JUDGMENT : R.B. Misra, J. The present petition has been filed after 169 days, beyond 90 days. The Petitioner has tried to explain the delay in paragraph 17 of the writ petition. All that has been said in that paragraph is that the record from the Court of the Civil Judge was received in the office of Naib Tahsildar (Ceiling) Muzaffarnagar on 6-5-1980 along with a copy of the judgment of the learned Civil Judge dated 12-11-1979. The file was immediately sent to the District Government Counsel (Civil) for his opinion on the same date. The opinion of the District Government Counsel (Civil) was received on 9-6-1980. After receiving the opinion of the District Government Counsel (Civil) the matter was referred to the Law Department for its sanction on 18-6-1980. The sanction was obtained from the Law Department on 15-7-1980 which received in the office of the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar on 18-7-1980. The official was immediately sent to the office of the Chief Standing Counsel on 22-7-1980. 2. A bare perusal of the averments made in paragraph 17 indicates that this paragraph deals how the file moved from one place to another. But this is hardly an explanation for the unusual delay of 169 days. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, however, has contended that a lenient view of the matter should be taken in respect of the writ petition filed on behalf of the State and in support of his contention he referred to a large number of cases. To start with learned Counsel has cited General Manager, U.P. Govt. Roadways, Bareilly Region and Another Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1971 All 263 . A single Judge of this Court dealing with a preliminary objection to the Writ petition being barred by limitation has observed: This preliminary objection is, however, devoid of any force for the simple reason that no limitation for filing a Writ petition is prescribed by any law. It is only discretionary with the Court not to entertain a Writ petition on the ground of laches, if the Petitioner approaches the Court after an undue delay of the passing of the impugned order. In the present case, the Bench while admitting the Writ petitions was satisfied that the delay had been explained and that there were no laches on the part of the Petitioners. In the present case, the Bench while admitting the Writ petitions was satisfied that the delay had been explained and that there were no laches on the part of the Petitioners. Hence this objection is no more open to the contesting opposite party at this stage. 4. That case is of no help to the Standing Counsel inasmuch as in that case while admitting the Writ petition the learned Judge has condoned the laches and entertained the Writ petition. Therefore, the objection about the laches in filing the Writ petition could not be availed of at the time of final hearing. In the present case we are concerned with the entertainment of the Writ petition at the preliminary hearing. Therefore, on facts that case has no application to the present case. Besides, the explanation given in paragraph 17 in the Writ petition hardly explains the unusual delay. 5. Next reliance was placed on Damodar Goswami Vs. Narnarayan Goswami and Others, AIR 1955 Guw 163. A Division Bench of the Assam High Court dealing with the question of delay in presenting the Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution held: The question of delay is a very potent factor to be taken into account in throwing out an application for a Writ of certiorari in limine; but after the issue of a rule nisi when the Court has examined the record and is satisfied that the order complained of is manifestly erroneous and illegal or without jurisdiction, the High Court would be loath to allow the mischief of the order to continue and reject the application simply on the ground of delay, unless there are very extraordinary reasons to justify such rejection. 6. This case is also distinguishable. In the Assam case also the Writ petition had been admitted and then an objection was sought to be raised at the time of the final hearing that the Writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches. The objection was over-ruled. In the present case the Stamp Reporter has reported that the Writ petition has been filed after an undue delay and therefore, the court is reluctant to entertain the Writ petition unless it is satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown; but the averments made in paragraph 17 of the Writ petition hardly show any sufficient cause for the condonation of the unusual delay. 7. 7. Next reliance was placed on Ahmed Hassan v. The Chief Commissioner for Manipur AIR 1966 Man 18. The same principle was reiterated by the Manipur Court also when it observed: It is well-settled rule of practice that an application by way of Writ of certiorari or other Writ should be filed within a reasonable time from the date of the order which the Applicant seeks to be quashed. In appropriate circumstances, the High Court certainly has the power to excuse the delay. In this case though there was delay in filing the Writ petition but the Writ was admitted as there were certain debatable points. As it was admitted after condoning delay, it cannot be dismissed now on that ground. 8. Next reliance was placed on Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1974 SC 259 . Dealing with the delay in filing the Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the Supreme Court observed: The rule which says that a Court may not inquire into belated or stale claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. The question is one of discretion to be followed on the facts of each case. It may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the Petitioner on ground of laches or delay in that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there was reasonable explanation for the delay. It may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned the rule of a sentinel on the survive for protection of the fundamental right cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like. 9. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed for filing a Writ petition in the Limitation Act or in the Constitution itself. 9. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed for filing a Writ petition in the Limitation Act or in the Constitution itself. However, the practice has been to dismiss or not to entertain the petition after a long lapse of time. Article 226 is an extraordinary remedy and the Petitioner must move within the prescribed period of 90 days for other appeals etc. In the instant case the Writ petition has been filed after a long lapse of 169 days and virtually no explanation had been given for this unusual delay. In the instant case there is no question of the infringement of the fundamental right and therefore the Supreme Court case cited above also does not solve the problem. Even the Supreme Court has also observed that it is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion of the Court has to be exercised not arbitrarily but on the basis of the principle that unless the Court is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for condoning the laches the Court cannot entertain the petition as a matter of course. 10. Next reliance was placed on Sathya Kumar and Others Vs. The state of Andhra Pradesh and Others, AIR 1971 AP 320 . In this case a Division Bench of that Court took the view that if the order complained of is manifestly erroneous or without jurisdiction or affects fundamental rights petition should not be rejected simply on ground of delay. 11. In the instant case there is no question of infringment of the fundamental right and also there is no question of any order being without jurisdiction. Thus this case is also distinguishable on facts. 12. Next reliance was placed on Nav Rattanmal and Others Vs. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704 . 11. In the instant case there is no question of infringment of the fundamental right and also there is no question of any order being without jurisdiction. Thus this case is also distinguishable on facts. 12. Next reliance was placed on Nav Rattanmal and Others Vs. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704 . Dealing with the distinction between claims of Government and claims of individuals, the Supreme Court observed: The generally accepted basis that statutes of limitation are designed to effectuate a beneficent public purpose, viz; to prevent the taking away from one what he has for long been permitted to consider his own on the faith of which he plans his life, habits and expenses, does not militate against there being a rational basis for a distinction being drawn between the claims of the State and the claims of the individual in the matter of a provision of a bar of limitation for enforcing them. In considering this matter two points have to be kept separate: (1) whether a distinction could be drawn or a classification supported between the provision of any variation in the time that should be available for enforcing claims by private individuals and claims by the State (2) whether, if such a classification were good, the period of 60 years provided by Article 149 of the Limitation Act is such a long period of time as to be unreasonable. The fact that in the case of the Government if a claim becomes barred by limitation, the loss falls on the public, i.e. on the community in general, and to the benefit of the private individual who derives advantage by the lapse of time, in itself, would appear to indicate a sufficient ground for differentiating between the claims of an individual and the claims of the community at large. Next it may also be mentioned that in the case of governmental machinery, it is a known fact that it does not move as quickly as in the case of individuals. It is in this background that the question of the special provision in Article 149 has to be viewed. Next it may also be mentioned that in the case of governmental machinery, it is a known fact that it does not move as quickly as in the case of individuals. It is in this background that the question of the special provision in Article 149 has to be viewed. On these principles as well as on the ratio underlying the decisions upholding the validity of the special provisions for the recovery of the Government claims, it must be held that there is a rational basis for treating the Government differently as regards the period of limitation and therefore Article 149 does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. The proposition laid down by the Supreme Court was on the argument raised before the Court that Article 149 of the Limitation Act fixed a period of 60 years for suits by the Government and it was unconstitutional as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court on the ground that there was reasonable basis of classification why a different period of limitation was provided for a suit by the State in Article 149 and it was held that Article 149 was not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court did not hold that while granting the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Court should adopt a different standard. After all the State in a welfare State is as much a litigating party as any other private individual and there is no reason why a different standard should be adopted while condoning the delay in filing the Writ petition. 14. Reliance was also placed on Uayan Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali AIR 1977 SC 2319 . There the question was for the interpretation of Section 12(2) and Explanation of the Limitation Act. We are not concerned with that question in the present case. 15. Lastly, reliance has been placed on an unreported decision of the Division Bench at Lucknow in Special Appeal No. 27 of 1973 (State of U.P. v. Sant Bux) decided on 21st March, 1980. 16. In that case Writ petition was filed after a lapse of seven years and the delay was condoned but that was under special circumstances of the facts of the particular case. A lot of time had been taken in filing the revision. 16. In that case Writ petition was filed after a lapse of seven years and the delay was condoned but that was under special circumstances of the facts of the particular case. A lot of time had been taken in filing the revision. A question of maintainability of the revision arose and the question was referred to a Full Bench. While the revision was pending the U.P. Legislature amended the Indian Forest Act and the revision was transferred to the District Judge. There the jurisdiction of the District Judge to hear the revision was challenged. The Forest Department after losing the Writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 preferred a Special Appeal but on the advise of its legal advisers it withdrew it. Within 90 days from the date of withdrawal of the Special Appeal the Writ petition giving rise to the present Special Appeal was filed. The delay which occurred after the dismissal of the Special Appeal had been explained in the Writ petition and the Court thought it fit to condone the delay in those circumstances of the case. In the opinion of the Division Bench there was sufficient cause. This is not the position here in the present case. 17. For the reasons given above, the Writ petition must fail and it is accordingly dismissed on the ground of laches.