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1980 DIGILAW 75 (SC)

State Of Gujarat v. Maheshkumar Dhirajlal Thakkar

1980-02-13

O.CHHINNAPPA REDDY, R.S.SARKARIA

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JUDGMENT SARKARIA, J.:—The accused-respondent was serving as a Tracer in the office of the Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation officer, Bhavn gar from December 12, 1965 to Feb. 6, 1968. While still in service as a fracer, he applied on January 10, 1969 to the Railway Authorities Bhavnagar for receiving training as an Apprentice Electrical Signal Maintainer. His application was accepted by the Divisonal Assistant Signal and Tele-communication Engineer. The accused obtained earned leave from the Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation officer for the period from February 13, 1967 to February 15, 1968 and joined as Apprentice for receiving training at Ajmer. On completion of the training at Ajmer. On completion of the training, the accused obtained leave from the Western Railway from February 5, 1968 and resumed duty in the office of the Soil Conservation officer, Bhavangar and resigned from that service with effect from February 6, 1968. He obtained pay and allownecs from the Soil Conservation office for the period, December 16, 1967 to February 6, 1968 and also drew the stipend admissible to trainee Apprentices from the Railway for the said period. 2. On these facts, the respondent was prosecuted under Section 168, Indian Penal Code, before the Special Sub-Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class. Ahmedabad (Rural) and was convicted under the said Section and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 60/-. The Sessions Judge dismissed his appeal. 3. On revision, the Gujarat High Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent by a judgment, dated July 27, 1978. Hence, this appeal by the State of Gujarat. 4. The only question that falls to be considered in this appeal is whether the engagement of the appellant as the Railway Service Apprentice, amounted to engaging in trade within the contemplation of Section 168, Indian Penal Code? The High Court has answered this question in the negative, and we think rightly. The word trade in its narrow popular sense means "exchange of goods for goods or for money with the object of making profits". In its widest sense, it includes any business carried on with a view to earn profit. (See Halsburys Laws of England, Vol 32, Paragraph 487). Further, the word takes its meaning from the context. 5. The word trade in its narrow popular sense means "exchange of goods for goods or for money with the object of making profits". In its widest sense, it includes any business carried on with a view to earn profit. (See Halsburys Laws of England, Vol 32, Paragraph 487). Further, the word takes its meaning from the context. 5. The appellant (respondent?) had entered into an agreement with the Railway Adminstration not for the purpose of engaging intrade business of profession, but for the sole purpose of receiving training, so that on completion of the training he could be employed by the Railway Administration. The mere fact that he was paid a stipend during the training period as an Apprentice, did not make him an employee of the Railway Administration. Indeed, Clause 17 of the agreement (Ext. 69) stated in clear terms that the Railway Administration did not bind itself to employ him on the completion of the training. In its narrow sense, the act of the accused-respondent did not amount to engaging in trade. Even if the wider interpretation were to be put on the word trade in Section 168. Penal Code, the engagement of the appellant (respondent?) as an Apprentice-trainee would not bring him within the purview of the expression trade. The fact remains that during the period of his apprenticeship, the appellant (respondent?) was not carrying on any trade as a means of livelihood within the meaning of Section 168, Indian Penal code. 6. We have therefore, no hesitation upholding the judgment of the High Court and in dismissing this appeal. Appeal dismissed. For Citation : AIR 1980 SC 1167 Vikas Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd.