Judgment The Regional Transport Authority, Hooghly at its meeting held on 8th August, 1970, resolved to grant two permits in favour of the two petitioners to ply stage carriage in Route No. 12-Serampore-Tarakuwar. The Regional Transport Authority by the said resolution rejected 23 other applications for grant of stage carriage permits in the said Route No. 12 including an application of M/s. Das Brothers Transport Corporation, the respondent No. 3. 2. The respondent being aggrieved by the said order dated 8th August, 1970 of the Regional Transport Authority preferred an appeal under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with Rule 84 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rule, 1940. The appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority by its Offer dated 27th August, 1975 allowed the said appeal of M/s. Das Brothers Transport Corporation and ordered that their case for the grant of a permit for stage carriage in Route No. 12 be remanded to R.T.A., Hooghly, for re-consideration in accordance with law. Till further consideration of the matter status quo in respect of the plying of the buses of the petitioners was directed to be maintained. The petitioners being aggrieved by the said decision of the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority (Annexure 'B' to the petition) has obtained this Rule. 3. Mr. Patil, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has submitted that the Appellate Sub-Committee acted without jurisdiction by remanding the matter to the Regional Transport Authority because the said appellate authority neither under Section 64 of the Act nor under Rule 84 of the Bengal Motor Vehicle rules had any such power to remand. Secondly, Mr. Palit submitted that the order of the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority was also erroneous on merits. 4. The second point urged by Mr. Palit may be disposed of shortly. The Appellate Sub-Committee in its impugned order has held that the R.T.A. in its order dated 8th August, 1970 did not explicitly state the grounds for rejecting the application of the respondent No. 3 herein. The R.T.A. merely mentioned that serial Nos. 8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 21, 23 and 24 did not possess requisite qualifications. But what qualifications the appellants should have possessed for being eligible were not mentioned. The R.T.A. merely mentioned that serial Nos. 8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 21, 23 and 24 did not possess requisite qualifications. But what qualifications the appellants should have possessed for being eligible were not mentioned. The disposal by the R.T.A. of the application for grant of permit in Route No. 12 was in a rolled up manner which has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court. Therefore, I find that the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority did not commit any error of jurisdiction by setting aside the order dated 8th August, 1970 for granting permits in favour of the present petitioners. 5. I may now take up the question whether the Appellate Sub-Committee had acted without jurisdiction by remanding the matter and directing the R.T.A. to again consider the grant of permits for stage carriage in Route No. 12 in accordance with law. In this connection, Mr. Palit strongly relied upon the decision of B.N. Banerjee, J. in (1) Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta v. State Transport Authority & Others, reported in 70 CWN 341. The learned Judge held that the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority has neither statutory nor inherent Jurisdiction to make an order of remand to the Regional Transport Authority. Therefore, it must decide the case itself, even it has to make further enquiries, keeping in view section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The above decision in Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta's case (supra), would be binding upto me sitting singly unless the said decision stands expressly or impliedly over-ruled either by a larger Bench of this Court or by a decision of the Supreme Court. 6. Mr. Malay Kumar Basu, appearing on behalf of the Regional Transport Authority, has drawn my attention to several decisions of other High Courts in viz. (2) P. Abdul Azeez, Belary, v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal & Ors. AIR 1962 Mysore 31, (3) Surendra Mohan Chaurasiva v. State Transport Appellate Authority & Ors., AIR 1970 M.P. 230 , (4) Smt. Kanakamal v. Thiru K.L. Narasimham, AIR 1972 Mad. 226 and (5) T.M. Rangappa & Bros and Ors. v. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal & Ors. A.I.R. It is unnecessary for me to consider at length these decisions of the different High Courts dealing with the scope of powers of the appellate authority under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 226 and (5) T.M. Rangappa & Bros and Ors. v. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal & Ors. A.I.R. It is unnecessary for me to consider at length these decisions of the different High Courts dealing with the scope of powers of the appellate authority under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As already observed, sitting singly I am bound to follow a precedent of this Court unless the same is contrary to the law or as laid down by the Supreme Court. 7. Undoubtedly, the right of appeal is a creature of statute. Therefore, the extent of powers of the appellate body would be governed by the provisions relating to such appeal. In the absence of any limitation imposed by the relevant statute the appellate body acts as a court of error. It is also well settled that unless the relevant law expressly or impliedly impose restrictions the appellate body enjoys all the powers of the trial authority. 8. I may now proceed to examine the scope of Section 64 or the Motor Vehicles Act and Rule 84 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, to ascertain whether these provisions of law curtail or restrict the powers of the appellate authority. Under Sub-section (1) of Sec. 64, the appellate tribunal after giving the appellant and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, "give decision thereon which shall be final". Section 64 does not define the powers of the appellate authority. It only sets out the circumstances in which appeal lies. The Supreme Court in (6) Ram Gopal v. Anant Prasad and another, AIR 1959 SC 851 , had observed that if an appeal lies under any of the clauses other than clause (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 64, the same must be an effective appeal and the appellate authority must, therefore, have all powers to give relief to which the appellant is found entitled. Section 64 was not concerned with the defining the powers of the appellate authority. Clause (f) of Section 64 did not in any way restrict the powers of the appellate tribunal to grant all proper reliefs in an appeal which is competent under clause (a) of the Section. 9. Rule 84 or the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules does not purport to our tail or restrict the appellate authority under Section 64. Clause (f) of Section 64 did not in any way restrict the powers of the appellate tribunal to grant all proper reliefs in an appeal which is competent under clause (a) of the Section. 9. Rule 84 or the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules does not purport to our tail or restrict the appellate authority under Section 64. It is Section 64 which creates the jurisdiction and the rules only indicate the mode in which it is to be exercised. Therefore, rules cannot be applied to restrict the provisions contained in Section 64. In fact, Rule 84(d) by providing that the appellate authority may confirm, vary or set aside the order against which an appeal is preferred as intended to clarify and elucidate that the appellate authority enjoyed all the powers which are normally and ordinarily exercised by an appellate body. Secondly, the express power of the appellate authority to confirm, vary or set aside include all incidental and implied powers for giving effect to the aside appellate powers. In the event the appellate authority decides to set aside the order appealed against, the appellate authority is further required to given consequential directions to implement its decision. In a particular case, it might oat be reasonably practicable to finally dispose of a case and a remand to the trial authority would be not only desirable but incumbent. 10. The basis of the judgment of B.N. Banerjee, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta v. State Transport Authority & Ors. (supra), is that the Rule 84 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 is a complete code. In the said case, the appellate sub-committee could have itself may, further enquiries and passed further orders as might be proper. Secondly, according to Banerjee J. the administrative tribunal unlike courts did not enjoy inherent powers. Therefore, statutory tribunals have no inherent powers to make orders on the plea of serving the ends of justice. At the same time, Banerjee J. himself was inclined to hold that certain powers not expressly conferred upon the tribunal by statutes may be implied. Secondly, according to Banerjee J. the administrative tribunal unlike courts did not enjoy inherent powers. Therefore, statutory tribunals have no inherent powers to make orders on the plea of serving the ends of justice. At the same time, Banerjee J. himself was inclined to hold that certain powers not expressly conferred upon the tribunal by statutes may be implied. I have already pointed out that Section 64 of the said Act does not enumerate the different powers of the appellate tribunal and where it is not reasonably practicable for the appellate tribunal to finally dispose are case the tribunal after setting aside the order of the trial authority is bound to remand the case for fresh disposal. 11. In this case, the order of the lower authority having been set aside the proceeding relating to the grant of stage carriage permits in Route No. 12 revived and became pending. Therefore, it was necessary for the Appellate Sub-Committee to give directions for fresh consideration and disposal of the applications for the grant of state carriage in the said Route, even assuming that the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority could have itself considered the said applications and granted permits so persons found competent. But adopting such a course might have presented both legal and practical difficulties. In the present case only some of the applications for the Route No. 12 were parties in the appeal before the Appellate Sub-Committee of the Stats Transport Authority. Having found that the application of the appellant before it was not considered in accordance with law the Appellate Sub-Committee deciding that all the applications for grant of the stage carriage permit should be considered afresh in accordance with law. In the absence of all the necessary parties, there might have been serious obstacles in the way or the Appellate Sub-Committee itself considering the question of grant or the said permit. 12. In the instant case, the difficulties pointed out by B.N. Banerjee, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta's case (Supra), (at p. 348-49) did not arise. In the absence of all the necessary parties, there might have been serious obstacles in the way or the Appellate Sub-Committee itself considering the question of grant or the said permit. 12. In the instant case, the difficulties pointed out by B.N. Banerjee, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta's case (Supra), (at p. 348-49) did not arise. His Lordship had emphasised that the Rule 84 was a complete code because another view of the said provision might result in putting off grant of stage carriage permits indefinitely and thereby defecting the primary object for which instant case while remanding the matter to the Regional Transport Authority, the Appellate Sub-Committee had directed that the status quo be maintained by permitting the present petitioners to ply their vehicles in the route. Therefore, there was no question of any hardship to the traveling public or of any prejudice resulting disposing of the applications for stage carriage permits in the aforesaid Route No. 12. 13. B.N. Banerjee J. in Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta's case (Supra) among other decisions, had referred to the decision in (7) Yagsen Ram Prashad Khewat v. Chief Commissioner, Ajmer, reported in AIR 1956 Ajmer 41, but had declined to follow the same. The Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer in the said case had upheld the power of the Chief Commissioner to remand a case arising under Motor Vehicles Act. Subsequently, the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in (8) N.K. Dharamdas v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal of Kerala and others, reported in AIR 1963 Kerala 73 approved the said decision in Yagsen Ram Prasad Khewat (Supra), and held, inter alia, that the appellate authority under Sec. 64 of the Motor Vehicle Act has power to remand the case because such power was implicit in the power of the Appellate Court. The learned Judges of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court was of the view that such power of remand was incidental to and implicit in the appellate jurisdiction created by that section. 14. The Supreme Court in (9) Income-Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, reported in AIR 1969 S.C. 430 held that the appellate tribunal under sections 254 and 255 etc. of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 had power to grant stay as incidental and ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. 14. The Supreme Court in (9) Income-Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, reported in AIR 1969 S.C. 430 held that the appellate tribunal under sections 254 and 255 etc. of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 had power to grant stay as incidental and ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case among other cases with apparent approval referred to the decision of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in AIR 1963 Kerala 73 (vide page 434 of the reports). Some of the reasoning’s given by the said Full Bench decision were substantially the same with those given by the Supreme Court in M.K. Mohammad Kunhi's case (supra). The ratio of there two decisions is that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. The power or granting Stage, carriage permit in the said case, was held to be incidental and implied in the power of the appellate authority. Thus, the Supreme Court had approved the view taken by the Kerala Full Bench in AIR 1963 Kerala 73, relating to the power of remand of the appellate authority, under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The contra decision of B.N. Banerjee J. in Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta's case (supra), about the scope of the power of the appellate authority under section 64 of the Act is no longer good law because the same stands impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in AIR 1969 S.C. 430 . Incidentally and implied powers of the appellate authority under section 64 should be deemed to include a power to remand to the Regional Transport Authority. It is immaterial that the decision of Kerala High Court which was approved by the Supreme Court did not consider the scope of Rule 84 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, because if section 64 of the Act itself impliedly confers such power of remand upon the appellate body it would be immaterial that Rule 84 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules does or does not mention the said power of remand. I may, however, add that having regard to the wording of Section 60 of the Act and the authority under Rule 84 such power of remand must be considered as incidental and implied. 15. Mr. I may, however, add that having regard to the wording of Section 60 of the Act and the authority under Rule 84 such power of remand must be considered as incidental and implied. 15. Mr. Basu has also drawn my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (10) Abdul Rehman and others v. State Transport, Appellate Tribunal and Others, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 674 . In support of his submission that in case the State Transport Tribunal set aside the grant of the stage carriage permit by the Regional Transport Authority and remands the case, the Regional Transport Authority is required to consider not only the applications of there who were the parties to the said appeal but also the applications of other eligible persons. In Abdul Rehman and others v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra), the appellate tribunal had set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and had reminded the case for the reasons I need not go into. Therefore, the Regional Transport Authority had considered the applications of those persons whose cases had been remanded to it but had refuted to consider the case of one who did not prefer any appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Thereupon, the said persons preferred another appeal and while the appeal was pending the route was converted into an inter-regional route. The appellants sought for amendment for their original applications for amalgamated route and the tribunal accorded the prayer and also allowed the appeal. Being aggrieved by the said order an existing operator on the route had filed a writ petition in the High Court and the High Court had quashed the order of the tribunal. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court. It may be noted that no argument was made in the said case about the validity of the order of remand made on an earlier occasion. But the Supreme Court found that after such remand the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act did not commit any error of jurisdiction warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 16. For the foregoing reasons I am not prepared to interfere with the order of the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority impugned in this Rule. I, accordingly, discharge this Rule. There will be no order as to costs.