ORDER A.N. Varma, J. -This is a tenants petition. It is directed against orders passed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 allowing an application filed by respondents Nos. 3 and 4, the landladies of the premises in question, under S. 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972). 2. These are the facts. The respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are the owners and landladies of the premises in question which are situate at Bazar Moorganj, Phul Khumran in the city of Saharanpur. The petitioners have been its tenants. The landladies filed the aforesaid application for an order of eviction of the tenants on the following assertions. 3. The respondent No. 3 Shrimati Dan tat Elahi has three sons and three daughters. The eldest son Rais Ahmed has passed his M. A. Examination and is unemployed. Akhlaq Ahmed, the husband of Shrimati Barkat Elahi (respondent No. 4) was working as a Forest Contractor in Dudhwa range in the district of Lakhimpur Khari for some years. However, his health started steadily deteriorating. Life in forest did not suit him. Besides, there was no proper arrangement for messing and other necessities of life. As a consequence, his health suffered serious setback. Furthermore, his family was residing at Saharanpur. 4. For all these reasons Akhlaq Ahmed has decided to shift to Saharanpur and to start the business of wholesale timber, wood carving, wood, wool, furniture, iron and cement and other allied materials connected with that business. Rais Ahmed being unemployed and in need of being settled in life, it has been decided that Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmed would do the aforesaid business in partnership at Saharanpur. The landladies do not have any accommodation available with them where these to gentlemen could start the above business. The premises in question are ideally suited for the proposed business as they are situate in the main market of the town and it has also a big courtyard inside it where trucks carrying timber and other materials, could be taken and parked for loading and unloading, purposes. As for the tenants, it was alleged that they were originally doing commission agency business in food-grains, but lately they have been using the accommodation as a parking place for the carts laden with food-grains brought from villages. As for the tenants, it was alleged that they were originally doing commission agency business in food-grains, but lately they have been using the accommodation as a parking place for the carts laden with food-grains brought from villages. The tenants have virtually stopped doing business in the premises. They are using the same only for the aforesaid purposes, i. e. realising parking charges from the villagers bringing food-grains to the town for sale. On these assertions, it was claimed that the landladies bona fide required the premises for Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmed. 5. The application was contested by the petitioner who denied that the landladies bona fide required the premises. It was asserted that the landladies family was a "compact family" the members of which were engaged in a number of lucrative businesses in and around Saharanpur. The tenants on the other hand have been engaged in the business of commission agency in food-grains, oil-seeds, gur (jaggery) etc. which they have been carrying on in the premises ever since 1930. They have come to acquire considerable goodwill which will be lost to them resulting in irreparable loss, if they were evicted from the accommodation in dispute. It was further asserted by the tenants that the landladies have a number of buildings in the same town available with them into any one of which, the proposed business could be started. 6. In support of their respective cases, both parties adduced evidence in the form of affidavits. 7. Upon a consideration of the material on the record, the prescribed authority held that the landladies bona fide required the premises for Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmed. It examined the hardship likely to be caused to the tenants from the grant of the application and came to the conclusion that having regard to the volume of business of the tenants, they did not require the whole of the buildings under tenancy and that the release of a part only of the accommodation would serve the purpose of the tenants. The prescribed authority consequently directed the eviction of the petitioners from the premises except what has been described as "bail khana" which consists of four rooms adjoining the main street of the gher in question. From a perusal of the site plan, it appears that the premises in question consisted of these four rooms, verandah and a big courtyard. The prescribed authority consequently directed the eviction of the petitioners from the premises except what has been described as "bail khana" which consists of four rooms adjoining the main street of the gher in question. From a perusal of the site plan, it appears that the premises in question consisted of these four rooms, verandah and a big courtyard. The result of the order passed by the prescribed authority was that all the four ' rooms of the premises were allowed to be left with the tenants while the courtyards and the verandahs were directed to be released in favour of the landlords. 8. Both sides felt aggrieved by the decision of the prescribed authority; the landladies, because the whole of the premises was not released in their favour, while the tenants, because the prescribed authority had directed the release of a portion of the premises in question. 9. The learned Additional District Judge, Saharanpur who heard these appeals, allowed the appeals of the landladies and dismissed that of the tenants. The net result was that the whole of the premises have been directed to be released in favour of the landladies. Hence this petition by the tenants. 10. I heard this petition at some length. Shri S. N. Kackker argued the case for the petitioners and Shri Shanti Bhushan for the respondents. 11. Broadly stated, Shri Kackker raised three contentions in support of the petition which may be summarised thus :- (1) The approach of both the courts below to the case was fallacious, being manifestly opposed to the scheme and purpose of the statute :- (2) Clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 16 (2) of the Rules framed under the aforesaid U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 have been completely ignored by the learned District Judge. (3) The learned District Judge has committed a patent illegality in not directing himself properly and calling his attention to a vital enquiry, namely, whether the release of a part only of the premises would not have satisfied the requirements of the landlords. The obligation to focus his mind on this question became the greater because the Prescribed Authority had expressly directed the release of a part only of the premises. Having heard counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that none of the aforesaid points has any merit. 12. I shall take up the first contention first. The obligation to focus his mind on this question became the greater because the Prescribed Authority had expressly directed the release of a part only of the premises. Having heard counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that none of the aforesaid points has any merit. 12. I shall take up the first contention first. Sri S. N. Kackker developed the first point thus. 13. Both the courts below seemed to have thought that each and every member of the family of landlords was entitled, in the context of the Act, to have separate business of his own. Such an approach was basically wrong being repugnant to the scheme of the Act. Elucidating the point, learned counsel urged that both the courts below have found that various members of the family of the landladies were already fairly well engaged in a number of substantial business may be not in the names of the individuals for whose benefit orders are being sought under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act. If that is so, continued the learned counsel for the petitioners, orders of eviction could not properly and legally be passed on the mere circumstances that these individuals (Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmed) did not have any business in their own name. Expanding the argument, counsel submitted that the Act defines "family" and provides under Section 21 (1) that a building under tenancy could be released not only for the occupation and use of the landlord himself but also for his family members. If, therefore, the statute conferred a benefit on the family members of the landladies, it must follow as a necessary corollary that the fact that the family as a unit or circle already has substantial business was a highly relevant fact which the courts below illegally excluded from consideration. 14. Having given the matter a careful thought, I do not find any infirmity in the approach of the court below. In my judgment the court below comprehended the law correctly and applied the same legally and properly to the facts of the case. 15. 14. Having given the matter a careful thought, I do not find any infirmity in the approach of the court below. In my judgment the court below comprehended the law correctly and applied the same legally and properly to the facts of the case. 15. I am not persuaded to accept the contention of Sri S. N. Kackker, as a proposition, that if some members of the family of the landlords are found engaged in any business earning profits, the building under tenancy ought not to be released for enabling the unemployed or unengaged members of the family to start business of their own in that building merely because the family as a circle or unit has some existing business engagement. In my view, each adult ought to be legitimately entitled to work for his own independent existence and sustenance. He is entitled to choose a vocation or profession suiting his individual aptitude, education or qualification, capabilities and so forth. The need of such an unemployed member cannot, in my judgment, be dismissed by telling him that he must follow the line or profession of the other members of the family or try to get absorbed in the business already carried on by the family. Of course, such a need of the landlords will have to be balanced against the hardship likely to be caused to the tenants from the grant of the application. 16. To my mind, the fact that under Section 21 (1) of the Act, the release can be had for the benefit of the landlords family members also is not adequate ground for holding that the release of the building cannot be asked for settling in a new venture of the unengaged member of the family. I find nothing in the Act or the policy underlying it which may countenance the broad proposition canvassed by Sri S. N. Kackker. 17. Keeping the broad proposition aside, let us examine what the facts in the present case are. The learned District Judge has found that Akhlaq Ahmed was hitherto doing business as a forest contractor in Dudhwa Range in the district of Lakhimpur Kheri, but that owing to his health having suffered a setback on account of hazards of jungle-life, he has bona fide decided to wind up his business at Lakhimpur Kheri and to start the business of the character mentioned above at Saharanpur. 18. 18. I see no bar in the Act - express or implicit-in Akhlaq Ahmeds being allowed to do that business in the accommodation in dispute. To my mind, it would not be legitimate to refuse relief to the landladies on the ground that inasmuch .as some of his family members are engaged, Akhlaq Ahmed ought to try and get absorbed in those businesses rather than hope for an independent and separate business or vocation for himself. Learned counsel was also unable to demonstrate with reference to the evidence led in the case whether the existing businesses are, by their volume and nature, such as to satisfy the needs of Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmad, and also whether having regard to the constitution of the partnership concerns, it is reasonably practicable to absorb these persons in those concerns. 19. I therefore, see nothing exceptionable in the view taken by the courts below that since Akhlaq Ahmed and Rais Ahmed do not have any business of their own, nor do they have any other accommodation available with them, the landladies must be held to require the premises in dispute bona fide. 20. In my judgment the problems arising under tne Act cannot and ought not to be disposed of on vague generalisation. Each case will have to be decided on its facts keeping in view the Legislative intent as disclosed by the provisions of the Act and the Rides framed thereunder. What is required to be found out is whether on the facts of each case, the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation in dispute and if so whether an order of eviction should be passed against the tenant upon a comparison of relative hardship. 21. Both the courts below have concurrently found that Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmed do propose to start the business mentioned above at Saharanpur for compelling reasons. They have further found that Akhlaq Ahmed has experience of the proposed business which he will bring to bear on the business intended to be started in the premises in question. Another vital finding recorded by the courts below is that neither the landladies nor Akhlaq Ahmed or Rais Ahmed have any accommodation under their control or possession available with them where Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmed could start the proposed business. Another vital finding recorded by the courts below is that neither the landladies nor Akhlaq Ahmed or Rais Ahmed have any accommodation under their control or possession available with them where Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmed could start the proposed business. Some buildings were suggested by the tenants as available with the landladies, The learned District Judge has examined this aspect of the case in detail and has leached the conclusion that none of the buildings available is suitable for the sort of business which is proposed to be started. 22. The aforesaid findings of the learned District Judge are findings on pure question of facts. Shri Kackker made no attempt to demonstrate that these findings were vitiated by any error of law. On these findings, the conclusion of the District Judge, that the landladies bona fide required the premises is perfectly legitimate and proper. 23. Sri Kackker, however, made a feeble attempt in the beginning of his arguments to question the correctness of the finding of the courts below on the issue whether Akhlaq Ahmed and Rais Ahmed do really intend to start the aforesaid business and whether Akhlaq Ahmed does really intend to wind up his business at Lakhimpur Kheri. However, as the arguments progressed he did not pursue this contention. At any rate, he was unable to point out any error of law in the finding of the courts below on the aforesaid issue. 24. This court, therefore, holds that the approach of the learned District Judge was legal and proper. 25. I may now pass on to the second point urged in support of the petitioner. Sri Kackker argued that admittedly the petitioners have been tenants of the accommodation in dispute since the year 1930. The provisions of clause (a) of R. 16 (2) of the Rules framed under the aforesaid U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 were therefore clearly attracted. This Rule provides that greater the period since when the tenant has been carrying on his business in the building under tenancy) the less the justification for allowing the application. Relying on this provisions, counsel submitted that the learned District Judge seemed to have been oblivious of this Rule and has, therefore, omitted to apply the same to the present case. I do not agree. Relying on this provisions, counsel submitted that the learned District Judge seemed to have been oblivious of this Rule and has, therefore, omitted to apply the same to the present case. I do not agree. While narrating the pleadings of the parties the learned District Judge has expressly adverted to the fact that the tenants have been there in occupation of the building in question ever since 1930. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the learned District Judge was not conscious of the length of the tenancy of the petitioners. The mere fact that the learned District Judge has not expressly adverted to clause (a) of the Rule 16 (2) of the Act cannot with any justification lead to the conclusion that the learned District Judge was not aware of this Rule. The length of the tenancy of a tenant of a commercial building is relevant for finding out the amount of goodwill which the tenant may have acquired in respect of the building under tenancy. 26. The learned District Judge has examined this aspect of the case. He has referred to the relevant facts for arriving at the conclusion that despite the length of the petitioners tenancy, the volume of business which the tenants have picked up through the years is comparatively small and modest. The learned District Judge has, keeping in view the nature and volume of the business picked up by the petitioner held that if the petitioners occupy the newly constructed shops in the same locality where the premises in question are located, they would not suffer any substantial loss. The learned District Judge has, therefore, considered facts which were relevant for the application of the aforesaid rule. The learned District Judge was not unmindful of the goodwill earned by the petitioners. Under the circumstances a mere omission specifically to refer to Rule 16 (2) (a) of the Rules framed under the Act would not, in my judgment, vitiate the order passed by the learned District Judge. It cannot be said that the District Judge has not had regard to the factors mentioned in R. 16 (2) (b). 27. Under the circumstances a mere omission specifically to refer to Rule 16 (2) (a) of the Rules framed under the Act would not, in my judgment, vitiate the order passed by the learned District Judge. It cannot be said that the District Judge has not had regard to the factors mentioned in R. 16 (2) (b). 27. The next rule relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners is Rule 16 (2) (c) of the Rules which provides that greater the existing business of the landlords own apart from the proposed business to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application. Sri S. N. Kackker vehemently argued that in view of this statutory provision, the learned District Judge fell into a manifest error of law in not taking into account the existing business of the landladies. 28. Having given the matter my best consideration, I am clearly of the view that the above Rule does not take the matter further for the petitioners. Strictly, this rule would apply to a case where the landlord proposes to set up a new business in the leased premises himself. In the present case, the landladies have applied for the release of the premises on the ground that two of the members of their family are out of employment and business. These members do not have any existing business of their own. One has to be settled in business for the first time. While the other i. e. Akhlaq Ahmed has to start the timber business afresh having been compelled by circumstances to wind up his business at Lakhimpur Kheri. It is, therefore, not as though the landladies themselves proposed to set up a new business in the leased premises apart from their existing business being carried on elsewhere. This rule, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. At any rate Rule 16 (2) of the Rules only provides that the prescribed Authority shall have regard to the facts set out in various clauses of R. 16(2) of the Rules. These rules have been framed only as guidelines. They do not prohibit absolutely the release of the accommodation where the landlords desire to start a new business in the premises under tenancy in addition to their existing business being carried on elsewhere. These rules have been framed only as guidelines. They do not prohibit absolutely the release of the accommodation where the landlords desire to start a new business in the premises under tenancy in addition to their existing business being carried on elsewhere. On the facts found by the learned District Judge in the present case, he was justified in directing the eviction of the tenants, particularly in view of the fact that the tenants have available to them shops across the road in the same locality. I, therefore, find no substance in the second point too. 29. Coming now to the third and last point, learned counsel urged that there were a number of grounds which obligated the learned District Judge to give a categorical finding that nothing short of the release of the whole building under tenancy would meet the requirements of the landladies. The grounds urged were:- (1) The prescribed Authority having directed the release of a part only of the premises, the District Judge was bound to consider whether the release of a part only of the premises would not satisfy the landlords requirements. (2) The provisions of Section 21 (1) of the aforesaid U. P. Act No. Ill of 1972 imposes a duty on the authorities, in each case to record a categorical finding whether the release of a part only of an accommodation would not satisfy the requirements of the landlord and (3) The requirements of a humanist approach made it obligatory for the learned District Judge to give a clear finding on the question of extent of accommodation which would have satisfied the needs of the landlords. Before, I take up these various grounds for consideration, I may add that according to my reading of the judgment of the learned District Judge, he has recorded a finding that the whole of the premises are needed by the landladies in the business which is proposed to be started therein. 30. Before the learned District Judge, there were two appeals, one filed by the landladies, while the other by the tenants. The landladies appeal was expressly directed against the order passed by the prescribed Authority releasing a part only of the accommodation and not the whole of it. Upon a consideration of the entire evidence on record, the learned District Judge has allowed the appeal of the landladies and directed the release of the entire premises. The landladies appeal was expressly directed against the order passed by the prescribed Authority releasing a part only of the accommodation and not the whole of it. Upon a consideration of the entire evidence on record, the learned District Judge has allowed the appeal of the landladies and directed the release of the entire premises. The finding that the landladies require the entire accommodation is, therefore, implicit in the order passed by the learned District Judge allowing the appeal of the landladies and directing the release of the entire premises. However, apart from this, I find that there are observations in the judgment of the learned District Judge which indicate that the learned District Judge was clearly of the opinion that the entire premises were needed by the landladies for the purposes of business. The learned District Judge has observed thus:- "The disputed premises having much area and open space, would obviously suit for the proposed business.........." Again while considering the feasibility of the landladies being able to carry on the proposed business in the buildings pointed out by the tenants, the learned District Judge said as follows:- "As discussed above, no suitable spot for the proposed business could be shown by the tenants in the ownership or possession of the applicants or of Rais Ahmad and Akhlaq Ahmad. A number of other buildings and shops of the applicants or Rais Ahmad and Akhlaq Ahmed have been cited by the tenants but none of them actually belongs to the applicants or aforesaid two persons for whom the disputed premises are required. In my opinion these other buildings cannot accordingly be taken into consideration for judging the need of the applicant. In any case, reference is expressly made by the tenants to the three stored building situated near the disputed premises and it is alleged that on the second floor thereof the proposed business can be started. It is not understandable as to how the wooden logs which are the relevant material in timber business would be carried up the second floor, it is also mentioned that as many as five shops are vacant in the said three stored building. But the business complex which is proposed to be started in partnership by Rais Ahmad and Akhlaq Ahmed cannot be accommodated in these shops." (Emphasis added). But the business complex which is proposed to be started in partnership by Rais Ahmad and Akhlaq Ahmed cannot be accommodated in these shops." (Emphasis added). Still further, the learned District Judge has observed thus:- "Thus the record shows that the disputed premises is the only suitable spot for the proposed partnership business." The aforesaid observations clearly show that the learned District Judge was of the view that the landladies needed the entire premises under tenancy for the proposed business. 31. I shall now take up the various grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the above argument. So far as the circumstances that the prescribed Authority had directed the release of a portion only of the accommodation is concerned, it may be noted that the prescribed Authority had m making that order preoccupied himself only with the limited question whether having regard to the smallness of the size or the business of the tenants, leaving a part only of the accommodation with the tenants would not satisfy their requirements. The prescribed Authority had not addressed himself to the question as to whether the business proposed to be started by Rais Ahmed and Akhlaq Ahmed could or could not with any reasonable practicability, be accommodated in the remaining part of the building directed to be released. It may be noted that the prescribed Authority had rejected the application of the landladies in respect of what has been described as Bailkhana which comprises all the rooms that there are in the building under tenancy. The landladies were not left with any rooms. There was no conscious adjudication by the Prescribed Authority of the question whether or not the release of a part only of the accommodation would satisfy the requirements of the landladies. If there had been such an adjudication by the Prescribed Authority, it could with some justification be argued that the learned District Judge was bound to give a more categorical finding on the issue. I, therefore, find no substance in the first ground. 32. As regards the second ground, namely, that Section 21 (1) itself casts a duty on the prescribed Authority to give such a finding, I find it difficult to accept the contention. I, therefore, find no substance in the first ground. 32. As regards the second ground, namely, that Section 21 (1) itself casts a duty on the prescribed Authority to give such a finding, I find it difficult to accept the contention. Section 21 (1) of the aforesaid Act reads as follows : "21 (1) The prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely:......." 33. In my view, this provision only gives power to the prescribed Authority to direct the eviction of the tenant either ( from the whole or any specified part of the building under tenancy. The latter power the prescribed Authority would have in the absence of an express ' statutory provision for the simple reason that a tenancy cannot be split up. Section 21 (1) of the Act, therefore, merely confers a power on the prescribed Authority to direct eviction even from a part of the premises. It does not by itself cast a duty on the prescribed Authority or the appellate Court to give, in each, case, a categorical finding whether a release of a part only of the accommodation would not satisfy the requirements of the landlords. The decisions cited by Sri S. N. Kackker on this aspect of the matter are those which are founded upon statutory provisions which are not to be found in Section 21 (1). I shall deal with these provisions a little later. Suffice it to say that Section 21 (1) of the Act by itself does not impose a duty on the prescribed Authority or the appellate court to give a categorical finding whether the point is raised or not, in each case whether the release of a part only of the accommodation would not satisfy the requirements. At any rate, as found above, in the present case, the learned District Judge has given a finding that the landladies require the whole of the premises for the proposed business. 34. I may now deal with the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner. I shall begin with the case of Rahman v. Ram Chand ( AIR 1978 SC 413 ), which Sri Kackker made the sheet anchor of his argument under this head. 34. I may now deal with the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner. I shall begin with the case of Rahman v. Ram Chand ( AIR 1978 SC 413 ), which Sri Kackker made the sheet anchor of his argument under this head. Construing the provisions of the third proviso to Explanation appended to Section 11 (h) of the Jammu and Kashmir House Rent Control Act, 1966 their Lordships ruled that even in the absence of specific pleadings under the said Explanation, the Court must give a finding whether the eviction should be ordered from the whole or part only of the building under tenancy. In my view, this case lends no support to the contention of Sri S. N. Kackker. In the first place, as mentioned above, the District Judge was not oblivious of the duty to consider the question whether the landlords requirement would not be satisfied by the release of a part only of the premises. Secondly, in Section 21 (1) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, there are no provisions such as are to be found in Section 11 (h) of the aforesaid Jammu and Kashmir Rent Control Act. 1966. In the rules framed under the U. P. Act, however there is a Rule 16 (1) (d) which does contain provisions substantially analogous to the aforesaid Explanation to Section 11 (h) of the Jammu and Kashmir Act, 1966. But Rule 16 (1) concerns itself only with residential buildings. There is no such corresponding provision in Rule 16 (2) of the Act which deals with commercial or non-residential buildings. 35. Section 11 (h) Explanation to the IIIrd proviso of the aforesaid Jammu and Kashmir Rent Control Act, 1966 in so far as it is relevant for the present inquiry reads :- "Protection of a tenant against eviction :- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or law no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house or shop shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant including a tenant whose lease has expired: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any suit for decree for such recovery of possession. (h) Where the house or shop is reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or re-building or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house or shop is held, ........................................... Explanation- The Court in determining the reasonableness of requirement for purposes of building or rebuilding shall have regard to the comparative public benefit or disadvantage by extending or diminishing accommodation, and in determining reasonableness of requirement for occupation shall have regard to the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the landlord or the person for whose benefit the house or shop is held and of the tenant: Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the house or shop and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest, and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix a proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant which portion shall henceforth constitute the house or shop within clause (3) or clause (5) of S. 2 and the rent fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 8." Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules framed under U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 says:- "16 (1) In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the prescribed authority shall also have regard to such other factors as the following........... (d) Where the tenants needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlords needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building." To my mind, therefore, in the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 while in regard to residential buildings, there is a mandatory requirement to give a finding of the nature mentioned above, whether the tenant raises that plea or not, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, there is no such corresponding duty in regard to commercial buildings. To my mind, there being no such parallel statutory provisions in respect of commercial buildings, the Court is not required to give such a finding in the absence of a plea specifically raised in that behalf by the tenants. 36. Sri Kackker, however, contended that there is and ought not to be such dichotomy between sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 16. He argued that Rule 16 (1) must be deemed to have been framed with a view to effectuating the purpose of Section 21 (1) of the Act. It must, therefore, follow' that the necessity to give such a finding is implicit in the substantive provision of the Act, namely Section 21 (1) which applied both to a residential as well as non-residential building. 37. I do not agree. 38. I have already held above that Section 21 (1) of the Act imposes no such duty and I do not agree that there does not exist a dichotomy between residential and non-residential buildings. The Legislature has laid down distinct sets of Rules for the two classes of buildings, residential and commercial. Consideration ..the event for directing eviction of the tenants from residential accommodation are inherently different and distinct from those applicable to commercial buildings. The omission of a rule corresponding to Rule 16 (1) (d) in regard to commercial building is, therefore, significant and cannot be ignored. 39. Even in the case of Shrimati Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd Addl. District Judge, (1980 (UP) RCC 86), on which learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance, the Supreme Court, spelled out the duty to give such a finding from Rule 16 (1) (d) and not the substantive provision of Section 21 (1). This case, too, therefore, affords no assistance to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 40. And now the third and the last ground, learned counsel contended that in the administration of this law (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972), a humanist approach ought to be adopted, having regard to the gravity of the repercussions on the rights of tenants arising from orders of eviction. In support learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions reported in the case of J.R. Thakkar v. T.R. Mantri, ( AIR 1977 SC 1357 ) and Transport Corporation of India v. Bal Krishna Lal Poddar (1979 All Rent Cas 371) in both of which such an approach has been commended. In support learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions reported in the case of J.R. Thakkar v. T.R. Mantri, ( AIR 1977 SC 1357 ) and Transport Corporation of India v. Bal Krishna Lal Poddar (1979 All Rent Cas 371) in both of which such an approach has been commended. 41. No one can seriously dispute that such should be the approach in the administration of this legislation. The question is: Did not the District Judge have this approach in mind?" 42. There is in my view no reason to assume that the learned District Judge did not approach the case from a humanist angle. Having explored the possibility of the two gentlemen for whom the premises were being sought to be released, being able to start their business elsewhere in the various buildings pointed out by the tenant and having found that there was no other building available with the landladies for the proposed business, the learned District Judge set himself, to finding out how the interests of the tenants were going to be safeguarded. The learned District Judge considered the nature and magnitude of the tenants business. He came to the conclusion that the business of the' tenants could be easily accommodated in one or two rooms and that the tenant did not really the entire premises under tenancy. Then the learned District Judge found, relying on the rejoinder-affidavit of Akhlaq Ahmad that one Deo Kumar again has constructed a market just across the road and in the same locality. The learned District Judge held that the tenants could easily take up one or two shops according to their requirements in the said newly constructed market. The sum and substance of the findings of the earned District Judge is that the tenants could shift into one of the newly constructed shops in the same locality in close vicinity of the disputed premises without any risk of loss to their business. On these facts and circumstances, it cannot be argued that the approach of the learned District Judge was other than humanist. 43. Sri Kackker, however, urged that the finding that the tenants had an alternative accommodation in the alleged New Market was vitiated in law. On these facts and circumstances, it cannot be argued that the approach of the learned District Judge was other than humanist. 43. Sri Kackker, however, urged that the finding that the tenants had an alternative accommodation in the alleged New Market was vitiated in law. He submitted that the allegation that a new Market come up in the same locality came for the first time in the rejoinder-affidavit to which the tenants had no opportunity to give a reply. The argument is clearly wrong. For, I find that the tenants were not only given an opportunity to rebut the aforesaid assertions contained in the rejoinder affidavit, but they even availed themselves of it by filing an affidavit-in-reply (See the affidavit of Nem Chand Jain filed with the writ petition as Annexure 13). In the affidavit filed in reply to the rejoinder-affidavit of Akhlaq Ahmed, there was no rebuttal of the said averment. Sri Kackker then submitted that the allegations in the rejoinder-affidavit of Akhlaq Ahmed did not require any reply. The relevant paragraph of the rejoinder-affidavit, namely, paragraph Mo. 46 reads as follows :- "46. That the contentions of the opposite parties that the Government has abandoned its earlier decision of taking over the food-grains business has also no bearing, when it has been clearly shown that taking and by not taking any business the opposite parties are not earning more than Rs. 10,000/- according to them of huge business of turnover of lakhs of in huge property which is at their the eviction will not be a ruina-opposite-parties but they can well settle their business if they so like. Recently, Sri Dev Kumar Jain has constructed a new market just opposite to the property in dispute and if the applicants want they may take the shop there which will not put any harm, to them." 44. Sri Kackker argued that what was alleged was that a new market had been constructed and if the "applicants" wanted any alternative shop, they could occupy the same in the new market. Sri Kackker continued that the "applicants" were the landlords and not the tenants, and that consequently the tenants were not required to rebut the said assertion. I find no force in this argument. The word "applicants", is an obvious mistake for the word "tenants". Sri Kackker continued that the "applicants" were the landlords and not the tenants, and that consequently the tenants were not required to rebut the said assertion. I find no force in this argument. The word "applicants", is an obvious mistake for the word "tenants". In the context of the whole paragraph, it is clear that the deponent of the rejoinder-affidavit clearly intended to say that if the tenants so wanted, they could occupy one of the newly constructed shops. At any rate, the averment clearly was that a new market had been constructed just across the road in which shops were available. 45. I may now deal with the last case cited namely Mahomed Yasin v. 2nd Addl. District Judge, (1980 All Rent Cas 106). It has been held by a learned Judge of this Court that in judging the need of a landlord the fact that his father has available with him a vacant shop, is a relevant fact which the prescribed authority ought not to ignore. This case has no application. The finding of the learned District Judge is that the landladies have no other accommodation available with them whether owned by them or not, to accommodate the business which is proposed to be started. 46. The above discussion disposes of all the points urged in support of this petition. 47. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 48. The petitioners are, however, granted three months time within which they will hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respondents-landladies.