JUDGMENT A. N. Verma, J. - This is a tenant's petition. It is directed against two orders, one passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing an application of respondents Nos. 3 to 6 (Kamta Prashad, Shrimati Bimla Devi, Raja Ram and Shrimati Rani Devi), the landlords of the premises in question under Section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972) and the other by the learned II Additional District Judge, dismissing the appeal of the petitioner filed against the first order. 2. These are the relevant facts. The respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are the owners and landlords of the northern half portion of a house No. 134, Chak, Allahabad, while the respondents Nos. 5 and 6 (Raja Ram and Shrimati Rani Devi) are the owners and landlords of the other half of that House. Baij Nath Prasad Sahu, the Petitioner's father was originally the tenant of the aforesaid house. He died in the year 1971 leaving the petitioner his widow Shrimati Dulari Devi (respondent No. 7) and other sons Purshottam Das, Deveshwar Nath, Kailash Nath, and Bishambhar Nath (respondents Nos. 8 to 11) as his heirs and legal representatives. 3. The aforesaid landlords filed a joint application against the petitioner and his mother for the release of the accommodation on the following assertions : 1. The respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were residing with considerable hardship and inconvenience in an ancestral house No. 86, Chowk Gangadass in just one living room. This house belonged to 53 persons who are residing in different portion thereof. The family of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 consisted of seven members consisting of husband and wife, four sons, and one daughter. There was no place for respondent No. 3 to sleep and for the children to study. All this was affecting the health of the entire family and the education of the children. 2. The respondents Nos. 5 and 6, the other set of landlords were also similarly residing as a licencee in just one room accommodation at No. 89, P.D. Kydganj, Allahabad, Respondent No. 5 had even to carry on the business in this single room accommodation. The landlords were sonars by caste and profession, but due to Gold Control Rules, their vacation had been seriously affected. The landlords were sonars by caste and profession, but due to Gold Control Rules, their vacation had been seriously affected. It is alleged that the landlords were being put to a great hardship. 3. The tenant on the other hand has a house of his own, a few yards away from the premises in question, being house No. 137 Chak, which had plenty of accommodation the tenant could very conveniently shift into it. 4. The application was contested by the petitioner, who denied that the landlords bona fide required the premises for their occupation. It was asserted that both the sets of landlords were comfortably residing in their respective houses at No. 86, Chowk Gangadas and No. 89 P.D. Kydganj, Allahabad. The landlords had no need at all for the accommodation in dispute. It was false that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were residing in only one room. Likewise respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were also in occupation of 89 P.D. Kydganj, Allahabad, as tenants and not as mere licencees, without any difficulty. 5. As regards house No. 137 Chak, Allahabad, the same belonged to the petitioner and was in occupation of the petitioner's mother and her other sons, who were also doing business in part thereof. The petitioner had no right to occupy the same, nor was there any accommodation available therein. 6. In support of their respective cases, both parties filed affidavits. A commissioner was also appointed to report as regards various houses in question, namely, house No. 134 Chak, Allahabad City, house No. 86 Chowk Ganga Das and house No. 89 P.D. Kydganj, Allahabad. The Commissioner submitted a report, a true copy of which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure "6". The petitioner filed an affidavit by way of objection to this report and annexed therewith an extract of description of house No. 86 given in a previous litigation (Kamta Prasad v. S.R. Vishwas) by a Commissioner appointed in that case on 31.10.1969. The prescribed authority over-ruled the objection and affirmed the report. 7. The Prescribed Authority, upon a consideration of the evidence on record came to the following conclusions : 1. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are being put to considerable hardship being compelled by circumstances to reside in just one living room in their ancestral house No. 86, Chowk Gangadass in which they are minimal ; 2. Respondents Nos. 7. The Prescribed Authority, upon a consideration of the evidence on record came to the following conclusions : 1. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are being put to considerable hardship being compelled by circumstances to reside in just one living room in their ancestral house No. 86, Chowk Gangadass in which they are minimal ; 2. Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were similarly residing under great hardship in kuchcha one room accommodation which was a tin shed; 3. Both the sets of landlords bona fide required the accommodation ; 4. The tenants had an alternative accommodation in house No. 137 Chak, Allahabad situate a few yards away from the premises in question, and besides whereas the tenants were substantial businessmen, the landlords were men of ordinary means ; and 5. As between the landlords and the tenants, the former would suffer greater hardship than the tenants. 8. On the aforesaid findings, the Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord and directed the eviction of tenants. 9. The petitioner filed an appeal. In the appeal, a Commissioner was appointed to submit a report with regard to the extent of accommodation in house No. 187 Chak. A detailed report was submitted (see Annexure "10" to the writ petition). A supplementary report was also submitted by the Commissioner, a true copy of which Annexure "11" to the writ petition. 10. Upon a consideration of the entire evidence on record, the learned District Judge concurred with the Prescribed Authority in the various findings recorded by the latter and dismissed the appeal. 11. Counsel for the petitioner urged that both the courts below erred in law in ignoring material pieces of evidence on record, namely, the Annexure to the affidavit filed by the petitioner by way of objection to the Commissioner's report. This Annexure clearly indicated that house No. 86 Chowk Gangadass consisted of 18 rooms whereas both the courts below wrongly laboured under the impression that there were three or four rooms in that house which was being shared by 53 members of the joint Hindu Family of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 12. I find no substance in the above argument. Whatever may be the precise number of rooms in house No. 86. Chowk Gangadass, Allahabad the fact remains that the consistent case of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 12. I find no substance in the above argument. Whatever may be the precise number of rooms in house No. 86. Chowk Gangadass, Allahabad the fact remains that the consistent case of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 throughout was that so far as their family was concerned, comprising seven members it was occupying only one living room. This allegation was specifically made in the application under section 21 of the aforesaid Act. In the written statement filed by the petitioner, in paragraph 42 thereof, there was just a bald denial that the landlords were occupying only one room, but it was not disclosed how many rooms were in occupations of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 13. In my view, the material fact to be ascertained in the case was not how many rooms there were in House No. 86, Chowk Gangadas, but it was as to how much accommodation there was at the disposal of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 14. Both the courts below have believed the case of respondent No. 3 Kamta Prasad, which was supported by his affidavit that he had only one living room for his entire family of seven. 15. Furthermore, it does not appear that any attempt was made by the petitioner to have a Commission issued to find out the exact number of rooms in house No. 86 before the appellate court had issued a commission in regard to house No. 137, Chak, Allahabad. The trial court had confirmed the Commissioner's report in regard to various houses and if the petitioner had any genuine or real grievance, he could have moved the appellate court for issuance of a similar commission with regard to house No. 86 Chowk Gangadas, Allahabad also. No such attempt was, however, made. The courts below were, therefore, right in relying on the latest Commissioner's report rather than on an obsolete report given in an altogether different case more than ten years before. The other fact upon which both the courts below laid emphasis was that indisputably as many as 53 persons were occupying house No. 86 Chowk Gangadas as cosharers. The Commissioner has reported that that house is very small. Under these circumstances, the finding of the courts below that respondents Nos. The other fact upon which both the courts below laid emphasis was that indisputably as many as 53 persons were occupying house No. 86 Chowk Gangadas as cosharers. The Commissioner has reported that that house is very small. Under these circumstances, the finding of the courts below that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 together with five other members of their family are forced by circumstances to occupy a small one room accommodation resulting in considerable hardship to them and that, therefore, their need is genuine and pressing, cannot be said to be wrong. The first point, therefore, fails. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the findings of the courts below about need of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 is manifestly unsustainable in law. The respondents No. 5 and 6 came to the court with the sole allegation that they were residing in house No. 89 P.D. Kydganj, Allahabad as licencees, and that the owner of that house was pressing them to leave the same. This case has not been found to be true by either to the courts below and hence the application could not legally be allowed on the ground that the said respondents were residing in a kuchcha house under some difficulty. 17. I do not agree. The case of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 was that they were in occupation of just one room in house No. 89 as a licencee. No doubt, it was also alleged that their licensor Prabhat son of Sarkar Bahadur the tenant of that house was pressing them to leave, but in the application it was also asserted that respondent No. 5 had also to do this business in this one room residence in house No. 89. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the only ground upon which the application was founded was that the licensor of the said respondent was pressing them to leave. 18. Furthermore, the Commissioner appointed by the Prescribed Authority found that as many as six persons were occupying one room tin-shed accommodation in house No. 89, Chowk Gangadass, Allahabad. The Commissioner found that it was a kuchcha house. The Prescribed Authority considered the evidence on record and held that the accommodation under occupation of Raja Ram respondent No. 5 could not at all be said to be suitable and sufficient to serve his requirements. The Commissioner found that it was a kuchcha house. The Prescribed Authority considered the evidence on record and held that the accommodation under occupation of Raja Ram respondent No. 5 could not at all be said to be suitable and sufficient to serve his requirements. The Prescribed Authority further appears to have accepted the case of the said landlords that they were mere licencees and not tenants as alleged by the petitioner. The appellate court also has recorded the aforesaid findings, though it assumed for the sake of argument that Rajaram was a tenant of house No. 89, Chowk Gangadass. The learned District Judge observed that even if Raja Ram was a tenant of that house, it was clear that the house was entirely insufficient and wholly unsatisfactory, being a kuchcha tin shed. 19. No grievance appears to have been raised before the learned District Judge that the finding of the trial court that Raja Ram bona fide required the premises in dispute because he was occupying a kuchcha tin-shed in house No. 89 P.D. Kydganj under compelling circumstances was bad in law being beyond the pleadings of the landlords. In my opinion, under these circumstances no fault can be found with the concurrent findings of the courts below that having regard to the condition of premises No. 89 PD. Kydganj as well as of the fact that it consisted of just one room, the need of the landlords respondents Nos. 5 and 6 for the premises in question must be held to be bona fide and pressing. The said finding was based on the evidence on record consisting of the affidavit of Kamta Prasad as well as the report of the Commissioner in my judgment, the finding of the courts below as regards the need of respondents No. 5 and 6 is supported both by the evidence on record as well as the pleadings as disclosed by the application for amendment under section 21 of the Act. Furthermore in these proceedings, the pleadings of the parties have to be read in a broad sense and not in the narrow technical way in which the pleadings in regular civil suits are construed. 20. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that I find no error in the finding of both the courts below that the premises in dispute are bona fide required by the landlords. 21. 20. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that I find no error in the finding of both the courts below that the premises in dispute are bona fide required by the landlords. 21. Coming to the findings of the courts below on the question of comparative hardship, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that house No. 137 Chak did not belong to petitioner. It belonged to his mother, and in any case, the said house had no vacant and available accommodation for the petitioner to occupy, and that consequently the courts below erred in taking that house into account against the petitioners. I find no substance in this argument either. 22. The courts below were called upon to compare the hardship likely to be caused to the two parties. They found that there were the landlords who were compelled by circumstances to reside in accommodations which were entirely insufficient, unsuitable and unsatisfactory for the members of the family of the landlords. It was further found that the landlords had no other accommodation available with the to satisfy their needs. The courts below have then noted that the tenants are substantial business men and that their mother has a house in close vicinity, namely, house No. 137 which has sufficient accommodation into which the tenants could easily shift. 23. Even if that house did not belong to the petitioner in strict legal sense, in comparing the hardship likely to be caused to the two parties, the courts below cannot be said to have committed any illegality in considering the fact that the petitioner's own mother owned and possessed a big double storeyed house, and that there was no reason to think that the petitioner would not be accommodated in that house. This finding is based upon the Commissioner's report and the evidence of the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any error of law in the finding recorded by the courts below that house No. 137 was big enough to accommodate the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that the house did not belong to the petitioner cannot be a sufficient ground for setting aside the findings recorded by both the courts below that as between the landlord and the tenant, it is the former who would suffer greater hardship. 24. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that the house did not belong to the petitioner cannot be a sufficient ground for setting aside the findings recorded by both the courts below that as between the landlord and the tenant, it is the former who would suffer greater hardship. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the end also submitted that the premises in question consists of only one room, and that consequently the need of the landlords could not be satisfied, in any case, by the release of the premises in their favour. I find no force in this submission either. In the first place, in the counter-affidavit, the allegation that the premises in dispute consist of only one room has been denied. It has been asserted that the premises in dispute consist of two big rooms, a verandah, a kitchen bath room and latrine, as well as the staircase connecting the first floor of the house. Secondly, both the courts below before whom a similar argument was advanced have observed that if the petitioner and his brothers along with their families could reside in the premises in dispute, as well as carry on business there was no reason to think why the landlords could also not similarly make use of the premises. The courts below have further observed that if the landlords found the accommodation inadequate, they could also undertake additions and alterations suiting their requirements and convenience. The view taken by the courts below is perfectly sound and calls for no interference. 25. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The petitioner is, however, granted three months' time to vacate the premises. He will hand over vacant possession -of the accommodation to the respondent landlords within this period.