JUDGMENT S. Roy, J. All these applications arise out of a common order dated 3.3.1972 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Chaibasa, exercising the power of the Special Land Acquisition Judge. 2. Some lands of village Karudih, police station Seraikela, District Singhbhum was acquired and award in respect of the same was drawn up in the name of Raja Adhya Pratap Singh Deo. The awardee being not satisfied with the amount of compensation filed an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, claiming higher compensation. The Collector referred the same to the District Judge. During the pendency of the reference the awarded died on 22.12.1969 leaving behind his son, daughters and other legal representatives who are parties to these applications. 3. Sudhendra Narayan Singh Deo, one of the sons of the awardee, filed an application in the court below for substitution of the names of all the legal representatives of the deceased awardee, but subsequently Sudhendra Narayan Singh Deo filed an application for substitution or his name only on the ground that the other legal representatives were not taking any interest. His name was accordingly substituted. Bhupendra Narayan Singh Deo, another son of the awardee filed an application in the court below that Sudhendra Narayan Singh had fraudulently got his name substituted. The prayer, therefore, was made to substitute all the legal representatives of the deceased awardee. This gave rise to Misc. case No. 12 of 1971. Similar application was filed by Bhupendra Narayan Singh Deo which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 21 of 1971. Sura Bhanu Singh Deo, a grand-son or the awardee filed another application for substituting the names or all the heirs instead of Subhendra Narayan Singh Deo alone. This gave rise to Misc. Case No. 22 of 1971. Shata Bhanu Pratap Singh Deo, the eldest son or the awardee filed an application on the ground that Sudhendra Narayan Singh Deo had fraudulently got his name substituted in place of the deceased awardee. He contended that as per terms of the agreement of merger of Seraikella state in the Dominion of India the property acquired was part of the private properties or Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Deo. He contended that as per terms of the agreement of merger of Seraikella state in the Dominion of India the property acquired was part of the private properties or Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Deo. In terms of the merger agreement, the President of India bas been pleased to recognise Shata Bhanu Pratap Singh Deo as the Raja of Seraikella, that is the next ruler alter the death of Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Deo. He, therefore, was solely entitled to the compensation. This application was registered as Misc. Case No. 1 of 1972. By order dated 3rd March, 1972 the Court below held that Raja Shata Bhanu Pratap Singh Deo was not exclusively entitled to the compensation. It further found that the names of all the legal representatives of the deceased awardee should be substituted. Raja Shata Bhanu Pratap Singh Deo has challenged the legality of the order in all these four applications. 4. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Civil Revision No. 551 of 1972 submitted that there is no dispute that before coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter called "the Act"), Raja family of Seraikella was governed by the rule of lineal male primogeniture. The estate of Raja was impartible. By an agreement dated 15th December 1947 entered into by and between the Governor General of India and Raja of Seraikella State, the Seraikella State ceded to the Dominion of India and the Dominion Government got full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power for and in relation to governance of the State and the administration of the State was transferred to the Dominion Government from Ist January 1948. He submitted that although by the Act, the rule of devolution of properties to the eldest male member of the eldest male line was done away with but section 5 of the Act, makes specific provision that the Act, shall not apply to succession in respect of certain properties. Reliance was placed on sub-section (II) of Section 5 of the Act. By Article 5 of the merger agreement the Government of India guaranteed succession in the family of the Raja of Seraikella according to custom. According to the custom prevalent in the family the petitioner succeeded to the property of Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Deo. Reliance was placed on sub-section (II) of Section 5 of the Act. By Article 5 of the merger agreement the Government of India guaranteed succession in the family of the Raja of Seraikella according to custom. According to the custom prevalent in the family the petitioner succeeded to the property of Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Deo. He also submitted that the President of India has, in terms of the merger agreement, recognised the petitioner as the person who had succeeded to the Gaddi of the Seraikella State. The petitioner therefore, is solely entitled to the compensation in respect of the land acquired, Mr. N. N. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in other cases has adopted the argument. 5. To appreciate the submission of Mr. Chatterjee it is necessary to notice in detail the relevant provisions of the Act, and the merger agreement. By agreement dated 15.12.1947 the Raja of Seraikella Aditya Pratap Singh Deo agreed that the administration of the Seraikella State should be integrate with the Province of Orissa. He, therefore, entered into the agreement with the Government of India. The relevant Articles of the agreement are Articles 3 and 5 which are as follows : Article 3. “The Raja shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of this agreement. The Raja will furnish to the Dominion Government before the 1st day of January. 1948 an inventory of all the immovable property securities and cash balance held by him as such private property. If any dispute arises as to whether any item of the property is the private property of the Raja or State property, it shall be referred to such officer with judicial experience as the Dominion Government may nominate and the decision of that officer shall be final and binding on both panics.’ Article, 5. “The Dominion Government guarantee the succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi of the State and to the Raja's personal rights, privileges dignities and titles.” It will be necessary to refer to Article 4 or the agreement, which is as follows: “The Raja, the Rani, the Rajamata, the Yuvraj and the Yuvrani shall be entitled to all personal privilege enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territories of the State immediately before the 15th day of August. 1947.” Relevant section of the Act, is as follows: “5. Act, not to apply to certain properties. This Act, shall not apply to- (i) xxx xxxx xxxxx (ii) any estate which descends to a single heir by the terms of any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler or any Indian State with the Government or India or by the terms or any enactment passed before the commencement of this Act." (iii) xxx xxx xxx xxx 6. Mr. Chatterjee, submitted that by Article 5 of the agreement, the Government or India not only guaranteed the succession according to the custom to the Gaddi or the State, but also succession according to the custom to the Raja's personal rights and privileges which include his private properties. By putting this interpretation to Article 5 of the agreement he urged that the agreement is an agreement as envisaged in section 5 (ii) of the Act. The petitioner was not only entitled to succeed to the Gaddi or the State but also entitled to the compensation in respect of the private property. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party contended that Article 5 or the agreement must be confined to the Gaddi or the State and Raja's personal rights, privileges and dignities and titles relating to the Gaddi or the State. According to him it could not be extended to the private properties or the Raja of which full ownership and enjoyment was given to him in terms of Article 3. 7. The Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the various articles of the merger agreement entered into by and between the erstwhile rule, of princely States and the Government or India. In the case or Visheshwar Rao Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh the Supreme Court while interpreting Article 4 or the merger agreement entered into by the Ruler of Khairagarh (which is similar in all material particulars with Article 4 already quoted above) observed that the guarantee or assurance to which due regard is to be had is limited to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler qua a Ruler. It does not extend to the personal property which is different from personal rights.” Applying this interpretation of the case of Visheshwar Rao (Supra) the Supreme Court while interpreting articles 4 and 5 of the agreement in the case of Sudhansushekhar Singh Deo and another Vrs. The State of Orissa and another observed as follows : “The privileges guaranteed by Articles 4 and 5 are personal privileges of the appellant as an ex-Ruler and those privileges do not extend to his personal property.” It may be mentioned that Articles 4 and 5 of that case are similar to articles 4 and 5 of this case. This was reiterated in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Anadhra Pradesh Vrs. H.E.H. Mir, Osman Ali Bahadur. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee, therefore, that Article 5 of the agreement also guarantees succession according to the custom to the Raja's private property has no substance. 8. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the petitioner has been recognized by the President of India as the Ruler of Seraikella by notification made under clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to succeed according to the custom to the private properties of the Ruler also cannot be accepted. From the case of Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh Vrs. Union of India and others it appears that after the death of the Rules of Dholpur, by a notification dated 13.12.1956 in pursuance of clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution of India, the President of India was pleased to recognise the adopted son of the widow of the deceased Ruler as the Ruler of Dholpur. This was challenged by the brother of the deceased Ruler. The Supreme Court observed: “It is manifest that right to private properties of the last Ruler depends upon the personal law of succession to the said private properties. The recognition of the ruler is a right to succeed to the Gaddi of the Ruler. This was challenged by the brother of the deceased Ruler. The Supreme Court observed: “It is manifest that right to private properties of the last Ruler depends upon the personal law of succession to the said private properties. The recognition of the ruler is a right to succeed to the Gaddi of the Ruler. This recognition of Ruler ship by the President is an exercise of political power vested in the President and is thus an instance of purely executive jurisdiction or the Act, so far as the President is concerned, associated with any Act, or recognition or right to private properties.” It further observed: It has to be recognized that the right to private properties of the Ruler is not embraced within clause (22) or Article 366 of the Constitution which speaks of recognition of a Ruler by the President.” 9. It must, therefore, be held that neither the agreement nor the recognition of the President under clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution of india embraces private properties or the Ruler. 10. The next question that arises is when neither article 5 of the agreement nor the notification issued under clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution of India embraces private properties of the ruler, what will be the effect of section 5 (ii) of the Act, to this case. Can it be said that the private property of the Ruler shall be inherited by the petitioner alone? As noticed above, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the agreement or recognition has nothing to do with the private property of the Ruler and the guarantee under the agreement is only with regard to the Gaddi of the State and of the Raja's personal rights privileges, dignities and titles qua a Ruler, The word "estate" in section 5 (ii) of the Act, must be confined to properties other than private properties of the Ruler. The right to the private properties of the Ruler shall depend on the personal law of succession by which the family is governed. It must, therefore, be held that section 5 (ii) of the Act, has no application to this case. The order of the court below is correct and can not be interfered with. 11. In the result, the applications are dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Applications dismissed.