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1980 DIGILAW 73 (RAJ)

Umed Singh v. Bahadur Singh

1980-02-02

G.M.LODHA, KANTA BHATNAGAR

body1980
G.M. LODHA, J.—The Emblem or symbol of "Justice" is "Balance" or "Scales". A Judge is required to maintain it even matriculously and not to allow it to "tilt" on any consideration whatsoever. "Tilting of the "Balance of justice or the scales of justice" by weight of coins" is the very antithesis of a "Judge" and "Justice". It is the "stigma" against a Judge. For a Judge "independence" is "heart" and "integrity" in his "lungs". For a Judge; if quantity is lost: nothing is lost: if quality is lost, something is lost but if "independence, integrity or impartiality" is lost, everything is lost". 2. The present contempt proceedings arises due to contemners outburst "Justice is sold in open market" against judiciary. A humble Munsif, lowest in the ladder, being the first casuality, and also the worst casuality, as by judicial ethics and restrain, he hardly gets opportunity to defend himself against such wild allegations, and had to suffer silently all humiliation, without any demur or protest. 3. Honble the Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court was the chief guest at a function of inaugural ceremony of the new court-building at Sardarshahar, District Churu, in Rajasthan on 26-4-1979. The elite of the town and all im-portant officers of the State Government and Judicial Officers of the district were present in this function, which was organized by the Bar Association and presided by the District Magistrate, Churu. After the Chief Guest and the President had spoken, respondent Shri Bahadur Singh, Advocate of Churu appeared on the scene and gave his speach. "Justice is auctioned: the local court indulogs in favourities and the judgments of the court are known a fortnight in advance in the market" alleged Shri Bahadur Singh The audience consisting of the high dignitaries was shocked at this scandalous outburst and it was resented by the people present there. 4. "Justice is auctioned: the local court indulogs in favourities and the judgments of the court are known a fortnight in advance in the market" alleged Shri Bahadur Singh The audience consisting of the high dignitaries was shocked at this scandalous outburst and it was resented by the people present there. 4. The Bar Association, Sardarshahar, passed a resolution on 4-5-1979 which is as under:— ^^vfHkHkk"kd la?k ljnkj kgj dh vkt ;g vlk/kkj.k cSBd loZ&lEefr ls fuEu fyf[kr izLrko ikfjr djrh gS%&fnukad 27-4-79 dks LFkkuh; eqaflQ U;k;ky; us uo&fufeZr Hkou dh mn~?kkVu osyk ij ekuuh; eq[; U;k;kf/kifr Jh pkaney yks<+k ds vfHkuUnu gsrq bl vfHkHkk"kd la?k }kjk vk;ksftr lkoZtfud lekjksg esa mRlkgh] drZO;fu"B] bZekunkj ,oa U;k;fiz; LFkkuh; eqaflQ eftLVªsV ij pq: ds vk;dj] fcØh dj lykgdkj Jh cgknqjflag ,MoksdsV us >wBs] kjkjriw.kZ fujk/kkj ,oa U;k;ikfydk dh xfjek dks fxjkus okys kCnksa }kjk ^LFkkuh; dksVZ esa i{kikr gksrk gS] U;k; fcdyk gS rFkk QSlyksa ds ckjs esa iUnzg fnu iwoZ gh cktkj esa [kcj vk tkrh gS** vkfn vkjksi yxk;sAvfHkHkk"kd la?k ljnkj kgj loZ&lEefr ls Jh cgknqjflag ,MoksdsV ds bl d`R; dh ?kksj fuUnk o HkRlZuk djrk gSAvfHkHkk"kd la?k ljnkj kgj loZ&lEefr ls Jh cgknqjflag ,MoksdsV ds mDr dFku dks e;kZnk foghu ,oa leLr U;k;ikfydk dks viekfur djus okyk rFkk vfHkHkk"kdksa dh vkpkj lafgrk ds foijhr ekurk gS vkSj iqjtkjs kCnksa esa ekax djrk gS fd Jh cgknqjflag ,MoksdsV ds f[kykQ rRdky dBksj ls dBksj dk;Zokgh dh tkosA** The news of the above criticism of the judiciary got wide publicity, and Dainik Navjyoti, an important newspaper in Rajasthan, narrated it under the caption ^^vnkyrh QSlys vkmV gksus dk vkjksi**. According to this news item, an unusual situation arose when the above advocate publicly and openly criticized the local Munsif for selling Justice in the market, doing favouritism and intimating the judgments a fortnight prior to its announcement. According to this new item there was pandonium in the function, when Bahadur Singh made this scathing criticism of judiciary, and Nem Chand Mali, Advocate, had to intervene to declare that the allegation was false and wholly unfounded, and Bahadur Singh was not a member of the Bar, but, he was a broker of tax-dozzers. 5. It was then mentioned in the news-item that the Munsiff Magistrate requested the Chief Justice that he should be allowed hearing, against such wild false allegation and further permitted to take proceedings by instituting a case against Bahadur Singh. 5. It was then mentioned in the news-item that the Munsiff Magistrate requested the Chief Justice that he should be allowed hearing, against such wild false allegation and further permitted to take proceedings by instituting a case against Bahadur Singh. 6. One Umed Singh, Advocate of Sardarshahar then applied for permission to launch for contempt proceedings, and the Advocate General Shri R. K. Rastogi accepted the application, and vide letter dated 6.10.1979, Annexure A3 granted it, under section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, to move a competent court for an action for contempt of court. On 24.10.1979. Shri Umed Singh Rathore filed this contempt petition and on 25.10.1979. a Division Bench of this Court issued a notice to the non-petitioner Bahadur Singh. 7. Shri Bahadur Singh has filed an apology to it, which reads as under:- "I, Bahadur Singh son of Shri Briju Singh, by caste Rajput, Advocate, Churu, unconditionally tender apology and most humbly and respectfully sumbit that I had no intention or motive to scandalise any court by lowering the authority or prestige of any court or judicial authority including the court of Sardarshar." Mr. S.R. Singhi, advocate for the petitioner, Umed Singh, has filed an application mentioning that since he would be out of station, this case may not be called and adjourned for some future date. However, we are of the opinion that in a case of scandalising the court and undermining the authority of the court, though a complainant can inform a court by a petition, the principle concern is of the court to consider the case objectively in a detached manner in order to decide whether there has been, in fact, contempt and if so, what punishment would meet the end of justice. In this view of the matter the prayer for adjournment did not deserve any serious consideration, and is consequently rejected. There is no lis between the complainant applicant, and the contemner in such cases, nor the court can allow it to become an instrument of private vendetta. 8. At Sardarshahar, there is only one judicial court of Munsif Magistrate. The resolution of Sardarshahar Bar mentions that the local Munsif Magistrate was honest and sincere for his duty, and very enthusiastic and famous for doing justice, and the allegations were false, mischievous, baseless and such, which undermines the dignity of the judiciary. 8. At Sardarshahar, there is only one judicial court of Munsif Magistrate. The resolution of Sardarshahar Bar mentions that the local Munsif Magistrate was honest and sincere for his duty, and very enthusiastic and famous for doing justice, and the allegations were false, mischievous, baseless and such, which undermines the dignity of the judiciary. According to this resolution, the unwanted criticism by Bahadur Singh, Advocate, were scandalous of the entire judiciary and against the professional ethics and conduct of advocates. It was strongly pleaded that serious action should be taken against Shri Bahadur Singh for bringing disgrace to the Bar and bringing judiciary in contempt. , 9. Contemner Bahadur Singh has not chosen to raise any controversy about these facts mentioned above and in not doing so, he has been very well advised by senior counsel Shri Lekh Raj Mehta. 10. We are, therefore, to proceed on the assumption that the facts mentioned above, are true, correct and faithful narration of the incident which resulted in these proceedings of contempt. These words are certainly scandalous and the contemner is guilty of committing contempt of court by scandalising the judiciary in general and local Munsif in particular. 11. According to the federal structure of the Constitution, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary constitute the three important wings of the State. The judiciary plays the most important role as watchdog of the Constitution, to apply check and balances both for the functioning of the Constitution and the various laws and the executive. It is known for its independence and integrity, and that is the reason why whenever any serious incident rocks any State, a demand for judicial enquiry is made in and outside the legislature of the country. The judiciary is required to adjudicate inter se between-the citizen and also, between the citizens and the State and some times, between the various wings of the State itself, and some times between Legislators vs. Judiciary as happened in U.P. Speakers case, where President made reference in Keshar Sings case. 12. It is thus, required to play an important role in the administration of justice in this country This cannot be possible unless it inspires confidence and people look towards it with utmost confidence and respect of getting justice and justice alone. 12. It is thus, required to play an important role in the administration of justice in this country This cannot be possible unless it inspires confidence and people look towards it with utmost confidence and respect of getting justice and justice alone. The expectency for getting unadultated and purer justice from the temples of justice can only be maintained if people act with restraint and utmost respect to the majesty of law and justice. The slightest effort to undermine the status and dignity of court or a judge deserves to be taken serious note of and should be dealt with with a heavy hand. It assumes all the more importance when the Majesty of law and justice is undermined and the respect in the temples of justice is shattered by such scandalization of courts by none else than a member of the Bar having ten years standing. This is so because the Bar and the Bench are the twins of judiciary: and in otherwords, they are both limbs of the same juristic body. Such "contempt" partakes the character of "suicide" in contradistinction to "Homicide" as known in Criminal Jurisprudence. 13. There cannot be any room for doubt that the allegation that the "justice is sold" or justice is auctioned" by judiciary, is not only serious, but henious type of scandalising of the court. It means that justice becomes a marketable commodity like vegetable or cloth, which can be purchased on payment. It means judgments can be purchased on payment of certain coins. It means that decisions are not given on merits, not according to law, but according to price which one can pay. An allegation of dishonesty, bribery or partiality is most serious stigma on the conduct of a judicial officer, and when it is made generally, it tarnishes the image of the entire judiciary. 14. It means that decisions are not given on merits, not according to law, but according to price which one can pay. An allegation of dishonesty, bribery or partiality is most serious stigma on the conduct of a judicial officer, and when it is made generally, it tarnishes the image of the entire judiciary. 14. The fact that the occasion of function attended by the entire elite of the city, the highest dignatory and the top members of judiciary and the several members of the Bar, where the temple of justice was being inaugerated, and Honble the Chief Justice was being welcomed and greeted, was chosen the time and the venue for such scandalous attacks, makes the nature of the contempt more serious, and the scandalisation became so notorious that even the important newspaper of the State carried banner headlines against the judiciary based on the report of the contemners speech, and the Bar Association passed resolution condemning it for the irreparable harm, which he has done. 15. After undermining and bringing in disrepute administration of justice he did not choose to publish any apology for the mistake and the blunder committed by him, anywhere either in the newspaper or by writing to the Bar Association or to the Munsif Magistrate or to the Honble Chief Justice. This all shows the adamancy of the contemner and it aggravates his offence. 16. Even before this Court after the service of contempt notice, he did not has ten to submit an unconditional apology and make any effort to purge himself from the contempt, as though he appeared on 22-10-1979 and the case was adjourned to 10-12-1979 and then to 19-12-1979 and then to 5-1-1980 no such apology was filed. It was only when the hearing commenced on 21-1-1980, that the above apology was filed in the Court. 17. In Surendranath Banerjee vs. C J of Bengal (1), the Privy Council has broadly defined contempt. In Ramakrishna Reddy vs. State of Madras (2), the Supreme Court laid down important proposition in this respect. The article purported to convey to its readers that the Sub-Magistrate of Kovvur was a bribe-taker. Instances were cited where it was remoured that the officer had either taken bribes or had put the parties to undue harassment as they were abdurate enough to refuse the demands of his broker. The article purported to convey to its readers that the Sub-Magistrate of Kovvur was a bribe-taker. Instances were cited where it was remoured that the officer had either taken bribes or had put the parties to undue harassment as they were abdurate enough to refuse the demands of his broker. The High Court of Madras held it was clear contempt calculated to lower the prestige and dignity of court and bring into disrepute the administration of justice. In special leave the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the contemner in this case based his article on rumours and was not in a position to prove them and further the allegations were so scurrilous that it was more than defamation and was cleat contempt. 18. In Surendranath Banerjees case (supra), the Bengalea published a scurrilous attack on Judge Morris, comparing him to the odious Jeffrys and scr-ogg and stating that he set the Hooghly on fire by directing a sacred Hindu Saligram to be brought into court precincts, an act of zubberdusti. In this case, Surendra Naths apology was not considered, and he was convicted for contempt of court. In the instant case, it was not in dispute that the allegations contained in the speach of the contemner constitute gross contempt as they scandalise the local judiciary and undermined the prestige, status, dignity and impartiality of the court and administration of justice. 19. The sole question is whether the apology should be accepted and do punishment is required to be given. In the matter of Hiren Bose, Contemner(2), the Calcutta High Court, Special Bench, while dealing with the question of apology, observed as under;— "Submission of an apology as an apologia to the contemners other con-tentions is to exhibit a desire to escape punishment without really being contrite. Courts should not accept such qualified apologies. It is also not a matter of course that a Judge can be expected to accept any apology. Apology cannot be a weapon of defence forged always to purge the guilty. It is intended to be evidence of real contrition, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong doers power. Only then is it of any ewall in a Court of justice. Apology cannot be a weapon of defence forged always to purge the guilty. It is intended to be evidence of real contrition, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong doers power. Only then is it of any ewall in a Court of justice. But before it can have that effect, it should be tendered at the earliest stage, not the latest. Even if wisdom downs etc. latter stage, the apology should be tendered unresorveedly and unconditionally, before the Judge has indicated the trend of his mind. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered apology robbed of all grace but it ceases to be an apology. It cease to be full, frank and manly confession of a wrong done, which it is intended to be. An apology certainly has this virtue that it minimises the gravity of the offence committed by the contemner, but it does not wholly absolve him of the guilt." 20. In Lal Behari vs. State (3), the question of acceptance of an apology was considered as under: — "In cases of contempt the Court is not bound to accept an apology or even an unqualified apology. The question whether it should do so or not would depend on circumstances of such particular case. A court can refuse to accept an apology which it does not believe to be genuine, it can even when it accepts the apology, commit an offender to prison or otherwise punish him. Further more there cannot be both justification and apology. The two things are incompetible. Where the apology does not seem to be so much the out-powring of a panitent heart moved by feeling of remorse and overcome by a sense of ones own guilt, as a convenient device clutched up by a person driven and compelled by the logic of events to resort to a measure which seems to him to provide the only mode of escape from the impencing doom or as a last desperate throw in a game of chance hazarded by him at a time when all else has failed and everything seems to be lost, it should be considered to be merely an apology for an apology. It deserves to be given short shrift at the hands of the Court." 21. It deserves to be given short shrift at the hands of the Court." 21. In Umesh Saigal vs. R. K. Dalmia (4), a Special Bench considered an apology of Shri Dalmia, but refused to accept it and then observed as under :— "That takes me to the punishment and 1 must confess that this has given me a few anxious moments. I however, feel that having regard to the fact that Shri R.K. Dalmia is an old man of about 75 years with ill health and must have been carrying a feeling of frustration on one of his workman being sent to jail when an order for bail had already been passed, 1 consider that the interest of justice will be served by administering a warning to Shri Dalmia. This lesser punishment is being awarded having regard to the circumstances of this case but we do not want sound a note of warning that any act impairing the magesty of Courts will be dealt with strongly. I would like to point out that no person has a choice of taking law into his own hands and interfere with the impartial administration of justice. If any person has any grievance against judicial orders made by Courts there are ample remedies for rectification of errors, but the flow of administration of justice must be kept unimpeded and its channels clear. The contemner will also pay Rs. 200/- as costs. 22. Shri Dalmia also tendered a written apology towards the end of the arguments, it is stated in that application:— "I had no intention to commit any contempt of Court and as advised by my counsel, I committed no such contempt. Still if the Honble Court consider that what I uttered constitutes contempt of Court, I tender my unqualified apology." 23. This is no apology in the eye of law, and I would decline to accept it. 24. Messrs Mehta and Goal appearing for the contemner, invited our attention to the judgment of Dinabandhu Sahu vs. State of Orissa (5), where the apology was held to be sufficient. This is no apology in the eye of law, and I would decline to accept it. 24. Messrs Mehta and Goal appearing for the contemner, invited our attention to the judgment of Dinabandhu Sahu vs. State of Orissa (5), where the apology was held to be sufficient. It was observed: "Where the Court is convinced about the sincerity of the apology asked by the contemners through their at the time of hearing, the conviction morely on the ground that apology was not tendered at earlier stage and was not in writing is not sustainable." Before the Supreme Court in that case, the learned Advocate for the State conceded that the apology should be accepted. Moreover, in the peculiar circumstances of the political controversy it was observed by the Supreme Court:— "Whatever may have been the justification for the High Court to initiate the proceedings in respect of a matter, which in the state of the atmosphere then prevailing was likely to create a suspicion, whether justifiable or imaginary, in the public mind and particularly in the mind of the litigants, by the circumstance that a person who is a Respondent in a case where a judgment was reserved was given prominence and referred to in terms of praise or eulogy, that situation had changed after the learned Chief Justice had given an explanation for the reasons why Dr. Mehtab was given a seat among the few selected persons at the Buffet lunch and other matters incidental thereto. The apology tendered was not merely an apology but was something more than an apology because what was asked of the Court out of its generosity was forgiveness: that this was sincerely meant is amply demonstrated by its being repeated again before us. We think that the contempt, if any has been certainly purged in the manner in which the apology was given and the matter should have been set at rest there. It is no part of the judicial function to be vindictive or allow any personal or other considerations to enter in the discharge of its functions and since both the learned Chief Justice and Misra, J. would have been prepared to accept that apology if it was given by the Appellants themselves and in writing, and since Mr. It is no part of the judicial function to be vindictive or allow any personal or other considerations to enter in the discharge of its functions and since both the learned Chief Justice and Misra, J. would have been prepared to accept that apology if it was given by the Appellants themselves and in writing, and since Mr. Chari said that the Appellants would have been prepared to give such an apology in writing, if that was the only thing that was required and even now are ready and willing to do so we feel that the apology tendered on their behalf by their Senior Advocate can well be accepted and the proceedings closed. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the convictions and direct the repayment of the fine, if any, and close the proceedings." Our attention was also drawn to the judgment of this Court, State of Rajasthan vs. M. R. Mitruka (6). A Bench of this Court was of the opinion that the proceedings were misconceived, because they were not initiating by a Bench of two Judges. However, on the merits of the case also, the following observations were made: — "In Baradekantas case (2), their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following observations made by Jagannadhadar, Chief Justice (as he then was) of the Orissa High Court in the State vs. The Editors and Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra (4):— "A review of the cases in which a contempt committed by way of scandalization of the Court has been taken notice of for punishment shows clearly that the exercise of the punitive jurisdiction is confined to cases of very grave and securrilous attack on the Court or on the Judges in their judicial capacity the ignoring of which could only result in encouraging a repetition of the same with the sense of impunity which would thereby result in lowering the prestige and authority of the Court. Section 13 of the Act in substance enacts what their Lordships have observed and it has been provided therein that no court shall impose a sentence under this Act for contempt of Court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes or tends substantially to interefere with the due course of justice. Section 13 of the Act in substance enacts what their Lordships have observed and it has been provided therein that no court shall impose a sentence under this Act for contempt of Court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes or tends substantially to interefere with the due course of justice. We have examined the matter with great earnestness and although we find that the respondent in his over zealousness has made some exaggerations, yet we are unable to find that while writing the letter in question he was actuated by any improper motive or malicious intention to scandalise the court or to do any act which may lower the authority or prestige of this Court, or of judiciary in general. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not a fit case in which action need be taken against the alleged contemner." 25. It would be pertinent to note that the Court was of the opinion that the reference to corruption in the letter in question was in relation to officials working in the judiciary and not to any of the Judges of this Court or the judicial officers. 26. The above would show that if the reference would have been of the Judicial Officer, the Court would take a serious view in that case also. But, since it was only for the ministerial staff, there was no question of disreputing the judiciary, and undermining its prestige and status. 27. In the above case, it has been further emphasised that the motive and the intention of the contemner should be seen. In the instant case, the very fact that in a large gathering of the elite, where the speeches were made by the Honble Chief Justice and other persons and a building of a court-room was being inaugurated, the contemner chose to scandalise the very Judicial Officer of that Court by saying that "justice is being sold in the open market" in addition to others, makes no room to doubt that the sole intention of the contemner was to scandalise the judiciary in the eyes of the public at large and in the eyes of the Chief Justice in particular. 28. 28. We are of the opinion that any reaising of fingerat the judiciary by such scandalization should be dealt with severely by this Court, not only for punishing the contemner in the case but also for creating circumstances on account of which repeat and recurrences of such scandalization of the courts are prevented. It was on account of this that the founding father of the Constitution enacted Article 215 of the Constitution to provide protection to the judiciary and for taking penal action. 29. It is to be noted that in M Y. Shereef vs. Honble Judges of the Nagpur High Court (7) their Lordships considered the liability of counsel regarding the signing of a petition containing materials scandalising the court and observed as under:— "This misconception has to be rooted out by a clear and emphatic pronouncement, and we think it should be widely made known that counsel who sign applications or pleadings containing matter scandalizing the Court without reasonably satisfying themselves about the prima facie existence of adequate grounds therefor, with a view to prevent or delay the course of justice, are themselves guilty of contempt of Court and that it is no duty of a counsel to his client to take any interest in such applications: on the other hand, his duty is to advise his client for refraining from making allegations of this nature in such applications. Once the fact is recognized as was done by the High Court here that the members of the Bar have not fully realized the implications of their signing such applications and are firmly under the belief that their conduct in doing so is in accordance with professional ethics, it has to be held that the act of the two appellants in this case was done under a mistaken view of their rights and duties, and in such cases even a qualified apology may well be considered by a Court." In that very case, the Court further observed as under — "Having approached the matter thus, the learned Judges referred to a large number of cases for the admitted proposition of law that a "sincere apology does not entitle a contemner as of right to a remission of the sentence." It was further thought that acceptance of apology would lead 10 an invidious distinction being made in the case of two advocates and Zikar." 30. In the result the apology was not accepted and the report concluded with the following observations:— "If in the circumstances at this case, the apology were to be accepted, we would be encouraging the notion that it is the contemners right to get his apology accepted when he chooses and in whatever manner he tenders even in a case where he has aggrevated the original offence. We will be unsettling established principles, and setting a bad precedent. Above all, we would be dealing a blow to the authority of the Court, the consequence of which cannot be viewed with equanimity." 31. On careful and thoughtful consideration of the principles in relation to the question of acceptance of apology, we are of the opinion that mere apology in the instant case is not sufficient looking to the gravity and seriousness of the contempt committed by the contemner as we agree with the above observations (emphasis is ours). It should not be forgotten that the view which we are likely to take in such matters is bound to effect the general respect and dignity of the courts and the efforts to undermine them and bring them in contempt by unscrupulous or persons or people having vested interest. Occasion and the vanue where the contemner publicly and openly scandalised the judiciary, right at the very nose of the Honble Chief Justice, calls for a deterrent punishment to meet the ends of justice and to prevent such recurrences in future. If the apology would not have been tendered there would have no hesitation in sending the contemner to jail for sufficient and substantial period. However, since the apology has been tendered, it would certainly result in lightening the punishment, as it minimises the gravity of the offence. 32. An apology should not be allowed to have an amusing effect of magic formula for avoiding the punishment the contemner deserves. Apologies tendered for the purpose of avoiding punishment only proves that the submission of apology was tactical and trickery played on the Court. They are crocodile tears only and deserves not to be accepted simplicitor. 33. In Satish Chandra vs. Union of India, this Court (per CM. Lodha J.,) observed:— "It is pertinent to re-call here that the then Chief Justice Gajendra Gadkar said on June 15, 1965, in a meeting West Minister Hall which was arranged to celebrate the signing of the Magna Carta. 33. In Satish Chandra vs. Union of India, this Court (per CM. Lodha J.,) observed:— "It is pertinent to re-call here that the then Chief Justice Gajendra Gadkar said on June 15, 1965, in a meeting West Minister Hall which was arranged to celebrate the signing of the Magna Carta. The Chief Justice observed thus: "I deem it to be a proud privilege that I should have been given an opportunity to participate in this monings commemoration of the 750th anniversary of the signing of Magna Carta Man love and live by symbols and ever since Magna Carta was signed by the unwilling monarch at the Runnymede on 15.6.1215 A.D., it has been assigned a place to pride among the historical symbols by all democracies in the world. The significance of Magna Carta lics not so much in its specific provisions; these dealt with contemporary problems and found remedies for grievances flowing from feudalism: its significance lies in the spirit of liberty which it breathed, the recognition which it gave to the dignity of the personality of the individual citizen, his freedom and his property; and the supremacy of law which it established. Laws bind all alike, the King, the barous and the common man that is the spirit of the message of Magna Carta. On this occasion, as a student of Indian Jurisprudence I feel tempted to recall that more than a thousand years before Magna Carta was signed, an ancient Indian Philosopher of jurisprudence had described the magesty of law in terms which may sound significant and meaningful even today. Said the Indian Jurist, Law is the kind of Kings, for more rigid and powerful than they there is nothing higher than law; and by its prowess as by that of the highest monarch in heaven, the weak shall prevail over the strong and justice will trimuph". 34. It was then observed by this Court: — (per G.M. Lodha, J). "All the officers, the citizens in general, the litigants and the State functionaries in all seriousness should keep the following eternal saving of the great Jurist Maharshi Manu as upper-most in our mind, i.e. Law is the Kind of Kings far more rigid and powerful than they, there is nothing higher than law; and by its prowess the weak shall prevail over the strong and justice shall trimuph. I wish this should not only be exhibited as the guide lines in all Government Officers, importance public institutions, street-corners and road corners but acted upon both in letter and spirit by all irrespective of the office, profession, status and assignment which one holds in life." 35. While setting aside the judgment on merits of the case, the Supreme Court agreed with them but added the following:— "We agree but wish to add that the Manu text be exhibited also in court-halls together with Cronwells famous statement which the great Judge, learned Hand wanted should be hung on legislative and court-halls: I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you might be mistaken." 36. In view of the above observations of Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that even though normally a serious and grave contempt committed by the contemner by publicly undermining the integrity and status and dignity of the judiciary in a public gathering of the elite as mentioned above deserves to be punished with deterrent punishment of imprisonment of maximum term of 6 months but because the unconditional apology has been tendered and the fact that Mr. L.R. Mehta, senior counsel for the contemner mentions before us and we have no reason to disbelieve the statement at the Bar of such a senior and eminent counsel, that his client is really repentent for his action, and no effort was made at all to plead any justification or to raise controversy of the fact, we think the ends of justice would be met if the non-petitioner, who is guilty of contempt of court is punished by a fine of Rs. 100/- (Rupees one hundred only), only, in addition to acceptance of apology. While awarding this minor punishment, we are also exercising restraint in view of the dictum of Learned Justice Hand who quoted Cronwell, extracted above by Supreme Court in the above judgment. 37. We accordingly order that the non-petitionet Bahadar Singh is guilty of contempt of court under Section 12 (read with Section 15) of the Contempt of Courts Act. 1971. and is punished with a fine of Rs. 100/- Rupees one hundred only. He should pay this amount within a period of seven days from today, failing which he will be sent to jail to undergo simple imprisenment of one week. Contemner Bahadur Singh would also pay the cost of Rs. 1971. and is punished with a fine of Rs. 100/- Rupees one hundred only. He should pay this amount within a period of seven days from today, failing which he will be sent to jail to undergo simple imprisenment of one week. Contemner Bahadur Singh would also pay the cost of Rs. 100/- of this contempt application to the petitioner, Umed Singh, whos has taken pains to bring this ¼1½ rL;kFkZ loZ Hkwrkuka xksIrkja /keZekRe t; czg~e rstks Hk;a n.Me l`tRiwoZ ehoj% ¼7@14½ ljktk iq:"kks n.M% eusrk kkflrkpl% ¼7@14½ euqLe`fr matter to the notice of this Court, after obtaining permission from the Advocate General and thus assisted in maintaining the dignity of the majesty of law and the Courts of justice. 38. The contempt petition, is therefore, accepted as indicated above and rule is made absolute.