JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - The petitioners are Chamhar by caste. According to them, they and their forefathers have been doing business in hides, horns and bones of dead animals in rural area of district Lucknow. They have alleged that when any animal in rural area dies, the owner thereof calls a Chamar and hands over the body to him. The Chamar in return delivers a pair of shoes or a parchi to the owner. The Zila Parishad Lucknow has, however, framed-certain bye-laws the effect of which is that only one person in the block can remove the body of a dead animal. It, thus, creates a monopoly and has adversely affected fundamental rights of the petitioners to any on business in hides, horns and bones of dead animals. The bye-laws in question are, said to be violative of Article 19 (b) of the Constitution and, therefore, ultra vires. The Zila Parishad has refused to grant licences to the petitioners who are thus being deprived of their legitimate business. The petitioners have, therefore, filed this writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the bye laws creating a monopoly in the trade and collection of hides, bones and horns of the dead animals in the rural area of district Lucknow and to quash the impugned sale of Theka. The petition has been opposed. The matter was first listed before a Division Be rich which has referred the case to a Full Bench. This is how it has come up before us. 2. It would be appropriate to mention here certain provisions of law regarding the disposal of carcass of a dead animal in rural area. Under the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922 a District Board for each district was established under Section 4 thereof. Section 21 of the said Act required every District Board to make reasonable provision within the district, inter alia, for regulating offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callings or practices. Under Section 174 (1) of the said Act a District Board was required to make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district for the purposes of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of such area. Under Section 174 (1) of the said Act a District Board was required to make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district for the purposes of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of such area. Then, the District Board could also make bye-laws under subsection (2) of Section 174 for the purpose of prohibiting the deposit or storage of manure, refuse, carcasses of animals, oi other offensive matter in a manner prejudicial to the public health, comfort or convenience, for regulating the removal of noxious vegetation and for regulating slaughter-houses and offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callings or practices and prescribing fees to defray the expenditure incurred by a Board for this purpose and also for providing for the distraction of unclaimed, diseased or rabid dogs and noxious animals and also for prohibiting or regulating any act which occasions or is likely to occasion a public nuisance for the prohibition or regulation of which no provision is made elsewhere by or under the Act. By reason of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 174 the District Board, Lucknow, framed bye-laws vide Government notification no. 643/IX-113, dated 17th April, 1930. Paragraph 3 of the said bye-laws provides that do person shall deposit or throw any offensive matter, rubbish, night soil or carcass on any part of a public place or street or lane into any public drain or into any drain communicating with a public drain otherwise than in a place appointed under a bye-law. Paragraph 5 of the said bye-laws was in these terms : "Whenever any animal in charge of a person dies otherwise that by being slaughtered either for sale or for consumption or for some religious purposes, the person in charge thereof, shall within 24 hours convey the carcass to a place (if any) fixed for the disposal of dead bodies of animals or to a place beyond the abadi". A breach of the provisions of the said bye-laws was made punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs. 50 and the breach was continuing breach with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 5 for every day after the date of the first conviction during which the offender is proved to have persisted in the offence. 3. A breach of the provisions of the said bye-laws was made punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs. 50 and the breach was continuing breach with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 5 for every day after the date of the first conviction during which the offender is proved to have persisted in the offence. 3. The United Provinces District Boards Act stood repealed in relation to a district from the date of the establishment of a Kshettra Samiti in pursuance of Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 (hereinafter called the Adhiniyam). Under the Adhiniyam the establishment of Kshettra Samiti was completed in the district of Lucknow and the United Provinces District Boards Act stood repealed in this district. Zila Parishad was also constituted under the Adhiniyam. Under Section 239 of the Adhiniyam the Parishad may, and where required by the State Government shall, make bye-laws for its own purposes and for the purposes of Kshettra Samitis, applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district in respect of matters required by the Act to be governed by bye-laws and for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the rural area of the district. The Parishad may also in exercise of the said powers make bye-laws for prohibiting the use of any place, in default of a licence granted by the Parishad or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of licence to be granted as a factory or other places or business for boiling and storing offal, blood, bones guts or rags and for the manufacture of leather or leather goods. It may also frame bye-laws providing for prohibiting or regulating, with a view to sanitation or the prevention of decease any act which occasions or which is likely to occasion a public nuisance and for providing for the destruction of unclaimed, diseased or rabid dogs and noxious animals. 4. There is also one more Act whose provisions are relevant for the purposes of the case. The U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 has been enacted to establish and develop Local Self Government in the rural areas of Uttar Pradesh and to make better provision for village administration and development. 4. There is also one more Act whose provisions are relevant for the purposes of the case. The U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 has been enacted to establish and develop Local Self Government in the rural areas of Uttar Pradesh and to make better provision for village administration and development. Under Section 3 of the Pauchayat Raj Act the State Government shall by notification in the official Gazette establish a Gaon Sabha for a village or group of villages. The Gaon Panchayat is the Executive Committee of the Gaon Sabha constituted under Section 12 of the said Act. Sec 15 of the Panchayat Raj Act provides that it shall be the duty of every Gaon Panchayat so far as its funds may allow to make reasonable provisions within its jurisdiction for sanitation and taking curative and preventive measures to remove and stop the spread of an epidemic, and for regulating places for the disposal of dead bodies and carcasses and of other offensive matter. A Gaon Panchayat may also under Seer. 16 of the Panchayat Raj Act make provision within its jurisdiction for regulating the collection, removal and disposal of manure and sweepings and making arrangements for the disposal of carcasses of animals deed for prohibiting or regulating the curing, tanning and dyeing of skins within 200 yards of the abadi. Under Section 110 of the Panchayat Raj Act the State Government may make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 110 of the said Act the State Government has made rules called Panchayat Raj Rules. Rule 145-A reads asunder: "145-A (1) A Gaon Panchayat may undertake the burial of dead animals where the owner thereof fails to do so within six hours of their death. (2) Where the Gaon Panchayat acts as aforesaid - (a) it may arrange for the skinning of the carcass prior to burial; (b) the owner of the animal shall pay to it the expenses of the burials may be specified and within the period to be fixed by the Gaon Panchayat in a written notice to the owner. (3) If the owner pays the expenses of burial within the period specified or within such extended period as the Gaon Panchayat may allow the sale proceeds of the skin shall be paid to him. (3) If the owner pays the expenses of burial within the period specified or within such extended period as the Gaon Panchayat may allow the sale proceeds of the skin shall be paid to him. (4) If the owner fails to pay the expenses of burial within the period specified or within such extended period as the Gaon Panchayat may allow, the Gaon Panchayat may appropriate the sale-proceeds of the skin towards them, provided that where the expenses of burial are in excess of the sale proceeds of the skin, such excess shall be recoverable from the owner in the manner provided for the recovery of fines: Provided also that where the expenses of burial are less than the sale-proceeds of the skin the excess amount shall be refunded to the owner of the dead animal. Explanation - The word "skin" used in this rule may include bones, horns etc. as directed by the Gaon Panchayat". 5. The Zila Parishad, Lucknow has framed the impugned bye-laws 1076 under Section 239 (2) (d). Paragraph 1 of the said bye-laws provides that no person in the rural area of district Lucknow shall, without obtaining a licence under the bye-laws, remove and carry the carcass of a dead animal or do skinning of the carcass or indulge in the activity of curing of hides, dyeing and tanning of skins or preparing leather goods nor any person shall in the rural area store skins, horns and bones unless he has obtained a Theka or licence for the said purpose from the Zila Parishad, Lucknow. The licensing authority may suspend or cancel the licence or Theka on the violation of any of the terms of the bye-laws. The place where the carcass may be carried or conveyed and its skinning may be done and the place where the curing of hides of dyeing and tanning of skins or storing the skins, horns and bones may be done shall be beyond 200 metres from abadi, school temple or any other religous pious place. The licence or the Teka shall be for one year commencing from 1st April and ending on 31st March. Paragraph 9 of the bye-laws gives the licence fee as under : (a) for conveying the carcass to a place fixed for the disposal of dead animals or skinning the carcass - Rs. The licence or the Teka shall be for one year commencing from 1st April and ending on 31st March. Paragraph 9 of the bye-laws gives the licence fee as under : (a) for conveying the carcass to a place fixed for the disposal of dead animals or skinning the carcass - Rs. 25 per annum (b) curing of hides dyeing and tanning of skins - Rs. 50 per annum Paragraph 10 of the said bye laws provides for the place of storing skins, horns and bones of dead animals and the number of those places shall be fixed by the licensing authority and the fees shall be determined by auction. The power to grant Theka shall be with the licensing authority and the Theka may be given either by public auction or by inviting tenders. Paragraph 13 of the said bye-laws provides that if any owner of the dead animals wants to bury it, he shall get it buried two metres under the ground within six hours of the death and shall give written information of it to the licence-holder Thekedar and the Mukhya Adhikari of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. Paragraph 14 of the said bye-laws provides that the licence-holder stay remove the convey to the prescribed place the carcass within six hours of the death of the animal. Paragraph 15 provides that if the owner of the dead animal does not want to have it buried, he shall immediately give information of the death of the animal to the licence-holder. Paragraph 16 lays down that in case the licence-holder does not remove the carcass within six hours of the death of the animal, the Gram Panchayat shall be entitled under rule 14c-A to remove and convey to the prescribed place the carcass of the dead animal and realise the expenses thereof from the licence-holder and thereafter deliver the skin to be licence-holder. Paragraph 17 provides that if within six hours of the death of the animal the licence-holder does not remove it to the prescribed place and the Gram Panchayat also does not do this work, the owner of the dead animal shall be entitled to remove and convey to the prescribed place the carcass and recover all expenses incurred in that behalf from the licence-holder. The aforesaid bye-laws further provide that any violation of the bye-laws is punishable. 6. The aforesaid bye-laws further provide that any violation of the bye-laws is punishable. 6. The objects of the aforesaid provisions of the District Boards Act, the Zila Parishad Adhiniyam and the Panchayat Raj Act plainly were to ensure expeditious removal of a carcass of a dead animal so that the public health may not be endangered and grave nuisance be avoided. The District Board as also the Zila Parishad and Gram Panchayat are entrusted with authority to take steps to protect the health of the residents within their jurisdictional area. The bye laws framed by the District Board vide notification dated April 17, 1930 required that no person shall deposit or throw any carcass od the part of a public place or street or lane, into any public drain or in to any drain communicating with a public drain otherwise that in a place appointed Cor it. It further required that whenever any animal in charge of a person died otherwise than by being slaughtered either for sale or for consumption or for some religious purposes, the person in charge of the and should within 24 hours convey the carcass to a place fixed for the disposal of dead bodies of animals beyond abadi area. Similarly, under the Panchayat Raj Act also the owner has to bury the dead animal within six hours of its death. The bye-laws framed under the Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam also require the owner of the dead animal to bury the carcass within six hours. A duty has thus been imposed firstly on the owner of the animal to remove the carcass and convey it to a fixed place within a fixed place within a specified period of six hours of the death of the animal, so as to ensure against the grave nuisance to the residents of the locality. He has an option to have the carcass buried within six hours of the health of the animal. If he fails to do so and allows it to remain at the place of death, a grave nuisance would be caused which may endanger public health ; hence under the Panchayat Raj Act a duty is imposed on the Panchayat of the village concerned to remove the carcass and convey it to the specified place. If he fails to do so and allows it to remain at the place of death, a grave nuisance would be caused which may endanger public health ; hence under the Panchayat Raj Act a duty is imposed on the Panchayat of the village concerned to remove the carcass and convey it to the specified place. The Panchayat is in that event entitled to have the skinning made and to sell the skin and thereafter to reimburse its expenses from the sale proceeds. If the sale proceeds fall short of the expenses, the balance may be recovered from the owner and if the sale proceeds turn out to be in excess, then the excess amount is to be given to the owner of the dead animal. The bye-laws framed by the Zila Parishad also entitle the owner of the dead animal to have it buried within six hours. But if he fails to bury the carcass within six hours and allows it to putrefy he shall lose his right in the carcass. It then becomes the duty of the Zila Parishad to have the carcass removed to the appointed place. The property rights in the carcass thus pass on to the Zila Parishad and it becomes entitled to have it disposed of. The holder of licence issued under the said bye-laws shall collect and convey the carcass to the specified place where skinning may be done and the curing of the hide and dying and tanning of the skin may also be done. If the licence-holder fails to perform his duty, the Gram Panchayat shall get the carcass removed within sick hours of the death of the animal and if the licence-holder and Gram Panchayat fail to do so, the owner of the deed animal shall have a right to get it removed to the appointed place and recover the expenses incurred by him in that behalf. Thus the owner of the dead animal has not only the right to have the carcass buried but he has also the right in certain circumstances to have it conveyed to the appointed place where skinning and curing of the bide may be done. 7. In the instant case the petitioners have not impugned the bye-laws in question on the ground that their rights as overs of the dead animals have been infringed. 7. In the instant case the petitioners have not impugned the bye-laws in question on the ground that their rights as overs of the dead animals have been infringed. The petitioners, on the other hands claim to have been carrying on the business in the disposal of the carcasses. They are aggrieved by the provisions of paragraph 1U of the aforesaid bye-laws. Their contention is that, that person would be entitled to keep and store skins, horns and bones of dead animals at the prescribed place who makes the highest bid in the auction to be made for that purpose by the Zila parishad, it creates a monopoly in one man, namely, the highest bidder who alone would be entitled to keep and store skins, borns and bones. In other words the petitioners would not be entitled to keep and store any skin of a dead animal or its bones or horns the carcass of which they would be entitled to collect and convey to the prescribed place and to do skinning thereof and the curing, dying and tanning of the skin and for which they may hold a licence as well. Their contention is that a citizen carrying on the business in the disposal of the carcass is entitled to the constitutional protection against unreasonable restrictions on the carrying on the lawful business or occupation. In our view the contention is meritless. 8. A carcass of an animal belonging to a person is no doubt his property and he has the right of its disposal but that right is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable restrictions. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao and others (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1157) it was pointed out that a carcass being in its very nature a noxious thing, if allowed to remain on the premises of the owner or occupier, is likely to cause serious harm to the health and well-being of the residents and other persons in the neighbourhood. The law, which imposes on the owner or the occupier of the place in which the carcass is found, duty to remove the carcass or to get it removed through the Municipal agency with the least practicable delay, is conceived in the interest of the general public. The law, which imposes on the owner or the occupier of the place in which the carcass is found, duty to remove the carcass or to get it removed through the Municipal agency with the least practicable delay, is conceived in the interest of the general public. A law designed to abate a grave nuisance and for protection of public health is prima facie one enacted for the protection of the interests of the general public. Further, if the owner's right to dispose of the property is subjected to reasonable restrictions, the right of the skinner is also subjected to reasonable restrictions imposed in the interest of the general public. 9. The right of State to destroy or regelate property rights in the public interest is in modern constitutional phraseology known as police power, while the right of State to acquisition for public necessity is designated as eminent domain. When the private property is taken for public use, the State resorts to the power of eminent domain and is bound to compensate the owner. When the Government imposes regulation upon the use of property or interferences ; with the enjoyment of property in the public interest, it does so under its police power and there is no duty to compensate the owners though their property may thereby be substantially diminished in value. There is thus "compensable taking" under eminent domain and "non-compensable regulations" under police power. 10. In Milter v. Scheme [(1928) 276 U.S. 272] it was held:- "Where the public interest is involved preferment of that interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent of even of its destruction is one of distinguish g characte restics of every exercise of police power which affect property". In Herbert W. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead (8 L. Ed. 2d. 130) it was observed : - "The exercise of Police Power cannot be `burdened with the condition that the State must compensate the owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community". Relation between Eminent Domain and Police Power is well brought out in a passage in the American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition Vol. Relation between Eminent Domain and Police Power is well brought out in a passage in the American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition Vol. 16 Art. 301, page 592 : - "The State, under the police power, cannot in any manner actually take and appropriate property for public use without compensation, for such action is repugnant to the constitutional guaranty that where private property is appropriated for public use, the owener shall receive reasonable compensation. Thus, there is a vital difference, which is recognised by the authorities, between an act passed with exclusive reference to the police power of the State, without any purpose to rake and apply property to public uses, and an act which not only declares the existence of a nuisance created by the condition of particular property, but in addition, and as the best means of accomplishing the end in view, authorises the same property to be approbate by the public". In Chirenjit Lal Chowdhnry v. The Union of India and others, (A.I.R. 1951 Supreme Court, 41) it was pointed out : - "It is a right inherent very sovereign to take and appropriate private property belonging to individual citizens for public use. This right, which is described an eminent domain in American law, is like the power of taxation, an off-spring of political necessity and it is supposed to be based up a an implied reservation by Government that private property acquired by its citizens under it protection may be taken or its use controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner. Article 31 (2) of the Constitution prescribed a twofold limit within which such superior right of the State should be exercised. One limitation imposed upon acquisition or taking possession of private property which is implied in the clause is that such taking must be for public purposes. The other condition is that no property can be taken unless the law which authorises such appropriation contains a provision for payment of compensation in the manner laid down in the clause". These principles were reiterated in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and others (A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court 92) and Dwarkadas Shriniwas v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Limited and others, (A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 119) and further in R. Cavasjee Cooper and others v. Union of India, (1970 (1) Supreme Court Cases 248). 11. These principles were reiterated in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and others (A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court 92) and Dwarkadas Shriniwas v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Limited and others, (A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 119) and further in R. Cavasjee Cooper and others v. Union of India, (1970 (1) Supreme Court Cases 248). 11. Referring to the doctrine of police power the Supreme Court in P.N. Raushal v. Union of India and others, (A.I.R. 1978 Supreme Court 1457) observed : - "While the police power as developed in the American jurisprudence and constitutional law, may not be applicable in terms to the Indian Constitutional law, there is much that is common between that doctrine and the reasonableness doctrine under Article 19 of Indian Constitution. Notes on American Law Journal: "The police power has often been described as the "least limitable" of the governmental powers. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless for each case turns upon its own facts The police power must be used to promote the health, safety or general welfare of the public, and the exercise of the power must be "reasonable". An exercise of the police power going beyond these basic limits is not constitutionally permissible. Noxious Use Theory : This theory upholds as valid any regulation of the use of property, even to the point of total destruction of value, so long as the use prohibited is harmful to others'". 12. It is under its regulatory powers that the State has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants, its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession because there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants ; See, Har Shanker and others v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, (AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1121). 13. The object of the impugned bye-laws framed by the Zila Parishad, Lucknow seems to be to control and regulate the activities of skinning of the carcass and storing skins, horns and bones of dead animals in rural areas. A carcass, if remained under stroyed within six hours, may become a matter of grave nuisance and may cause health hazzard. The Gram Panchayat under its regulatory powers has a right to have the carcass removed if the owner fails to have it buried within six hours. A carcass, if remained under stroyed within six hours, may become a matter of grave nuisance and may cause health hazzard. The Gram Panchayat under its regulatory powers has a right to have the carcass removed if the owner fails to have it buried within six hours. This right of the Gram Panchayat has not been taken away by any other enactment. In fact this right has been recognised by the impugned bye-laws framed by the Zila Parishad. The Zila Parishad, has. however, regulated the activity of removing the carcass to the prescribed place for the purpose of skinning, dyeing and tanning as also the activity of storing skins, horns and bones ; the object of the said bye-laws in that behalf being that the carcass should not be allowed to remain undisposed of for a period of more than six hours and that it should be removed to of place fixed for the purpose of skinning, dyeing and tanning so that the residents of the locality may not be in convened and their health may not be put to grave peril but the Zila Parishad has no right to prohibit the owner of the dead animal from burying it. In fact the bye-laws do not impose such restrictions. The bye law no. 10 imposes a restriction on the place of storing skins, borns and bones. No person can be permitted to store horns, bones and skins of dead animals at any place of his choice within the abadi area or even outside the abadi area which may endanger public health and affect sanitation. The bye-law which requires that the skinning, dyeing and tanning as also the storing of skins, horns and bones shall be made at a place far away from abadi area or a school or religious place cannot be sain to be imposing an unreasonable restriction on the right of a person who is engaged in the activity of skinning, dyeing and tanning and even manufacturing of leather goods. Bye law no. 10 however, provides that only that person would be entitled to keep and store skins, horns and bones of dead animals who has been given a Theka for it by the licensing authority of the Zila Parishad, Lucknow. The Theka will be given to a person who would mad the highest bid in a public auction. Bye law no. 10 however, provides that only that person would be entitled to keep and store skins, horns and bones of dead animals who has been given a Theka for it by the licensing authority of the Zila Parishad, Lucknow. The Theka will be given to a person who would mad the highest bid in a public auction. Naturally one person, namely, the highest bidder would be entitled to carry on with business of storing hides, bones and horns in a rural area and no other person would be entitled to engage in that activity. The fee that would be charged from the Thekedar would be determined on the basis of the highest bid in the public auction. 14. It is quite plain that the Zila Parishad has competence to make impugned bye-laws under Section 239 of the Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, that the Zila Parishad has power to frame rules regarding certain specified offensive trades and also for any other purpose if such use is likely to cause public nuisance and that the regulatory power-of the Parishad extends to controlling offensive trades in public interest. The learned counsel, however, submitted that what was disputed by the petitioners was the manner in which the said power was being exercised and in this connection it was submitted that the offensive trades should not be regulated in such a way so as to take away the rights of two persons (owner and purchaser) and create a monopoly in favour of the contractor and allow the Parishad to make profits by selling the rights to the highest bidder. Further it was urged that there being no authority to sell the licence at a premium, the Zila Parishad is exercising an authority which is not there. Such an arbitrary exercise of power by the executive transgresses the permissible limits of delegated legislation and is void. The submission was that the impugned bye-law in effect confers a wide discretionary power on the Zila Parishad without providing any guidelines. Such an arbitrary exercise of power by the executive transgresses the permissible limits of delegated legislation and is void. The submission was that the impugned bye-law in effect confers a wide discretionary power on the Zila Parishad without providing any guidelines. Consequently, it was open to serious challenge if such a power could be exercised by a delegate as it amounts to delegation of ; essential legislative function itself, it was urged that under Section 239 of the Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam no guidelines have been provided by the Legislature prescribing the manner in which offensive trades are to be controlled within its jurisdiction nor has it reserved for itself any control over the delegate. The Zila Parishad by virtue of the aforesaid provisions is exercising wide powers which extend even to the abridgement of ; the petitioner's fundamental rights as also the fundamental rights of the owners of the carcass. In support of his contentions the learned counsel referred us to certain decisions of this Court, namely, Town Ana Thana Bhutan v. Asha Ram and others, (Special Appeal no. 980 of 1968 decided on 7th April, 1968 ; Jagat Dhari and another v. Zila Parishad, Partapgarh, (AIR 1975 Allahabad 135), and Mohammad Iqbal and others v. The Zila Parishad and others (Civil Misc. Writ Petions Nos. 2086 of 1976 and 2137 of 1976 decided " on 7th January, 1977) as also Suraj Pal v. Zila Parishad, Banda and others Writ Petition No. 1540 of 1974 decided on 20th November, 1977). In all the aforesaid cases the impugned bye-laws of the Zila Parishads in question were struck down on the ground that they created a monopoly in favour of the contractor. 15. In Jagat Dhari's case (supra) the validity of the bye-law framed by the Zila Parishad, Pratapgath, which provided that the light to collected to bones and hides etc. in rural areas shall be auctioned and the highest bidder , alone, to the exclusion of all others, w ill have the right to collect bones, hides ' etc. was challenged on the following grounds : - (1) Various activates mentioned in the bye-laws cannot be regulated by Zila Parishad under Section 239 of the U.P. Kshettra Samitii and Zila Parishads Act. was challenged on the following grounds : - (1) Various activates mentioned in the bye-laws cannot be regulated by Zila Parishad under Section 239 of the U.P. Kshettra Samitii and Zila Parishads Act. (2) These bye-laws are invalid as they have been framed with on following the procedure the purpose as laid down in U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, and (3) The impugned bye-laws enable to Zila Parishad to create monopoly in favour of the highest bidder which under the law it cannot do. 16. Relevant portion of Section 239 of the Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act run thus : - "(1) Parishad may, and where required by the State Government shall make bye-laws for its own purpose and for the purpose of the Kshettra Samiti applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district consistent with this Act, and in respect of matters required by this Act, to be governed by the bye-laws and for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the rural area of the district and for furtherance of the administration of this Act in the Khand and the District. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) the Parishad may, in the exercise of the said power, make any bye-laws described in the list below : A........................... B........................... C........................... D........................... E. Offensive trades - (a) Except where and so far as is inconsistent with anything contained in the Petroleum Act, 1934 or in rules made thereunder, prohibiting the use of any place, in default of a licence granted by the Parishad or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of licence so granted as a factory or other places of business - (i) for boiling and storing offal, blood, bones, guts or rags. (ii) for the manufacture of leather or leather goods For any other purpose if such use is likely to case a public nuisance or involve the risk of fire." 17. Referring to Section 239 it was observed in Jagat Dhari's case (supra) that the Zila Parishad had right to frame bye-laws for any other purpose if such is likely to case public nuisance. H. N. Seth, J. dealing with ground no. 1 on which the by law.was challenged observed . Referring to Section 239 it was observed in Jagat Dhari's case (supra) that the Zila Parishad had right to frame bye-laws for any other purpose if such is likely to case public nuisance. H. N. Seth, J. dealing with ground no. 1 on which the by law.was challenged observed . - "It cannot be disputed that unrestricted use of places for storing of hides, bones and horns of dead animals is likely to cause public nuisance. In the circumstances even the work of storing of hides and horns could be regulated by framing of bye-laws under Section 239." The contention that the impugned bye-law created monopoly in favour of the contractor was however, accepted. In this connection the following observations may be extracted "Bye-law no. 11 provides that fees for giving the contract for storing hides, bones and horns may be determined by auction or tender. This necessarily means that the bye- laws contemplated that the activity of storing of bides, bones and horns in a rural area, within the jurisdiction of the Zila Parishad can be carried on only by the person who has been given the contract by the Zila Parishad on the basis of tender or auction. It follows that persons-other than those who do not succeed in getting the contract area prohibited from doing the work of storing hides, bones and horns. This bye-law certainly creates a monopoly in favour of the person whose bid or tender has been accepted by the Zila Parishad. It is true that bye-law no. 11 contemplates the grant of Theka either individually or jointly to certain persons but none the less it results in creation of monopoly in favour of the person or persons to whom Theka is given. In my opinion Section 239 of the Act merely enables the Zila Parishad to regulate offensive trades is rural areas lying within its jurisdiction by prohibiting the use of any place in default of licence granted by the Parishad or otherwise than in accordance with the condition of a licence. It contemplates that if an offensive trade is to be so regulated every person who is in a position to carry it on in accordance with the condition of licence to be issued by the Parishad should be allowed to carry on that trade. It contemplates that if an offensive trade is to be so regulated every person who is in a position to carry it on in accordance with the condition of licence to be issued by the Parishad should be allowed to carry on that trade. It does not authorise the Zila Parishad to form a monopoly in respect of such trade in favour of an individual or group or individuals." The bye-law in question was, therefore, held to be void under Article 13 (I) of the Constitution. 18. In Jagat Dhari's case (supra) while holding that the impugned bye-law created a monopoly in favour of the contractor, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Rashid Ahamad/Municipal Board Kairana (AIR 1950 Supreme Court 163). In Rashid Ahmad's case the petitioner was an Aratia carrying on wholesale business in (sick) vegetables, fruits and Kairana in the district of Muzaffarnagar. The Municipal Board in March 1949 published certain proposed bye-laws made under Section 2 8 of the Municipalities Act. These bye-laws were passed by the Board on 19th April, 1949. After confirmation by the Commissioner the bye-laws came into operation on and from 1st January, 1950. In anticipation of these new bye-laws the Municipal Board on 2lst May, 1949 auctioned "the contract for wholesale of vegetable" presumably meaning thereby the monopoly right to do wholesale business on vegetables. The petitioner applied for a licence to carry on his wholesale Aratia business at his shop. The Municipal Board rejected that application and later on gave a notice to the petitioner requiring him not to sell any more vegetables in breach of the bye-laws. Bye-law no. 2 which runs as follows was impugned ; - "No person shall establish any new market or place for wholesale transaction without obtaining the previous permission of the Board and no person shall sell or expose for sale any vegetable, fruit etc. Bye-law no. 2 which runs as follows was impugned ; - "No person shall establish any new market or place for wholesale transaction without obtaining the previous permission of the Board and no person shall sell or expose for sale any vegetable, fruit etc. at any place other than that fixed by the Board fur the purpose." It was noticed that the second part of the said bye-law contemplated that every body will be entitled to do business at the place fixed by the Board but as a result of a monopoly in favour of the contractor having been created nobody else can do business at that place and that it was much more than reasonable restriction on petitioner as was contemplated by clause (6) of Article 19 ; hence the bye-law was held to be void. 19. In the case of Mohammad, Iqbal (supra) the bye-laws framed by the Zila Parishads of Varanasi and Mirzapur were impugned on the ground that they created monopoly in favour of the contractor. The Division Bench placing reliance on Jagad Dhari's case (supra) held that the Zila Parishad had do right to frame a bye-law providing that the right to collect bones and hides etc. in rural areas shall be auctioned to the highest bidder to the exclusion of all others and the highest bidder alone shall have that right. It was observed that the provisions in this behalf in the bye-laws purport to create monopoly in favour of the contractor which the Zila Panshad had no authority to do. The Division Bench further observed that it may be open to the Zila Parishad to make a provision that no owner of a deed animal shall dispose of the dead body of the animal in a manner which may be hazardous to the health of the inhabitants of the area but it is not open to the Zila Parishad to provide that no owner of a dead animal shall be entitled to bury the dead body of the animal without obtaining the permission in writing of a qualified doctor or that no such permission shall be granted unless the animal had died due to some infectious disease. It seems that in the case of Mohammad Iqbal (supra) the counsel for Zila Parishad had also placed reliance on Section 32 of the Adhiniyam and on Section 33 (1) (v) read with Schedule item (viii) and Schedule II, Part A, item 3 (viii). Section 32 read with Schedule item 2(vii) provides that every Kshettra Samiti shall exercise powers and perform the functions in regard to carcass utilisation whereas Section 33 (1) (v) read with Schedule If, Part A item 3 (viii) provide that every Zila Parishad shall exercise and perform the powers and functions in the matter of offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callings or practices. Further, in exercise of powers under sub section (3) of Section 38 of the Adhiniyam the Governor of Uttar Pradesh has been pleased to direct that the function of carcass utilisation vested in the Kshettra Samitis under Section 32 read with item 2 (viii) of Schedule 1 of the said Adhiniyam shall henceforth be exercised by the respective Zila Parishads of the district concerned. According to the Division Bench in Mohammad Iqbal's case (supra), the said provisions did not confer any power on the Zila Parishad to create any monopoly in respect of caraass utilisation, hut the said provisions do entitle the Zila Parishad only to regulate the utilisation of the carcass The Division Bench was of the opinion that the Zila Parishad in the exercise of those powers also cannot frame a bye-law that the right to deal with bones and hides etc. shall vest only in the highest bidder, hence certain bye laws framed by the Zila Parishad, Varanasi as also by the Zila Parishad, Mirzapur which provide that the right to collect bones and hides etc. in rural areas shall be auctioned to the highest bidder to the exclusion of all others and the highest bidder shall have right to carry on the various activities mentioned therein and the incidental provisions dealing with the rights and obligations of the highest bidder were quashed. in rural areas shall be auctioned to the highest bidder to the exclusion of all others and the highest bidder shall have right to carry on the various activities mentioned therein and the incidental provisions dealing with the rights and obligations of the highest bidder were quashed. In the case of Surajpal v. Zila Parishad, Banda and others (supra) reliance was placed on behalf of the Zila Parishad on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Himmat Bhai Narbhe Ram Rao, (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1157) but the Division Bench distinguished the said case Ion the ground that the Bombay Municipal bye-laws which were declared valid by the Supreme Court placed restrictions which were reasonable restrictions and that the said bye-laws related to a Metropolis (Bombay) ; hence the rule laid down therein may not be of relevant consideration with respect to bye-laws which govern villages which are not so thickly populated. In our view, this distinction is not justified. The matter relating to public health within the same way and with the same promptitude whether they arise in Bombay or in a small town or village, The validity or reasonableness of an enactment, rule or bye-law does not depend on the fact that it applied to one particular place or the other. 19. There can be no doubt that Article 19 guarantees all the seven freedoms to the citizen of the country including the right to hold, acquire and dispose of property. It must, however, be remembered that Article 19 confers an absolute and unconditional right which is subject only to reasonable restrictions to be placed by Parliament or the Legislature in public interest vide clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19. It must, however, be remembered that Article 19 confers an absolute and unconditional right which is subject only to reasonable restrictions to be placed by Parliament or the Legislature in public interest vide clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19. Under Article 19 (1) (g) all citizens have the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business This right conferred by vehicle 19(1) (g) is, however, conditioned by various factors mentioned in clause (6) thereof, which reads as under : "(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in making any law imposing, in the interest of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to or prevent the State from making any law relating to (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise." The Constitution thus permits reasonable restrictions, to be placed on the said right in the interests of the general public. In Pathumma and others v. State of Kerala and others, (AIR 1978 Supreme Court 771), certain guidelines to determine the question of reasonableness were succinctly laid down as follows : - "(1) that in judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by clause (5) of Article 19, the Court has to bear in mind the Directive Principles of State Policy. (2) That restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the genera public. (3) That in order to judge the quality of the reasonableness no abstract or general pattern or a fixed principle can be laid down so as to be of universal application and the same will vary from case to case. (4) That a just balance has to be struck between the restriction . imposed and the social control envisaged by Clause (6) of Article 19. (4) That a just balance has to be struck between the restriction . imposed and the social control envisaged by Clause (6) of Article 19. (5) That there must a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the restriction imposed and the object which is sought to be achieved. In other words, the Court has to see whether by virtue of the restriction imposed on the right of the citizen the object of the statute is really fulfilled or frustrated. (6) That court must see the prevailing social values whose needs are satisfied by restrictions meant to protect social welfare. (7) That so far as the nature of reasonableness is concerned it has to be viewed not only from the point of view of the citizen but the problem before legislature and the object which is sought to be achieved by the statute. In other words, the Courts must see whether the social control envisaged in Clause (6) of Article 19 is being effectuated by the restrictions imposed on the fundamental right'." We have to see whether the impugned bye-law satisfied the tests. This is to be examined along with the objection that the impugned bye-laws confers wide discretionary power on the Zila Parishad without providing for guidelines and that if such a power could be exercised by a delegate, it was open to serious challenge as it amounts to delegation of essential legislative function which can be exercised by the legislature itself. 20. What constitutes the essential legislative function is difficult to define. It was observed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi, ( AIR 1968 SC 1232 at p 1240). "The legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative function. Exactly what constituted "essential legislative functions", was difficult to define in general terms, but this much was clear that the essential legislative function must at least consist of the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct. Thus where the law passed by the legislature declares the legislative policy and lays down the standard which is enacted into a rule of law, it can leave that task of subordinate legislation which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute to subordinate bodies, i. e., the making of rules, regulations or bye-laws. Thus where the law passed by the legislature declares the legislative policy and lays down the standard which is enacted into a rule of law, it can leave that task of subordinate legislation which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute to subordinate bodies, i. e., the making of rules, regulations or bye-laws. The subordinate authority must do so within the framework of the law which makes the delegation, and such subordinate legislation has to be consistent with the law under which it is made and cannot go beyond the limits of the policy and standard laid down in the law. Provided with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular case". In the same strain it was observed in Vasanthlal Maganbhai Sajanwal v. The State of Bombay, ( AIR 1961 SC 4 ) : - "A statute challenged on the ground of excessive delegation must therefore be subject to two tests (1) whether it delegates essential legislative function or power, and (2) whether the legislative has annunciated its policy and principle for the guidance of the .delegate" 21. An unreasonable restriction on the right to trade was struck down in Hari Chand v. Mizo District Council, ( AIR 1967 SC 829 ) because the regulation concerned provided no principles nor contained any policy. 22. The test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed should be applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent or urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time should enter into the judicial verdict. See State of Madras v. V. G. Row, ( AIR 1952 SC 196 ). It was pointed out in P. N. Kaushal's case (supra) that if it is coal or mica or cinema, the test of reasonableness will be stricter, but if it is an intoxicant or a killer drug or a fire arm the restrictions must be stern. See State of Madras v. V. G. Row, ( AIR 1952 SC 196 ). It was pointed out in P. N. Kaushal's case (supra) that if it is coal or mica or cinema, the test of reasonableness will be stricter, but if it is an intoxicant or a killer drug or a fire arm the restrictions must be stern. When the public interest is clear that the policing need is manifest from the nature of the business itself, the guidelines are easy to fird. Business in coal, gold and fruits is not the same as the activity of disposal of a carcass of a dead animal. Reasonableness of the restrictions imposed on the activity of disposal of noxious substances cannot be tested on the same footing as reasonableness of the restrictions imposed on the trade of coal, gold and fruits. The ratio of Rashid Ahmad's case (supra) would obviously not apply to the instant case. 23. Bye-law No. 10 in question requires the licensing authority to fix the place where the skins, horns and bones of dead animals are to be stored in a rural area and he shall also specify the number of such places. This power of a licensing authority cannot be said to be excessive or uncanalised. Bye-law No. 6 furnishes sufficient guideline in the matter It provides that the place of storing skins, horns and bones of dead animals should be at least 200 metres away from the abadi area school, temple or other religious place. 24. Bye-law No. 10 further provides that the Theka shall be given by auction or by inviting tenders and the licence fee shall be determined by such Theka. This, again is neither arbitrary nor excessive so as to go beyond the requirement of the interests of the general public. The object of the provisions of law discussed herein would be plainly fulfilled and not frustrated by virtue of the restriction imposed. The restriction is meant to protect social welfare and to effectuate the social control envisaged in Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. 25. As was pointed out in Nashirwar v. Stale of Madhya Pradesh and others, (AIR 1975 SC 260)there is the police power of the State to enforce public morality to prohibit trades in atrocious or dangerous goods. 25. As was pointed out in Nashirwar v. Stale of Madhya Pradesh and others, (AIR 1975 SC 260)there is the police power of the State to enforce public morality to prohibit trades in atrocious or dangerous goods. Elimination and exclusion from the activity of storing skins, bones and horns of dead animals is inherent in the nature of that activity and in, our view, it will hardly be proper to apply to such activity principles applicable to trades which all can carry. Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and others, ( AIR 1954 SC 220 ) lays down that there can be a monopoly only when a trade which can be carried on by all persons is entrusted by law to one or more persons to the exclusion of the general public. Such is not the case with the activity of storing skins, bones and horns of dead animals. The case of the petitioners is that they being Chamar by caste have been carrying on the business of vocation of skinners of carcass and of preparing shoes from the skin after curing it and dyeing and tanning it. They do not say that the said activity could be carried on by all persons. Moreover, under the bye-laws every person who is interested in the activity of storing skins, horns and bones of dead animals is invited to make bids. It is the only method by which that activity can be regulated. We, therefore, find no force in the contention that the provisions of the bye-laws are unconstitutional on the ground that they abridge the rights of the petitioners to carry on the activity of skinning, dyeing and tanning and of storing skins, horns and bones freely. The impugned bye-laws are designated to advance public interests. Even a profession or trade has sometimes to be limited in the public interests. Every one including the petitioners has an equal chance of making a bid in the auction but he must stand in the competition with others. After all bones, hides and skins cannot be stored at every place and by every one. They need a particular treatment so that nuisance may be eliminated. It is the duty of the Zila Parishad to regulate the disposal of carcasses. After all bones, hides and skins cannot be stored at every place and by every one. They need a particular treatment so that nuisance may be eliminated. It is the duty of the Zila Parishad to regulate the disposal of carcasses. A body of a dead animal, if not removed within six hours, gets putrefied and its foul smell may make the living in the locality highly unreasonable. If the dead body remains undisposed of and is allowed to remain where the animal had died, it may cause not only inconvenience and discomfort but may also endanger the health of the public and may thus become a public nuisance. This obviously cannot 'be permitted, and the State (which includes Zila Parishad) would be perfectly justified in taking charge of the carcass and in disposing of the same. No rights of property can be claimed in a putrefied carcass which cannot be treated property, and as such, either the principle of bona vacantia referred to in Article 296 of the Constitution would be attracted or the police powers of the State would come into play. No right to trade in a putrefied carcass as such can be claimed by any citizen. It is, therefore, open to the Zila Parishad. and indeed public interest makes it its duty to regulate the disposal of the carcass and the storing of skins, horns and bones of dead animals. For the purpose it may control storing by providing that only one person would be entitled to store who would compete in the public auction and made the highest bid. This, in our opinion, does not create a monopoly in one person to the exclusion of others. The work assigned to the Thekedar is in the nature of a service which he has to render. In fact public interest demands that a carcass of a dead animal should be removed from the place of its death to the specified place most expeditiously before it putrefies and becomes a nuisance endangering sanitation and health of the people. This^ service can, in the nature of things, he more appropriately rendered by a Thekedar who shall be fully accountable to the authority If the carcass is not removed, the Thekedar shall be questioned about the default. This^ service can, in the nature of things, he more appropriately rendered by a Thekedar who shall be fully accountable to the authority If the carcass is not removed, the Thekedar shall be questioned about the default. But if there are more persons, each acting independently of the other, entitled to remove the carcass, it may not be possible to fix the responsibility for the default on any particular person. Absence of accountability in such a matter is obviously not desirable in public interest. The Thekedar will have the duty of seeing that no carcass is left unremoved or undisposed of in case of his neglect or omission he may render himself liable for penalty for breach of the bye-laws. 26. As it is the duty of the Zila Parishad to make regulations for maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the rural area of the district as also for regulating with a view to sanitation or which is likely to occasion a public nuisance, the Zila Parishad may charge a licence fee for it for granting permission to store hides, bones and horns. Such amount is not fee, properly so called but is in the nature of the price of a privilege which one has to pay in any trading or business activity. Auction is a mode or medium for ascertaining the best price obtainable for the grant of privilege ; hence there can be no contradiction in terms in directing that a particular licence may be granted on the fee fixed by auction. That being so, the provision in the bye-law for determining the licence fee by auction is not bad in law and we find no force in the contention that the said provision exceeds the permissible limit of the delegated legislation under Section 143 of the Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam. 27. With great respect we are unable to agree with the views expressed in Jagat 'Dhari and others v. Zila Parishad, (AIR 1975 Allahabad 135), Mohammad Iqbal and others v. Zila Parishad Varanasi and others (Writ Petition No. 158 of 1976 decided on 7th January, 1977) and in Suraj Pal v. Zila Parishad, Banda and others (Writ Petition No. 1540 of 1974 decided on 26-11-1977) that the effect of the impugned bye-law is to create monopoly in favour of one person. The Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam and the bye-laws do furnish guidelines for controlling the activity of disposal of a class and in imposing reasonable restrictions in that behalf. These restrictions are neither arbitrary nor excessive but are indeed in the interests of general public No fundamental right can be claimed by a citizen' in seriously obnoxious trades, offensive businesses or outraging occupations like trade in dangerous commodities, trafficking in human flesh, horrifying exploitation or ruinous gambling. The Zila Parished will use police power under Article 19 (6) read with Section 239 of the Rshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam to regulate any activity or the user of any substance which is likely to^cause a public nuisance. The said Adhiniyam and the bye-laws do not impose unreasonable restrictions on even alleged customary right to skin the carcass of a dead animal, cure and dye the skin. The impugned bye-law does not impose any unreasonable restriction on the right to store bones, horns and skins of dead animals. Keeping in view the nature of the activity involved and of the fact that the substance in obnoxious and, if it is allowed to be kept by any one at any place of his choice inside the abadi area or outside the abadi area, it would put the public health in jeopardy. The impugned bye-law cannot be said to be bad on the ground that it unites monopoly. We. therefore, find no merits in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners. 28. For the reasons in the foregoing, the petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. 29. In Writ Petition No. 1445 of 1976 the contentions are identical with those raised in Writ Petition No. 2423 of 1978 except that the bye-law is different but in pari materia. The Zila Parisbed, Gonda has framed certain bye-laws in exercise of its power under Section 239 of the Rshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam. Para 1 to the writ petition provides that no person shall store bones of dead animals or shall skin the carcass or shall cure and dye skin or shall prepare leather goods in the rural area of district Gonda unless he has obtained a licence for the same from the Zila Parishad, Gonda. Para 1 to the writ petition provides that no person shall store bones of dead animals or shall skin the carcass or shall cure and dye skin or shall prepare leather goods in the rural area of district Gonda unless he has obtained a licence for the same from the Zila Parishad, Gonda. Paragraph 5 of the said bye-laws provides that the fees for storing bones and skins shall be determined by auction. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the effect of bye-law no. 5 is to create monopoly in favour of the highest bidder at the auction ; hence it is void. This contention, as pointed out earlier, is virtually the same as made in writ petition no. 2423 of 1978 in which the bye-laws framed by the Zila Parished, Lucknow were impugned. These contentions must fail on the ground aforesaid. Without more ado, this writ petition is also dismissed but without costs. 30. Both the writ petitions are thus dismissed.