Judgment :- 1. The petitioners challenge Exts. P-3 and P-4 dated 21-1-1977 and 30-6-1977 respectively. The Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum held by Ext. P-3 that the revision filed by the petitioner against the order of the first respondent was maintainable. Consequently the revision was disposed of on merits by Ext. P-4 in favour of the first respondent. These two orders are challenged on the ground that no revision was maintainable against the award of the arbitrator by reason of the bar of Clause (b) of the proviso to S, 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, ('the Act') and also by reason of res judicata. 2. Petitioner's counsel Shri P Sukumaran Nair contends that there was a decision on the merits when the first respondent's appeal against the award was dismissed on the ground of limitation. Counsel further contends that the dismissal of the appeal, albeit by reason of time bar, constituted res judicata. He says that the award of the Tribunal had become the subject-matter of an appeal so as to attract the bar of Clause (b) of the proviso to S.84. 3. S.84 confers power of revision upon the Tribunal. The first proviso to that section, however, says: "Provided that the Tribunal shall not take any action under this section if (a) the time for appeal against the decision or order has not expired; or (b) the decision or order has been made the subject matter of an appeal." 4. The question is whether the award challenged before the Tribunal in revision had already been made the subject matter of an appeal so as to attract the ban under Clause (b) of the first proviso to S.84. The award (Ext. P-1) was made on 17-12-1975. The first respondent presented his appeal against the award before the Tribunal on 22-10-1976, admittedly, outside the period of limitation, and it was dismissed for that reason. The first respondent's counsel Shri. V. Sreedharan Nair submits that that order of the Tribunal was not an order on the merits constituting res judicata for the appeal was dismissed only by reason of limitation. Consequently, counsel contends, the bar of Clause (b) will not apply. 5. In Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR. 1966 SC. The first respondent's counsel Shri. V. Sreedharan Nair submits that that order of the Tribunal was not an order on the merits constituting res judicata for the appeal was dismissed only by reason of limitation. Consequently, counsel contends, the bar of Clause (b) will not apply. 5. In Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR. 1966 SC. 1332 at 1337, the Supreme Court stated as follows: "We are therefore of opinion that where a decision is given on the merits by the trial court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on some preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, it must be held that such dismissal when it confirms the decision of the trial Court on the merits itself amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on the merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal." Such decisions, the Supreme Court stated, would constitute res judicata. See also Ram Gobinda v. Bhakta Bala, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 664. 6. With reference to Art.182 of the Limitation Act 1908, where the period of limitation began to run as provided under item 2 of column 3, reading: (where there has been an appeal) the Privy Council stated that "there has been an appeal" even where the appeal was finally dismissed for reason that it was irregular and incompetent. This is what the court stated: but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent " This principle was followed in Mohammed Nagir v Allauddin Ahmed, 1941 Patna 213; State v. Mathew 1955 KLT. 471 and Abdul Kaniq v. Nanoo,1963 KLT. 758. 7. In the Instant case, there has been an appeal against the award, although the appeal has been dismissed by reason of limitation. Such dismissal of the appeal was, as stated by the Supreme Court, a dismissal on the merits. The award of the arbitrator has thus been made the subject matter of an appeal, thereby attracting the ban under clause (b) of the first proviso to S.84 of the Act. 8. Such dismissal of the appeal was, as stated by the Supreme Court, a dismissal on the merits. The award of the arbitrator has thus been made the subject matter of an appeal, thereby attracting the ban under clause (b) of the first proviso to S.84 of the Act. 8. A revision against the very same award suffers from two vices: (i) the vice of clause (b) and (2) the vice of res judicata. Looking at it either way Exts. P-3 and P4 are void. They are so declared. The original petition is allowed in the above terms. No costs. Allowed.