ORDER B.D. Agarwal, J. - In the basic year records published under Section 9 (1) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the petitioners were recorded co-tenure-holders of the land in dispute which is situate in village Mailuta, Tappa Mail, Pargana Salempur Majhauli District Deoria. The respondent No. 3 to this petition filed an objection under Section 9 (2) of the Act. This objection was belated. By this objection, the respondent No. 3 claimed to be a co-tenure-holder of the land in dispute along with the petitioners. He filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing this objection. The Consolidation Officer condoned the delay. Against this order, a revision was preferred before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The order was upheld by him. Thereupon the petitioners, feeling aggrieved, filed a writ petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1498 of 1971. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed by this Court on March 7, 1975. The orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation as well as of the Consolidation Officer, were quashed and the case was remanded to the Consolidation Officer with a direction to decide the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act afresh in accordance with law. 2. When the matter went back to the Consolidation Officer, 7th June, 1978 was fixed for hearing before him. Undisputedly, the respondent No. 3 had notice of this date. He, however, did not appear and his objection was dismissed in default on that very date. It was only on 30th June, 1978 that an application duly supported by an affidavit was filed by the respondent No. 3 with a prayer for setting aside the ex parte order dated 7th June, 1978 and the restoration of the case to its original number. It may be noticed at this stage that no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed along with this application for restoration nor was it filed at any subsequent stage. The petitioners filed objection to this restoration application. The objection was supported by an affidavit of Bharosa. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated October 21,1978 allowed the restoration application. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a revision under Section 48 of the Act. The petitioners filed objection to this restoration application. The objection was supported by an affidavit of Bharosa. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated October 21,1978 allowed the restoration application. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a revision under Section 48 of the Act. The Assistant Director of Consolidation who heard the revision, by his judgment and order dated August 16,1979 dismissed the same. Thereupon the petitioners preferred the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for the quashing of the two orders dated 16-8-1979 and 21-10-1978 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Consolidation Officer respectively. 3. Shri M.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has made the following submissions before me. I have also heard Sri U.S.M. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 in reply to these submissions. 4. Firstly, it has been contended that the application for restoration filed by the respondent No. 3 on 30th June, 1978 was beyond time. The application ought to have been filed within 15 days of the date of the order, i.e., within 15 days of 7th June, 1978. Further, it has been submitted that since no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application had been filed nor even otherwise any prayer to that effect was made in the application for restoration filed, nor any explanation was sought to be led before the Court for not having filed restoration within time, the Consolidation Officer was not within his jurisdiction in condoning the delay and acted without authority of law in purporting to condone the delay though, in fact he had not done so but merely directed restoration of the case. Shri Tripathi has refuted these submissions. He has submitted that in law there was no necessity of filing a specific application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. What alone, according to him was necessary was that a prayer be made to the Court for condonation of delay. He has further submitted that in the application for restoration itself filed on 30th June, 1978 cause for not having filed restoration application within time was stated and hence it was within the jurisdiction of the Consolidation Officer to condone the delay which, according to him, was condoned by the Consolidation Officer in his impugned order. He has further submitted that in the application for restoration itself filed on 30th June, 1978 cause for not having filed restoration application within time was stated and hence it was within the jurisdiction of the Consolidation Officer to condone the delay which, according to him, was condoned by the Consolidation Officer in his impugned order. 4-A. Section 41 of the Act makes applicable the provisions of Chapters IX and X of U.P. Land Revenue Act to all proceedings including appeals and applications under the Act. Section 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act which occurs in Chapter IX of U.P. Land Revenue Act provides rehearing of a case upon proof of good cause shown for non-appearance. This section enables a party against whom judgment has been delivered to apply within 15 days from the date of the order sought to be set aside, and, upon good cause shown for his non-appearance. It is only upon this condition being satisfied that the officer concerned, upon satisfying himself that there had been failure of justice, can revive a case and alter or rescind the order already passed. 5. It would thus be seen that it is a prerequisite to the exercise of power of revival of the case under this section that there must be a good cause shown for non-appearance within 15 days from the date of the ex parte order. 6. Shri Tripathi had laid great stress on his submission that in law, there need not have been application in writing. He has cited certain decisions in support of this submission of his. Assuming this to be so, but, then, one cannot absolve the necessity of a prayer being made for condonation of delay in applying for restoration of the order passed ex parte. Admittedly, the application in this case was not filed within 15 days as required by law. The application was, in fact, filed on 30th June, 1978 as already noticed. I have been taken through the application and the affidavit filed in support thereto. What all has been stated in this application is that on the 7th June, 1978, the date fixed for hearing of the case before the Consolidation Officer, for reasons of illness the respondent No. 3 could not appear and the presence of the representative who had been sent by him, being not duly authorised was taken of no avail. What all has been stated in this application is that on the 7th June, 1978, the date fixed for hearing of the case before the Consolidation Officer, for reasons of illness the respondent No. 3 could not appear and the presence of the representative who had been sent by him, being not duly authorised was taken of no avail. This allegation, though has been controverted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners before the Consolidation Officer, but even taking this averment made by the respondent No. 3 as a fact then too his case is not advanced. Whatever was stated by him was in relation to the alleged cause for his absence on the 7th June, 1978. Not a word has been stated as to what was the cause of delay thereafter. Why the respondent No. 3 could not apply for restoration soon thereafter or in any case what was the reason for delay after the expiry of 15 days from the date of ex parte order till the date of filing of the restoration application, the application as also the affidavit filed by him are significantly silent on this score. Conclusion obviously, therefore, is that the respondent No. 3 failed to lay any case whatsoever before the Consolidation Officer for making out a case for condonation of delay in not having filed restoration application within time. As already noticed above, this was essential prerequisite before the Consolidation Officer could have passed the order of revival. 7. Shri M.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended that the order of the Consolidation Officer as well as that of the Deputy Director of Consolidation who dismissed the revision against the order of the Consolidation Officer both manifestly aimed ignoring the aforesaid essential prerequisite of order of revival, The Consolidation Officer as well as the Deputy Director of Consolidation upon a plain reading of both these orders can undoubtedly be subject to a valid criticism, that without applying their mind to the contents of the application of the restoration and the affidavit in support thereto assumed some case in favour of the respondent No. 3 and purported to condone the delay in filing the restoration application. It is significant to note that the order of the Consolidation Officer finds a specific mention about the objection of limitation having been raised on behalf of the petitioners to the restoration application. It is significant to note that the order of the Consolidation Officer finds a specific mention about the objection of limitation having been raised on behalf of the petitioners to the restoration application. After noticing this objection, the order is completely silent. He just chose not to deal with this objection, and on the ground of illness, not related to any date beyond 7th June, 1978, he chooses to restore this case. This he, in my opinion, was not open to do so. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has again committed the same error. For these reasons, I am unable to sustain these orders. 8. Shri M.P. Singh has placed reliance on the cases of Parsidh Narain Rai v. D.D.C. Azamgarh, (1979 All LJ 764) and Ram Sundar Singh v. Ram Mohan Singh, (1978 All WC 588 : (1978 All LJ 823 which pertain to proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. These cases do support his submission no doubt very and many a time, parties proceedings under Consolidation of Holdings Act are not well conversant with legal procedure, but, at the same time one has not to forget that they are mostly represented by counsel. In the instant case, from the record, it is borne out that the respondent No. 3 was duly represented by a counsel. On the face of the application dated 30th June, 1978, it can, without doubt, be inferred that the same was drafted by the counsel. It cannot be assumed that the counsel was not aware of the requirement of limitation of 15 days. Not a word, as already been noticed, has been mentioned explaining the delay in filing the application. The law appears to be clear on this point. Inaction of a party in not instituting a proceeding or taking necessary action within the time provided by Legislature, creates an important right in the other party, in whose favour that order has been passed and that cannot be taken away from him except on grounds open in law. Law is further clear, and, the Supreme Court has been emphasising repeatedly that in an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, each day's delay has to be explained. In the present case, one finds that the respondent No. 3 has given a complete go by to this requirement. This cannot be countenanced in law. 9. Law is further clear, and, the Supreme Court has been emphasising repeatedly that in an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, each day's delay has to be explained. In the present case, one finds that the respondent No. 3 has given a complete go by to this requirement. This cannot be countenanced in law. 9. For all these reasons, this writ petition is allowed. The judgment and order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 16-8-1979 and the judgment and order of the Consolidation Officer dated 21-10-1978 are quashed. 10. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.