorded by the investigating agency under Section 161, Cr. P. C. The Magistrate found three kinds of statements:- (1) The statement of Smt. Sukhmati :- She supported the F. I. R. which implicated the opposite party along with other accused equally. 8. In the present case the only documents relied by the prosecution are the statements recorded by the investigating agency under Section 161, Cr. P. C. The Magistrate found three kinds of statements:- (1) The statement of Smt. Sukhmati :- She supported the F. I. R. which implicated the opposite party along with other accused equally. (2) The statements of two injured, namely, daughters of the applicant, and some others. They had stated that the opposite party had not entered inside the house. Only his wife, his two daughters and a son entered into the house and assaulted. The opposite party was only standing outside along with others. (3) The statements of the two witnesses Indra Jeet and Ram Behari. They stated that initially the incident took place as alleged by the two daughters of the informant but afterwards the opposite party along with two other persons, Om Prakash Rajoli and Rajendra entered the house and began to beat the persons. 9. The learned Magistrate found that the evidence of these two witnesses, though recorded at a late stage was clearly against the case taken by the informant and her daughters. He also found that these who were alleged to be victims of the assault, namely, two daughters of the applicant, had categorically stated that opposite party was not one of those who had assaulted them. Under such circumstances he was of the view that the accusation against, the opposite party was clearly groundless. This appreciation is wholly justified. It did not amount to traversing beyond the limit of the powers of a Magistrate, at the time of framing of charge. There is no doubt that there were two sets of witnesses against the opposite party. The first set comprised only of applicant herself and the other included the two sets of witnesses mentioned in clause (3) above. But even these two sets of witnesses differed. According to applicant, the opposite party came inside along with all other co-accused at one time, whereas the others said that the opposite party and some others came at a subsequent stage and only four had entered the house earlier and assaulted the two girls. But even these two sets of witnesses differed. According to applicant, the opposite party came inside along with all other co-accused at one time, whereas the others said that the opposite party and some others came at a subsequent stage and only four had entered the house earlier and assaulted the two girls. Even if this material contradiction could be left for appreciation at 'the time of trial, the fact remains that the material evidence in such a case would be only of victims, namely, the two girls and they had clearly stated that only the wife, daughters and son of the opposite party had entered into the house and assaulted them. They had not given any part to the opposite party except that he remained outside. So in face of such clear statements of the victim it will be too much for any court to hold that opposite party was also guilty of offence under Sections 452, 323 and 379, I. P. C. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, right in holding that there was no ground for framing charge against the opposite party. 10. The learned counsel for the applicant contends that the evidence against opposite party, Rajendra and Rijauli was the same and so if he framed charge against those two persons, there was no reason why the charge was not framed against the opposite party. I agree that considering the evidence mentioned above that the case of opposite party and those two persons is on the same footing and they should have been equally treated, but it does not mean that even when it is found that when on merits no charge should have been framed against opposite party, this court should direct Magistrate to frame a charge against him. All that can be said is that those persons may also be similarly treated by this court, even though they did not come in revision. This can be done under the suo motu powers of this court. The facts have already been brought to the notice of this court and it is clear that in view of the statements of the victims which exonerates the persons other than the wife, daughters and the son of the opposite party, no case against those two persons was also made out. So the order of framing charge against those two persons was also made out. So the order of framing charge against those two persons was also made out. So the order of framing charge against the those two persons can also be set aside. 11. Accordingly the revision is dismissed. It is further ordered that the order of the Magistrate in framing charge against Om Prakash Rijauli and Rajendra is also set aside.