ORDER A.N. Verma, J. -These are three connected writ petitions which are directed against an order passed by the learned District Judge, Agra disposing of three appeals under the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972). As the three appeals in question were disposed of by the learned District Judge by a common order, it would be convenient to deal with these connected writ petitions together. 2. The relevant facts are these :- Sri Ram Kishan Khandelwal and Sri Jai Kishan Khandelwal (petitioners in Writ Petition No. 8871 of 1978) are the owners and landlords of three shops comprised in premises No. 3/27 Pratappura, Agra. Sri Phool Chand Bansai (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 8592 of 1978) Sri R. S. Rathore and Sri G. S. Bhatnagar are each tenants of these three shops. The landlords moved three applications against the aforesaid tenants for permission to file suits under Section 3 (1) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. III of 1947). In these applications the case set up by the landlords was that Sri J. K. Khandelwal was working abroad on temporary educational assignments. He wanted to come back home and settle down in India with the intention of doing the business of printing and publishing in the premises comprised in the aforesaid three tenancies. It was alleged that the landlords therefore, bona fide needed the shops for their own use. It was further asserted that the property was old and dilapidated and would have to be renovated for rendering it fit for the business proposed to be started therein. In regard to each of the three tenants, the-landlord alleged that they no longer needed the shop in dispute, all of them being engaged elsewhere. On these assertions. it was said that the landlords' need was greater than that of the tenant. 3. Each of the three tenants contested the aforesaid applications. They denied that the need of the landlord was genuine. They asserted that Sri J. K. Khandelwal was permanently settled abroad and had no intention to come back and do business in India. On these assertions. it was said that the landlords' need was greater than that of the tenant. 3. Each of the three tenants contested the aforesaid applications. They denied that the need of the landlord was genuine. They asserted that Sri J. K. Khandelwal was permanently settled abroad and had no intention to come back and do business in India. As for themselves, each one of the three tenants asserted that the shop in his tenancy was being used by him and that he had no other alternative shop where he could-carry on his business. 4. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by an order dated 28th of April, 1972 allowed the applications of the landlord as against Sri G. S. Bhatnagar and Phool Chand Bansai but dismissed it as against R S. Rathore. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer, three revisions were preferred before the Commissioner, Agra Division. Agra, one by the landlord in regard to the shop under the tenancy of R. S. Rathore and the other by Sri G. S. Bhatnagar and Phool Chand Bansai. 5. While these revisions were pending, U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 came into force, under Section 43 (2) (m) whereof these revisions stood transferred to the court of the learned District Judge, (who) by the impugned order disposed of all the three appeals. He dismissed the appeals of the landlords and Phool Chand Ban- sal, but allowed that of G. S. Bhatnagar. .As the appeals, under the relevant provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1,972, had to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 (1) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the learned District Judge instead of affirming the order granting permission under Section 3 (1) of the 1947 Act directed the eviction of Phool Chand Bansai under the provisions oi U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The net result of the aforesaid orders passed by the learned District Judge was that no relief was granted to the landlords as against R. S. Rathore and G. S. Bhatnagar, while Phool Chand Bansai was ordered to be evicted from the shop. 6. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned District Judge, three writ petitions were filed in this Court. Writ Petitions Nos. 8871 of 1978 and 8872 of 1976 have been filed by the landlords. 6. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned District Judge, three writ petitions were filed in this Court. Writ Petitions Nos. 8871 of 1978 and 8872 of 1976 have been filed by the landlords. Writ Petition No. 8592 of 1978 has been filed by Phool Chand. Writ Petition No. 8871 of 1978 is directed against the order passed by the learned District Judge, in so far as the tenancy of R. S. Rathore is concerned, while the Writ Petition No. 8872 of 1978 is directed against the order allowing the appeal of G. S. Bhatnagar. 7. I shall first dispose of Writ Petition No. 8871 of 1978. Both the courts below have found that though the need of the landlords for the shop under the tenancy of R. S. Rathore is bona fide for the reasons asserted by the landlords, yet having regard to the hardship likely to be caused to R. S. Rathore, it would not be reasonable and proper to grant the application of the landlords. 8. In support of Writ Petition No. 8871 of 1978, the only contention raised by Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the learned District Judge did not take into consideration the need of the landlords and the hardship likely to be suffered by them vis-a-vis. R.S. Rathore. I do not agree. The learned District Judge did consider the need of the landlord at some length. Having found that the need of the landlord was genuine, the learned District Judge considered the hardship likely to be caused to each of the three tenants separately. In regard to R.S. Rathore the learned District Judge considered the case of the landlords which was that R. S. Rathore was no longer using the shop and that he has allowed his brother to occupy the same. It was further alleged by the landlords that R.S. Rathore was serving in the Imperial Hotel at Agra and was not doing any business in the shop in dispute . 9. The learned District Judge has found, upon evidence that R. S. Rathore is in point of fact carrying on business in the shop in dispute, having been a tenant of the shop ever since 1952. He has further found that over the years, R. S. Rathore has earned a goodwill in respect of the shop of great value. 9. The learned District Judge has found, upon evidence that R. S. Rathore is in point of fact carrying on business in the shop in dispute, having been a tenant of the shop ever since 1952. He has further found that over the years, R. S. Rathore has earned a goodwill in respect of the shop of great value. Yet another finding is that he has no other alternative accommodation where he may hope to shift his business without the risk of the goodwill being destroyed, having regard to the nature of the business. The learned District Judge has affirmed the order of the Rent Control & Eviction Officer who had also found that as between the landlords and the tenant, it is the latter who would suffer greater hardship. It is hence not correct to say that the learned District Judge has not compared the hardship likely to be caused to the two parties. I, therefore, find no substance in the only contention raised in the Writ Petition No. 8871 of 1978 which is liable to be dismissed. 10. Coming to the Writ Petition Number 8592 of 1978 filed by Phool Chand Bansai, the findings of the learned District Judge are: (1) the shop in dispute is bona fide required by the landlords for enabling J.K. Khandelwal to set up printing and publishing business therein after his return from abroad and that it is not correct to say that Sri J. K. Khandelwal is permanently settled abroad and that he has no intention to return to India to do the said business (2) Phool Chand Bansai is actually carrying on business in partnership with his brother in a shop just across the road. The learned District Judge has disbelieved the case of Phool Chand Bansai that he had nothing to do with the business of his brother. The learned District Judge has further taken note of the fact that the tenancy of Phool Chand Bansai was a recent one and he cannot be said to have earned any substantial goodwill in respect of the shop. The learned District Judge has further taken note of the fact that the tenancy of Phool Chand Bansai was a recent one and he cannot be said to have earned any substantial goodwill in respect of the shop. The learned District Judge appears to have believed the case of the landlord that Phool Chand Bansai is not carrying on any business in the shop in dispute but that he is just holding on to it with a view of warding off any rival competitor posing a threat to the business being run by Phool Chani Bansai and his brother in the shop across the road. From all these facts, the learned District Judge has concluded that as between the landlords and the tenants it is the former who would suffer greater hardship. 11. Sri Swami Dayal, counsel for the petitioner contended that the landlords have not disclosed with any degree of certainty as to exactly when does Sri J. K. Khandelwal propose to return to India. Learned counsel contended that at any rate the need of the landlords for the accommodation in dispute is not a need in present and, therefore, cannot be considered. I find no substance in this argument. The learned District Judge has believed, upon evidence on the record, the version of the landlords that Sri J. K. Khandelwal would come back to India as soon as the premises become available for starting the business proposed to be set up by him. In my opinion, under these circumstances, no fault can be found with the orders passed by the Courts below on the mere ground that the landlord has not given a precise date by which Sri J. K. Khandelwal intends to return to India. I also do not agree that the need set up by the landlord is not a need in present. The need that the shops are required to enable Sri J. K. Khandelwal to settle down in India and to start printing and publishing business therein is a need in present and not in future. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner (Phool Chand Bansai) also made a feeble attempt to challenge the finding of the learned District Judge on the question whether Phool Chand Bansai is not doing business in partnership with his brother in front of the shop just across the road. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner (Phool Chand Bansai) also made a feeble attempt to challenge the finding of the learned District Judge on the question whether Phool Chand Bansai is not doing business in partnership with his brother in front of the shop just across the road. However, he was unable to point out a single error of law in the said finding. The issue whether Phool Chand Bansal was doing business in partnership with his brother in the aforesaid shop is essentially a pure question of fact which not having been demonstrated to be vitiated by any error of law, cannot be set aside in these proceedings. Even on facts, I am satisfied that the conclusion of the learned District Judge that Phool Chand Bansai is doing business in partnership with his brother in the shop across the road is. fully justified. There are thus no merits in Writ Petition No. 8592 of 1978 also. 13. In support of Writ Petition Number 8872 of 1978 Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the learned District Judge could set aside the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer only if he had found that the Rent Control & Eviction Officer had committed some error of jurisdiction. Learned counsel contended that the scope of appeal before the learned District Judge was governed by Section 18 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) as amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 which is analogous to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, only errors of jurisdiction could be corrected under Section 18 after its amendment. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar submitted that the learned District Judge appears to have been totally oblivious of the restricted jurisdiction which he had in disposing of the appeals. The learned District Judge, contended learned counsel for the petitioner, acted as a Court of first appeal having unlimited jurisdiction and set aside the order of the Rent Control & Eviction Officer on a mere reappraisal of the evidence on the record which was entirely impermissible. 14. The learned District Judge, contended learned counsel for the petitioner, acted as a Court of first appeal having unlimited jurisdiction and set aside the order of the Rent Control & Eviction Officer on a mere reappraisal of the evidence on the record which was entirely impermissible. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, on this aspect of the matter at some length, I am clearly of the view that the contention raised by Sri S. S. Bhatnagar is well founded and is fully supported by the relevant statutory provisions which I shall deal with below. 15. Section 43 (2) (m) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 reads thus : "Any revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the Commissioner shall stand transferred to the District Judge, and his decision shall be final. The next relevant provision is Section 43 (2) (q) which is as follows:- 'Section 43............... (2) ............. (q) the provisions of Section 18 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to all appeals filed before the District Judge, under clause (i), clause (j) or clause (k) and all revisions transferred to him under clause (m). 16. These provisions came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court reported in 1976 All WC 428, Karam Chand v. Bal Mukund. The Full Bench observed thus : '20. There is an additional pointer to the conclusion that a revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 pending at the time of the commencement of the new Act should not be decided under the old Act but should be decided according to Section 21 of the new Act. Clause (q) of Section 43 of the new Act reads : 'The provisions of Section 18 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to all appeals filed before the District Judge, under clause (i), Cl. (j) or Cl. (k) and all revisions transferred to him under Cl. (m) or Cl. (p). Clause (q) of Section 43 of the new Act reads : 'The provisions of Section 18 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to all appeals filed before the District Judge, under clause (i), Cl. (j) or Cl. (k) and all revisions transferred to him under Cl. (m) or Cl. (p). 'This provision, which makes provision of an appeal contained in Section 18 of the new Act applicable to a revision transferred to the District Judge under Clause (m), has the effect of converting such a revision into an appeal and this also is indicative of an intention to destroy the provisions of the old Act contained in Section 3, for clause (q) enjoins in effect that the revision will be decided under the provisions of the new Act as an appeal and not as a revision under the new Act. 17. The net result of the aforesaid statutory provisions as construed by the Full Bench in Karam Chands case is that the revisions filed before the Commissioner under the provisions of the old Act namely U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 not only stood transferred to the learned District Judge as provided under Section 43 (2) (m), but had to be disposed of as an appeal under Section 18 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 18. The next provision relevant in the context is Section 26 (2) of U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act). The Amending Act was enacted to amend various provisions of the parent Act namely, U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Under Section 26 certain provisions were enacted to deal with pending proceedings commenced under the Principal Act. By Section 11 of the Amending Act, the provisions of Section 18 were amended. The powers of the appellate Court under Section 18 were drastically restricted. It was provided that no appeal shall lie under Section 16 or 19 of the Principal Act but any person aggrieved by an order under those Sections could prefer a revision on the grounds mentioned therein. The grounds mentioned under the Amended Section 13 of the Principal Act are grounds analogous to those of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The grounds mentioned under the Amended Section 13 of the Principal Act are grounds analogous to those of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ordinarily, the amendment of Section 18 not being retrospective, pending appeals would have undoubtedly to be decided under the provisions of Section 18 as it stood before their amendment by Amending Act. But I find that the legislature expressly intended to catch even the pending appeals. It can scarcely be gainsaid that the legislature does have power to enact an express provision restricting the scope of even pending appeals. With that legislative intent, which is explicit upon the plain language of the Statute, Section 26 (2) was enacted. 19. Section 26 (2) of the Amending Act reads as follows:- 'All appeals under Section 18 of the Principal Act, pending immediately, before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be revisions preferred under the said Section as amended by this Act and shall be disposed of accordingly. 20. Reading Section 43 (2) (m), Section 43 (2) (q) and Section 26 (2) of the aforesaid Amending Act, together, there is no manner of doubt that the appeals pending before the learned District Judge had to be disposed of with reference to the provisions of Section 18 as amended by the Amending Act. That being so, the learned District Judge could set aside the order of the trial Court only on some grounds of error of jurisdiction and not otherwise. The learned District Judge appears clearly to have been unaware of the restricted powers which he had under Section 18 of the principal Act. 21. Sri Swami Dayal, counsel for the respondents raised two contentions against the above arguments of Sri Bhatnagar. He first contended that Section 11 of the Amending Act, by which Section 18 was amended was prospective in its operation, because the language used in Section 11 of the Amending Act is that for Section 11 of the principal Act, the following section shall be substituted. If Section 11 of the Amending Act had stood by itself, the contention of Sri Swami Dayal completely ignores the provisions of Section 26 (2) of the Amending Act from which the Legislative intent is plainly discernible, namely, that even the pending appeals shall have to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Section 18 as amended by the Amending Act. 22. 22. The next argument of Sri Swami Dayal was that in view of the decision of the Full Bench in Karam Chands case the proceedings before the learned District Judge had to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, of the principal Act. That being so, an appeal clearly lay to the District Judge under Section 22 of the principal Act. 1 cannot agree. Merely because a revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 had to be decided, in the view of the Full Bench, in accordance with the procedure and conditions laid down In Section 21, it cannot follow that the appeal before the learned District Judge became converted into an appeal under Section 22 of the Principal Act. An appeal is a creature of Statute and has to be decided with reference to the express provisions of the Statute. In regard to a revision pending under Section 3 of 1947 Act before the Commissioner, in U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the legislature made an express provision that it shall be transferred to the District Judge and that the same shall be decided in accordance with Section 18 (and not under Section 22) of the principal Act. Consequently, the appeal before the learned District Judge had to be decided in accordance with Section 18 and not under Section 22 of the Act. 23. Sri Swami Dayal then placed reliance on Section 43 (2) (a) of the principal Act and contended that under that provision an application under Section 3 of 1947 Act is deemed to be an application or proceeding under Section 21 of principal Act. Section 43 (2) (a) has no relevance to the controversy. The matter in hand has to be decided with reference to the provisions of clauses (m) and (q) of Section 43 (2) of the Principal Act. None of the submissions made by Sri Swami Dayal in opposition to the contention raised by Sri S. S. Bhatnagar has, therefore, any substance. 24. Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for Sri G. S. Bhatnagar adopted the arguments of Sri Swami Dayal. He, however, made an additional submission. None of the submissions made by Sri Swami Dayal in opposition to the contention raised by Sri S. S. Bhatnagar has, therefore, any substance. 24. Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for Sri G. S. Bhatnagar adopted the arguments of Sri Swami Dayal. He, however, made an additional submission. The argument was that Section 26 (2) of the Amending Act must be held to be inapplicable to the appeals transferred to the learned District Judge under Section 43 (2) (m) as otherwise Section 26 (2) of the Amending Act would be rendered void as being repugnant to the Constitution of India being hit by Article 14 thereof. Expanding the argument, learned counsel contended that there was no nexus between the classification and the object sought to be attained by the alterations made in the law. He said there was from this point of view no distinction between those litigants whose appeals have been disposed of between 1972 (when the Principal Act came into force) and 1976 (when the Amending Act came into being), and those whose appeals had remained undisputed (undisposed) till after 1976. 25. Having given the matter a careful thought, I find no substance in this argument. No Statute can be presumed to be unconstitutional. I shall therefore, have to start with the assumption that Section 26 (2) does not impinge upon the prohibition contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 26. It is settled law that no rule which seeks to change a law can be held invalid for the mere reason that it effects an alteration in the law from a certain date. Merely, because as a result of the alteration in the law, a distinction is made between the past and the future (it) cannot be a ground, by itself, for holding that the statute, the validity of which is called in question unlawfully discriminates between the litigants who are affected by the change in law and those whose cases have already been disposed of prior to the introduction of the amendment in the law. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have repeatedly emphasised this (see AIR 1965 SC 134 at p. 136, (1969) 3 SCC 311 : ( AIR 1970 SC 778 ) at p. 318 and AIR 1960 SC 920 (923)) 27. Sri Ravikant however, placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1955 SC 13 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have repeatedly emphasised this (see AIR 1965 SC 134 at p. 136, (1969) 3 SCC 311 : ( AIR 1970 SC 778 ) at p. 318 and AIR 1960 SC 920 (923)) 27. Sri Ravikant however, placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1955 SC 13 . That decision is clearly distinguishable. There the impugned piece of legislation had been brought to deal with tax evaders whose matters had been referred before September 1, 1948. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court struck down the impugned legislation on the ground that there was no special or rational nexus between the classification and the object sought to be achieved. Their Lordships held that there was a clear discrimination between the tax evaders whose case had been referred before September 1, 1948 and those whose cases were referred subsequently thereto. The impugned legislation had sought to fix artificially a date i. e. 1st September, 1948 as the dividing line, that is, the legislation was retrospective in its character having no nexus or rationale. There is, therefore, absolutely no correspondence between that case and the case in hand. 28. I, therefore, find no substance in the contention that the application of Section 26 (2) to pending appeals shall have the effect of rendering that provision unconstitutional. Indeed, the language of Section 26 (2) is so explicit and unambiguous that there is hardly any room for argument. 29. Sri Ravikant also made an attempt to argue that even if it be assumed that the amended Section 18 applied to the present case and that the learned District Judge could not set aside the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer except on the ground of an error of jurisdiction, in the present case the Rent Control & Eviction Officer had clearly committed errors of jurisdiction and consequently, the learned District Judge was competent to set aside that order. 30. I do not think that this Court should itself go into the question whether or not the order of the Rent Control & Eviction Officer suffers from any error of jurisdiction. For, the District Judge disposed of the revision without being aware of the true ambit of his jurisdiction. He acted as a Court of appeal having unlimited jurisdiction reappraising the evidence on the record. For, the District Judge disposed of the revision without being aware of the true ambit of his jurisdiction. He acted as a Court of appeal having unlimited jurisdiction reappraising the evidence on the record. In setting aside the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer, the learned District Judge has not pointed out any error of jurisdiction. He has simply reassessed the evidence on the record and reached a conclusion different from that arrived at by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer. This was plainly impermissible. 31. Under the circumstances, the better course would be to send back the case to the learned District Judge for a fresh decision of the appeal/revision in accordance with law, having regard to the limits of his powers under S. 18 as it stands after the amendment introduced in 1976. 32. In the view of what has been stated above Writ Petitions No. 8592 of 1978 and 8871 of 1978 are dismissed, while writ petition No. 8872 of 1978 is allowed. Phool Chand Bansai is, however, granted two months time to vacate the shop under his tenancy. He will hand over vacant possession of the shop to the respondent landlords within this period. The order passed by the learned District Judge in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 165 of 1972 is quashed. The case is remanded to the learned District Judge, Agra for disposing of Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 165 of 1972 in accordance with law having regard to the observations made in this judgment. The parties in each three petition shall bear their own costs.