JUDGMENT S. D. Agarwal, J. - This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for a declaration that the order D/- 28-12-64 of the Asstt. Consolidation Officer, Bakawali and 1-7-1966 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in case No. 65 concerning Khata No. 34 of village Shyampur Jalilpur are fraudulent, null, void and ineffective and therefore, liable to be cancelled. A further relief of perpetual injunction was claimed restraining the appellant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff-respondents over the land in dispute. The relevant facts which gave rise to the present suit are as follows:- The village in which plots in dispute are situate came under the consolidation operation. The dispute arose be-ween the parties in respect of Khatas in which their plots were situate. On 28-12-1964 reconciliation between the parties took place. By virtue of the said reconciliation parties settled their disputes in regard to Khata No. 152 and Khata No. 34. The Assistant Consolidation Officer by his order dated 28th December, 1964 accepted the said reconciliation and passed order accordingly in respect of both the Khatas 152 and 34. The plaintiff-respondents filed an appeal against the order dated 28th December, 1964. The Settlement Officer Consolidation by his judgment dated 14th March, 1966 set aside the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 28-12-1964 in respect of Khata No. 34 and maintained the order in respect of Khata No. 152. The Settlement Officer Consolidation was of the view that Khata No. 34 appears to have been added to the terms of the compromise as it was of different ink. Against the judgment dated 14th March, 1966, the appellant filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Etah. The revision court examined the matter in great detail, after summoning the original records of the proceedings in respect of both the Khata Nos. 152 and 34 and came to the conclusion that the dispute was in regard to both the khatas between the parties and that in fact, reconciliation had taken place between the parties in respect of both the khatas. He further found that the finding of the Settlement Officer Consolidation that Khata No. 34 was added subsequently was incorrect and that both the Khatas were mentioned at one and the same time when the compromise was filed. He further found that the finding of the Settlement Officer Consolidation that Khata No. 34 was added subsequently was incorrect and that both the Khatas were mentioned at one and the same time when the compromise was filed. In view of this finding the revisional court set aside the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and directed that the reconciliation be given effect to. The revision was therefore, allowed by the judgment dated 1st July, 1966. 2. The plaintiff-respondent thereafter filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the Hon'ble High Court, the writ petition number being 3520 of 1966. The writ petition came up for admission before a Bench of this court and the said writ petition was rejected on 15th September, 1966. The record of the writ petition has been examined by me. In the petition the petitioner had challenged the orders of the Asstt. Consolidation Officer on the ground that they have been obtained by fraud. It was specifically averred in the petition that the addition of Khata No. 34 was with a ( different ink and as such, the compromise was an act of forgery. In spite of this averment in the petition, the High Court did not accept the plaintiff-respondents submission and rejected the petition. 3. The plaintiff-respondents having failed to obtain relief either from the Deputy Director of Consolidation or from the High Court, started a fresh innings by filing the present suit out of which the present second appeal arises. 4. The trial court held that the suit . was barred under Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. It also held that the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata. Against the said judgment an appeal was filed by the pi plaintiff-respondents. The District Judge, Etah by his judgment dated 3-10-1970 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit. The appellate court came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of the Act and was also not barred by the principle of res judicata. Aggrieved by the judgment of the District Judge, Etah, the defendant-appellant has filed the present second appeal in this Court. 5. The appellate court came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of the Act and was also not barred by the principle of res judicata. Aggrieved by the judgment of the District Judge, Etah, the defendant-appellant has filed the present second appeal in this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the view taken by the lower appellate court that the suit is not barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and also by the principles of res judicata are findings erroneous in law. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has, however, urged that the compromise entered into between the parties was a voidable document and as such the consolidation courts had no jurisdiction to go into the question and examine the validity of the said document and, therefore, any finding given by the consolidation authorities in those proceedings is wholly without jurisdiction and the civil court alone had the jurisdiction to go into the validity of the said compromise. He has, therefore, urged that the suit was not barred either by Section 49 of the Act or by the principle of res judicata. 8. It is well settled that if a document is void or voidable it can be set aside by the civil court. The case has to be considered, however, taking into consideration the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is as follows:- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of right of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has been issued under sub-section (2) of Section 4, or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act". 9. The above Section 49 creates a bar to filing of a suit in a civil court. 9. The above Section 49 creates a bar to filing of a suit in a civil court. In regard to pending proceedings and suits similar provisions had been made for their abatement under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act which is as follows :- "(a) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority, whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall be an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated". 10. Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act is in similar terms to that of Section 49 of the Act. In Amanat Ullah v. Mohd. Fariyad, 1978 All LJ 661. I had occasion to discuss this provision in detail and after examining the various provisions of the Contract Act and the decision of this Court as well as the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nath v. Hari Narain Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 , I had held that in case a declaration is sought in respect of a document which is alleged to be void in law, the consolidation authorities can ignore the same and as such the consolidation authorities could go into the question as to whether the said document was null and void. 11. In the case of Amanat Ullah (supra) after examining the provisions of the Contract Act, I had laid down the following proposition of law:- "The Contract Act, 1872 has drawn a distinction between voidable and void contracts. Section 19 deals with voidable contract, while Section 23 of the Act deals with void contract, Section 19 contemplates a case where a consent has been obtained by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation. It is only when such a consent is obtained that an option is available to a party to abide by the contract or not, and as such, these contracts are voidable contracts. In the case of contracts which have not been entered into at all, the consideration or the object of which was wholly unlawful and is fraudulent then those agreements are void. In the case of contracts which have not been entered into at all, the consideration or the object of which was wholly unlawful and is fraudulent then those agreements are void. In Section 23 it has been specifically provided that every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. Similarly a compromise entered into in the absence of a certain party is in the nature of void contracts. In the instant case the allegation of the plaint establishes that the plaintiff-appellant had set up a case that the compromise decree is void and not a voidable one". 12. The question, therefore, to be examined in this case is whether in the instant case, on the case set up by the plaintiffs the document sought to be got cancelled is a void document or a voidable one. I have gone through the averments made in the plaint. In the plaint the judgment of the Assistant Consolidation Officer has been sought to be set aside on the ground that after the reconciliation has taken place between the parties, khata No. 34 has been added subsequently in the compromise in collusion with the consolidation authorities and as such, so far as the compromise is concerned in regard to Khata No. 34, it is fully a forged document. It is not the case of the appellant that his consent has been obtained by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation but his case is that no consent had been given but subsequently a fraud has been played by making forgery in the document. From the allegations, therefore, in the plaint, it is clear that what the appellant seeks to get adjudged as null and void, is a document void in law and not voidable one. In the circumstances, it was within I the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities to go into the question of the validity of the deed. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the Full Bench decision of the court in Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna, 1976 RD 220. In the Full Bench decision of Ram Nath (supra) the Full Bench has held that the documents which are voidable can be cancelled by the civil court only and cannot be cancelled by the consolidation authorities. So far as the void documents are concerned, this principle does not apply and the case is, therefore, distinguishable on its own facts. 14. In the Full Bench decision of Ram Nath (supra) the Full Bench has held that the documents which are voidable can be cancelled by the civil court only and cannot be cancelled by the consolidation authorities. So far as the void documents are concerned, this principle does not apply and the case is, therefore, distinguishable on its own facts. 14. Learned counsel has, also relied upon Baij Nath v. Binda, 1978 R. D. 77 and Smt. Marachi v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 79. In the case of Baij Nath (supra) the cancellation of the document was sought on the ground that inducement and fraud was practised on the executant. It was held that it was a void document. This case in fact, supports the respondents not the appellant. 4 15. So far as the case of Smt. Marachi (supra) is concerned, the learned Judge has held that in every case where a document is said to be fraudulent representation, it is not necessarily voidable. If the character of the document is itself challenged as distinguished from the contents of document. it shall be void. Even on the principle laid down in this case, clearly the case set up is that of document being void and not voidable as in the instant case the appellant seeks to get the document declared null and void on the ground that forgery had been committed in the document. This case, therefore, also does not help the appellant. In view of the above, since the consolidation courts could have gone into the question of the validity of the compromise as well as the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer regarding the compromise, the present suit was H early barred under Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The view to the contrary taken by the appellate court is, therefore, erroneous in law. 16. In regard to the question of res judicata, in the present case the appellant did raise this question of fraud before the consolidation courts and when he lost from the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the High Court, he has initiated the present proceedings by way of a suit. The decision in the consolidation proceedings in the circumstances clearly operates as res judicata in the present proceedings. The view to the contrary taken by the lower appellate court in this regard also, is therefore, erroneous in law. 17. The decision in the consolidation proceedings in the circumstances clearly operates as res judicata in the present proceedings. The view to the contrary taken by the lower appellate court in this regard also, is therefore, erroneous in law. 17. There is another aspect of the matter. In the instant case the allegation on which the judgment of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 28-12-1964 is sought to be set aside is on the ground that the words 'Khata No. 34 were inserted subsequently in collusion with the consolidation authorities. It is well settled that every court has inherent jurisdiction to examine fraud played upon the court. In Mst. Kalpa v. Sita Ram reported in AIR 1955 All 187 , a Division Bench of this Court has opined as follows:- "It was evidently the duty of the Court below to have come to a conclusion on the allegations made by the defendant with regard to the making of the compromise. If a party to a compromise denies having entered into the compromise, the Court will have to come to a finding as to whether there had or had not been a compromise effected between the parties and then also to decide if the agreement or the adjustment was lawful. It is only after the Court is satisfied that there had in fact been a compromise and further that the compromise was a lawful compromise, that there would be no option left to the Court but to record it and to pass a decree in terms of the compromise". 18. In U. P. State v. Shib Saran, AIR 1960 All 360 a Division Bench of this court also held that it is well established that fraud on the court itself and mistake of the Court and the protection of minors are categories in cases in which the powers given to the court under Section 151 of the Code may be exercised in suitable cases. 19. In the instant case, as stated above, the allegations were made in regard to the fraud played upon the court in collusion with the consolidation authorities. This question was raised and rightly so by the appellant before the Consolidation courts. The Deputy Director of Consolidation did not ultimately accept the contention of fraud as raised by the appellant. 19. In the instant case, as stated above, the allegations were made in regard to the fraud played upon the court in collusion with the consolidation authorities. This question was raised and rightly so by the appellant before the Consolidation courts. The Deputy Director of Consolidation did not ultimately accept the contention of fraud as raised by the appellant. The judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was challenged in this court and the Division Bench rejected the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The decision, therefore, on this question became final after the rejection of the writ petition. In this view or me matter also the decision in the earlier proceedings will clearly operate as res judicata in the present proceedings. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the lower appellate court dated 3-10-1970 is set aside and the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.