JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is against the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh, dated 24 7.73. 2. The petitioner was recorded in the basic year as sirdar and the contesting opposite parties were found in possession, hence in C.H. Form 4 it was indicated that the contesting opposite parties were claiming co-tenancy right in the disputed land. The Consolidation Officer and the appellate authority had negatived the claim of the contesting opposite parties nos. 3 and 4, namely Raj Narain and Mahadeo. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate authority the contesting opposite parties Raj Narayan and Mahadeo preferred a revision petition which was allowed by the revisional court through its judgment dated 24.7.73. The petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that there was no written objection filed by the contesting opposite parties hence their claim was wrongly recognised by the revisional court and bar of Section 11A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act would stand in the way of the recognition of the claim of the contesting opposite parties. 4. Secondly, he has contended that no plea of estoppel and acquiescence was taken by the contesting opposite parties, hence the revisional court has patently erred in recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted in reply that in the circumstances of the present case when they had put forward their claim of co-tenancy and their claim was noted in C.H. Form 4, it was not at all necessary for the contesting opposite parties to have filed any written objection before the Consolidation Officer. 6. Secondly, he has also submitted that on findings of fact arrived at by the consolidation authorities that the contesting opposite parties were in possession over the disputed land and had paid rent, technical plea of raising bar of estoppel and acquiescence should not stand in the way of the contesting opposite parties. He has emphasised that on the facts found the contesting opposite parties demonstrated that they were entitled to claim of co-tenancy right on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence and according to him it was rightly accepted by the revisional court. 7. He has emphasised that on the facts found the contesting opposite parties demonstrated that they were entitled to claim of co-tenancy right on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence and according to him it was rightly accepted by the revisional court. 7. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. In the circumstances of the present case I am of the view that if no written objection was filed by the contesting opposite parties it would not stand in the way of the consolidation authorities to investigate into the claims put forward by the contesting opposite parties. The contesting opposite parties had put forward their claim of co-tenancy right before the consolidation authorities and their claim was noted in C.H. Form 4 and the case was fought out on the basis of that claim before the consolidation authorities. In the circumstances of the present case no question of bar of Section 11A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 arises. The aforesaid Section reads as below :- "No question in respect of- (i) claim to land ; (ii) portion of joint holding ; and (iii) valuation of plots, trees, wells and other improvements while the question is sought to be raised by a tenure-holder of the plot or the owner of the wee, well or other improvements recorded in the annual register under Section 10, relating to (he consolidation area, which has been raised under Section 9 or which might or ought to have been raised under the Section but has not been so raised, shall be raised or heard in subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings." 8. The present writ petition arises out of proceeding under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hence no question of applicability. The contesting opposite parties had put forward their claim and that claim was referred to by the Assistant Consolidation Officer, before the Consolidation Officer, who has decided the claims of the parties. To my mind the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding want of written objection in the present case appears devoid of any merits and deserves to be rejected. 9. To my mind the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding want of written objection in the present case appears devoid of any merits and deserves to be rejected. 9. As regards the petitioner's claim about the recognition of the right of tho contesting opposite parties on the basis of estoppel and a j quiescence, it is proper to direct the attention of the revisional court to the ruling reported in Kalawati Devi v. Consolidation Officer, Achnera, District Agra and others, 1968, R.D. 45. wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court has observed as below :- ".........Hence sirdar could not transfer or permit another to be a co-sharer in the sirdari holding directly. He could not do it indirectly by acquiescence or estoppel." 10. In the present case, it is not disputed before me that the disputed land is sirdari land. In view of the above extract from the ruling mentioned supra it is evident that the revisional court has patently erred in recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the circumstances of the present case in the absence of written objection plea of estoppel and acquiescence could not be taken nor could be accepted by the revisional court. If in law the opposite parties could acquire co-tenancy right on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence, they could demonstrate to the revisional court that they had acquired that right on the basis of the materials before the revisional court. In the present case all the consolidation authorities have recorded categorical findings to the effect that the contesting opposite parties had been in possession over the disputed land and had paid rent in respect thereof. In such circumstances, the contesting opposite parties could demonstrate that they could acquiescence if the disputed land had not been sirdari land but had been Bhumidhari land. It is well known that strict rules of pleadings are inapplicable to the proceedings before the consolidation authorities. They are required to do substantial justice between the parties without adhering to the technicalities. In such circumstances, the contesting opposite parties could demonstrate that they could acquiescence if the disputed land had not been sirdari land but had been Bhumidhari land. It is well known that strict rules of pleadings are inapplicable to the proceedings before the consolidation authorities. They are required to do substantial justice between the parties without adhering to the technicalities. In view of what I have said above, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the plea of estoppel and acquiescence could not be urged or accepted by the revisional court due to not taking specific plea in writing before the Consolidation Officer. In the present case the contesting opposite parties had taken specific plea of estoppel and acquiescence before the appellate authority and it also appears that they had taken such a plea before the revisional court. However, the disputed land is Sirdari land and in view of the ruling mentioned supra, the opposite parties cannot acquire sirdari right therein, hence the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed. 11. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the revisional court dated 24-7-73 in Raj Naravan and another v. Baiju and others, Revision No. 7710 of 1973 is hereby quashed and the revisional court is directed to re-examine the claim of the parties afresh in the light of the materials on record and in accordance with law. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.