JUDGMENT K. N. Goyal, J. - These three writ petitions have been filed by the Management of an Intermediate college or by the Society running these institutions and arise out of proceedings taken against the Principal of the institution. The relevant facts may be briefly stated as follows :- On 24th November, 1947, the Committee of Management passed a resolution appointing a sub-committee for enquiring into certain allegations against Sri Ram Het Singh, the Principal. The sub- committee was asked to prepare a charge-sheet in respect of those allegations and to hold a formal inquiry and to report to the Committee of Management. This is Annexure 4, to the Writ Petition No. 298 of 1979, the last of the three petitions. For the sake of convenience, all documents, unless otherwise identified, shall be referred to from the file of this writ petition only. On the same day, the sub-committee met and recommended to the committee of Management that the Principal be suspended pending inquiry. This resolution is Annexure 5. On the same day, Sri Singh applied for one month's leave which was granted to him. He also filed a suit for injunction in the Court of Munsif, Faizabad, to restrain the committee of Management from suspending him. No interim injunction was, however, granted by the court. Thereupon, he sent a telegram on 26th November, for cancellation of his leave and he also joined duty. On 28th November, the Committee of Management passed a resolution ordering the suspension of Sri Singh pending inquiry. This order is Annexure 6. It was mentioned in this resolution that the committee had considered the report of the sub-committee on this question. It was also provided in the order that Sri Singh should not leave the headquarters without permission of the Management and that he would get a subsistence allowance according to rules. Sri Singh allegedly evaded service of suspension order upon him. There upon. it was published in a local newspaper. the Jan Morcha, on 29th November, 1974. The sub-committee served a charge-sheet dated 14th/20th December, 1974, vide Annexure 8. In all, nine charges were framed against Sri Singh. On 6th/7th January, 1975, Sri Singh gave his reply, vide Annexure 9. He denied all the charges. With regard to charges Nos. 2 and 7, he further said that the charges were vague. The sub-committee served a charge-sheet dated 14th/20th December, 1974, vide Annexure 8. In all, nine charges were framed against Sri Singh. On 6th/7th January, 1975, Sri Singh gave his reply, vide Annexure 9. He denied all the charges. With regard to charges Nos. 2 and 7, he further said that the charges were vague. One of the charges was that in the year 1973-74, the Principal had received a sum of Rs. 400/- from the District Inspector of Schools for expenditure on students participating P. T. events in the Regional Sports and that he had not spent the full amount on those students, but had misappropriated part of the same. In this connection, the Manager sent a letter on 30th November, 1974. Annexure 11, to the District Inspector of Schools (for short, DIOS) requesting him to furnish relevant information relating to that grant of Rupees 400/- and its expenditure. The sub- committee started the oral inquiry on 26th May 1975; a copy of the proceedings is Annexure 10. Sri Singh was questioned by the sub-committee in respect of the charges. He admitted receipt of the sum of Rs. 400'- from the D. 1. O. S., but denied that he had not spent the full amount. While, according to the charge-sheet, he spent only Rupees 3001- out of Rs. 400/-, he stated that he had spent the entire amount on the students who participated in P. T. He also likewise repudiated the other allegations which were put to him. The inquiry was adjourned to 18th July, 1975. On that date, the sub-committee decided to await receipt of the information which had been sent for from the D. I. O. S. It was decided to send a reminder to the D. I. O. S. The proceedings are Annexure 12. On 8th September, 1975, the D. I. O. S., vide his letter. Annexure 13, replied to the Manager asking the latter to quote the relevant provisions of the Education Manual or the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, under which a copy of the documents mentioned in the Manager's letter dated 29th August, 1975, had been asked for. The letter dated 29th August, 1975, appears to have been a reminder issued in pursuance of the decision of the sub-committee dated 18th July, 1975. The letter of the D. I. O. S., was virtually a refusal to comply with the request of the Management. The letter dated 29th August, 1975, appears to have been a reminder issued in pursuance of the decision of the sub-committee dated 18th July, 1975. The letter of the D. I. O. S., was virtually a refusal to comply with the request of the Management. The sub-committee treating it as such, resumed the inquiry on 12th September. 1975. Oral evidence was recorded on that day, Sri Singh participated in the inquiry. A teacher, Sri Uma Shanker Singh, was examined. The Principal cross-examined this witness on 12th, 15th, 17th and 23rd September. Thereafter, the next meeting of the sub-committee for continuing with the inquiry was called for on 13th Oct. On that day, the Principal was absent and the sub-committee decided to adjourn the inquiry to 18th Oct. Information of the adjourned date was sent to Sri Singh by registered post but he did not appear and the meeting was adjourned to 23rd October. Information about this date was sent to his residence and it was published in the Jan Morcha as well. As he did not appear in spite of these attempts of the sub-committee to secure his presence, the sub-committee decided to proceed further with the inquiry ex parte. In the meantime, it may be stated here the D. I. O. S. passed an order on 3rd October, 1975, revoking the order of suspension dated 28th November, 1974. Against this order of the D. I. O. S., the Management filed Writ Petition No. 2322 of 1975, (the first of the three Writ Petitions). The sub-committee concluded the inquiry ex parte and examined several other witnesses and gave its report on 30th October, 1975, holding Sri Singh guilty of the various charges. This report is Annexure 28. The committee of Management met on 21st November, 1975, to consider the recommendations of the subcommittee. On this date, the Principal was also present and made oral sub- missions. After considering his submissions, the committee accepted the report of the sub-committee and decided to dismiss Sri Singh. This resolution is Annexure 30. On 28th November. 1975, the relevant papers were sent by the Committee to the D. I. O. S. seeking his approval. The D. I. O. S., by his order dated 22nd/24th April, 1976. Annexure 31, declined to grant approval. He held that Sri Singh had not been given a reasonable opportunity and he further held that the findings were incorrect. On 28th November. 1975, the relevant papers were sent by the Committee to the D. I. O. S. seeking his approval. The D. I. O. S., by his order dated 22nd/24th April, 1976. Annexure 31, declined to grant approval. He held that Sri Singh had not been given a reasonable opportunity and he further held that the findings were incorrect. On 27th May. 1976, the committee of Management filed an appeal with the Deputy Director of Education (for Short, D. D. E.) vide Annexure 32, against the order of the D. I. O. S. On 7th July, 1976, the D. I. O. S. passed an order requiring the Committee of Management to reinstate Sri Singh. This order was challenged by the Management by its writ petition No. 1994 of 1976, (the second of the three writ petitions). The Management also secured an interim order from this court staying the operation of the order of the D. I. 0., S. Ultimately, the Deputy Director dismissed the Management's appeal by order dated 20th December. 1978, Annexure 36. The Deputy Director passed a consequential order for reinstatement of Sri Singh on 27th December, 1978, vide Annexure 37. It was thereafter that the third petition mentioned at the outset was fled by the Management. 2. These writ petitions are contested by Sri Singh and also by the authorities concerned. 3. The first question that has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the D. I. O. S. has no appellate authority over the decision of the Management. There is a relationship of master and servant between the Society and the Principal and the Management acts as a domestic Tribunal. The findings of the domestic Tribunal should be treated as binding, and the D. I. O. S. or the Deputy Director cannot take a different view on the findings as if they had any appellate jurisdiction against the order of the Management. They cannot 'compel the institution to keep the teacher in service. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on Maclean v. Workers' Union (1929) 1 Ch. 602. at p. 620). Therein it was laid down, inter alia, that a domestic Tribunal is not required to act on what may strictly be construed as evidence. They cannot 'compel the institution to keep the teacher in service. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on Maclean v. Workers' Union (1929) 1 Ch. 602. at p. 620). Therein it was laid down, inter alia, that a domestic Tribunal is not required to act on what may strictly be construed as evidence. He also relied on State of Mysore v. Sivabasappa, ( AIR 1963 SC 375 ) (para 3) and State of Orissa v. Murlidhar Jena, ( AIR 1963 SC 404 ). 'These authorities are not, in our opinion, applicable to the case. They deal only with the jurisdiction of the courts over decisions of domestic Tribunals. Here the D. I. O. S. and the Deputy Director are exercising powers conferred on them by the Legislature. When power is given to the D. I. O. S. to approve or disapprove of an order of punishment or suspension, that authority is bound to sit in judgment over the decision of the Management. Jurisdiction of these authorities is not akin to the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. Although the proposal sent to the D. I. O. S. by the Management is for approval and the word 'appeal' is not mentioned in the statutory provisions, it is obvious that the D. I. O. S., as 'the authority required to take a decision on the proposal, can review the findings and also the validity of the proceedings. That jurisdiction is certainly wider than the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in a suit brought by an employee against the employer. 4. Sri S. L. Varma, learned counsel for the petitioner, also argued that the approval of the D. I. O. S., was required only for proposed punishment and not for finding. Accordingly, he contended that the D. I. O. S., could look only into the quantum of punishment and not into the question of guilt. The words "proposed punishment" are similar to the words "proposed action" occurring in Section 240 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as originally enacted. It was held in Khem Chand v. Union of India, ( AIR 1958 SC 300 ), following High Commr. The words "proposed punishment" are similar to the words "proposed action" occurring in Section 240 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as originally enacted. It was held in Khem Chand v. Union of India, ( AIR 1958 SC 300 ), following High Commr. for India v. I. M. Lall, (75 Ind App 225) : ( AIR 1948 PC 121 ), as follows:- "In order that the opportunity to show cause against the proposed action may be regarded as a reasonable one, it is quite obviously necessary that the Government servant should have the opportunity, to say if that be his case, that he has not been guilty of any misconduct to merit any punishment at all and also that the particular punishment proposed to be given is much more drastic and severe than he deserves. Both these pleas have a direct bearing on the question of punishment any may well be put forward in showing cause against the proposed punishment". 5. These observations are clearly attracted to interpretation of the words "proposed punishment" occurring in Section 16-G (3) of the Intermediate Education Act read with the Regulations. Accordingly, the finding of guilt is also within the jurisdiction of the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. 6. Learned counsel next placed his reliance on Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir ( 1979 (4) SCC 160 ) and on Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain ( AIR 1976 SC 888 ) :(1976 Lab IC 576) and also on our own decision in Writ Petri. No. 1106 of 1976 (Devendra Pratap v. District Co-operative Bank) decided on 12-9-1979 (All). In all these cases, it was the employee who had sought relief from the court and it was held that the courts were unable to compel the employer to keep him in service. Even though the termination of services may be in violation of statutory provisions regulating the conditions of service of employees, the relationship of master and servant was not capable of being specifically enforced, nor could according to our decision in Devendra Pratap (supra) the duties of the employer in such a situation be deemed to be duties of a public nature which could be enforced by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this court. In the instant case, however, it is the employer and not the employee who is seeking the assistance of this court. The employer is assailing the correctness of the order of public authorities. It is, therefore, for the employer to satisfy us that the order of the Public authorities are bad in law. We are not concerned herein with the situation when the employer may continue to flout the decision of the, authorities. We may assume without deciding, for the purposes of the present petitions, that if he does so, the Principal may not have a right to come to this Court to compel the Management to obey the orders of the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that if the employee cannot approach this court, the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. cannot give him relief either. This, in our view, is non- sequitur. It cannot be said that merely because the Court may not assist an employee in a situation like this, the court must allow the writ petition of the employer at his bidding without his showing the order of the statutory authorities to be illegal. 7. We, therefore, proceed to examine the validity of the impugned orders in the light of the legal position stated above. 8. The D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E., while holding that the proceedings before the sub-committee were vitiated by failure of natural justice, have also proceeded to go into the evidence and to reject the findings. Normally, in such circumstances, the proper course is to send the matter back to the punishing authority or enquiring authority instead of entering into the correctness of the findings. Of course, where the charges are patently illegal or otherwise untenable or on the face of them frivolous or trivial, or where the ex parte evidence recorded by the enquiring and punishing authority does not go to establish the ingredients of the charges, and the authority comes to the conclusion that a fresh inquiry would be merely an abuse of process or a waste of public time and money, then it may no doubt be open to the D. I. O. S. or the D. D. E. to quash the findings and the disciplinary proceedings as a whole. But where only ex- parte evidence has been recorded and; the charges are not suggested to be it-; legal or frivolous, it is not normally expected that the D. I. O. S. or the D. D. E. would go into the correctness of they findings by appraising the evidence and: the credibility of the witnesses. 9.The Deputy Director in his order,. Annexure 36, has on charge No. I expressed the view that because a copy of the complaint of students regarding non- expenditure of Rs. 400/- was not given to Sri Singh, and because opportunity was not given to Sri Singh to rebut the charge, therefore, the finding was in- correct. It has also been mentioned by the D. D. E. that the statements of some witnesses were recorded in the absence of Sri Singh and for that reason also the evidence should not have been accepted. This shows that the D. D. E., although. he divided his judgment into two parts, the first dealing with the question of opportunity in the context of Regulation 36, and the second dealing with the correctness of the findings, has, even while on the second subject, namely, the correctness of findings, arrived at his conclusion on the basis of his view with regard to the first. Again, on charge No. 2, he has observed that the statements of three students had been taken in the absence of Sri Singh. On charge No. 8, which related to an inflammatory speech allegedly given by Sri Singh to incite the students, it was observed by the D. D. E. that the statements had all been recorded in the absence of Sri Singh. Thus, the two concepts have been mixed up. If proper opportunity was not given, then the matter should have been remitted back for opportunity being given instead of holding that the evidence recorded behind the back of Sri Singh was legally not evidence at all and that therefore it could not have been considered by the Management. 10. Likewise, we find from the order 9f the D. I. O. S., Annexure 31, that he first came to the conclusion that Sri. Singh had not been given reasonable opportunity of hearing and thereafter he discussed the correctness of the findings. On charges Nos. 10. Likewise, we find from the order 9f the D. I. O. S., Annexure 31, that he first came to the conclusion that Sri. Singh had not been given reasonable opportunity of hearing and thereafter he discussed the correctness of the findings. On charges Nos. 1 and 2, he observed that as Sri Singh had not been given an opportunity of cross-examining the 'witnesses, therefore, the charges should be held not proved. Likewise, on charge No. 8 it was said that Sri Singh was not informed along with the charge-sheet of the evidence sought to be relied on against him and for that reason also, the charge should be held to be not proved. Thus, both the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. fell into the same error, namely, of mixing the question of opportunity with the question of credibility of the witnesses examined ex parte. 11. In doing so, both the authorities have also gone to the extent of criticising the statements of various witnesses recorded during the course of inquiry. As pointed out earlier, all the witnesses excepting one were not even cross- examined and there was no evidence in rebuttal given on behalf of Sri Singh. To hold all such witnesses untrustworthy merely on the basis of arguments advanced by Sri Singh in his replies submitted to the educational authorities as not fair to the witnesses. The principles of natural justice are, no doubt, applicable to an inquiry against a charged employee. They are equally applicable to the proceedings before the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. wherein both the Management and the employee are entitled to proper opportunity. Likewise, the principles of natural justice are also applicable to witnesses. One of the principles is embodied in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, which provides that if a witness is to be contradicted with reference to his previous statement, he should be given an opportunity of explanation. As regards the applicability of these principles to the testimony of wit- W)Passes, reference may be made to the Associated Cement Co. v. Workmen ( (1964) 3 SCR 652 ). As regards the applicability of these principles to the testimony of wit- W)Passes, reference may be made to the Associated Cement Co. v. Workmen ( (1964) 3 SCR 652 ). In this case, Gajendragadkar, J.(as he then was), speaking for the Supreme Court, observed as follows at page 664: "It would be noticed that each of the three reasons set out in the report in support of the conclusion that the version of Vishwa Nath's witnesses could pot be believed, introduces a serious infirmity in the enquiry and the report. The first reason refers to the fact that some of the witnesses cited by Vishwa Nath were absent from duty on Oct. 20, 1952. Now, it is plain that this fact had been ascertained by the officers from the attendant;e register and Vishwa Nath was not given an opportunity to give his explanation and a chance to produce the said witnesses to say what they had to say on the point. Besides, it is not unlikely that even if the witnesses may not have attended duty, they may have been able to depose to what happened near the gate on October 20, at 7 a.m. Therefore, the first reason on which the enquiry officers relied is based on information received by them from a register without notice to Vishwa Nath. The second reason is also open to serious challenge. When Bakhtawar Singh was examined, he was not asked why he was shown as on duty at 3 a.m. when in fact he claimed that he came to duty between 6.45 a.m. and 7 a.m. The rule that a witness should not be disbelieved on the ground of an inconsistency between his statement and another document unless he is given a chance to explain the said document, cannot be treated as a technical rule of evidence. The principle on which the said rule is based is one of natural justice, and so, it seems, that in disbelieving Bakhtawar Singh on a ground not put to him, the enquiry officers acted unfairly against Vishwa Nath." (Emphasis given)* 12. Likewise, in the instant case, what we find is that both the officers had chosen to criticise the testimony of the witnesses on various grounds. Likewise, in the instant case, what we find is that both the officers had chosen to criticise the testimony of the witnesses on various grounds. For instance, one teacher has been disbelieved on the ground that he was on casaal leave on the day on which he is said to have witnessed Sri Singh making the allegedly inflammatory speech. Another teacher has been disbelieved on the ground that he earlier had expressed grievance against the Principal and had said that the Principal was inimical towards him. Can it be said that a person who makes a complaint against an official, is an incompetent witness in an inquiry against the latter? He is very much a competent witness and his testimony cannot be rejected merely on the ground that in his complaint he had tried to demonstrate that the charged official was inimically inclined towards him. His testimony has to be considered on merits. He may no doubt, be cross- examined, and it may be put to him that he was giving false testimony on account of enmity, but without any opportunity of explanation, he cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that he had earlier made a complaint against the charged official. Likewise, the students have been disbelieved on the ground that they had not made a complaint for almost a year. About this also, *Emphasis not supplied in original. -Ed. the students were not cross-examined and were not asked to explain the delay. Thus, the orders of the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. are clearly unfair to the witnesses who have been disbelieved although neither were they cross-examined, nor was their testimony sought to be rebutted by other contrary evidence. 13. Thus, the two orders, in respect of the view taken therein about the findings on the charges, are clearly vitiated. The argument of learned counsel for Sri Singh, Sri D. S. Bajpai, was that this court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot interfere unless the orders of the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. were based on no evidence. Here, what we are considering is the correctness of the view taken by the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. in regard to the findings recorded by the sub-committee and the committee of Management. Here, what we are considering is the correctness of the view taken by the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. in regard to the findings recorded by the sub-committee and the committee of Management. This view was not based on any evidence taken by the D. I. O. S. but on reappraisal of the evidence. It is therefore, the reasoning of the D. 1. O. S. and the D. D. E. that has to be considered, and the question of there being no evidence in support of their conclusions on this part of the case does not arise. 14. The other question is whether the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. were correct in holding that the Management had not given a proper opportunity to the Principal. This finding has been assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri S. L. Varma, on two grounds. Firstly, it has been contended that the petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity by the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E to rebut any assertions made by Sri Singh, In para 41 of the third petition it was mentioned that Sri Singh did not file any reply before the D. I. O. S. or the D. D. E. to the knowledge of the petitioner and no copy was given to the petitioner. This assertion was found to he incorrect as the proceedings before the D. I. O. S. were placed before us by the learned State counsel and the proceedings showed that the Management had on 1st March, 1976 asked the O. I. O. S. to supply them with a copy of the reply of Sri Singh. The D. I. O. S. decided on 18th March, 1976, that no copy of the reply need be given to the Management. He however, added that it was open to 'the Management to inspect the same. 'Thereafter, the hearing continued and was concluded on 12th April, 1976. Thus, it is obvious that the Management were cognisant of the reply given by Sri Singh and the assertion in para 41 of the writ petition to the contrary was clearly wrong. The grievance of the petitioner was not that opportunity for inspecting the reply was not sufficient or that the Management was not actually allowed to inspect the reply. Thus, it is obvious that the Management were cognisant of the reply given by Sri Singh and the assertion in para 41 of the writ petition to the contrary was clearly wrong. The grievance of the petitioner was not that opportunity for inspecting the reply was not sufficient or that the Management was not actually allowed to inspect the reply. Accordingly, although it would have been preferable for the D. I. O. S. to have supplied a copy of the reply of Sri Singh to the Management, his failure to do so cannot be said to have caused prejudice to the Management. 15. The other question is whether the view taken by the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. that adequate opportunity was not given to Sri Singh was correct or not. The view taken by the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. that a copy of the support of, the sub-committee ought to have been given to Sri Singh is not supported by any specific provision in the regulations. In Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) it was held that there was no rigid requirement of natural justice that a copy of the inquiry report should be supplied to the charged official. Such a requirement is there in the case of Government servants who are governed by Article 311 of the Constitution, but the principle was not extended to other employees. It is, however, no doubt, desirable that a copy of the inquiry report ought to be given to the charged official so that he may make his submissions more effectively before the committee of Management under Regulation 37. In the instant case, however, Sri Singh also did not ask the Committee of Management for copy of the report. 16. Another ground taken by the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. for holding the inquiry to be vitiated was that the evidence that was to be adduced in support of the charges was not set out in the charge-sheet, and further that the charges were vague. It was also held that Sri Singh was not informed of the adjourned date of hearing for the inquiry, i.e., 23rd October, 1975, and onwards. It was also held that Sri Singh was not informed of the adjourned date of hearing for the inquiry, i.e., 23rd October, 1975, and onwards. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the orders of the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. on all these points. So far as the first two points are concerned we find no merit. It was open to Sri Singh to seek any detailed clarification in respect of the charges which are ex facie not vague. There is no rigid requirement that an extract of the evidence proposed to be given at the inquiry should be intimated along with the charge-sheet. All that is required is that the charged official should not be taken by surprise. The contents of the charges themselves indicated the nature of the evidence which was likely to be adduced. As regards the question whether Sri Singh was properly informed of the adjourned date and whether the Management knew of Sri Singh's absence from Faizabad and presence at Lucknow at the time the ex parte inquiry was conducted from 23rd October, 1975, onwards. these are questions of fact which have been considered by the two authorities. We are unable to hold that the view taken by the two authorities on these questions is based on no evidence. I We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the decisions of the two authorities on this question only. Accordingly, the proper order that should have been passed by the two authorities should have been to leave the matter open to the Management for further inquiry. Whenever any inquiry is quashed by an appellate or sanctioning authority on the ground of procedural error, it is always open to the original punishing authority to hold a fresh inquiry or to resume the inquiry from the stage it ,vas found vitiated. Reference may in this connection be made to the Supdt. {Tech. I) Central Excise v. Pratap Rai ( (1978) 3 SCC 113 ) : ( AIR 1978 SC 1244 ) and Chet Singh v. State of Punjab ( (1977) 2 SCC 499 ) : ( AIR 1977 SC 1494 ). Reference may in this connection be made to the Supdt. {Tech. I) Central Excise v. Pratap Rai ( (1978) 3 SCC 113 ) : ( AIR 1978 SC 1244 ) and Chet Singh v. State of Punjab ( (1977) 2 SCC 499 ) : ( AIR 1977 SC 1494 ). The same view has been taken by an- other Division Bench of this court to which one of us (Goyal, J.) was a party in unreported decisions in Gandhi Vidyalaya v. D. D. E. (Writ Petition No. 1730 of 1978) decided on 6-3-1979 (All), and Om Prakash Agrawal v. D. D. E. (Writ Petri, No. 1033 of 1977) decided on 13-4-1979 (All). In both these cases, the inquiry was found vitiated on account of violation of the relevant regulations and it was held that the Management was free to hold a fresh inquiry. 17. Accordingly, the third writ petition deserves to be partly allowed, and the two impugned orders of the D. I. O. S. and the D. D. E. respectively should be quashed in part. 18. The second writ petition was directed against the order of the D. I. O. S. dated 7th July, 1976, for reinstatement of Sri Singh. In view of the fact that the orders of the D. I. O. S. and that of the D. D. E. are being quashed in part, the matter will have to be considered a fresh by the D. I. O. S. Accordingly, this writ petition also deserves to be allowed In part. At this stage, we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion about the validity of the petitioner's contention 1 hat the D. I. O. S. or the appellate authority has no power to order reinstatement, a proposition in support of which he placed reliance on Bhushan Singh v. Public Inter College (1965 All LJ 1069). It will be open to the petitioner to urge this question before the D. I. O. S. who may take a proper decision in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Regulations on the subject. Regulation No. 45 and the provisions of the U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. ,may also be relevant in that connection. 19. The first writ petition is directed against the revocation of the order of suspension. Regulation No. 45 and the provisions of the U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. ,may also be relevant in that connection. 19. The first writ petition is directed against the revocation of the order of suspension. The impugned order is Annexure 7 to this writ petition. The D. I. O. S. has passed this order on the basis that disciplinary proceedings against Sri Singh were being delayed for no fault of Sri Singh. It has, however, been seen Above that the inquiry proceedings were delayed because of the attitude of the D. I. 0. S. himself in not supplying to the Management certain information which he was requested to do. No statutory provision was required in support of the request of the Management. There was nothing in law to prevent the D. I. O. S. from complying with that request. The letter of the D. I. O. S. dated 8th September, 1975, Annexure 13 to the third writ petition, showed an attitude of non-Co-operation. The D. I. O. S. is, no doubt, under a duty to protect teachers from victimisation or unfair dealing by any Management. The D. I. O. S. is, however, not expected to treat the Management as an accused person. The Management is perfectly justified in taking disciplinary proceedings on valid charges against its employees. The D. I. O. S., or the D. D. E. should not prejudge the issues either against the Management or against the teacher. They should consider each matter on merits. If the teacher is at fault, they should support the Management, and if the Management is at fault, they should protect the teacher. They should not be unduly obsessed by petty technicalities, but should look at the substance of the matter and should keep in mind, above all, the interest of the institution and its students as distinguished from the interest either of the Management or of any individual employee. From the chronology of events set out at the outset, it cannot be said that the Management was deliberately delaying the disciplinary proceedings. As the order has been passed on the basis of incorrect assumptions, it cannot stand. He should consider this matter also afresh in the light of all the circumstances. 20. From the chronology of events set out at the outset, it cannot be said that the Management was deliberately delaying the disciplinary proceedings. As the order has been passed on the basis of incorrect assumptions, it cannot stand. He should consider this matter also afresh in the light of all the circumstances. 20. Before parting with the case, we feel that the incorrect averment in para 41 of the third writ petition, which was supported by an affidavit of Sri K.K. Manocha on the basis of his own knowledge, should not be ignored. Writ petitions are decided on the basis of averments and affidavits and it is very necessary that deliberately false averments are not permitted to be made with impunity. It is even open to this court to decline any grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution where it is found that the petitioner has made a deliberate averment. In the instant case, we are not adopting that extreme course because the interests of the institution as distinguished from the interest of the particular members of the Management are involved. It appears prima facie that the person, who has sworn the affidavit, which has been found contrary to the official records shown to us by the learned State counsel at the time of the hearing, has committed an offence punishable under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. He shall, therefore, be asked to show cause why proceedings under Section 195 Cr. P. C., 1973, be not initiated against him. 21. In the result, we make the following order :- 1 (a) Writ Petition No. 298 of 1979 is allowed in part, and the Annexures 36 and 31, namely the orders of the D. D. E. and D. I. O. S. respectively dated 20th December, 1978, and 24th April, 1976, (together with the consequential order of the D. I. O. S. dated 30th April, 1976, which is Annexure 4 to the Writ Petition No. 1984 of 1976) are quashed to the extent they hold that the charges against respondent No. 3, Sri Ram Het Singh, were not proved. The said orders, only to the extent they hold that the said respondent was not given a reasonable opportunity of hearing from 23rd October, 1975, onwards are sustained. The Management shall be free to resume the inquiry from that stage in accordance with the relevant regulations. The said orders, only to the extent they hold that the said respondent was not given a reasonable opportunity of hearing from 23rd October, 1975, onwards are sustained. The Management shall be free to resume the inquiry from that stage in accordance with the relevant regulations. No order as to costs. (b) Issue notice returnable at an early date to Sri Kunwar Krishna Manocha to show cause why a complaint under Section 195 (1) (b) (i) Cr. P. C., 1973, be not filed against him in respect of an, offence punishable under Section 193 of the I. P. C. on the ground of his having made the following false statement in. para 2 of his affidavit dated 30th Jan,, 1979, read with para 41 of the writ petition, namely : "That Shri Ram Het Singh did not file any reply before the D. I. O. S or the Deputy Director to the knowledge of the petitioners." 2. Writ Petn. No. 2322 of 1975 is allowed in part. The order of the D. I. O. S. dated 3rd October, 1975, Annexure 7, is quashed. The D. I. O. S. shall consider the question of approval or revocation of the order of suspension pending inquiry afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in this judgment. No order as to costs. 3. Writ Petition No. 1984 of 1976 is allowed in part. The order of the D. I. O. S. dated 7th July, 1976. Annexure 5, is hereby quashed. The D. I. O. S. shall consider the question of ordering rein- statement of Sri Singh afresh after deciding the question of approval or revocation of the order of suspension pending inquiry as directed in writ petition No. 2322 of 1975. No order as to costs.