JUDGMENT S. J. Hyder, J. -The counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellants, who have lost from the two courts below, has raised a number of pleas, which would appear from this judgment. However, the plea which requires some reflection is the plea based on Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. Two cross-suits were filed before the Court of Munsif, Gohana District Ghazipur. One of the said suits being suit No. 2070 of 1957 was filed by defendant-respondent 2 in the present second appeal. He alleged that parties were resident of village Konthi Zafarpur in the district of Azamgarh. He had persuaded the quondam zamindar to settle shikmi plots Nos. 3 and 4 of abadi khasra 749 with him before the abolition of zamindari. He further stated that he had built a house on a portion of the said plots and made cattle troughs thereon. According to the allegation made in his plaint the aforesaid plots had vested in him under Section 9 of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. His grievance was that the plaintiff appellant in the present second appeal had made certain cattle troughs in another portion of the said plots and that they had started digging foundation in the said plot and intended to make certain constructions thereon. He has also complained that the plaintiff-appellants of the present second appeal had made a drain in the land in dispute. Accordingly defendant-respondent No. 2 in this second appeal sought the relief for mandatory injunction and possession against the plaintiff-appellants. The said suit No. 2070 of 1957 was contested by the plaintiff-appellants of this second appeal on the ground that the disputed constructions did not lie in shikmi plots as alleged by the defendant respondent No. 2. According to them the land in dispute was joint sehan of the parties. They further asserted that the constructions made by them were old and the suit of the defendant respondent 2 was barred by time and also by the principle of estoppel. 3. The appellants of this second appeal filed another suit No. 2293 of 1957 before the same Munsif. They stated that the land in dispute was joint sehan land of the parties and the defendant-respondents have constructed a house in a portion of the said joint land which was shown by letters 'ABC and D and the land adjacent. thereto. 3. The appellants of this second appeal filed another suit No. 2293 of 1957 before the same Munsif. They stated that the land in dispute was joint sehan land of the parties and the defendant-respondents have constructed a house in a portion of the said joint land which was shown by letters 'ABC and D and the land adjacent. thereto. It was also stated that in making the said constructions the defendant-respondents had blocked the drain of the plaintiff-appellants. They also prayed for relief of demolition and mandatory injunction. The suit was contested only by defendant-respondent 2. He repeated the averments which had been made by him in his plaint in O. S. No. 2070 of 1957. He also pleaded the bar of estoppel and limitation. According to him his house and ahata were old constructions and existed there prior to the abolition of zamindari. He denied that any drain belonging to the plaintiff-appellant existed at the place where his constructions stood. 4. The trial court framed separate issues in the two suits. It however consolidated the two suits with the consent of the parties. In the opinion of the trial court there was no merit in the claim of the plaintiffs of the two suits. In consequence the trial court dismissed the two suits by a common judgment dated 29-8-1966. It may be stated that suit No. 2070 filed by defendant-respondent No. 2 was treated as the leading case and the evidence was recorded in the said suit. The trial court was of the view that the constructions of the parties stood in different portions of the shikmi plots Nos. 3 and 4 of khasra abadi No. 749. It, however, held that the permission of the zamindar relied upon by the defendant-respondent, No. 2 was forged and did not confer any title upon him. It further came to the conclusion that the plaintiff-appellants have also not been able to prove their title to the said shikmi plots but in view of the contentions raised by the parties it was likely that the land in dispute was a joint sehan land of the parties. The issues relating to bar of limitation and estoppel were decided against the plaintiffs in the two suits. 5. Defendant-respondent No. 2 in this second appeal submitted to the decree of the trial court in O. S. No. 2070 of 1957 dismissing his suit. The issues relating to bar of limitation and estoppel were decided against the plaintiffs in the two suits. 5. Defendant-respondent No. 2 in this second appeal submitted to the decree of the trial court in O. S. No. 2070 of 1957 dismissing his suit. Plaintiff-appellants, however, felt aggrieved with the decree of the trial court dismissing their suit No. 2293 of 1957. They accordingly preferred a Civil Appeal No. 142 of 19.67 before the District Judge, Azamgarh (decided) by his judgment and decree dated March 28, 1970. The salient features of the findings recorded by the first court of appeal will be evident from what follows in this judgment. 6. Learned counsel for plaintiff-appellant has strongly urged that since defendant-respondent No. 2 submitted to the decree of the trial court in O. S. No. 2070 of 1957 the said decree operated as res judicata between the parties and the suit of the plaintiff-appellants should have been decreed by the first court of appeal. Similar contention was raised on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant before the court of appeal. Relying on a decision of a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in Jainarain v. Bulaqi Das ( AIR 1969 All 504 : (1968 All LJ 1047)) the said court did not accept it. 7. Learned counsel has, however, urged that the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jai Narain (supra) required reconsideration in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court. 8. Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code embodies the rule of res judicata, or as English lawyers call it. the principle of estoppel by judgment. The said section inter alia provides that if a matter was directly and substantially in issue in a former suit and was finally decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction a subsequent suit concerning the same controversy between the same parties shall neither be entertained nor decided upon in a subsequent suit. The principle is based on two maxims of Roman Jurisprudence. The first maxim is to the effect of interest republican ut sit finis lithium which means that it concerns the State that there must be an end to law suits. The other maxim is nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem cause, no man should be vexed twice over for the same facts. The first maxim is to the effect of interest republican ut sit finis lithium which means that it concerns the State that there must be an end to law suits. The other maxim is nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem cause, no man should be vexed twice over for the same facts. Rule of res judicata though posed on ancient precedent lays down a salutary rule of law. In the case of Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin ( AIR 1960 SC 941 ) the Supreme Court has described the principle of res judicata in these terms: "The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to the judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When the matter - whether on a question of fact or a question of law - has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embedded in relation to suits in Section 11 of the C. P. C. but even where Section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for purposes of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct." 9. From what has been stated above it follows that the rule of res judicata, or the principle underlying Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, has for its aim prevention of the trial of suits about matters which have already been adjudicated between the parties. The principle underlying the section gives effect to rule of convenience and safeguards rights of a party who has already obtained a decision against the other party from a court of law m regard to the same controversy. It is nevertheless to be borne in mind that the rule of res judicata does not give effect to any principle of absolute justice. It is nevertheless to be borne in mind that the rule of res judicata does not give effect to any principle of absolute justice. This makes it necessary for the courts to be wary before throwing out a suit on the ground that it was barred by Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is only when the principles embodied in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code are strictly attracted to the facts of a case that the Court would refuse to adjudicate upon a subsequent suit. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants submitted that the question that the dispute between the parties in these two suits to which reference has been made related to different portions of shikmi plots Nos. 3 and 4, khata khasra No. 749 is of no consequence for the application of Section 11, Civil P. C. He submitted that the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigation's and not the identity of the actual property involved. In support of the contention reliance was placed on Raj Laxmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33 and Ram Gobinda v. Bhaktabala. AIR 1971 SC 664 . The principle con- tended for by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is well established in law and has not been disputed, on behalf of the defendant-respondent No. 2. But the question which has to be answered in this second appeal is, however, wholly different. The court of appeal relying on the case of Jai Narain (1968 All LJ 1047) (FB) (supra) has held that the result of consolidating the two suits was to combine the controversies therein into a single controversy and a single proceeding. Since the common judgment in the proceeding had been put in jeopardy by being appealed against it cannot be said that the matter was finally decided so as to attract the bar of Section 11, C. P. C. It is the correctness of this view which is sought to be displaced on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants. 11. In an attempt to meet this situation counsel for the plaintiff-appellants has placed strong reliance on Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kumar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 : (1966 All LJ 578), Lonankutty v. Thomman, AIR 1976 SC 1645 , Narayana Prabhu Venkateshwara Prabhu v. Narayan Prabhu Krishna Prabhu, AIR 1977 SC 1268 . 11. In an attempt to meet this situation counsel for the plaintiff-appellants has placed strong reliance on Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kumar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 : (1966 All LJ 578), Lonankutty v. Thomman, AIR 1976 SC 1645 , Narayana Prabhu Venkateshwara Prabhu v. Narayan Prabhu Krishna Prabhu, AIR 1977 SC 1268 . None of the decisions however cited on behalf of plaintiff-appellants help the contention advanced on their behalf or tend to weaken the authority of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Jai Narains case (supra). 12. The law on the question of res judicata which has bearing on the controversy in this second appeal was considered by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mst. Lachhmi v. Mst. Bhulli, (AIR 1927 Lah 289). Tekchand, J. speaking for the Court formulated the following question for decision:- "Where two suits having a common issue are by consent of parties or by order of the Court, tried together, the evidence being written in one record both suits disposed of by a single judgment, can it be said that there have been two distinct and independent trials?." 13. The question was answered in the negative and it was held that res judicata is either estoppel by verdict or estoppel by judgment and there is no such thing as estoppel by decree. The above principle laid down by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court was approved by the Supreme Court in the case Narhari v. Shankar, AIR 1953 SC 419 . It may however be stated that a contrary view has been taken n Manohar Vinayak v. Laxman Anand Rao, AIR 1947 Nag 248. In the case of Sheodan Singh (supra) the Supreme Court noted this divergence and held that the controversies which arose before the Lahore High Court and the Nagpur High Court were wholly different from the controversy before the Supreme Court. In the result the decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court was distinguished by the Supreme Court. It may be stated that the case of Sheodan Singh (1966 All LJ 578) was brought to the notice of the Full Bench of this Court in Jai Narains case (1968 All LJ 1047) (supra) and has been fully discussed by it. 14. The case of Lonankutty ( AIR 1976 SC 1645 ) is also distinguishable. It may be stated that the case of Sheodan Singh (1966 All LJ 578) was brought to the notice of the Full Bench of this Court in Jai Narains case (1968 All LJ 1047) (supra) and has been fully discussed by it. 14. The case of Lonankutty ( AIR 1976 SC 1645 ) is also distinguishable. In that case the respondent to the appeal had filed a suit against the appellant Lonankutty. Much after the commencement of the said suit Lonankutty filed another cross-suit against respondent of the appeal before the Supreme Court. On account of the time lag in filing of the two suits each of them was decided separately by two different judgments pronounced on distinct dates. It was in these circumstances that the principle laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Jai Narains case (1968 All LJ 1047) (supra) was not applied by the Supreme Court. This case also affords no assistance to the plaintiff-appellants. The case of Narain Prabhu Venkateshwara ( AIR 1977 SC 1268 ) is also distinguishable. In fact in the said case their Lordships extracted and approved a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Narhari v. Shankar ( AIR 1953 SC 419 ) (supra) in which the Supreme Court in its turn had approved the decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore Court in Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhulli (AIR 1927 Lah 289) (supra). It may also be noticed that in the case of Narain Prabhu Venkateshwara their Lordships were concerned with two separate judgments which come in one continuation but under different headings. 15. From the above discussion the principles which emerge may now be summarised. The test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigation's and not the identity of the actual property involved. The result of consolidating two suits was to combine the controversies in the two suits into a single controversy and a single proceeding. Res judicata is either estoppel by verdict or estoppel by judgment and there is no such thing as estoppel by decree. The result of consolidating two suits was to combine the controversies in the two suits into a single controversy and a single proceeding. Res judicata is either estoppel by verdict or estoppel by judgment and there is no such thing as estoppel by decree. When the suits which have been consolidated are decided by a common judgment and an appeal is preferred against the said judgment, though one in one suit only, the entire judgment is placed in jeopardy and the matter cannot be said to have been finally decided so as to attract the bar of Section 11, C. P. C. 16. In view of what has been stated above there is no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants that the decree in their favour should have been passed on the ground that the contention urged on behalf of respondent 2 was barred by Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. 17. Learned counsel next submitted that the first court of appeal has erred in law in not giving any reasons for coming to the conclusion that the drain did not flow at the place claimed by the plaintiff-appellants. It may be stated that on this part of the case the trial court had given a clear and categorical finding with adequate reasons. The first court of appeal was only affirming the said finding and it was not therefore necessary for the said court to give detailed reasons before reaching the conclusion that the finding of the trial court was correct. 18. It was then urged on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants that the trial court had found that the land in dispute was part of the joint sehan land of the parties and on that finding the suit of the plaintiff-appellant should have succeeded. It was further submitted that the first court of appeal was in error in setting aside the said finding. It find no merit in this contention. The trial court rejected the document of permission filed on behalf of the defendant-respondent 2 in support of his title and then held that the only alternative left for it was to concede that the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the land in dispute was joint sehan land of the parties was correct. The first court of appeal rightly held that this approach was erroneous and legally unsustainable. The first court of appeal rightly held that this approach was erroneous and legally unsustainable. The land in dispute could be held to be joint property only on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties. The plaintiff-appellants were not entitled to succeed on this part of their case merely because defendant-respondent 2 had failed to substantiate his title to the said land. The finding recorded by the trial court on the question of the land being joint sehan land of the parties was based on mere surmises and conjectures and was rightly set aside by the first court of appeal. There is no satisfactory evidence on record to support their case of co-ownership. 19. No other argument was urged in support of this appeal which is wholly devoid of merits. 20. The result is that this second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.