ORDER K.C. Agarwal, J. -This writ petition has been preferred by the Life Insurance Corporation of India against a judgment oF the II Additional District Judge, Kanpur, dated 11-2-1955. dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioner against an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, dated 17-5-1973. 2. The Life Insurance Corporation of India was a corporation established under the Life Insurance Corporation Act 1956. The object of the Act was to provide nationalisation of business in India by transferring all such business to a Corporation established for the purpose and to provide for the regulation and control of the business of the Corporation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. With effect from September, 1, 1956 the Life Insurance, Corporation of India was established by virtue of Section 3 of the Act. It was provided that the Corporation shall be the body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property and may by its name, sue and be sued. The petitioner Life Insurance Corporation has its Central Office at Bombay and Zonal offices at several places including Kanpur. Since the Central Zonal office at Kanpur controls territories of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, a large number of employees are employed at its office, many of whom had to come from outside on transfer to Kanpur for the purpose. A group of properties, known as Free India Estate, consisting of 59 tenements including 29 bungalows and/or cottages, out-houses and garages, were owned by the Free India Insurance Company Limited at Kanpur. All the apartments had been let out to various tenements. On the enforcement of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the aforesaid property vested in the Life Insurance Corporation of India. 3. One of the quarters of the said building, which was quarter No. 47, fell vacant. Thereupon, the Life Insurance Corporation of India filed an application for its release on the ground that the same was required by it for housing an officer. The application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the premises was allotted. Against the said order, the Corporation preferred an appeal to the District Judge. The appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, on 11-2-1975. Being aggrieved, the Life Insurance Corporation of India filed the present writ petition. 4. The application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the premises was allotted. Against the said order, the Corporation preferred an appeal to the District Judge. The appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, on 11-2-1975. Being aggrieved, the Life Insurance Corporation of India filed the present writ petition. 4. Sri R. P. Goel counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 did not apply to the building in view of Section 2 (1) (f) of the unamended Act, hence the allotment made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was invalid. Alternatively, counsel urged that in view of the amendment of Section 2 of the aforesaid Act by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976, the Act ceased to apply to the petitioners building, and as such, the allotment order was invalid. In this regard, counsel also urged that the Amending Act No. 28 of 76 was inoperative. 5. After hearing counsel for the parties, since I propose to allow the writ petition on other grounds, it is not necessary for me to decide whether the original Act as it stood before the Amending Act 28 of 1976, covered the building belonging to the Life Insurance Corporation of India. By Section 2 (a) (2), the following clause amongst others was substituted:- (a) any public building or In clause (f) the words "by a University or any other statutory Corporation or" shall be omitted. Clauses (o) and (p) of Section 3 gave the' definition of words "public building" and "Public sector corporation". The definition of the expression "Public building" includes a building belonging to a corporation owned or controlled by the Government. A combined reading of all these provisions will show that after the amendment made by U. P. Act No. 28 of 76, the building belonging to a "Public sector corporation" is exempt from the operation of the Act. The result would, thus, be that U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to it. 6. In the instant case I have already stated above that by Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, the Life Insurance Corporation of India was established. Section 6 lays down the general title of the Corporation which was inter alia, to carry on, life insurance whether outside or inside India. 6. In the instant case I have already stated above that by Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, the Life Insurance Corporation of India was established. Section 6 lays down the general title of the Corporation which was inter alia, to carry on, life insurance whether outside or inside India. In view of the various provisions of this Act, such as Sections 4, 5, 6B, 11, 12, 15, 17 and 21 make it abundantly clear that the corporation is owned and controlled by the Central Government. In the discharge of its duties, and functions, under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, it is required to be guided by such directions and matters of policy involving public interest, as the Central Government may issue in writing. Accordingly the Life Insurance Corporation is a public sector corporation within the meaning of that expression defined in the U. P. Act No. 28 of 76. The building, is therefore, exempt from the operation of the Act. 7. In Om Kumar v. District Judge, 1980 (UP) RCC 9 : (1979 UPLT NOC 52), a Division Bench of this Court, held:- "It is obvious from the said provisions that the legislature intended to release the State Government, local authority, public sector corporation and a recognised educational institution from the effect of order of eviction passed under cl. (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the principal Act.............." The above was a case where the division bench was called upon to consider the applicability of Section 21 (1) (a) to a building which had been let out to the Punjab National Bank as a tenant. After having accepted the contention raised on behalf of the Punjab National Bank that Section 21 (II (a) did not apply to a building let out to a public sector corporation, the division bench held that the landlord of that case was entitled to get a release order made in his favour under S. 21 (1) (a). The Division Bench also held that the amendment made in Section 2 (1) (a) exempting a public building was retrospective. 8. Although the aforesaid was a case where the Punjab National Bank was the tenant but on the view taken in this case, it would have to be found that the provisions of the Act did not apply even to a building belonging to a public sector corporation. 8. Although the aforesaid was a case where the Punjab National Bank was the tenant but on the view taken in this case, it would have to be found that the provisions of the Act did not apply even to a building belonging to a public sector corporation. The definition of the words "Public building" given in S. 3 (i) makes that point clear. The inescapable result, therefore, is that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction or power to allot the disputed building. The allotment order is rendered invalid. 9. That apart even on merits, the order of the learned Additional District Judge is not correct. The learned Additional District Judge incorrectly held that since the building was not required for occupation of the corporation itself but for its officers, the application for release could not be granted. The quarter was a residential one, and as such, the need of an officer to occupy it, could be a ground for releasing it in favour of the Life Insurance Corporation. The requirement of a building for an employee working in the corporation could be the requirement of the landlord. The Additional District Judge, committed an error in holding that although such a need could not be that of the Life Insurance Corporation, but as steps have not been taken by the corporation for release of its quarters and flats, the application could not be granted. The view taken by the learned Additional District Judge does not seem to be correct. For getting the disputed quarter released in its favour on the ground of its bona fide requirement, the corporation was not required to give reasons as to why it did not take steps in the past or simultaneously with the application made in the present case for release. The need for this quarter had to be decided on its own merits without being affected from the fact that the corporation did not take steps to get the other accommodations vacated. 10. The petitioner was not an individual and was not expected to occupy the premises personally. It could only be either for its office or for its employees. The need for this quarter had to be decided on its own merits without being affected from the fact that the corporation did not take steps to get the other accommodations vacated. 10. The petitioner was not an individual and was not expected to occupy the premises personally. It could only be either for its office or for its employees. If the petitioner required the apartment in question for the residence of its officers, the need of the officer would be a requirement "by the landlord for occupation by himself" within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 16 (See LIC of India v. Jalpat Rai Bhatia, 1976 (UP) RCC 329). 11. Next point raised by the respondent was that since the amendment made by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 in excluding the properties of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, suffers from the vice of discrimination. The amendment made in the said provision is ultra vires to the Constitution. Counsel urged that by treating the building of the Life Insurance Corporation differently than those of private individuals, the legislature has created an artificial clause which has no nexus with the objects to be achieved. Consequently, the amendment made was liable to be struck down. The argument has no merit. 12. Article 14 of the Constitution does not permit classification of persons falling in the same category. The law now is settled that the legislature has power of making special laws to attain particular end, and for that purpose, it may select or classify persons and things upon which such law could operate. The further requirement is that it must be a real distinction, bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object of legislature and is not a mere arbitrary selection. In other words, the classification to be valid and permissible must satisfy a double test. It must be found on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes those are to be put together from others, and that the differentia must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved. It has been held in State of Rajasthan v. Mukanehand. AIR 1964 SC 1633 that where a statute according to special treatment of Government or other public bodies, is challenged on the ground of discrimination, the validity of statute has to be judged by applying this double test. 13. It has been held in State of Rajasthan v. Mukanehand. AIR 1964 SC 1633 that where a statute according to special treatment of Government or other public bodies, is challenged on the ground of discrimination, the validity of statute has to be judged by applying this double test. 13. In the instant case, the U. P. Act No. 28 of 76 exempts the public building from the operation of the Act. The words "public building" mean any building belonging to or taken on lease or acquisition by or on behalf of Central Government or a State Government and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation. From the above definition, it would be found that the buildings excluded were those of. 1. Central Government 2. State Government. 3. Local Authority, and 4. Public Sector Corporation. 14. The expression "Public sector corporation" has been defined in Section 3 (b). This covers any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. 15. From the above, it would appear that exemption is only with respect to buildings belonging to specified classes which stand differently from the private individuals. What is forbidden by Art. 14 is that the same amongst equals cannot be given favoured treatment. In my opinion, the Life Insurance Corporation cannot be compared with a private individual. Therefore, the building of Life Insurance Corporation could be lawfully excluded from the operation of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The exclusion of these buildings would not attract Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is not uncommon to find legislature according special treatment, to Government or other public bodies and such legislation has been upheld by the Supreme Court in numerous cases. In Northern India Caterers (PI Ltd. v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1967 SC 1581 ) Bachawat J., in his minority judgment, has referred to several such decisions. For this purpose. reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Baburao Shantaram v. Bombay Housing Board, AIR 1954 SC 153 in which the validity of exemption of premises belonging to the Government or a local authority from the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, was upheld. There are a number of other decisions dealing with this controversy. It is, however, not necessary to refer to them. There are a number of other decisions dealing with this controversy. It is, however, not necessary to refer to them. It would suffice to mention that in all those decisions, the law providing for special treatment to Government or other public bodies was held not to be discriminatory. 16. The second test required to be satisfied was that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. The object sought to be achieved was to make the building available to the Government and Life Insurance Corporation so that the public interest was more appropriately served. As a result of exemption, the bar imposed for evicting a tenant could not apply to these buildings. This would entitle the Life Insurance Corporation and other bodies for taking steps to recover possession of the premises let out and to use them for more beneficent public purposes. Further, the buildings could not be allot-table. That would subserve the purpose of the public bodies needing those buildings for their own occupation. It the provisions of U. P. Act No. 28 of 76 dealing with the exemption of public building are properly construed, the same could not be said to be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 17. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ramana v. I. A. Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 (1629). The Supreme Court field that Air India Corporation was the instrumentality or agency of Government, it would, in the exercise of its power or discretion, be subject to the same constitutional or public limitations as Government. Consequently according to this view, the rule inhibiting arbitrary action by the Government applied equally to a case of Corporation which deals with the public. The present is a case altogether different than the said one. There is nothing in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 (598) which could help the respondent in getting the impugned amendment struck down. In this case, the Supreme Court held that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality. That question does not arise in the present case. In the present case no executive action of the Government has been challenged on the ground of being hit by Article 14. 18. In this case, the Supreme Court held that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality. That question does not arise in the present case. In the present case no executive action of the Government has been challenged on the ground of being hit by Article 14. 18. Next reliance has been placed on Northern India Caterers v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1581 . Since this case has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer, Delhi, AIR 1972 SC 2205 , it is not necessary for me to deal with it. In Hari Singhs case, the Supreme Court held that the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act providing for a summary proceeding of ejectment from Government premises was not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 19. State of Punjab v. Khan Chand, AIR 1974 SC 543 was a case where the Supreme Court found that East Punjab Move-able Property (Requisitioning) Act, conferred uncontrolled power on the State Government or the officers to requisition any movable property. Since no guideline has been given for the object and purpose, for which it could be requisitioned, the Supreme Court struck- down the provisions of the said Act. There is nothing in this decision which could be of any assistance to respondent. 20. Apart from the decisions mentioned above, I wish, to refer to a Full Bench judgment of our High Court reported in Dr. Shamshuddin v. (Smt.) Dr. Zaibunmsa, 1979 All Rent Cas 311: (1979 All LJ 718). In this case, the validity of R. 11 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 had been challenged. The said rule provided, amongst others, priority in the course of allotment to a Government servant. Its validity was upheld on the ground that the need of a Government servant to live in the house was a public purpose. It was found that allotment of a premises for the residence of a Government servant was to be treated differently than that of others. Reference has been made to a number of decisions in support of this view. It is not necessary for me to refer to those cases at this place. 21. For what I have said above, I do not find any merit in this submission. 22. Reference has been made to a number of decisions in support of this view. It is not necessary for me to refer to those cases at this place. 21. For what I have said above, I do not find any merit in this submission. 22. Counsel for the respondent has filed an affidavit stating that the Life Insurance Corporation of India has been accepting rent of the premises in dispute since June 1, 1973. I am not called upon to decide the consequence of this acceptance. The limited controversy before me was about the validity of allotment order made in favour of the contesting respondents. I have held it to be invalid. Whether any contractual obligation arises from the acceptance of rent is not to be answered in these proceedings. 23. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the Additional District Judge dated 11-2-75 and that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 17-5-73 are quashed. As a result thereof, the allotment order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall stand set aside. The petitioner will be entitled to get costs from the contesting respondent.