JUDGMENT Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.—This writ petition coming up for preliminary bearing, after notice to the respondents, is disposed of by the following order by consent of counsel and after hearing finally. 2. The petitioner who is an Income Tax assessee made disclosure for the years 1973-74 and 1974-75 under the provisions of the Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Act, 1976. It came to be rejected on the sole ground that it was filed beyond the time stipulated in the Act. 3. Thereafter, the assessee filed revised returns for the aforementioned assessment years as well as for the assessment year 1975-76. In this writ petition, we are concerned only with the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75. For those two years, the concerned ITO, namely, the IInd ITO, Raichur, completed the assessment accepting the revised returns. He also proposed action under s. 271(1)(c) of the I. T. Act of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), for concealment of income. Before the proceedings under s. 271(1)(c) commenced, the petitioner assesses moved the respondent-commissioner for relief. 4. Section 273A of the Act specially empowers the Commissioner to reduce or waive the amount of penalty imposed or imposable on a person under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and also to reduce or waive the amount of interest paid or payable under sub-s. (8) of s. 139, or s. 215 or s. 217 of the Act and the penalty imposed or imposable under s. 273 of Act. 5. The petitioner aggrieved by the order rejecting his application by the respondent has approached this court under art. 226 of the Constitution, inter alia, contending that the order is vitiated and liable to be set aside mainly on the ground that the Commissioner had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him in accordance with law and also while exercising the jurisdiction under s. 273A of the Act, the respondent had wrongfully exercised that jurisdiction. 6. 226 of the Constitution, inter alia, contending that the order is vitiated and liable to be set aside mainly on the ground that the Commissioner had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him in accordance with law and also while exercising the jurisdiction under s. 273A of the Act, the respondent had wrongfully exercised that jurisdiction. 6. Sri K. R. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has contended that once the petitioner had satisfied the requirements of the test laid down in sub-clause (b) of s. 273A(1) and the further test prescribed under the provisions following sub-clause (c) of that section, the Respondent Commissioner did not have any alternative but to exercise his jurisdiction either to waive or reduce the penalty and, therefore, in the case on hand the respondent-Commissioner acted contrary to law by rejecting the same on grounds which were extraneous or on grounds which were not germane to the scheme underlying s. 273A of the Act. 7. It is seen from the impugned order of the Commissioner that what has been held against it (the assessee) is that there was rejection of his voluntary disclosure under the special provisions of the 1976 Act where-upon the petitioner revised his returns and even thereafter it took shifting stands by disclosing the income as spread over the three assessment years instead of two years to which the voluntary disclosure related, resulting in considerable loss of revenue to the department. 8. Mahalakshmi Rice Mills V. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka-I. 9. Citation continued from : 1981 1290 ITR 53 10. It is necessary to extract the relevant portion of the impugned order to understand the reasoning of the respondent-Commissioner : "The assessee is a firm which claimed to have made a declaration under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme in December, 1975. However, it was seen that the declaration was received in the Commissioner's office after December 31, 1975, and was, therefore, treated as invalid. In this declaration the assessee had declared Rs. 20,000 each for assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76. Subsequently, after this declaration was treated as invalid by the department, if filed returns of income showing Rs. 40,000 for the assessment years 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76 by indicating Rs. 13,334 for each of the three years. Now, if the declaration had been accepted as valid, the assessee would have to pay Rs. Subsequently, after this declaration was treated as invalid by the department, if filed returns of income showing Rs. 40,000 for the assessment years 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76 by indicating Rs. 13,334 for each of the three years. Now, if the declaration had been accepted as valid, the assessee would have to pay Rs. 12,250 by way of tax besides making investment in bonds as per rules. Had it faithfully filed the returns of income only for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75, the additional demand that would have been raised in the case of firm and partners would have been Rs. 6960. But the assessee did not do so. Instead, he declared an aggregate sum of Rs. 40,000 for the assessment years 1973-74, 1974-75, 1975-76 and got himself assessed accordingly with the result the aggregate tax payable in the case of the firm and partners for these three years came to Rs. 5,242. Thus, here is a case where by not accepting the voluntary disclosure of the assessee, because it was filed late, the department has become a loser to the extent of over Rs. 5,000. The position has been further aggravated because the assessee was not faithful or consistent in its stand, viz., whereas at the time of declaration it took a stand that the income was earned during the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 but at the time of filing of the returns of income it has taken a stand that the income was earned during the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76. In this way it has saved a further sum of about Rs. 2,000 and it is now this assessee who has come before me claiming that it should be given benefit of section 273A of the act by waiving s. 271(1)(c) penalty for these two years." 11. It is patent from the above order that the respondent-Commissioner, had not applied his mind to satisfy himself whether the petitioner had filed the revised returns voluntarily and in good faith and had made a full and true disclosure of the same. He had also not taken into consideration whether or not the assessee co-operated with the department in concluding the assessment after voluntarily revising his return and whether the petitioner assesses had paid the tax or made satisfactory arrangement for the payment of tax. 12. He had also not taken into consideration whether or not the assessee co-operated with the department in concluding the assessment after voluntarily revising his return and whether the petitioner assesses had paid the tax or made satisfactory arrangement for the payment of tax. 12. A Division Bench of this High Court, in deciding the scope of s. 271(4A) of the Act as it then existed and which dealt with the penalties imposable under s. 271(1) of the Act, held that once the conditions laid down in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of s. 271(4A) of the Act were satisfied, the Commissioner had no discretion to refuse to reduce or waive the amount of minimum penalty imposable. The Division Bench further held that there was an obligation cast under s. 271(4A) on the Commissioner to examine the case of the petitioner and satisfy himself as to whether he fully satisfied all the conditions laid down in cls. (a), (b) and (c) and if any of the conditions have not been satisfied, then the Commissioner ought to state as to which condition had not been satisfied [See S. Sannaiah Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore and Another, (1974) 95 ITR 435 KAR. 13. Section 273A of the Act has been introduced by way of amendment in 1975 and came into force on October 1, 1975 and provides for not only the waiver and reduction of penalty under s. 271 but also provides for the waiver or reduction of interest chargeable under some other provisions of the Act. In all other respects it is in pari materia with s. 271(4A) of the Act as it existed. 14. I have already referred to the ingredients about which the Commissioner should satisfy himself before exercising his discretionary jurisdiction under s. 273A. From the portion of the order extracted, it is clear, that the Commissioner did not apply his mind and satisfy himself as to the existence of the ingredients which had relevance to the exercising of jurisdiction under s. 273A, but took after factors extraneous to that section into account in order to exercise his discretion. 15. However, the learned counsel appearing for the revenue strongly contended that it could be inferred from the impugned order that the assessee did not co-operate with the department inasmuch as he took shifting stands. 15. However, the learned counsel appearing for the revenue strongly contended that it could be inferred from the impugned order that the assessee did not co-operate with the department inasmuch as he took shifting stands. By this, the learned counsel apparently means that the voluntary disclosure for the years 1973-74 and 1974-75 came to be spread over 3 assessment years. I am afraid this argument cannot be accepted. Whatever was done under the 1976 Act cannot be said to the germane to any assessment under s. 143(3) read with s. 148 of the Act. Once the disclosure made under the 1976 Act was rejected as barred by time, the Commissioner was not correct in making use of that material to deny the co-operation extended to the ITO in completing the assessment after the revised returns were filed. Nothing has been placed before me to demonstrate that the petitioner assesses did not co-operate with the ITO in completing the assessment. Under s. 273A" co-operation" in any enquiry relating to the assessment should be held to mean that the assessee did not resort to litigation, obstruction or evasive tactics in concluding the assessment and no more. 16. For the above reasons, the argument advanced by the revenue cannot be accepted and having regard to the decision of the Division Bench referred to earlier, the petitioner must succeed. 17. In the result, rule, will issue and the order at annex. "E" to the petition dated July 2, 1979, is set aside with a direction that the Commissioner should pass fresh orders on the application of the petitioner assesses made under s. 273A of the Act for the relevant assessment years in the light of the observation made in this order. 18. There will be no order as to costs.