JUDGMENT H. S. Thakur, J.—This revision petition has been filed by the petitioner-tenant, under section 21 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), challenging the order of the Appellate Authority, District Solan, dated 20th July, 1970. The facts of the case, so far as the same are relevant for the decision of this petition, may be stated in brief. 2. The respondent-landlord filed a petition for the eviction of the present petitioner-tenant from the premises, in the month of March, 1972. The same was, however, dismissed by the Rent Controller, Solan, on 21-3-1975. The respondent-landlord preferred an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller before the Appellate Authority, under the Act. The appeal was fixed for arguments on several hearings, but was adjourned for one reason or the other. Certain adjournments were taken for arguments, by the learned counsel for the parties. Ultimately, on 20th July, 1976, an application was moved by the respondent-landlord under Order 23, rule 1 C. P. C. It was submitted in the application that the respondent-landlord desired to withdraw the petition, under section 14 of the Act, with a permission to file a new one on the same cause of action, there being some technical defects, and further that new grounds of eviction had also arisen. It is not disputed that both the parties were represented by their counsel. The learned Appellate Authority recorded the statements of the counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the present petitioner-tenant stated that he had no objection if the petition regarding the dispute was allowed to be withdrawn. He, however, stressed that the application be allowed by burdening the present respondent-landlord with costs. Consequently, the Appellate Authority by an order and judgment dated 20th July, 1976 accepted the application of the present respondent-landlord and set aside the judgment of the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority also granted permission to the present respondent-landlord, to initiate fresh proceedings on the same cause of action. The respondent-landlord, thereafter filed a fresh petition before the Rent Controller, Solan, on 22-9-1978. On 2-1-1979 the petition was adjourned to 16-2-1979 for the service of the present petitioner. Shri B. S. Chaudhary, Advocate, appeared for the present petitioner-tenant before the Rent Controller. On his objection that the copy of the petition was not received, the same was supplied to him. On 2-1-1979 the petition was adjourned to 16-2-1979 for the service of the present petitioner. Shri B. S. Chaudhary, Advocate, appeared for the present petitioner-tenant before the Rent Controller. On his objection that the copy of the petition was not received, the same was supplied to him. No written statement was filed on behalf of the present petitioner but instead he chose to prefer this revision petition against the above order of the Appellate Authority. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions contained in Order 23 rules 1 and 3 were not at all applicable to the facts of the case and that the Appellate Authority had no jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the petition already decided by the Rent Controller, or the appeal pending before it. The petitioner has also filed an affidavit making certain allegations against his Advocate, who consented to the withdrawal of the petition as also the appeal, [t is, however, nor disputed that the present petitioner was represented by the counsel before the Appellate Authority. In this revision petition, we are not concerned with the allegations made against the Advocate. The petitioner, if so advised can take any appropriate action against the Advocate, as may be permissible under the law. 4. Once it is admitted that the present petitioner was properly represented by his counsel, who consented to the withdrawal of the application by the Appellate Authority, it is to be determined as to what is its impact on the present petition. It is further to be seen whether the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority is without jurisdiction and hence void. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Act being a complete code, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act. He has referred to some decisions on the point. He has placed reliance on a decision Smt. Ram Piari v. Shri Amar Singh, [ATR 1978 HP 2 2] This decision does not relate to the proceedings under the Act but deals with the interpretation of Order 23 rule 1. In this case the facts were that the plaintiff had filed a suit and had also filed an application under Order 1, rule 8 C.P.C. The suit reached the stage of arguments, but the application was not disposed of. In this case the facts were that the plaintiff had filed a suit and had also filed an application under Order 1, rule 8 C.P.C. The suit reached the stage of arguments, but the application was not disposed of. At that stage the plaintiff made a statement expressing a desire to withdraw the suit on the ground that it contained a formal defect. The formal defect was that permission under Order 1, rule 8 had not been granted. On the basis of that statement of the counsel for the plaintiff, the suit was allowed to be withdrawn with permission to file a fresh one on the same cause of action. The said order was assailed, and the High Court ordered that the application filed under Order 1, rule 8 could be disposed of at any stage and even at the stage of arguments and the formal defect could be removed. It is to be noticed that at the time of the hearing of the revision petition, it was contended on behalf of the opposite party that the trial court had passed the order on the statements of the counsel for the parties. This fact was, however, disputed by the petitioner in tl is case. The High Court did not find such a statement having been made by the counsel for the opposite party. On that account, the objection of the respondent was not entertained. In view of these facts, the aforesaid decision is not of much help to the petitioner. The learned counsel has also referred to the decision in Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana, [AIR 1976 SC 869]. In this case the Supreme Court observed that the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 was a complete code providing procedure for eviction, and the prior notice under section 1C6 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the lease was not necessary before filing the petition. The learned counsel also referred to the decision in the case of M/s. Lachman Dass Sain Ditta Mal v. Shri Hanuwant Dass Sud, [(1968) PLR (Delhi Sec U 74 B]. This is a judgment of Delhi High Court, Himachal Bench, at Simla. Id this judgment it has been held by the learned Single Judge that rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to proceedings under the East Punjab Urban Pent Restriction Act. This is a judgment of Delhi High Court, Himachal Bench, at Simla. Id this judgment it has been held by the learned Single Judge that rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to proceedings under the East Punjab Urban Pent Restriction Act. It is, however, further held in this decision that the withdrawal of the previous application could not bar the institution of a fresh application on the same and some additional grounds. The learned counsel has also referred to the decision in V. Narayanappa v. Narayanappa and another, [AIR 1971 M\s. 334], In that case while the trial Court allowed the withdrawal of the suit under Order 23, rule 1, the defendant had resisted that application. In that judgment observations made in the case Abdul Sobhan v. Samsuddin Ahmed, [AIR 1931 Cal. 336], were quoted, which held that a court should give adequate reasons when granting permission to a plaintiff to withdraw the suit, and when there was no finding as to the formal defect on account of which the suit must fail, the court had no jurisdiction to permit a fresh suit to be brought. In this judgment, however, reference has been also made to a decision in Ramrao v. Appanna, [AIR 1940 Bom. 121 (FB), wherein it has been held that the expression "formal defect" must be given a wide and liberal meaning and must be deemed to connote every kind of defect which does not defect the merits of the case. The learned counsel has also referred to the decisions in K. J Kotecha v. A. K. Patel, [AIR 1972 Guj 63]; Sheo Ram v. Chandgi Ram and others, [AIR 1973 Punj. & H. 30] and Dalip Singh v. Rajinder Singh and others, [AIR 1972 Punj. & H. 279J. In these decisions it has been held that permission to withdraw a suit under Order 23 rule 1 can be given if the case fell within the four corners of rule 1 of Order 23. The learned counsel has also raised a further contention that even if the permission to withdraw the appeal could be given by the Appellate Authority, no permission to withdraw the original petition which had been decided on merits, could be given. He has , referred to the decision in Kanhaiyav. Dhaneshwari, [AIR 1973 All. 212]. The learned counsel has also raised a further contention that even if the permission to withdraw the appeal could be given by the Appellate Authority, no permission to withdraw the original petition which had been decided on merits, could be given. He has , referred to the decision in Kanhaiyav. Dhaneshwari, [AIR 1973 All. 212]. These are the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent, has raised a preliminary objection that the petition was barred by laches if not by limitation. It is pointed out by him that the present petition has been filed after a lapse of about three years of the passing of the impugned order. He has referred to the decision in 5. C Jain v. Sushila Devi, [ILR 1973 (HP) 1238]. This was a case under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. While dealing with the objection of delay, the learned Single Judge observed that the bar of limitation and the bar of laches are two distinct and different concepts and the question whether the petitioner was guilty of laches, had to be considered. Again, reference has been made to a Full Bench decision in Shamsher Singh Kanwar and another v. Union of India, etc., [ILR 1973 (HP) 1016]. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, R. S. Pathak, C. J. (as his Lordship then was) observed ; The doctrine of laches is founded in equity. It provides a defence in equity and has existed as such since the beginning of equity. It cannot be invoked where the statute prescribes a period of limitation. In contrast with a statute of limitation equity does not fix a specific period but considers the circumstances of each case. The doctrine of laches is based on the injustice which might result from the enforcement of long neglected rights, the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of ascertaining the truth of the makers in controversy and doing justice between the parties and on grounds of public policy, its aim being the discouragement for the peace and repose of society, of stab and antiquated demands and it is based on the maxims. Nothing can call equity into activity but conscience, good faith, and diligence. Equity aids the vigilant not those who slumber on their rights. He who seeks equity must do equity, and, he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Nothing can call equity into activity but conscience, good faith, and diligence. Equity aids the vigilant not those who slumber on their rights. He who seeks equity must do equity, and, he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations and is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In determining whether in any particular case there are laches, consideration must be given to the element of laches, and to various incidental matters, notably the relation of the party charged with laches to the right in controversy, the character of the evidence by which plaintiffs right is sought to be established, the nature of the right asserted and the relief asked, and the nature of the proceeding resorted to. (Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 30-A, para 115 pp. 31, 43). To determine whether the delay is such as to amount to laches, it is necessary to examine whether there has been ; 1. acquiescence on the part of the petitioner ; 2. any change of position which has occurred on the part of the respondent. In Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, [(1874) L. R. 5 P. C. 221 at 239], Lord Selborne observed that delay was material "where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him, if the remedy were to be afterwards asserted." And further, "Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." See also Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., (at 1279. (1878)3 App. Cas. 1218 (H.L.). Re Sharpe Re Bernett Masonic and General Life Assurance Co, v. Sharpe, (1892) 1 Ch. 154 (CA) 168) ; Rouchefocauld v. Boustead, (1897)1 Ch. 198 (A) 210)." The learned counsel also referred to a decision in M/s. Silver Screen Enterprises v. Devki Nandan Nagpal, [1970 RCJ 98]. (1878)3 App. Cas. 1218 (H.L.). Re Sharpe Re Bernett Masonic and General Life Assurance Co, v. Sharpe, (1892) 1 Ch. 154 (CA) 168) ; Rouchefocauld v. Boustead, (1897)1 Ch. 198 (A) 210)." The learned counsel also referred to a decision in M/s. Silver Screen Enterprises v. Devki Nandan Nagpal, [1970 RCJ 98]. In this judgment, the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act wherein the parties had affected compromise, observed as under : "Once a dispute is validly settled out of court, it is open to a party to a litigation to move the court to pass a decree in accordance with the compromise. Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit (which expression includes an appeal) has been settled wholly or in part by any lawful agreement, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to that suit. This is a mandatory provision. It is somewhat surprising that the High Court should have felt itself helpless under the circumstances of the case to do justice between the parties." From the above judgment of the Supreme Court it can be easily inferred that the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure can be applied even to the proceedings under the Rent Act, in appropriate cases. 6. The learned counsel has also referred to a decision in Bhagat Ram v. Dwarka Parshad, [1971 RCJ 94]]. In this judgment it has been held by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, that the provisions of Order 23 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, including the three sub-rules apply to proceedings before the Controller. It is further observed that the provisions, contained in this rule are of general application and are so fundamentally inherent in the exercise of jurisdiction of any court or tribunal. To the similar effect is the judgment in M/s. Urn and Company v. Lt. Col. K. M. Sayeed, [1971 Simla LJ 29], This view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court. To the similar effect is the judgment in M/s. Urn and Company v. Lt. Col. K. M. Sayeed, [1971 Simla LJ 29], This view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned counsel has also referred to the decisions in Ran Singh v. Mukhtiara Singh, [AT R 1953 Papsu 105], Gorelal and others v. Nandlal and others, [AIR 1953 Bhopal 3 ]. Sheikh Hassan v. Mohamed Ali and others, [AIR 1921 Bon. 278] and Krishnan Somayajipad v. Vatavatti Raman Nair, [AIR 1929 Mad. 36] in which it has been held that an appellate court can allow the withdrawal of a suit. 7. These are the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. 8. I have thoroughly considered the arguments of the parties. I am of the view that even if the provisions of Order 23 rule 1 may not be strictly applicable to the proceedings under the Act, its principles are still applicable, when there is no provision to the contrary, in the Act, itself. At the same time, 1 am of the view that even an appellate court (in the present case the Appellate Authority) is competent to allow the withdrawal of the petition, with a permission to file a fresh one, especially when both the parties consented to the same. It is to be noticed that on the application filed by the respondent, under Order 23 rule 1, the learned counsel for the petitioner had consented that the application be allowed, but on payment of costs. The Appellate Authority assessed the costs at Rs. 100. I had put it to the learned counsel for the petitioner whether his client had received the costs, as awarded, or was prepared to accept the same, if offered to him. It was, however, specifically asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if the costs were offered to him he would have refused to receive the same and would not also receive it even now. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that his client had offered the costs and is still prepared to pay the same if not already paid. Under the circumstances, I am inclined to hold that the equity is very much in favour of the respondent. 9. The Appellate Authority in its order has set aside the judgment of the Rent Controller. Under the circumstances, I am inclined to hold that the equity is very much in favour of the respondent. 9. The Appellate Authority in its order has set aside the judgment of the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority has further allowed the respondent to file a fresh petition under the same cause of action. As such, the order of the Appellate Authority had to be set aside, even if it was wrong. In fact, the appeal has been accepted with the consent of both the parties. It may be pointed out, that as observed earlier above, this court is not presently concerned with the allegations made by the petitioner in his affidavit against his advocate, who appeared before the Appellate Authority. At the same time bearing in mind the observations made by R. S. Pathak, C. J. in Kanwar Shamsher Singh (supra), I am of the confirmed view that the present petition is barred by laches and delay. In paragraph 5 of the revision petition, the petitioner has stated as under :— "That the petitioner awaited to see whether the respondent would start a fresh petition or not and has approached the Honble Court as soon as he was served with notice of fresh proceedings for his eviction." Such a conduct of the petitioner apparently shows that he has been sleeping over the matter for a period of about three years though he was fully aware of the impugned order. A litigant cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. 10. For the foregoing reasons, I have no alternative but to dismiss the revision petition. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. The record summoned in this revision petition be sent back without any delay. Revision dismissed.