JUDGMENT - MOHTA V., J. : - Whether the legal representatives of a decrased workman can sustain an action under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the “”Act”) is the heart of the question in the present matter. 2. This is how the matter arises. Deceased Sheikh Ibrahim was in the employment of the petitioner since 1946. On 9-3-1971 he died. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 who are respectively the sons and widow of the deceased, moved the Labour Court at Akola under section 33C(2) of the Act for computation in money of the benefit of bonus and gratuity. According to them, there was established practice with the petitioner to make payment of bonus as well as gratuity to every employee. Sheikh Ibrahim was entitled to receive these benefits during his life time. He did not get these benefits and therefore, the said application. 3. Before moving the Labour Court, three notices were issued to the petitioner-employer claiming the benefits. Those notices were not even replied. Right of the legal representatives to move the application and to claim the benefits was disputed in fact as well as in law. Both parties adduced oral evidence. Even the witnesses examined on behalf of the employer did admit in cross-examination that some payment was made to every employee but it was ex-gratia and not by way of gratuity. The employers case was that all this payment was supported by vouchers. However, in the enquiry, those documents were not produced. Certain other workers who had got the gratuity benefits at the rate of 15 days wages for the completed years of service were examined. Taking into consideration all these circumstances and after evaluating the oral evidence on record, the Labour Court recorded a finding of fact that the practice of payment of gratuity as claimed, was established and that the deceased workman was entitled to the same. Claim of bonus, however, was not disputed. One of the questions raised was to the effect that in addition to the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, there were other legal representatives of the deceased and the application was not maintainable in their absence. Those legal representatives are said to be the daughters of the deceased. Claim of bonus, however, was not disputed. One of the questions raised was to the effect that in addition to the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, there were other legal representatives of the deceased and the application was not maintainable in their absence. Those legal representatives are said to be the daughters of the deceased. The Labour Court took precaution to safeguard the interest of the other legal representatives, if any by ordering furnishing of security for the share of those legal representatives in case they made any claim and raised a dispute. However, on the point of maintainability of the application in their absence, the finding was in favour of respondents Nos. 2 to 4. 4. Before dealing with the principal question of law raised in tho present petition, we will dispose of the relatively minor points involved in this case. One is that the finding about practice of payment of gratuity is so perverse that it needs interference even in the writ jurisdiction. We may state at the outset that we do not agree with this proposition. The finding is purefy of fact and in our view correctly recorded. 5. The next point is about the absence of the daughters of the deceased and so also about the absence of succession certificate, as contemplated under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act. It may be stated that the restriction imposed in terms of section 306 of the Indian Succession Act operates only upon the Courts and not upon Tribunals like the Labour Court. Moreover, the daughters have so far made no grievance in the matter and their interest have been safeguarded by the Labour Court even in the unlikely event of any grievance made by them or any dispute having been arisen between the legal representatives. Considering all these aspects, we do not think that interference in the order passed by the Labour Court is called for even on this account. 6. This takes us to the principal question raised before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Potey. Argument is that only a workman during his lifetime can file an application under section 33C(2) of the Act and that the legal representatives have no place in the scheme of the said provisions even if the right had accrued to the deceased workman during his lifetime. Argument is that only a workman during his lifetime can file an application under section 33C(2) of the Act and that the legal representatives have no place in the scheme of the said provisions even if the right had accrued to the deceased workman during his lifetime. Support to this line of reasoning is taken from the terminology used in the relevant section 33(c) of the Act itself. This is how it reads: “33C(1). Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, the workman him self or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery or money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due. it shall issue a certificate for that account to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant bad sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government.” 7. Plain reading of these two sub-sections does create an impression that whereas there is a reference to the assignees and legal representatives of the deceased workman in sub-section (1), such reference is conspicuously o absent in sub-section (2). Plain reading of these two sub-sections does create an impression that whereas there is a reference to the assignees and legal representatives of the deceased workman in sub-section (1), such reference is conspicuously o absent in sub-section (2). However, on deeper consideration of the whole object of the Act, the basic difference between the two sub-sections, even if the plain language used and the rules framed under the Act, it seems to us clear that application under section 33C(2) of the Act at the behest of the legal representatives is as much maintainable as an application under section 33C(1) of the Act. 8. These are our reasons for arriving at this conclusion. It will have to be noticed that whereas under section 33C(1) of the Act money due under a settlement or an award can be recovered by approaching the appropriate Government, under section 33C(2), it is the entitlement to receive money or the benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money which is first to be adjudicated upon by the Labour Court and thereafter the amount can he recovered from the same authority and in the manner provided in the first sub-section. Relevant provision is section 33C(4) of the Act. 9. These two sub-sections are brought on Statute Book for achieving the object of speedy remedy and recovery of money due from an employer by the employee. The legislative intention is clear not only from the general object of the Act but also from the head note above this section. The worker who is generally poor neither can withstand the proverbial delay in the regular civil Court nor can afford to pay the heavy costs. The only difference between the two sub-sections lies in the fact that whereas for getting the adjudicated amount, it is the first sub-section which can be pressed into service; for getting adjudication and quantification of the benefits and its computation in money, it is the next sub-section which has to be utilised. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to assume that the Legislature ever intended that the legal representatives will have right only in the first instance and shall have no such right in the second instance. In our view, it will be doing violence to the object and scheme of the Act to read these two sub-sections in isolation. In our view they overlap each other. In our view, it will be doing violence to the object and scheme of the Act to read these two sub-sections in isolation. In our view they overlap each other. Even on the first principles and the Jain language used in the section, it seems clear to us that in section 33C(2) reference is to the vested right of the workman to get adjudication and quantification of benefits in the Labour Court and to get a certificate to be utilised for subsequent recovery in terms of section 33C(1). It may also be seen that sub-section(2) is silent about the person or persons at whose instance the application is to be made whereas such a reference is learly in existence in sub-section(1). 10. No doubt, reference to legal heirs or assignee was missing in section 33-C(1) of the Act as it stood before amendment by Act 36 of 1964. It is also true that no such amendment is made in the sub-section following. From this, however, we do not locate any stress of legislative intention in support of the theory that legal representatives are excluded from getting adjudication and quantification in terms of section 33-C(2), though the workman had acquired such vested right. This right and cause of action involved is obviously capable of survival even after his death and does not fall within the exceptional category of those rights, which die with the person. If this is the correct position, taking a different view of the matter, will lead to absurd and unjust result and present unsurmountable difficulty before the helpless legal heirs. It will be too much to assume that though object of those sub-sections is the same, in one case, speedy remedy was intended to be made available and in the other it was intended to be excluded, only because of the circumstances that after the accrual of the cause of action, the workman is dead. Reason for not amending section 33C(2) of the Act is obvious. It essentially lies in the different terminology used in two different sub. sections and in the fact that contrary to section 33C(1), section 33C(2) makes no reference to the person at whose instance the application has to be made. 11. Reason for not amending section 33C(2) of the Act is obvious. It essentially lies in the different terminology used in two different sub. sections and in the fact that contrary to section 33C(1), section 33C(2) makes no reference to the person at whose instance the application has to be made. 11. It is now well settled that proceedings under section 33C of the Act are in the nature of execution and that even an ex-workman is deemed to be included in the term “workman” utilized in the section in spite of the fact that it is not so defined in the terms of section 2(S) of the Act. In the case of [ National Buildings Construction Corporation Ltd v. Pritam Singh Gill]1 A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1579, it has been held that the term “workman” used in section 33C(2) includes all persons whose claim requiring computation is in respect of their existing right arising from his relationship of a master and servant. The use of the word “due” in section 33C(2) of the Act is also not without significance. The mere fact that either the worker bas died or that his services are terminated after the amount had become due and the cause of action had arisen, cannot in our view, adversely affect the already accrued vested right. 12. The ultimate view that we are taking is also supported by a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of [Sirabai Naruna Pujari v. Auto Engineers]2 1972 (1) Lab. L.J. 290 , though for different reasons. Shri Potey, however, contends that this decision needs reconsideration specially because the relative position of section 33C(1) and C(2) and the fact that in the year 1964, Legislature chose only to amend one sub-section, has not been considered in the said decision. Our attention was also invited to some decisions of the other High Courts in which not only a different view is taken but the decision in Sitabais case has been disapproved. In fairness to the learned counsel, it will have to be said that he also brought to our notice a decision ot the Patna High Court which in substance, though again for different reasons, has taken the view that we are taking. It is a case of [Jharia Fire Bricks (Private) Ltd. v. Sri Brige Nath Sharma]3 1977 Lab and Indus. Cases 1385. 13. It is a case of [Jharia Fire Bricks (Private) Ltd. v. Sri Brige Nath Sharma]3 1977 Lab and Indus. Cases 1385. 13. We will first make reference to a decision of Delhi High Court in the case of [Yad Ram v. Labour Court]4 1974 (2) Lab. L.J. 306. In this decision Sitabais case has been considered and disapproved mainly because according to the High Court, the decision of the Bombay High Court is based chiefly on permissiveness of the forms under the Rules and not on the difference in the phraseology of the two sub-sections. It appears that Full Bench of the Punjab High Court was also constituted to resolve these controversies because of difference of opinion which prevailed in the same High Court on the subject. 14. In the case of [General Manager, Northern Railways, New Delhi v. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Labour Court]5 1979 Lab. and Indus. Cases 995 (F.B.)., the majority opinion in Punjab High Court followed Delhi High Court view and disapproved of the Bombay High Court view. The reason for disagreeing with the Bombay view is almost the same. We were also taken through the case of [Boramani Naik v. Management, Samaj]6 1978 Lab. and Indus. Cases 1630, decided by Orissa High Court. In this case also, reasoning adopted by the Delhi High Court was followed. That decision in the Haramanis case, in our view, has taken the point too far. In that case, it was the workman who had presented the application under section 33C(2) of the Act and during the pendency of the said proceedings, he died. Legal representatives applied for being joined and this prayer was rejected holding that even if a workman died during the pendency of the proceedings, the legal representatives have no right to continue with the cause of action, which dies along with the workman. We are in disagreement with the view that has been taken by these High Courts and we say this with utmost regard. 15. Now there is no manner of doubt that in Sitabais case reference has been made to certain rules and forms under the Act. Section 38 of the Act empowers the Central as well as the State Governments to frame appropriate rules. 15. Now there is no manner of doubt that in Sitabais case reference has been made to certain rules and forms under the Act. Section 38 of the Act empowers the Central as well as the State Governments to frame appropriate rules. In terms of sub-section (5) of section 38 of the Act, it is mandatory lor the respective Legislative Houses which have been given power either to approve of those rules or to disapprove them partially or wholly. These rules are called “Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, or the “(Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957.” Rule 62 is the relevant rule under the Central Rules which prescribes Form K-l to be used by the workman and Form K-2 tor the use of legal representatives for presenting an application under section 33C(1) of the Act. Form K-1 was the only form prescribed for an application under section 33C(2) and it did appear on perusal of the said form that no provision io the form for making an application at the behest of either the legal representative or the assignee was made. On the basis of this difference in the forms, the Labour Court deciding Sitabais case, came to the conclusion that there was no scope for legal representatives to present an application under sub-section (2). 1 his reasoning of the Labour Court was blasted by the Division Bench of High Court in Sitabats case on reasoning that the forms were not at all compulsory and the application was tenable even if not in a prescribed form. Bombay High Court had taken a different view in the matter than it was taken in the case of [U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Meena Chatterji]7 (1969) 36 F.J.R. 308. 16. It seems to us that the Division Bench of this Court probably had in mind that normally it is not permissible to narrow down the import of the statute with reference to the rules etc. However, is may be stated that it is an accepted cannon of interpretation of Statute that in case of doubt and the two possible construction of Statute, the terminology used in the rules and the form prescribed can be looked into tor the light. However, is may be stated that it is an accepted cannon of interpretation of Statute that in case of doubt and the two possible construction of Statute, the terminology used in the rules and the form prescribed can be looked into tor the light. Keeping this principle in view, and even accepting the reasoning of the other High Courts that rules could be taken into consideration for construction of a Statute, it seems to us that we are fortified in the view that we are taking specially because of the specific amendment to Rule 62 of the Central Rules brought about by the Industrial Disputes (Central), (First Amendment) Rules, 1977, which has also prescribed new Form K-4 for the use of the legal representatives of the deceased for making an application under section 33C(2) of the Act. Amended rule 62 reads as under: “62. Application for recovery of dues- (1) Where any money is due from an employer to a workman or a group of workman under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, (Chapter VB) the workman or the group of workmen, as the case may be, may apply in Form K-1 for the recovery of the money due: Provided that in the case of a person authorised in writing by the workman, or in the case of the death of the workman the assignee or heir of the deceased workman, the application shall be made in Form K-2. (2) Where any workman or a group of. workmen is entitled o receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the workman or the group of workmen, as the case may be, may apply to the specified Labour Court in Form K-3 for the determination of the amount due, or, as the case may be, the amount at which such benefit should be computed. Provided that in the case of death of a workman, application shall be made in Form K-4 by the assignee or heir of the deceased workman. 17. Perusal of Form K-4 will show that it has been placed at par with Form K-2 which is meant for utilization of the legal representatives of the deceased in an action under section 33C(1) of the Act. 18. 17. Perusal of Form K-4 will show that it has been placed at par with Form K-2 which is meant for utilization of the legal representatives of the deceased in an action under section 33C(1) of the Act. 18. It appears to us that this aspect of the matter and the specific change in the rule was not placed for consideration before any of the High Courts though some of the matters have been decided subsequent to the amendment. 19. Thus, this amendment not only clears the doubt if at all it was there about the rights of the deceased workman to move the Labour Court under section 33C(2) of the Act but also shatters the whole basis upon which the edifice of the contrary view taken by the High Courts and various submissions advanced before us was built up We, therefore, do not think that any case for referring the question to Full Bench exists. 20. To conclude, therefore, the present petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----