JUDGMENT : K.C. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This is a Defendant's second appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 765/- as price of the fruits of the grover for the three years from 1965 to 1967 at the rate of Rs. 255/- per annum. 2. The Plaintiffs case was that the grove detailed at the foot of the plaint situated within the municipal limits of Amroha, belonged to their predecessor Abdul Gafoor. Abdul Gafoor sold the Bagh Bahar of the grove to the Defendant on 26-2-1947 for a sum of Rs. 250/- per annum and for twenty shares of fruits. The Defendant executed Qabuliat for a period of three years. The Plaintiffs alleged that as the price of the Bagh Bahar had not been paid, Abdul Gafoor filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 510/-. The suit was dismissed by the trial court but the appeal filed by Abdul Gafoor was allowed. Abdul Gafoor died during the pendency of the appeal and the Plaintiffs were brought on record as his heirs. In that case, the Defendant claimed himself to be hereditary tenant. The Civil Judge, deciding the appeal, negatived the claim of the Defendant to be the hereditary tenant of the land on 16-5-1953 (Ex.1). This judgment was taken in appeal to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal on 21-7-64. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed the suit for ejectment of the Defendant in the revenue court u/s 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in April 1967. Before the suit could be decided, the Plaintiffs filed the suit giving rise to the present second appeal for recovery of Rs. 765/- as price and also for injunction restraining the Defendant from damaging the trees. 3. The suit was contested by the Defendant inter alia on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Defendant further asserted that he was a hereditary tenant and as such, had acquired rights over the disputed land. The plea that he had been in adverse possession over the grove and the title of the Plaintiffs had extinguished, was also set up. 4. The trial court decided the issue of jurisdiction against the Defendant. He, however, held that the finding given in the earlier suit that the Qabuliat had been executed by the Defendant was binding on him. The plea that he had been in adverse possession over the grove and the title of the Plaintiffs had extinguished, was also set up. 4. The trial court decided the issue of jurisdiction against the Defendant. He, however, held that the finding given in the earlier suit that the Qabuliat had been executed by the Defendant was binding on him. In his opinion, the defence pleas taken in the present case were not barred by principle of res-judicata. He found that the title of the Plaintiffs had been extinguished and that the character of the land had ceased to be a grove. Under issue No. 5, he held that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove valuation of the crop of the trees during the years 1965, 1966 and 1967. On these findings, the suit was dismissed. This led to the filing of an appeal before the lower appellate court. The appeal was accepted and the decree of the trial court was modified. The lower appellate court found that the Plaintiffs' title over the disputed land had not vanished and further that the plea of the Defendant that he had become hereditary tenant was barred by res-judicata. He further found that the character of the grove had not changed. Being dissatisfied, the Defendant filed the present second appeal. 5. The first argument raised by the Learned Counsel was that the former suit being for the recovery of money in respect of different period than the one which was involved in the present case, the finding given in the earlier suit did not operate as res-judicata. The submission made is not correct. In order to sustain the plea of res-judicata, what was necessary to be seen was whether the question at issue in the two suits were found to be the same. The fact that the material which led to the decision in the earlier suit was not again placed before the court in the second suit, could not make any difference. The plea of res-judicata would be sustainable if the questions at issue and the parties were the same, subject of course to the other conditions of Section 11 In the earlier suit so also in the present, the main controversy was about the right of the Plaintiffs or their predecessor to realise price of fruits of the grove. This was answered in the first suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. This was answered in the first suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. There was no reason to hold that the finding given on the said question with regard to the right of the Plaintiffs over the aforesaid grove did not operate as res-judicata. 6. The second question that arises for decision is about adverse possession. In the earlier suit, the Civil Judge found in his judgment dated 15-5-53 that the Defendant was allowed to cultivate the land of the grove in lieu of his service for looking after the trees and subsequently, when the trees of the grove became productive, the Plaintiffs' predecessor gave to the Defendant on payment of Rs. 550/- per annum the Bagh Bahar. This finding of the Civil Judge was upheld by the High Court vide his judgment dated 21-7-64. From the aforesaid judgments it would be found that the Defendant was found to be a licencee of the disputed grove. Being a licencee he was estopped from challenging the title of the Plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest. He could not set up adverse possession. As long as he was in possession as licencee he could not hold it adversely to the interest of the licensor. The rule that tenant cannot deny his landlord's title extends in the case of persons coming in by permission as a licencee. There is no distinction between a licencee and a tenant in the matter of estoppel. A licencee who had obtained possession on account of a licence must first surrender possession before he can be allowed to show that the licensor's title had vanished. In the instant case, it did not happen. The Defendant did not hand over possession to the Plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest. As such, the licence did not terminate. 7. Counsel for the Defendant, however, urged that since the title of the Plaintiffs had been denied in the earlier suit, the right of the licencee of the Defendant were forfeited, and as such, since the date of denial of title the Defendant should be deemed in law to have been holding the property adversely to the interest of the Plaintiffs. This argument raises the question as to whether if principle of forfeiture of rights applied to the case of licencee. Section 60 of Easement Act prescribes the condition under which a licence may be revoked. This argument raises the question as to whether if principle of forfeiture of rights applied to the case of licencee. Section 60 of Easement Act prescribes the condition under which a licence may be revoked. It reads: A licence may be revoked by the grantor, unless. (a) It is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is enforced, (b) the licencee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. 8. This question does not expressly or indirectly incorporate the principle of forfeiture of a licence on the basis of denial of title of licensor. It is true that a tenant is liable to a penalty of forfeiture on the ground of denial of title of the landlord but in the absence of an express condition or an statutory provision prescribed for forfeiture on the ground of denial of owner's title, it is not possible to hold that a licencee also forfeits his right of being a licencee. The reason appears to be that a licence is liable to be revoked except for conditions mentioned in Section 60(a)(b). That being so, the legislature did not think it necessary to make any provision with regard to forfeiture in the case of a licence. 9. In Inspector Singh and Another Vs. Kharak Singh and Others and Amjad Khan and Others Vs. Shafiuddin Khan and Others, AIR 1925 All 203 , the view taken was that a denial of the owner by the licencee did not entail forfeiture. 10. For what I have said above, I find that the denial of title by the Defendant could not bring about any change in the relationship of the parties. 11. Apart from what has been said above, it would be noticed that the Defendant himself admitted that he was liable to pay rent to the Plaintiffs. This admission implied that the Defendant admitted the title of the Plaintiffs. Counsel for the Defendant took me through the statement of the Defendant, Bashir Mohammad, and urged that the lower appellate court committed an error in holding that such an admission, as is alleged above, was made by the Defendant. The Defendant's contention is not correct. Bashir Mohammad stated that he could not pay rent on account of failure of crop. Counsel for the Defendant took me through the statement of the Defendant, Bashir Mohammad, and urged that the lower appellate court committed an error in holding that such an admission, as is alleged above, was made by the Defendant. The Defendant's contention is not correct. Bashir Mohammad stated that he could not pay rent on account of failure of crop. This admittedly amounted to admission of the Defendant, otherwise the Defendant was not required to plead the reason for having failed to pay the rent. Thus, I find that not only the Qabuliat executed by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiffs' predecessor-in interest but also the judgment in the earlier suit, estops the Defendant from claiming title. 12. Argument was raised by the Defendant's counsel that the land had ceased to be a grove and, as such, the liability to payment of price of Bagh Bahar of the grove could not be continued on the Defendant. Since the Defendant was a licencee, he was liable to pay the price. He could not deny the liability. 13. For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.